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Abstract
During the early twentieth century, American cities and suburbs underwent significant change. This
dissertation examines two architectural projects, Rockefeller Center and Broadacre City, that respectively
sought to interpret and intensify competing trends of density and dispersion during the 1930s. Rockefeller
Center was designed by an architectural consortium led by Raymond M. Hood. It began in the late 1920s
as a project for an opera house adjoined by revenue-producing commercial development. After the
October 1929 stock market crash, it became a fourteen-building, office-and-entertainment complex that,
when completed in 1939, manifested an argument unequivocally in favor of urban densification. In the
spring of 1930, Frank Lloyd Wright began promoting Broadacre City as a framework for managing
automobile-induced dispersion. By 1940, he had written several books, given dozens of lectures, and
mounted exhibitions (including at Rockefeller Center) that expanded his original ideas into a robust theory
of socio-spatial change. Amidst the economic convulsions and social upheavals of the 1930s, these two
projects culminated debates about how American cities, the landscapes around them, and the
infrastructures that supported them were being reshaped by skyscrapers and suburbanization.
This dissertation examines these two works with a twofold aim: to reevaluate the terms on which they
have been understood in architectural history and to consider the perceived limits, possibilities, and
conditions of change—social, spatial, territorial, technological, cultural, economic—during a tumultuous
decade in twentieth century history. This dissertation contends that, despite their familiarity in histories of
modern architecture, there are new, critical insights to be gained about Rockefeller Center and Broadacre
City and that those insights can be used to elucidate the role architecture has played in mediating social
change. Considering these two projects together—in dialogue with one another and in the historical
context they shared—shows Rockefeller Center and Broadacre City to be ideal vehicles for understanding
the contours and contingencies of architectural and urban discourse and, more broadly, how metropolitan
America transformed during the Great Depression.
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ABSTRACT
THE SKYSCRAPER AND THE SUBURB: ARCHITECTURE, CAPITALISM,
AND THE AMERICAN METROPOLITAN LANDSCAPE, 1929–1940
Joseph M. Watson, Jr.
Daniel A. Barber
During the early twentieth century, American cities and suburbs underwent significant
change. This dissertation examines two architectural projects, Rockefeller Center and
Broadacre City, that respectively sought to interpret and intensify competing trends of
density and dispersion during the 1930s. Rockefeller Center was designed by an architectural
consortium led by Raymond M. Hood. It began in the late 1920s as a project for an opera
house adjoined by revenue-producing commercial development. After the October 1929
stock market crash, it became a fourteen-building, office-and-entertainment complex that,
when completed in 1939, manifested an argument unequivocally in favor of urban
densification. In the spring of 1930, Frank Lloyd Wright began promoting Broadacre City as
a framework for managing automobile-induced dispersion. By 1940, he had written several
books, given dozens of lectures, and mounted exhibitions (including at Rockefeller Center)
that expanded his original ideas into a robust theory of socio-spatial change. Amidst the
economic convulsions and social upheavals of the 1930s, these two projects culminated
debates about how American cities, the landscapes around them, and the infrastructures that
supported them were being reshaped by skyscrapers and suburbanization.
This dissertation examines these two works with a twofold aim: to reevaluate the terms
on which they have been understood in architectural history and to consider the perceived
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limits, possibilities, and conditions of change—social, spatial, territorial, technological,
cultural, economic—during a tumultuous decade in twentieth century history. This
dissertation contends that, despite their familiarity in histories of modern architecture, there
are new, critical insights to be gained about Rockefeller Center and Broadacre City and that
those insights can be used to elucidate the role architecture has played in mediating social
change. Considering these two projects together—in dialogue with one another and in the
historical context they shared—shows Rockefeller Center and Broadacre City to be ideal
vehicles for understanding the contours and contingencies of architectural and urban
discourse and, more broadly, how metropolitan America transformed during the Great
Depression.
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INTRODUCTION: A PREVIEW OF PROSPERITY
On April 15, 1935, Frank Lloyd Wright was at Rockefeller Center. The architect was
scheduled to broadcast his vision of Broadacre City to the American public as part of the
opening festivities of the 1935 Industrial Arts Exposition, a highly publicized but critically
panned showcase for design wares and consumer goods. The venue was as appropriate as it
was incongruous. Together with the automobile, telephone, and telegraph, Wright
understood radio to be a catalyst for territorial decentralization and, thus, to have made
Rockefeller Center and the urban centralization it exemplified obsolete. He had been
promoting this idea through lectures and publications since 1930, but the large, newly built
model of Broadacre City being debuted on the lower level of the RCA Building transposed
this argument from rhetorical to visual form. The radio broadcast would have conveyed
Wright’s thesis from the depths of Manhattan’s newest largest skyscraper to the firesides of
the American listening public.1 Broadacre City, he would explain, could coordinate and
control the dispersion already reshaping metropolitan America.
Wright never got to deliver his address. He was dropped from NBC’s broadcast
schedule at the last minute.2 In the midst of rehabilitating his public persona after decades of

Rockefeller Center’s architects and public relations team were always keen to point out that, while the
Empire State Building was taller than the RCA Building (102 floors or 1,250 feet vs. 66 floors or 850 feet), the
centerpiece of Rockefeller Center was larger (2,666,500 square feet vs. 2,707,400 square feet). The Equitable
Building had previously been the largest skyscraper in the city, with 1.2 million square feet.
2 After a frustrated attempt to reschedule, Wright did end up delivering an address planned for
Manhattan’s airwaves several weeks later, in June 1935, to a nationally syndicated program aired from
Wisconsin, where the Broadacre models had returned after the Industrial Arts Exposition’s mid-May closing.
Wright’s apprentice Edgar Tafel was stationed at the Industrial Arts Exposition as a guide during the show. He
delivered a three-minute proxy address on RCA affiliate WJZ on April 30th. See Edgar Tafel to Frank Lloyd
Wright, April 29, 1935, microfiche T009B03, Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation Archives (The Museum of
Modern Art | Avery Architectural & Fine Arts Library, Columbia University, New York), hereafter cited as
FLWFA; Tafel to Wright, May 2, 1935, T009B04, FLWFA. In a handwritten margin note on Tafel’s April 29th
telegram, Wright remarked that the “situation [was] so strange.” See also Kathryn Smith, Wright on Exhibit:
Frank Lloyd Wright’s Exhibitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 93.
1
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personal scandal and years of professional frustration, Wright nonetheless published the
original radio transcript, in 1940, as though it had been delivered as planned. The address
embraced the paradox of debuting Broadacre City inside of its architectural antithesis. He
declared to his now imagined listeners,
Out of an experience somewhat extensive in getting organic forms evolved in our
architecture, it is with great hope to make clear an organic form for the Democratic city
of the American future that I have tried to grasp and concretely interpret the whole drift
of great change taking place in and around us, in order to help create a human state
more natural than the one that present cupidity and stupidity will allow. […] So here, in
the entrails of final enormity, Rockefeller Center, New York City, you may see concrete
ideas of a fresh way of life.3
Wright believed that radio was a primary agent of this envisioned change, because it enabled
instantaneous social contact without the need for spatial proximity, which made—or would
have made—the new headquarters of the Radio Corporation of America, towering over
Depression-era midtown Manhattan, the most appropriate site for such a declaration. Radio
was an apt medium for Wright to disseminate his project, but it was also, of course, the raison
d’être for “Radio City.” This apparent conflict between these two works of architecture is the
central focus of this dissertation (figs. 0.1 & 0.2). Wright’s unaired remarks intimated, even if
they did not say so outright, that the intricate wooden model built by his apprentices and
Rockefeller Center’s monolithic slabs of limestone-clad steel made competing claims about
the future of America cities and suburbs and their social, cultural, and economic landscapes.
The 1935 Industrial Arts Exposition, subtitled “A Preview of Prosperity,” might seem to
be little more than a fleeting, if fittingly ironic, meeting of opposing architectural ideologies.

Frank Lloyd Wright, “A New Freedom for Living in America: Broadcast by Mr. Wright at the opening of
the National Exposition of Arts and Industries, Rockefeller Center, New York, April 1935, where the models
of Broadacre City were shown,” The New Frontier: Broadacre City, theme issue of Taliesin 1, no. 1 (October 1940):
36, 35.
3
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This study treats it instead as a crucial episode in the parallel, decade-long development of
two divergent but interrelated efforts to use architecture as a medium through which to
imagine the reconfiguration of metropolitan America. The beginnings of both Broadacre
City and Rockefeller Center can be traced in 1929. They each reached a stage of completion
in 1940, although they both also continued to evolve after World War II. The encounter
between the two projects in 1935, at the midpoint of their shared timelines, hints at the two
primary objectives of this dissertation. One is concerned with reevaluating the terms on
which they have each been understood in architectural history. The other uses these two
projects to consider what were the perceived limits, possibilities, and conditions of change—
social, spatial, territorial, technological, cultural, economic—during a tumultuous decade in
twentieth century history. By studying these two projects together, this dissertation contends
that, despite their familiarity in histories of modern architecture, there are new, critical
insights to be gained. It also uses the projects to argue, in a larger sense, that architecture
helped to structure—rather than merely reflect—“the whole drift of great change” during
the 1930s, to borrow Wright’s words. Using similar means but directed toward different ends,
Broadacre City and Rockefeller Center sought to develop and intensify conditions that were
beginning to transform American cities and their suburbs by 1929.
At face value, there would seem to be little commending these two projects for
comparative analysis, aside from their contemporaneity and one month-long exhibition.
Broadacre City was steeped in Wright’s often hyperbolic, utopian rhetoric, while Rockefeller
Center’s Associated Architects—a consortium of L. Andrew Reinhard and Henry
Hofmeister, Raymond M. Hood and J. André Fouilhoux, and Harvey Wiley Corbett and
Wallace K. Harrison—rationalized their work in terms of profit-motivated pragmatism.
3

Broadacre City existed, as Wright often liked to say, “everywhere and nowhere,” an idea
communicated through a twelve-by-twelve-foot model and several hundred pages of text,
while Rockefeller Center manifested in a collection of office towers, radio and television
studios, theaters, shops, and privately-owned-public spaces constrained by the Manhattan
gridiron. Yet, considering these two projects together, in dialogue with one another and in
light of the historical context that they shared, shows them to be ideal vehicles for
understanding the contours and contingencies of architectural and urban discourse and,
more broadly, of social change in America during the Great Depression.
The merits of considering these two projects side-by-side can be glimpsed in the way
that the team responsible for Rockefeller Center discussed their work, which, like Wright’s,
aspired to “democratic” ideals. The Center had its beginnings in a late-1920s plan to relocate
and upgrade the Metropolitan Opera’s facilities. This original scheme was superseded in the
months after the 1929 stock market crash by the three-block, fourteen-building office-andentertainment complex that was still under construction when Wright exhibited his models
there in 1935. As the project evolved from “Metropolitan Square” into “Radio City,” its
architects and managers embraced the same technologies on which Wright premised
Broadacre City, but they understood them to be agents of densification rather than
dispersion. Automobiles, radios, and telephones allowed people to commute further and
communicate better, but as Raymond Hood argued in a January 1932 Architectural Forum
article, “Decentralization means loss of time and inconvenience.” Rockefeller Center, he
clarified, “has been founded upon the principle that concentration in a metropolitan area for
business reasons is a desirable condition. We are aware that many oppose that view.”4
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Raymond M. Hood, “The Design of Rockefeller City,” Architectural Forum 56, no. 1 (January 1932): 7.
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A clue to the “democratic” ambitions underlying Rockefeller Center’s densifying thesis
can be found in a 1932 “Thematic Synopsis” that served as a preliminary guide to the
Center’s arts program.5 The document outlined an overarching theme and provided detailed
recommendations for the individual artworks that would embellish the complex’s lobbies,
façades, and outdoor spaces. Collectively, these murals and sculptures would transfigure
“Rockefeller City,” as the project was then known, into
the first clear expression in our economic life of a new social ideal, that is, of human
welfare and happiness as centering in the work that we do, and not in some
incidental wage: if a whole population, such as Rockefeller City will possess, can be
lifted into a finer life in their working hours, then the economic democracy of
America will have begun its answer to the Bolshevist challenge.6
Of course, Rockefeller Center’s architects and managers would inadvertently commission
a kind of “Bolshevist challenge” when they hired Diego Rivera to paint a massive mural of
“Man at the Crossroads” on the lobby wall of the RCA Building.7 But, the more immediate
question that arises from the foregoing passage concerns the “economic democracy” that
Rockefeller Center purported to make manifest. How was it that Broadacre City and

5 See [Henry Hofmeister et al], “Thematic Synopsis (1930),” Specifications for The Rockefeller Center
Development: Radio City – New York, N.Y. (N.p., n.p., ca. 1934), 1–32. The table of contents in the copy of a 1934
specification book held by Columbia University’s Avery Library Drawings & Archives gives a date of 1930 for
the “Thematic Synopsis.” Correspondence in the collections of the Rockefeller Archive Center indicates that
no serious thought was given to decorative schemes until at least May 1931. For the earliest extant mention of
the decorative schemes, see John D. Rockefeller, III, to Dr. George E. Vincent, May 12, 1931, folder 511, box
68, series C, Business Interests (FA312), Office of the Messrs. Rockefeller records (OMR), Rockefeller Archive
Center (RAC). Additional correspondence, mostly dating from early 1932, as well as other drafts of the
“Thematic Synopsis,” mostly undated, can be found in b93, f704, series C, OMR, RAC.
6 Ibid., 4.
7 This episode is explored in chapter 4. In what follows, the names of individual buildings at Rockefeller
Center are usually those by which they were known during the 1930s. Thus, the physical and conceptual
fulcrum of the project—referred to in the earliest plans as Building No. 1 and in subsequent years as the GE
Building, the Comcast Building, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, or simply 30 Rock—is here called the RCA Building. For
a drawing of the complex that includes the different names that the buildings have taken over the years, see
Daniel Okrent, Great Fortune: The Epic of Rockefeller Center (New York: Viking, 2003), viii–ix.
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Rockefeller Center could both offer visions of “democracy” when the aims of the two
projects appeared to be so obviously opposed?

Part of the problem lies in understanding that for neither Wright nor the Rockefeller
Center architects did “democracy” signify a representational form of government or a
striving toward socio-political egalitarianism. On different terms in each project, democracy
functioned as a sublimated way of talking about capitalism. Before exploring this further,
though, it is necessary to observe that another part of the problem is that the existing
literature on Rockefeller Center and Broadacre City does not offer much common ground
on which to compare the two projects. For authors as varied as Rem Koolhaas, Carol
Krinsky, Manfredo Tafuri, and Winston Weisman, the last of whom authored the first
extended historical study of the project in 1942, Rockefeller Center has been understood as
an aggrandizement of the conditions that produced so many skyscrapers in cities like New
York during the 1920s.8 Meanwhile, Broadacre City has been treated by Giorgio Ciucci,
Robert Fishman, and Neil Levine, among many others, as an unequivocal rejection of those
conditions in the name of territorial dispersion and romantic individualism.9 On top of this

8 See Rem Koolhaas, Delirious New York: A Retroactive Manifesto for Manhattan (orig. 1978; New York: The
Monacelli Press, 1994), chap. 4; Carol Herselle Krinsky, Rockefeller Center (New York: Oxford University Press,
1978); Manfredo Tafuri, “The Disenchanted Mountain: The Skyscraper and the City,” in The American City:
From the Civil War to the New Deal, tr. Barbara Luigia La Penta (orig. 1979; Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press,
1983), 389–503. Winston Weisman provided the first historical account of the Center in “The Architectural
Significance of Rockefeller Center” (Ph.D. diss., The Ohio State University, 1942). Weisman never published
his dissertation, but he did excerpt from it in “The Way of the Price Mechanism: The Rockefeller Centre,”
Architectural Review 108, no. 648 (Dec 1950): 399–406; “Who Designed Rockefeller Center?,” Journal of the Society
of Architectural Historians 10, no. 1 (March 1951): 11– 17; “Slab Buildings,” Architectural Review 111, no. 662 (Feb
1952): 119–23; “The First Landscaped Skyscraper,” Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians 18, no. 2 (May
1959): 54–59. See also Alan Balfour, Rockefeller Center: Architecture as Theater (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978);
Fredric Jameson, “The Brick and the Balloon: Architecture, Idealism and Land Speculation,” New Left Review
228 (March/April 1998), reprinted in The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on Postmodernism, 1983–1998 (New York
& London: Verso, 1998), 162–89.
9 See Giorgio Ciucci, “The City in Agrarian Ideology and Frank Lloyd Wright: Origins and Development
of Broadacres,” in The American City, 293–375; Robert Fishman, Urban Utopias in the Twentieth Century: Ebenezer
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is the historiographic disparity between Wright and Rockefeller Center’s architects. To gauge
the degree to which Hood and his colleagues have receded into relative obscurity while
Wright has come to occupy an outsized position in twentieth century history, one need only
compare the library shelf space given over to Wright’s life and work—the University of
Pennsylvania library catalogue includes 429 works under the subject heading, “Wright, Frank
Lloyd, 1867–1959”—with the two lackluster biographies of Hood, the single monograph
devoted to Wallace Harrison, and the two unpublished masters theses on Harvey Wiley
Corbett.10
Within discourse on modern architecture and urbanism, the projects typically become
ciphers for unrelated concerns. Since Siegfried Giedion’s treatment of the project in Space,
Time and Architecture (1941), Rockefeller Center has been understood as a fitful attempt to
assimilate Beaux-Arts planning with European modernism, which has led scholars to
understand it as the culmination of one era—defined by the eclectically styled skyscrapers of
the Roaring Twenties—or the precursor of a new one—typified by more assuredly
modernist midcentury office buildings and urban renewal—or both.11 Broadacre City, by
Howard, Frank Lloyd Wright, and Le Corbusier (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1982), part II; Fishman,
“Megalopolis Unbound,” Wilson Quarterly 14, no. 1 (Winter 1990): 24–45; Neil Levine, The Urbanism of Frank
Lloyd Wright (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), chap. 6; Levine, The Architecture of Frank Lloyd Wright
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 220–22. See also Anthony Alofsin, “Broadacre City: The
Reception of a Modernist Vision,” Modernist Visions and the Contemporary American City, theme issue of Center: A
Journal for Architecture in America 5 (Austin: Center for the Study of American Architecture, School of
Architecture, University of Texas, 1989), 8–43; John Sergeant, Frank Lloyd Wright’s Usonian Houses: Designs for
Moderate Cost One-Family Homes (New York: Whitney Library of Design, 1976), chap. 4.
10 See Walter H. Kilham, Jr., Raymond Hood, Architect: Form through Function in the American Skyscraper (New
York: Architectural Book Publishing, 1973); Robert A. M. Stern and Thomas P. Catalano, Raymond M. Hood
(New York: Rizzoli and the Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies, 1982); Victoria Newhouse, Wallace K.
Harrison, Architect (New York: Rizzoli, 1989); Betsy H. Bradley, “New Heights in American Architecture: The
Urban Design and Aesthetic Theories of Harvey Wiley Corbett” (M.S. thesis, Columbia University, 1990); Paul
D. Stoller, “The Architecture of Harvey Wiley Corbett” (M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1995).
11 See Siegfried Giedion, Space, Time and Architecture: The Growth of a New Tradition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1941), 569–80. See also Mardges Bacon, “Rockefeller Center: Modernist Paradigm for the
Urban Core,” in Therese O’Malley and Joachim Wolschke-Bulmahn, eds., Modernism and Landscape Architecture,
1890–1940 (Washington, D.C.: National Gallery of Art, 2015), 280–308; William H. Jordy, American Buildings
and Their Architects: The Impact of European Modernism in the Mid-Twentieth Century (Garden City, NY: Doubleday,
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contrast, has been treated as a reaction against Le Corbusier’s urbanism and a precursor to
post-World War II suburban sprawl, but many analyses still, as George R. Collins
characterized his own 1961 study, “try to describe how and why it arose and flourished in the
mind of the artistic genius who conceived it.”12 The argument developed over the following
chapters diverges from much of the existing literature on both projects. A central concern
of this dissertation is to show that Rockefeller Center and Broadacre City emerged from a
shared context and used similar means to achieve different ends. Both projects were deeply
rooted in debates about how American cities, the landscapes around them, and the
infrastructures that supported them were being reshaped by skyscrapers and
suburbanization; about how innovations like automobiles and radio might ameliorate or
exacerbate the social, cultural, and economic effects of those changes; and about how
architecture could be used to mediate them. Elaborating the three concepts in the subtitle of
this dissertation—architecture, capitalism, and the American metropolitan landscape—helps
to clarify this approach.
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1972), chap. 1; Reinhold Martin, The Organizational Complex: Architecture, Media, and Corporate Space (Cambridge,
MA: The MIT Press, 2003), 85–90; Elihu Rubin, Insuring the City: The Prudential Center and the Postwar Urban
Landscape (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 11–12, 20–22, 63–64.
12 George R. Collins, “Broadacre City: Wright’s Utopia Reconsidered,” in Four Great Makers of Modern
Architecture: Gropius, Le Corbusier, Mies van der Rohe, Wright, A verbatim record of a symposium held at the School of
Architecture from March to May 1961 (New York: Trustees of Columbia University, 1963), 74. On Wright and Le
Corbusier, see Hillary Ballon, “From New York to Bartlesville: The Pilgrimage of Wright’s Skyscraper,” in
Anthony Alofsin, ed., Prairie Skyscraper: Frank Lloyd Wright’s Price Tower (New York: Rizzoli, 2005), 100–11;
Levine, Urbanism, chap. 6. On Wright and post-World War II suburbia, see Alofsin, “Broadacre City,” 36;
Ciucci, “City in Agrarian Ideology,” 362–63; Robert Fishman, Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia
(New York: Basic Books, 1987), 188–89; Peter Hall, Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and
Design in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 290–91; Terence Riley, “The Landscapes
of Frank Lloyd Wright: A Pattern of Work,” in Terence Riley and Peter Reed, eds., Frank Lloyd Wright, Architect,
(New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1994), 96–107; Sergeant, Usonian Houses, 123; and the essays collected
in K. Paul Zygas, ed., Frank Lloyd Wright: The Phoenix Papers, Volume 1: Broadacre City (Phoenix: The Herberger
Center for Design Excellence & The University of Arizona Press, 1995).
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Architecture is here understood to encompass more than just formal, spatial, or aesthetic
issues. While Hood and his colleagues and Wright did concern themselves with these things,
they were also preoccupied with financial, environmental, infrastructural, managerial,
organizational, promotional, and technical matters. Take, for example, L. Andrew Reinhard’s
response to the widespread criticism that greeted the public unveiling of Rockefeller Center’s
design in March 1931. He informed readers of Architectural Record that the much-derided
scheme only “represents the rentable cubage” and had not yet been subjected to “any
architectural treatment.”13 Though Reinhard’s differentiation of logistical from aesthetic
concerns suggests a narrow definition of “architecture” per se, his admission nonetheless
indicates that the Center’s architects understood their professional responsibilities to
encompass both.
The implications of this expanded definition of architecture are twofold. First, it situates
the present study in relation to recent scholarship that has augmented the epistemological
and methodological scope of architectural history. These studies have examined various ways
in which architecture does not simply constitute discrete objects realized as intended in
response to fully formed social realities. Rather, as summarized by the Aggregate
Architectural History Collaborative, works of architecture are “contingent assemblages” that
have “participated in the political, economic, and cultural management of change.”14 Second,

13

281.

L. Andrew Reinhard, “What Is the Rockefeller Radio City?,” Architectural Record 69, no. 4 (April 1931):

14 Daniel M. Abramson et al., introduction to Governing by Design: Architecture, Economy, and Politics in the
Twentieth Century (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012), x. See also Daniel Barber, A House in the Sun:
Modern Architecture and Solar Energy in the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); David Gissen,
Manhattan Atmospheres: Architecture, the Interior Environment, and Urban Crisis (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2014); John Harwood, The Interface: IBM and the Transformation of Corporate Design, 1945–1976
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011); Reinhold Martin, The Urban Apparatus: Mediapolitics and the
City (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016); Joanna Merwood-Salisbury, Chicago 1890: The
Skyscraper and the Modern City (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); Felicity Scott, Architecture or Techno-
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and related to the first, this helps to overcome one of the obvious discrepancies between
Broadacre City and Rockefeller Center, namely, that one was a rhetorical construct that
became a plywood model while the other was a group of buildings that got built. In what
follows, both projects are treated in similar terms—less as singular, self-contained
architectural objects and more as collections of events staged across diverse media. The
following chapters detail the material contexts in which the two projects were developed; the
journal articles, books, exhibitions, public lectures, and radio broadcasts (even mismanaged
ones) through which they were disseminated; the ways in which they materialized; and the
discursive milieu in which they were received. In addition to revealing conceptual
congruencies between the two projects, this approach also shows that, in the production of
architecture, frustration and contingency are as significant as architects’ intentions, that
organizational strategies are at least as important as spatial forms.
Such an approach to architecture leads necessarily to considerations of capitalism. This is
because, broadly, the foregoing treatment of architecture understands it as something that
actively mediates the production of institutions like the economy, but also because, more
specifically, Rockefeller Center and Broadacre City were both conceived as critical
interventions in American industrial capitalism. This is most obvious in their shared point of
origin. Both projects began in the months before the October 1929 stock market crash.
They were not conceived in response to the ensuing global depression, as some scholars of
Broadacre City have claimed.15 But the tumult of the 1930s—the collapse of financial
institutions; the destabilization of commerce and industry; the economic and ecological

Utopia: Politics after Modernism (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2007); Carol Willis, Form Follows Finance:
Skyscrapers and Skylines in New York and Chicago (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1995).
15 See, for example, Alofsin, “Broadacre City,” 8.
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devastation of the Dust Bowl; the rampant rise in unemployment, poverty, and
homelessness; the rise of totalitarianism; and the fitful successes of the New Deal—did
form the context within and against which Rockefeller Center and Broadacre City took
shape. Beyond the acute crisis of the 1930s, however, these projects made assumptions
about capitalism that require it to be understood not as a monolithic, unchanging
phenomenon but as a system of inexorably mutable and unstable relations.
Rockefeller Center and Broadacre City were referendums on the future of American
capitalism. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Harvey Wiley Corbett, Raymond Hood, and Frank Lloyd
Wright were all skeptical of laissez-faire economics. The free market was, for each of them,
an adventitious and wayward institution. For Rockefeller, Corbett, and Hood, the managerial
controls of corporate capitalism provided a more viable alternative. They envisioned an
economy and a city coordinated not by government regulators or the market’s “invisible
hand” but by corporations’ ability to coordinate (or manipulate) markets. Wright was
meanwhile distrustful of anything large-scale and thought that the rampant competition of
the free market subverted possibilities for individual economic self-determination. His ideas
about economic devolution, in which individual agency would be reclaimed in dispersed,
small-scale exchanges, was as at least partly the result of his own financial tribulations during
the professional dry spell that coincided with an otherwise booming 1920s. Rockefeller
Center and Broadacre City used architecture to articulate the different possibilities of a
reconstituted capitalist society. Skyscrapers, gasoline service stations, and other building
types became proxies for competing economic arguments. This is not to say that
relationships between architecture and capitalism in these projects were always direct or
precise, or that building types were nothing more than economic proxies. It is to say that
11

both projects help to elucidate the perceived limits and possibilities of socioeconomic
change at this moment in American history.16
The third and final concept locates considerations of architecture and capitalism in a
more precise historical and geographic context, namely, the early-twentieth-century American
metropolitan landscape. Given its different connotations in architectural and urban history, the
usage of “metropolitan” here requires some clarification. In architectural discourse, authors
usually look to the Großstädte—literally “large cities”—of theorists like Walter Benjamin,
Siegfried Kracauer, and Georg Simmel. These thinkers conceptualized the experiences
enabled or imposed by the overwhelming scale, the frenzied pace, and the novel spaces of
European capitals like Paris and Berlin.17 The relationship between Berlin’s urban crowds and
Simmel’s blasé attitude or between Benjamin’s flâneur and Paris’s shopping arcades has
continued to inform explorations of architecture and cities.18 In urban history, and
The thinking about capitalism and its relationship to architecture here and in what follows have been
informed by Marshall Berman, All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1982); Peggy Deamer, ed., Architecture and Capitalism: 1845 to the Present (London: Routledge, 2014);
David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1989); Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 1990); Jameson, “Architecture and the Critique of Ideology,” in Architecture, Criticism, Ideology,
ed. Joan Ockman (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1985); Reinhold Martin, Utopia’s Ghost: Architecture
and Postmodernism, Again (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 2010); Martin, The Urban Apparatus,
chap. 2; Jonathan Massey, “Risk Design,” Grey Room 54 (Winter 2014): 6–33; Mary McLeod, “Architecture and
Politics in the Reagan Era: From Postmodernism to Deconstructivism,” Assemblage 8 (February 1989): 22–59;
Merwood-Salisbury, Chicago 1890; Louise A. Mozingo, Pastoral Capitalism: A History of Suburban Corporate
Landscapes (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2011); Manfredo Tafuri, Architecture and Utopia: Design and Capitalist
Development, tr. Barbara Luigia La Penta (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1976); Tafuri, The Sphere and the
Labyrinth: Avant-Gardes and Architecture from Piranesi to the 1970s, tr. Pellegrino d’Acierno and Robert Connolly
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1987).
17 See Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, tr. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, MA:
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002); Siegfried Kracauer, The Mass Ornament: Weimar Essays,
ed. and tr. Thomas Y. Levin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Georg Simmel, “The
Metropolis and Mental Life (1903),” in Georg Simmel on Individuality and Social Forms, ed. Donald N. Levine
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 324–39.
18 See, for example, Andrew Benjamin and Charles Rice, eds., Walter Benjamin and the Architecture of Modernity
(Melbourne, AU: re.press, 2009); Gevork Hartoonian, ed., Walter Benjamin and Architecture (London: Routledge,
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(London: Architectural Association, 2011); Tafuri, “Disenchanted Mountain;” Tafuri, The Sphere and the
Labyrinth, especially chap. 6. Though he does not cite these theorists, Koolhaas’s Delirious New York could also
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specifically in recent Americanist scholarship, metropolitan has been used to signify the
political and economic relationships that link center cities to an agglomeration of sometimes
competing suburbs and to the regions that they share. Though most historians still tend to
treat downtowns and suburbs separately, a “metropolitan perspective” clarifies how “the
histories of cities and suburbs are fundamentally intertwined, even as municipal boundaries
kept them politically separate,” as Kevin M. Kruse and Thomas J. Sugrue, editors of The New
Suburban History (2006), have argued.19 With this has come detailed attention to the forms of
prejudice and privilege that have determined who gets to occupy what parts of the
metropolitan landscape and under what conditions. Part of the objective of this study is to
introduce more of the latter understanding of “metropolitan” into architectural discourse,
although it does so critically.
The historiography of metropolitan America has been largely preoccupied with politicoeconomic concerns and almost exclusively focused on the effects of either nineteenthcentury or post-World War II suburbanization.20 This study uses architecture, rather than law
19 Kevin M. Kruse and Thomas J. Sugrue, introduction to The New Suburban History, eds. Kruse and Sugrue
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 6. For studies that treat either suburbia or downtown, see
Dolores Hayden, Building Suburbia: Green Fields and Urban Growth, 1820–2000 (New York: Vintage Books, 2004);
Robert M. Fogelson, Downtown: Its Rise and Fall, 1880–1950 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001);
Fogelson, Bourgeois Nightmares: Suburbia, 1870–1930 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005); Alison Isenberg,
Downtown America: A History of the Place and the People Who Made It (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004);
Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1985). On the “metropolitan perspective” that Kruse and Sugrue advocate, see also Robert Fishman, ed.,
The American Planning Tradition: Culture and Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press &
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); Raymond A. Mohl, “City and Region: The Missing
Dimension in U.S. Urban History,” Journal of Urban History 25, no. 1 (November 1998): 3–21. For critiques of
this methodological approach, see Marc Linder and Lawrence S. Zacharias, Of Cabbages and Kings County:
Agriculture and the Formation of Modern Brooklyn (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1999); Christopher Sellers,
Crabgrass Crucible: Suburban Nature and the Rise of Environmentalism in Twentieth Century America (Charlotte:
University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 12–14.
20 On nineteenth century topics, see Henry C. Binford, The First Suburbs: Residential Communities on the Boston
Periphery, 1815–1860 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985); William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis:
Chicago and the Great West (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1991); Michael Rawson, Eden on the Charles: The
Making of Boston (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010); Mary Corbin Sies, “The City Transformed:
Nature, Technology, and the Suburban Ideal, 1877–1917), Journal of Urban History 14, no. 1 (November 1987):
81–111; Sam Bass Warner, Jr., Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of Growth in Boston, 1870–1900 (Cambridge, MA:
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or politics, as the lens through which to bring the intertwined histories of city centers and
suburbia into focus. It also treats a decade that falls outside of what has become the familiar
terrain of metropolitan history. As indicated above and explored in depth in the following
chapters, Rockefeller Center’s Associated Architects and Frank Lloyd Wright similarly
incorporated skyscrapers, houses, commuter railways, automobile highways, and other
components of the metropolitan landscape as it existed in 1929 into new, markedly different
socio-spatial configurations. If this approach to architecture, capitalism, and the American
metropolitan landscape helps to elucidate previously under-appreciated qualities of
Rockefeller Center and Broadacre City, it can also use these projects to introduce new
dimensions to the fields of architectural and urban history.

The structure of this dissertation examines, first, the shared historical context of
Rockefeller Center and Broadacre City in debates about skyscrapers and suburbanization
during the four decades prior to 1929. Chapters 2 through 5 focus in depth on the parallel
development of the two projects during the 1930s, alternating between them in order to
emphasize their contemporaneity, their sometimes surprising similarities, and their very real
differences. The conclusion briefly considers the transformations of the two projects in the
years after World War II.

Harvard University Press, 1962); Gwendolyn Wright, Building the Dream: A Social History of Housing in America
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1983). For post-World War II histories, see Francesca Russello Ammon,
Bulldozer: Demolition and Clearance of the Postwar Landscape (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016); David M. P.
Freund, Colored Property: State Policy and White Racial Politics in Suburban America (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2007); Kevin M. Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2005); Matthew D. Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2014); Sara Stevens, Developing Expertise: Architecture and Real Estate in Metropolitan
America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016); Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and
Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). In a different (British) context and
with other (literary) concerns, see also Raymond Williams, The Country and the City (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1973).
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Since existing scholarship on Rockefeller Center and Broadacre City does not offer much
of a foundation for comparative analysis, Chapter 1 reconstructs the conditions from which
the projects emerged. It examines works of architecture that shaped metropolitan America,
materially and discursively, in the forty years before 1929, showing in particular the influence
of Frank Lloyd Wright, Harvey Wiley Corbett, and Raymond M. Hood—the latter two
representative of Rockefeller Center’s Associated Architects—during those decades. Wright’s
work in the suburbs of Chicago around the turn of the twentieth century, a 1913
competition entry for a suburban neighborhood, and a 1927 design for a gasoline service
station are considered alongside Harvey Wiley Corbett’s advocacy during the 1920s for setback skyscrapers and multi-level streets in Manhattan and Raymond Hood’s typological
explorations of freestanding skyscrapers and late-1920s speculations on a “city of towers.”
By considering these projects and proposals in relation to social, cultural, economic, and
infrastructural changes in and around cities like New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, this
chapter lays the groundwork for what follows.
Rockefeller Center originated in a late-1920s plan to build a new house for the
Metropolitan Opera. This dissipated in the aftermath of the October 1929 stock market
crash, but not before it established a site and a framework for combining cultural production
with commercial development within which Rockefeller Center would take shape over the
course of the following decade. Chapter 2 explores the first few tumultuous years of that
process. The departure of the Opera created a void at the center of the architects’
developing plans and in Rockefeller’s balance sheets. When RCA filled it, in early 1930, it
shifted the project’s cultural and commercial commitments. The peculiar status of radio in
the early twentieth century—as a “semi-philanthropic” corporate enterprise, according to
15

RCA’s founding director—also permitted John D. Rockefeller, Jr., to incorporate his own
ideas about corporatism as a cooperative “partnership” between capital and labor into the
architectural project.21 The architects responsible for the project characterized their role and
their relationship to their patron in similar cooperative terms. By examining the confluence
of capitalist ideologies among the project’s stakeholders—patron, tenant, architects—this
chapter examines how Rockefeller Center took shape, amidst the onset of the Great
Depression, as a purported incarnation of progressive corporatism. It also explores the press
events, journal articles, newspaper coverage, and the early critical reactions that informed the
design of the project.
In May 1930, Frank Lloyd Wright introduced the ideas that would become Broadacre
City in the last of six lectures at Princeton University, as part of a series sponsored by Otto
H. Kahn, the same financier who also initiated the project that became Rockefeller Center.
Over the next two years, Wright wrote newspaper and journal articles that further detailed
the project and gave it a name. The Disappearing City provided the most comprehensive
outline of the project. Published in September 1932, it expanded on and, in some cases,
augmented the themes Wright had articulated to date. Chapter 3 explores how these early
writings used typologies—skyscrapers, service stations, and homes, in particular—to
structure a critique of existing urban conditions, but also American society more broadly, a
critique often fraught with regressive ideas about race and gender. Before building the model
exhibited at Rockefeller Center in 1935, Wright relied primarily on the written and spoken
word to elaborate Broadacre City. Yet his lectures, exhibitions, and texts from the early 1930s

Owen D. Young quoted in Roland Marchand, Advertising the American Dream: Making Way for Modernity,
1920–1940 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 90; “Delegates Adopt Rockefeller Plan,” New York
Times, October 3, 1915, 20.
21
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did employ a limited and often polemical interplay of rhetorical and visual arguments.
Through these discussions of the media and the building types through which the project
took shape, this chapter argues that Wright’s work was not necessarily defined by a rejection
of the urban per se, as Wright himself and much of the existing literature suggest. Rather,
Broadacre City can be understood as a framework for recomposing existing metropolitan
phenomena into a decentralized culture of consumption.
Beginning in the early 1930s and continuing until 1940, Rockefeller Center’s architects
and managers began to treat their project as more than a self-contained commercial
development. As chapter 4 shows, the project’s leadership realized that the Center was
relatively inaccessible, despite its prominent location, because of the distance its tenants had
to walk from the closest subway and commuter rail stations. In response, they spent the
middle years of the 1930s pursuing infrastructural projects that included a private midtown
subway loop and a new midtown rail terminal. These would, at least, better integrated the
complex into the city’s existing transportation networks and, at most, reconfigure parts of
the metropolitan region to better serve the Center’s needs. In doing so, they would ensure, as
Nelson Rockefeller put it in an internal 1934 memo, “a continuous flow of the right kind of
people to the Center.”22 The need to address the Center’s transportation deficiencies was
due, in part, to its lack of a residential program. Between 1932 and 1940, members of the
Associated Architects developed several housing schemes that they used to stake larger, and
sometimes competing, claims about metropolitan geographies of class, race, and gender, and
the Center’s role in shaping them. Most of these infrastructural and domestic projects were,
in the end, unrealized. By offering critical insights into Rockefeller Center’s metropolitan
22 Nelson A. Rockefeller, remarks recorded in the minutes of the Committee on Subway Construction,
November 1934, quoted in Robert Fitch, The Assassination of New York (London: Verso, 1993), 198.

17

ambitions, this expanded scope nonetheless creates opportunities to put the Center in
dialogue with contemporary thought about reshaping the metropolitan landscape, especially
the Regional Plan Association’s 1929 Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs. In order to
appreciate the ideas underpinning the Center’s efforts to transform more than its three-block
site, the chapter begins with an examination of the arts program. The circumstances
surrounding Diego Rivera’s hiring and firing, in particular, help to connect the project’s
capitalist agenda with its metropolitan ideals.
The construction of the Broadacre City model and its exhibition at Rockefeller Center in
April 1935 introduce Chapter 5. The model quickly eclipsed Wright’s writings in the popular
and critical imagination, becoming the primary medium through which Broadacre City was
interpreted. In doing so, however, it revealed a lacuna in Wright’s arguments about the
economics of his envisioned society. Specifically, his writings of the early 1930s wavered on
whether the project amounted to a rejection of capitalism or a critique of it. The model’s
exhibition at Rockefeller Center—or, more accurately, the critical reaction to it—initiated a
process of clarification. But it was another engagement with his critics, after a 1937 trip to
the Soviet Union, that led Wright to begin using the phrase “organic capitalism” to describe
Broadacre City’s economic logic. The language that Wright used in the obscure 1937 article
that contained his first use of “organic capitalism” resonated with ideas espoused by the
proto-fascist “radio priest” Charles E. Coughlin, which brought Broadacre City into dialogue
with the reactionary politics of the late 1930s. By 1940, Wright had linked this dubiously
formulated idea of “organic capitalism” with a specific architectural typology, the roadside
market. Different incarnations of the market appeared in his writings and on the model, but
in each case it served to symbolize his economic ideal in the form of a small-scale capitalist
18

spectacle. This chapter explores how the project’s visualization and Wright’s flirtations with
white supremacists transformed the project during the second half of the 1930s.
The conclusion considers how Rockefeller Center and Broadacre City adapted to the
altered context of the post-World War II years. Wright continued to publish on and exhibit
Broadacre until his death in 1959, while Rockefeller Center added several new structures
between the late 1940s and the mid-1970s. A brief survey of these developments is
accompanied by attention to the ways in which both projects struggled to fit into postwar
architectural and urban discourse. Some closing remarks reflect on the degree to which the
two projects did prefigure certain qualities of metropolitan America after midcentury—in
particular, a curious kind of synthesis of their originally divergent aims can be found in
suburban shopping centers—just not on terms that any of the architects involved would
have recognized. This discrepancy between intentions and outcomes in the two projects’
late-stage developments points as much to a collective lack of prescience among the
architects as it does suggest that their original aims of using architecture to mediate
economic and metropolitan conditions took on new and unforeseen qualities.
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1. SKYSCRAPERS AND SUBURBS BEFORE 1929
In February 1896, the prominent New York architecture critic Montgomery Schuyler
published an extended essay in Architectural Record on contemporary architecture in Chicago.
Before introducing the recent works of Dankmar Adler & Louis Sullivan, Daniel H.
Burnham & Co., and Henry Ives Cobb, Schuyler felt compelled to offer “some preliminary
reference to the conditions of their work,” explaining, in other words, the extraordinary
qualities of the Western metropolis to an East Coast audience.1 He made clear that civic,
cultural, and religious institutions barely registered in his assessment of the city’s
architecture. They were “incidental and episodical to the real task of the architects, which is
to produce skyscrapers and homes.”2 Factories did “occupy much of the attention and
contribute much to the incomes of the busiest architects,” but “architecturally” they were
“neither here nor there.”3 Based on his identification of architects’ twofold professional
obligation—the production of “places of business and places of residence”—Schuyler
argued that the varied aspects of the city and its environs could be reduced to a simple
binary: “It is indeed curious how the composite image of Chicago that remains in one’s
memory as the sum of his innumerable individual impressions is made up exclusively of the
sky-scraper of the city and the dwellings of the suburbs.”4
As this first chapter shows, Schuyler’s “composite image” is as descriptive as it is limiting.
By the last decade of the nineteenth century, the prairies surrounding Chicago were strewn

1 Montgomery Schuyler, “A Critique (with Illustrations) of the Works of Adler & Sullivan, D. H. Burnham
& Co., Henry Ives Cobb,” The Architectural Record: Great American Architects Series, No. 2 (February 1896),
reprinted and abridged in American Architecture and Other Writings, vol. 2, eds. William H. Jordy and Ralph Coe
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1961), 377.
2 Ibid., 378.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid, 377.
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with the low-rise, low-density homes of the city’s industrial elite and an expanding middle
class, while the urban core was dominated by the tall office buildings to which corporate
executives, managers, and clerical staff daily commuted. But Schuyler’s typological
bifurcation of the metropolitan landscape obscured subtler social, technological, and
environmental factors. His skyscrapers and homes are a starting point from which to
examine how works of architecture shaped metropolitan America, materially and
discursively, between the 1880s, when the first skyscrapers began to appear and 1929 when
the two projects at the center of this study and the Great Depression began. By showing
how a different collection of architects, not discussed by Schuyler, including Frank Lloyd
Wright, Harvey Wiley Corbett, and Raymond M. Hood—the latter two representative of
Rockefeller Center’s Associated Architects—were instrumental in shaping discourse during
those decades, this chapter also establishes the shared context from which Rockefeller
Center and Broadacre City emerged.

1.1 Frank Lloyd Wright’s Variegated Suburbs

Rockefeller Center’s metropolitanism is self-evident, so it is useful to begin with
Broadacre City’s antecedents. The often-hyperbolic, anti-urban rhetoric through which
Wright argued for Broadacre City and against the “mantrap of gigantic dimensions,
devouring manhood,” that was, for him, the industrial city obscures the degree to which his
project emerged from and remapped, rather than rejected, conditions in the early-twentiethcentury metropolis.5 Much of the existing literature on Broadacre City has only further
obscured this continuum. In the 1950s critics like Lewis Mumford began comparing Wright’s

5

Frank Lloyd Wright, The Disappearing City (New York: William Farquhar Payson, 1932), 22.
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project to post-World War II suburban sprawl.6 Subsequent scholars like Anthony Alofsin
have argued to the contrary: “Suburbs lack the range of activities offered by Broadacre City
with its felicitous mix of farming, light industry, housing and green spaces.”7 Both Mumford
and Alofsin assumed that suburbs were primarily residential landscapes. Yet Wright
developed his project in dialogue with an existing metropolitan periphery that was as socially
and functionally divers as the “felicitous mix” of Broadacre City. In fact, when the architect
introduced an agrarian dimension to the project in The Disappearing City (1932)—a
development that would seem to remove the project entirely from the metropolitan scene—
it was intended to transform “the tiller of the soil” into “a suburban citizen of the new
city.”8 This was not an incongruity. A brief survey of the turn-of-the-century suburbs, and
Wright’s relation to them, helps to clarify Broadacre City’s origins and ambitions.
Wright was, of course, well acquainted with the suburbs through his early career outside
of Chicago. His own home in Oak Park (begun 1889) and the Winslow House in
neighboring River Forest (1893–94) mediated the transformation of these exurban villages
into metropolitan suburbs (figs. 1.1–1.3). Indeed, the compositional details of Wright’s

6 See Lewis Mumford, “The Skyline: A Phoenix Too Infrequent—II,” New Yorker, 12 December 1953,
116–27; “Megalopolis as Anti-City,” Architectural Record 132 (December 1962), reprinted in The Urban Prospect
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968), 128–41.
7 Anthony Alofsin, “Broadacre City: The Reception of a Modernist Vision,” Modernist Visions and the
Contemporary American City, theme issue of Center: A Journal for Architecture in America 5 (1989), 36. For similar
arguments concerning the relationship, or lack thereof, between Wright’s work and postwar suburbia, see
Giorgio Ciucci, “The City in Agrarian Ideology and Frank Lloyd Wright: Origins and Development of
Broadacres,” in The American City: From the Civil War to the New Deal, tr. Barbara Luigia La Penta (orig. 1979;
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1983), 362–63; Robert Fishman, Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia
(New York: Basic Books, 1987), 188–89; Peter Hall, Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and
Design in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 290–91; Terence Riley, “The Landscapes
of Frank Lloyd Wright: A Pattern of Work,” in Frank Lloyd Wright, Architect, eds. Terence Riley and Peter Reed
(New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1994), 107; John Sergeant, Frank Lloyd Wright’s Usonian Houses:
Designs for Moderate Cost One-Family Homes (New York: Whitney Library of Design, 1976), 123; and the essays
collected in K. Paul Zygas, ed., Frank Lloyd Wright: The Phoenix Papers, Volume 1: Broadacre City (Phoenix: The
Herberger Center for Design Excellence & The University of Arizona Press, 1995).
8 Wright, Disappearing City, 63.
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single-family houses—the centrally located hearths, the deep overhanging eaves, the high
window placements, the classicizing street façades contrasted with the picturesque garden
sides—have frequently been interpreted as discrete concretizations of a pastoral middle-class
suburban ideal.9 These houses created a domestic refuge from both the perceived corrupting
influences of the industrial city and the rugged hardships of the rural hinterlands, but their
surroundings were also socially, functionally, and environmentally diverse, conditions to
which Wright was attuned.
In his Autobiography (1932), the architect recalled Oak Park’s village core being
surrounded, in the late 1880s, with agrarian remnants, light manufacturing, as-yet
undeveloped land, and “endless rows of drab or white painted wood houses set regularly
apart, each on its little painted cardboard lawn” (fig. 1.4).10 His own shingle-style house was
built on partially cultivated woodland near the village center.11 An electric streetcar line to the
Loop bordered the site’s Chicago Avenue frontage, while retail shops filled the ground floors
of buildings less than two blocks away, near Harlem Avenue (fig. 1.5). If Wright’s early
domestic architecture seems to exemplify Robert Fishman’s classic formulation of the
suburbs as exclusively residential “bourgeois utopias,” the architect’s own attention to the

See, for example, William Cronon, “Inconstant Unity: The Passion of Frank Lloyd Wright,” in Frank
Lloyd Wright, Architect, 8–31; Robert Fishman, Urban Utopias in the Twentieth Century: Ebenezer Howard, Frank Lloyd
Wright, and Le Corbusier (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1982), 111; Henry-Russell Hitchcock, In the Nature of
Materials: The Buildings of Frank Lloyd Wright, 1887–1941 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1942), 17; Neil
Levine, The Architecture of Frank Lloyd Wright (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 9–21; Norris Kelly
Smith, Frank Lloyd Wright: A Study in Architectural Content (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 55–76;
Robert Twombly, Frank Lloyd Wright: His Life and His Architecture (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1979), 38–49;
Robert Twombly, Power and Style: A Critique of Twentieth-Century Architecture in the United States (New York: Hill
and Wang, 1995), 39–44; Gwendolyn Wright, Moralism and the Model Home: Domestic Architecture and Cultural
Conflict in Chicago, 1873–1913 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), 136–39.
10 Frank Lloyd Wright, An Autobiography (New York: Longman Greens, 1932), reprinted in Collected
Writings, vol. 2: 1930–1932, ed. Bruce Brooks Pfeiffer (New York: Rizzoli, in association with the Frank Lloyd
Wright Foundation, 1992), 157. The Collected Writings are hereafter cited as CW followed by the appropriate
volume number.
11 See Wright, CW 2: 159, 173.
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landscape around them coheres with the analyses of more varied and diverse suburbs of
more recent suburban history.12 Within Wright scholarship, however, the suburbs continue to
be treated as “exclusively residential,” as Neil Levine, following Anthony Alofsin, has
recently contended.13 At issue, however, is not simply an insistence that the early-twentiethcentury suburbs were socially and functionally heterogeneous. Wright’s early works existed in
a variegated environment, but they also used architecture to try to actively manage the
process of suburbanization, a theme that will recur throughout this and the following
chapters.
Between the closing decades of the nineteenth century and the onset of the Great
Depression, it was often difficult to distinguish between city, suburb, and country. On the
outskirts of cities like Chicago, where Wright worked, and New York, which he would make
Broadacre City’s foil, absolute division of land uses did not yet exist, and a surprising degree
of socioeconomic and ethnic diversity was common. In 1925, sociologist and selfproclaimed “suburban evangel” Harlan Paul Douglass characterized New York’s outer edges
as places where “the very stuff of which the metropolis is made is found in direct contact

12 See Fishman, Bourgeois Utopias. Similar depictions of the suburbs can be found in Kenneth T. Jackson,
Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). For more
recent scholarship that challenge some of Fishman’s and Jackson’s assumptions, see Mark Clapson, Suburban
Century: Social Change and Urban Growth in England and the United States (New York: Berg, 2003); Richard Harris
and Peter J. Larkham, eds., Changing Suburbs: Foundation, Form, and Function (New York: Routledge, 1999); Robert
Lewis, ed., Manufacturing Suburbs: Building Work and Home on the Metropolitan Fringe (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 2004); Richard Harris and Robert Lewis, “Constructing a Fault(y) Zone: Misrepresentations
of American Cities and Suburbs, 1900–1950,” Annals of the American Association of Geographers 88, no. 4
(December 1988): 622–39; Richard Harris and Robert Lewis, “The Geography of North American Cities and
Suburbs, 1900–1950,” Journal of Urban History 27, no. 3 (March 2001): 262–92; James L. Wunsch, “The
Suburban Cliché,” Journal of Social History 28, no. 3 (Spring 1995): 643–58. Additional studies are cited below.
13 Levine introduces a chapter on Wright’s “Home in a Prairie Town” for the Ladies’ Home Journal
(discussed below) by describing commercial, cultural, and civic activities unique to downtown Chicago before
stating, “The suburb, by contrast, was almost exclusively residential. The center/periphery distinction became
one of work versus domesticity, with the male defining the world of the downtown and the female that of the
suburb.” Neil Levine, The Urbanism of Frank Lloyd Wright (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 29.
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with the most aboriginal rural processes.”14 Though meant to simply convey the spectrum of
activities encompassed by the metropolis, Douglass’s use of “aboriginal” points to another
recurring theme in this study, namely, a kind of colonist’s mentality that accompanied the
capitalist ambitions of Broadacre City and Rockefeller Center. For Douglass and other
writers of the time, including Wright, the terms suburb and country were also often
interchangeable.15 For example, Wright described his 1901 contribution to the “New Series
of Model Suburban Homes Which Can Be Built at Moderate Cost” in the Ladies’ Home
Journal, which is discussed below, as “a city man’s country home on the prairie.”16 His early
career was also defined, of course, by the concept of an idealized and abstracted prairie that
legitimized the horizontal forms of his suburban houses.
The suburbs’ ambiguous geography was, for Douglass, indicative of their inherent
variety. His survey of New York’s metropolitan fringe noted the prevalence of middle-class
homes filled with Anglo-American families, but he also emphasized the presence of foreignborn and black suburbanites and the functional diversity of the suburban landscapes they
inhabited.17 What Douglass failed to account for was the fact that class hierarchies were less
determinant than racial or ethnic differences. Lower-, middle-, and upper-class whites—
demographics composed of assimilated northern and central European ethnicities—could
often live side-by-side, but other, unassimilated immigrants were usually confined to poor
ethnic enclaves. Restrictive covenants, discriminatory lending practices, and other

H[arlan] Paul Douglass, The Suburban Trend (New York: The Century Co., 1925), vii.
On the interchangeability of “suburb” and “country,” see Christopher Sellers, Crabgrass Crucible: Suburban
Nature and the Rise of Environmentalism in Twentieth Century America (Charlotte: University of North Carolina Press,
2012) 17–19.
16 Frank Lloyd Wright, “A Home in a Prairie Town,” Ladies’ Home Journal 18, no. 3 (February 1901): 17.
17 For Douglass’s comments on race, see Suburban Trend, 97; on the suburbs’ functional diversity, see 74ff.
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exclusionary tactics obstructed black access to most of suburbia’s social and material
benefits.18
By the mid-1920s, in places like Wright’s Oak Park and Douglass’s northern New Jersey,
neat rows of mail-order and developer-built homes were part of the same residential collage
as wealthy estates, workers’ cottages, self-built houses, and homeless encampments. Streetcar
lines and automotive highways connected residences to nearby light-industrial jobs and
small-scale retail outlets, as well as to central business districts and further-outlying heavyindustrial complexes. Many residents commuted daily to downtown business districts, but
other economic activities were increasingly dispersed throughout the metropolitan fringe.
Neither was agricultural activity the exclusive province of the outlying hinterlands. Revenueproducing farms were dispersed through the suburbs, where they relied on proximity to
industrial districts and the city center to attract laborers and customers. Many suburbanites
also maintained home gardens (see fig. 1.4).19 Whether these were tended for subsistence,
sale, or recreation—distinctions that usually signaled class status—Douglass praised them as
part of a gendered cultural ideal:
That the suburbanite plants, cultivates, and harvests as the farmer does—though on a
diminutive scale; that he mows the lawn, tinkers with the automobile, and tends the
furnace; that he enjoys his own sunshine and shade, his own birds and children, is
unquestionably important and gives his life a wholesome distinction not born of city

18 See Robert M. Fogelson, Bourgeois Nightmares: Suburbia, 1870–1930 (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2005); David M. P. Freund, Colored Property: State Policy and White Racial Politics in Suburban America (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2007), chap. 2; Harris and Lewis, “Geography of North American Cities and
Suburbs,” 272–75; Becky Nicolaides, My Blue Heaven: Life and Politics in the Working-Class Suburbs of Los Angeles,
1920-1965 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), 18–20; Andrew Wiese, Places of Their Own: African
American Suburbanization in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2004), chap. 1.
19 On the position of suburban agriculture in the metropolitan context, see “The Rural Side of the
Suburban Trend,” chap. 9 in Douglass, Suburban Trend, 239–70; Marc Linder and Lawrence S. Zacharias, Of
Cabbages and Kings County: Agriculture and the Formation of Modern Brooklyn (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press,
1999); Dolores Hayden, Building Suburbia: Green Fields and Urban Growth, 1820–2000 (New York: Vintage Books,
2004), 72–73.
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pavements. […] His garden may be profitable, but rarely is. His real profits lie in the
realm of intangible values.20
Douglass’s choice of male pronouns was not accidental. It fit neatly into a discourse that can
be traced back to the “image of a gentleman of leisure” that Dolores Hayden has found in
the mid-nineteenth-century writings of Andrew Jackson Downing.21 Wright would suffuse
Broadacre City with his own peculiar version of this gendered ideal. He would also
incorporate another dimension of Douglass’s fascination with suburban horticulture:
cultivated land was less a means of revenue production and more a tool for masculine
cultural edification.
As figures 1.6 and 1.7 make clear, the suburbs’ peculiar amalgamation of city and
country could produce some striking scenes. On one corner of southeastern Brooklyn in
August 1934, photographer P. L. Sperr recorded a herd of goats wandering between brand
new, developer-built duplexes and electric power lines. They foraged along an unpaved road
one block north of a sizable, multi-crop farm located just inland from a motley collection of
bayside houses. The presence of modern infrastructures and mass-produced residential
architecture alongside free-range domestic livestock and rows of cabbages may seem
anachronistic, but it was quite common.22 These suburbs occupied an ambiguous position

Douglass, Suburban Trend, 236, 245.
Hayden, Building Suburbia, 34. See also John Archer, Architecture and Suburbia: From English Villa to
American Dream House, 1690–2000 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), chap. 5; Margaret Marsh,
Suburban Lives (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1990), chap. 3; John R. Stilgoe, Borderland: Origins
of the American Suburb, 1820–1939 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 260–68.
22 These two photos and a third showing a lone cow traversing the same intersection—all from the New
York Public Library’s Irma and Paul Milstein Division of United States History, Local History and
Genealogy—constitute a belated visual précis of the detailed history of Brooklyn’s agrarian legacy in Linder and
Zacharias, Of Cabbages and Kings County. For the third photograph not included here, see “Brooklyn:
Pennsylvania Avenue—Stanley Avenue, 1934,” Irma and Paul Milstein Division of United States History, Local
History and Genealogy, The New York Public Library Digital Collections, accessed October 8, 2017,
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between the city and its agricultural hinterlands, geographically, economically, and culturally.
They were, nonetheless, undeniably metropolitan.
For Wright, suburban variegations were commonplace, but the process that produced
them required better coordination. As noted above, his Autobiography was attentive to Oak
Park’s diverse functional and environmental qualities. While alluding to long-simmering
marital problems, Wright also used the text to complain that, by 1909, his recreational habit
of horseback riding “over the prairies north of Oak Park” had been disrupted by unchecked
real estate speculation and the proliferation of automobiles, which precipitated “a
disturbance of all values, subtle or obvious.”23 The architect thus characterized himself, at
least in retrospect, as both a witness to and participant in turn-of-the-century suburban
history. He also positioned his residential design work as a tool for managing
suburbanization.
In February 1901, Wright published “A Home in a Prairie Town,” in the Ladies’ Home
Journal, as part of its “New Series of Model Suburban Houses Which Can be Built at
Moderate Cost.” In addition to presenting his nascent prairie style in prototypical form, the
project also initiated a framework for his individuated domestic ideal. Wright directed readers
to a site plan, identified as a “quadruple block plan,” and an aerial perspective at the top of
the page, both of which depicted four houses pinwheeling around a shared garden (fig. 1.8).
Casually exchanging the journal’s use of “suburban” with his own “country” modifier, and
ascribing masculine ownership on a house designed for a women’s journal, he explained,
It seems a waste of energy to plan a house haphazard, to hit or miss an already distorted
condition, so this partial solution of a city man’s country home begins at the beginning
and assumes […] an arrangement of the four houses that secures breadth and prospect
23
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to the community as a whole, and absolute privacy both as regards each to the
community, and each to each of the four.24
Before the supposed freedom and privacy of suburbanization could be guaranteed,
unregulated and haphazard real-estate development needed to be curtailed. To do this,
individual suburban dwellings would have to be conceived, somewhat counterintuitively, as
part of a communal ensemble. Classist presumptions underlying Wright’s domestic ideal,
implicit in his striving for “absolute privacy,” became explicit in his adaptation of this
scheme for a 1913 competition sponsored by the City Club of Chicago.25
The competition was conceived in part as a critical supplement to the 1909 Plan of
Chicago, filling out Daniel H. Burnham and Edward H. Bennett’s sweeping metropolitan
vision with more localized recommendations for controlling suburban growth. The brief
asked participants to propose schemes for housing up to 1,280 families of varying income
levels, along with civic, cultural, commercial, educational, and recreational facilities, on an
outlying “quarter section” of the city’s grid. Competitors were told that the imagined
residents could reach jobs in the Loop—a forty-five-minute streetcar commute, or eight
miles, away—or at industrial plants that were potentially within walking distance. Like
Wright’s later, more expansive vision in Broadacre City, the competition’s site and its

Wright, “A Home in a Prairie Town,” 17.
Wright submitted what was identified in the publication that resulted from the competition as a “noncompetitive” entry. This was either because he supported the aims of the Club but, as a former member of its
Committee on City Planning, was ineligible to compete, or because he was solicited to enter but, as related by
Gwendolyn Wright, did not “believe in competitions.” See Levine, Urbanism, 84–85; Gwendolyn Wright, Frank
Lloyd Wright’s Progressive Suburbia (Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Hixson-Lied College of Fine and
Performing Arts, 2010), 16.
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environs were more socially and functionally diverse than its identification as a “residence
district” might suggest.26
Wright’s entry used his “quadruple block plan” of the preceding decade as its basis,
though it offered much more (figs. 1.9 & 1.10). The original quartet of homes was
multiplied, sparingly, across the middle section of the 160-acre site. Multi-unit housing, retail
outlets, and a civic center lined the periphery. A public park containing cultural and
educational institutions bifurcated the site asymmetrically. The park’s recreational landscape,
and the allées that bordered it, segregated the site’s different functions and classes of
residents. Wright succinctly explained the plan’s organizing logic: “Accepting the
characteristic aggregation of business buildings, flats, apartments, and formal and informal
dwellings, for well-to-do and poor natural now to every semi-urban section about Chicago,
this design introduces only minor modifications in harmony with the nature of this
aggregation.”27 That is, for Wright, the social and economic variegations of the existing
suburban landscape were “natural,” but they needed precise spatial ordering to guarantee a
classist presumption of privacy in “picturesque” conditions.28 Though its usage has evolved
over time, privacy has often been used as a euphemism to support social and racial
segregation.29 This was true of Wright’s plan, which only ensured privacy and
picturesqueness for the “better class” homes.30 The multi-family dwellings, working-class
units, apartment buildings, and civic and commercial facilities along the site’s edges operated
See “The Program of the Competition,” in City Residential Land Development: Studies in Planning, Competitive
Plans for Subdividing a Typical Quarter Section of Land in the Outskirts of Chicago, ed. Alfred B. Yeomans (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1916), 1–2.
27 Frank Lloyd Wright, “Plan by Frank Lloyd Wright,” in ibid., 96.
28 Ibid.
29 See Archer, Architecture and Suburbia, 293–317; Hayden, Building Suburbia, 65–70; Freund, Colored Property,
343–45.
30 On the key to the plan, Wright differentiated “seven and eight room houses, better class,” from the
other types of housing on the site. See Wright, “Plan by Frank Lloyd Wright,” 98; fig. 1.9.
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as “‘background’ buildings.”31 Wright’s proposal reorganized the spatial relations of existing
suburban variegations. It also reinforced social inequities by insulating the privileged middleclass interior from the purportedly corrupting and “unsightly conditions” of the
surrounding streetscape.32
Anthony Alofsin, Giorgio Ciucci, Neil Levine, and Robert Twombly have all analyzed
this project in connection to Broadacre City, each concerned with whether or not it was a
formal prefiguration of the later work.33 The overall spatial structure of the site plan does
somewhat resemble that of the 1935 model—and a later variant of the quadruple scheme
was incorporated into Broadacre City in the 1950s—but the City Club competition entry can
be alternately characterized as an early attempt to articulate a method for managing
suburbanization. That is, it was an organizational precedent as much as it was a
morphological model for Broadacre City. As Wright made clear in the 1913 project
description, he was less interested in a formal solution than he was in managing the social
and economic processes of suburbanization. He explained, “Other rhythms in grouping
than those suggested here are easily imagined,” and also insisted, “The virtue of this plan lies
in the principle of subdivision underlying its features—the practical, economic, and artistic
creation of an intelligent system of subdivision, insuring greater privacy together with all the
advantages of co-operation […] with attractive open vistas everywhere.”34 Like Broadacre

Ibid., 96.
Ibid., 97.
33 For example, Giorgio Ciucci interpreted the non-competitive plan as one of three early works, together
with a 1909 project for Bitter Root Valley in Montana and Taliesin in Wisconsin (begun 1911), that when
synthesized formed the basis for Broadacre City. See Ciucci, “The City in Agrarian Ideology,” 317–24. For a
similar analysis, see also Twombly, Frank Lloyd Wright, 180–82. Anthony Alofsin and Neil Levine acknowledge
certain formal similarities between the non-competitive plan and Broadacre but make a clear distinction
between the conceptual underpinnings of the two projects, because Broadacre City purportedly rejected the
existing urban order while the earlier project accepted it as “natural.” See Alofsin, “Broadacre City,” 11–12;
Levine, Urbanism, 174–76.
34 Wright, “Plan by Frank Lloyd Wright,” 101, 99.
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City, albeit in less polemical terms, the competition entry was not a departure from suburban
conditions. It created a framework through which to manage their variegations.

1.2 Harvey Wiley Corbett’s “Artistic Business”

During the same years that Wright began his career in Oak Park, skyscrapers began to
dominate the downtowns of cities like Chicago and New York. In fact, the social and
functional heterogeneity of the suburbs was inseparable from transformations in the
metropolitan core. Through most of the nineteenth century, a small collection of offices
typically adjoined production facilities or trading floors. As the American economy
industrialized, businesses grew rapidly in size and complexity. A burgeoning managerial class
and corporate boards of directors began to replace what had been small cadres of clerks and
partners. With innovations like the railroad, telephone, and telegraph, companies could
separate spaces for production from those for management. Production remained in, or was
shifted to, the suburbs and further-outlying areas, where land was cheaper and available in
larger quantities. Management was consolidated downtown, where the flow of goods and
capital could be controlled from a centralized location. Emergent corporate business
practices remade the national economy and remapped metropolitan landscapes.35
A new type of commercial architecture, the office building, was critical in this
transformation. Early office buildings were typically four- to six-stories tall, their height
initially constrained by a reliance on load-bearing masonry for their structures and stairs for
vertical circulation. Telecommunications eased the spatial separation of offices from

See Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1977); Alan Trachtenberg, The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the
Gilded Age (orig. 1982; New York: Hill and Wang, 2007); Olivier Zunz, Making America Corporate, 1870–1920
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
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factories, but many businessmen continued to believe that “necessary personal conference”
with lawyers, bankers, and other professionals made “for successful business,” as Harvey
Wiley Corbett explained in 1929.36 Because specific professions and trades concentrated
themselves into dense, self-sorting clusters and because they needed to accommodate their
growing white-collar workforces, areas like lower Manhattan’s financial district and Chicago’s
Loop became incredibly dense and functionally homogeneous. During the 1880s and 1890s,
growing demand for space in the vicinity of LaSalle Street and Wall Street in Chicago and
New York, respectively, from financial institutions and businesses drove up land values
precipitously. Constructing taller buildings was one way to reconcile limited supplies of
(desirable) land with growing demands for space. Metal-frame construction and passenger
elevator service, both of which had been commercially available since the 1850s, were
combined with more recent advances in lighting, heating, and sanitation systems to permit
greater heights that could accommodate more office workers.37 By providing a primary site

36 Harvey Wiley Corbett, “Do We Want Three-Level Streets?,” Housing Problems in America: Proceedings of the
Tenth National Conference on Housing, Philadelphia, January 28, 29, 20, 1929 (New York: National Housing
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37 Early skyscraper historians almost exclusively emphasized technological achievements. See, for example,
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from which capitalism’s “managerial revolution” was staged, the “tall office building”—or
“sky-scraper,” as it began to be known in the mid-1880s—emerged from and mediated these
interwoven economic, social, technological, and urban changes.38
Among numerous possible early examples of these trends, the Standard Oil Building in
lower Manhattan is illustrative. The Rockefeller-owned Standard Oil Company was
incorporated in 1870 in Cleveland, Ohio. Cleveland became a key site of refinement because
of its proximity to the western Pennsylvania oilfields—the initial locus of oil production in
the U.S.—its connections to shipping routes on the Great Lakes and the nation’s expanding
rail networks, circumstances that John D. Rockefeller, Sr., exploited to monopolize the early
oil industry.39 In 1883, Standard Oil moved its corporate offices to New York, where it
occupied rented office space on Broadway, two blocks south of Wall Street, as they
assembled real estate nearby. Architect Ebenezer L. Roberts completed the company’s ninestory, solid-masonry headquarters in 1886 (fig. 1.11). Initially, the building’s address was
more famous than its architecture. 26 Broadway became shorthand for the Rockefellers’
sprawling corporate empire, but its design received little immediate critical attention. The
Pittsburgh Commercial Gazette offered one of the only contemporary assessments of its
architecture. In an August 4, 1886, daily market report, the paper laconically observed, “The
material is granite and the appearance imposing.”40

38 “Managerial revolution” is Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.,’s term for the corporatization of the American
economy. See Chandler, Visible Hand. Through the 1890s, the term “sky-scraper” was always hyphenated,
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the turn of the century. See Sarah Bradford Landau and Carl W. Condit, Rise of the New York Skyscraper, 1865–
1913 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), ix–x; Merwood-Salisbury, Chicago 1890, 12.
39 See Ron Chernow, Titan: The Life of John D. Rockefeller, Sr. (New York: Random House, 1998), 73ff.
40 The only other comment was a perfunctory image caption in American Architect and Building News 19, no.
531 (February 27, 1886): 102. In 1898, when the company completed a major expansion to the building,
Architectural Record recalled that the original was “considered the finest type of its class in the city.” “New
Developments in Building,” Architectural Record 7, no. 4 (April–June 1898): 519. See also Landau and Condit,
New York Skyscraper, 133–34; Chernow, Titan, 222.
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Like most corporate headquarters, the Standard Oil Building combined the corporation’s
own needs with speculative development. Space for the company’s executives, managers, and
clerical staff occupied the upper levels, with offices leased to numerous small enterprises
below.41 Standard had outgrown the building by 1895, less than a decade after its completion.
They commissioned Francis H. Kimball & George K. Thompson to design a narrow, mostly
self-supporting, steel-frame annex that rose alongside the existing structure before adding
seven floors to the overall height, with a two-story tower on the northwest corner. The result
was an awkwardly composed, sixteen-story wall of granite that helped make lower Broadway
into one of the city’s infamous “canyons” (fig. 1.12). The engineering required to achieve the
building’s added height was innovative, but the expansion itself was symptomatic.42 By the
time the expansion of 26 Broadway was complete, in 1898, there were almost one hundred
office buildings between ten and twenty-one stories concentrated in one-square-mile of
lower Manhattan.43
The Standard Oil Building’s first two incarnations were part of a multi-decade building
boom that lasted from the 1880s until the early 1910s. In 1911, the landmark U.S. Supreme
Court decision that broke up the Standard Oil monopoly was partly responsible for a
financial panic that slowed new construction. The outbreak of World War I ground it to a
halt. New York’s real-estate market did not truly recover until the early 1920s. The turn-of-
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the-century boom had produced nearly one-thousand buildings that were eleven- to twentystories tall and fifty-one that exceeded twenty-one stories, most of which were concentrated
in the southern tip of Manhattan.44 Cass Gilbert’s fifty-seven-story, 792-foot-tall Woolworth
Building (1910–13) was the tallest. (Chicago instituted a height restriction of 130 feet in
1893, which generally kept the city’s buildings below twenty stories, even as the limit was
incrementally increased in later years.) Graham, Anderson, Probst & White’s gargantuan
Equitable Life Insurance Building, begun in 1913 three blocks north of the Standard Oil
Building, dumped 1.7 million square feet of office space on the market and covered its
neighbors in a 7.5-acre shadow. The recession that began in 1911 and the perceived excesses
of structures like the Equitable helped to culminate a long-simmering debate about
skyscrapers’ adverse effects on the urban environment.
Numerous stakeholders had been voicing concerns about a lack of regulation of the
city’s real estate for decades. Landlords and tenants complained that new skyscrapers
devalued adjacent properties by blocking access to light and air. Planners and engineers
worried that the increasing size and number of skyscrapers strained municipal
infrastructures. Architects debated the intertwined aesthetics and economics of tall buildings.
Public health advocates warned that dark, canyon-like streets were havens for disease. A
1913 Heights of Buildings Commission report, which laid the groundwork for the city’s
1916 zoning resolution, summarized the situation: “The streets are being darkened and
congested. Pedestrian and vehicular traffic is becoming slow and difficult. The street

44 See “Table 1: Height of Buildings in Manhattan,” in Report of the Heights of Buildings Commission (New
York: Board of Estimate and Apportionment, 1913), 15.
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subsurface is becoming overcrowded with sewers, pipes, wires and rapid transit subways; all
occasioned in considerable measure by the extreme heights of buildings.”45
The New York City zoning law, enacted in July 1916, addressed these circumstances by
interdependently regulating building mass and land use. Use and area districts dictated
whether a site could be used for residential, business, or “unregulated” purposes and how
much surface area could be covered with building. The law’s most novel feature, and the one
that most intrigued architects, were its height districts. These dictated how high a building
could rise relative to street width before it would have to be setback. For example, in an area
like the financial district, already home to most of the city’s tallest structures, new
construction could ascend two-and-one-half times the width of the street it faced. An angle
drawn from the center of the street to that point would then determine the building’s
setbacks. In a two-and-one-half-times district, this would mean a setback of one horizontal
foot for every five feet of vertical rise. A tower of unrestricted height could occupy one
quarter of a site. This established what became known as an “envelope,” a theoretical, threedimensional building mass that produced the city’s iconic pyramidal towers during the 1920s.
New York’s zoning law represented a compromise between architects, real-estate interests,
and civic reformers, stabilizing property values while also asserting (some) regulatory control
over private property. The result was a delimited spatial framework within which architects
and developers were free to speculate.46
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Architects like George B. Post and C. Grant LaFarge were instrumental in crafting the
zoning law. Harvey Wiley Corbett was not involved—partly because he was arrested in 1910
for fraud and declared bankruptcy in 1914—but he became one of its most prominent
spokesmen after he started speaking and publishing on architectural opportunities that
emerged from the new zoning resolution in 1921.47 Corbett’s thinking largely operated
through the identification of competing forces—economy and beauty, private and public,
speculation and regulation, obsolescence and permanence, skyscrapers and automobiles,
offices and homes. Unlike Louis Sullivan’s strict separation of economic from aesthetic
concerns in his well-known 1896 essay “The Tall Office Building Artistically Considered,”
Corbett argued that architects could resolve those binaries by uniting technical knowledge
with “imagination.”48 This was evidenced in his revealing description of architecture as “a
kind of artistic business.”49 Thus, the zoning law permitted “innumerable spires, towers, and
domes” but instituted a “uniform cornice line,” which balanced “novelty and originality”
with the order of “a larger scheme.”50 For Corbett, this mixture of creativity and control
represented a better “form of democracy.”51 It revolved around a desire to curb unregulated
speculation through coordinated planning that, in effect, transposed the logic of Frank Lloyd

On the ups-and-downs of Corbett’s early career, see Paul D. Stoller, “The Architecture of Harvey Wiley
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Wright’s earlier suburban residences, wherein regulation of the collective ensures individual
freedom, to urban skyscrapers. It also advocated an aggressive form of gentrification,
because Corbett would replace the myriad small structures of an urban block—and the
people and activities they housed—with one enormous skyscraper.
In 1922, Hugh Ferriss gave Corbett’s thesis a visual dimension by producing a series of
dramatically rendered illustrations that demonstrated, in four steps, how an economically
viable structure could be hewn out of the zoning envelope (fig. 1.13). This imaginary edifice
occupied an entire city block, since, as Corbett argued, that would best exploit the law’s
tower provision and, by subjecting more land to unified control, produce greater visual
harmony.52 In his presentations at planning conferences and in publications for trade
journals like Pencil Points and popular outlets like the Saturday Evening Post, Corbett also
highlighted recent works that showed zoning’s already accruing benefits.
One of these was the Standard Oil Building. In 1920, the company initiated a second
expansion. The new building, designed by Carrère & Hastings, with Shreve, Lamb & Blake,
extended the existing structure southward via two roughly parallel, sixteen-story bars
intersected by a pyramidal tower (figs. 1.14 & 1.15). A new Renaissance-style façade blended
the old seamlessly with the new, at least from the exterior. The size and location of the
tower, as well as the ninth-floor setbacks along the southern and eastern frontages,

52 On the necessity for larger sites, see Corbett, “New Stones for Old,” 178. These were exhibited in
February 1922 and then published in Hugh Ferriss, “The New Architecture,” New York Times Book Review and
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conformed to the zoning envelope. For Corbett, the new Standard Oil Building
demonstrated “the opportunities and possibilities that Zoning gives,” because its enormous
footprint “[took] advantage of the 25% tower limit” and “unifie[d] the aspect of the city.”53
The enormity of the new Standard Oil Building was also indicative of the oil-generated
wealth that accompanied the growing popularity of gasoline-powered automobiles.
As Corbett was extolling the advent of zoning, automobiles and economic recovery
transformed urban discourse. Around 1923, the city’s real-estate market began to recover
from its decade-long slump. A new, post-World War I building boom commenced, which
saw skyscrapers spread rapidly uptown. During the 1920s, the possibility of assembling large
building sites on the uniformly gridded blocks above 14th Street produced a concentration
of towers that outpaced the downtown financial district in size and quantity.54 By 1929, there
were 114 buildings taller than twenty-one stories between 34th and 59th Streets (fig. 1.16).55
(In 1913, as noted above, fifty-one buildings in the entire city were in that category.) Aside
from the Standard Oil Building, all of the examples Corbett cited in his various articles
throughout the 1920s were located between 39th and 59th Streets.
The second development concerned vehicular traffic. Between 1900 and 1920, the
number of automobiles in the U.S. rose from just 8,000 to over 8 million and, in 1930, to
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54 See Max Page, The Creative Destruction of Manhattan, 1900–1940 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1999), chap. 2; Marc A . Weiss, “Density and Intervention: New York’s Planning Traditions,” in The Landscape
of Modernity, eds. Ward and Zunz, 46–70. Although, on the continued growth of the financial district during this
time period, see Abramson, Skyscraper Rivals.
55 See “Table III: Analysis of Building Heights in Manhattan South of 59th Street, for the Year 1929,” in
Thomas Adams et al., Regional Survey of New York and Its Environs, vol. 6: Buildings: Their Uses and the Spaces about
Them (New York: Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs, 1931), 60.
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more than 23 million.56 In 1926, there were almost 170,000 vehicles registered in Manhattan
and over 1.3 million in the New York metropolitan region.57 The city’s streets—already
clogged with horse, rail, and foot traffic—were overwhelmed (fig. 1.17). By the mid-1920s,
the “traffic problem” had superseded most other public health and safety concerns.
It is difficult to overstate how thoroughly skyscrapers and automobiles became
intertwined during the 1920s, not only in terms of urban traffic congestion but also in terms
of how these two phenomena were changing relations between areas like midtown
Manhattan and the suburbs. This intertwining barely registers in most skyscraper histories,
however. Influential studies like Carol Willis’s Form Follows Finance, for instance, have
provided detailed insights into the confluence of economic, regulatory, and technological
factors that shaped Manhattan’s and Chicago’s tall office buildings, but they are
comparatively silent on the influence skyscrapers exerted, in turn, on the metropolitan
landscapes around them.58 For Corbett—and, as shown below, for Frank Lloyd Wright and
Raymond Hood as well—the conflict between skyscrapers and automobiles was inseparable
from the metropolitan context they shares.
This was because automobiles permitted a greater freedom of movement, as compared
with the fixed, radial routes of streetcars and trains, which began to pull commercial

56 See Louis P. Cain, “Table Df339-342: Motor vehicle registrations, by vehicle type: 1900-1995,” in Susan
B. Carter et al, eds., Historical Statistics of the United States: Millennial Edition Online, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2006), accessed March 30, 2018,
http://hsus.cambridge.org/HSUSWeb/toc/tableToc.do?id=Df339-342. See also Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier,
chap. 9.
57 See “Table II: Number of Motor Vehicles in New York and Its Environs, 1916–1926,” in Harold M.
Lewis and Ernest P. Goodrich, Regional Survey of New York and Its Environs, vol. 3: Highway Traffic (New York:
Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs, 1927), 42. In addition to the city’s five boroughs, the numbers
for the region include parts of Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York State.
58 Willis does discuss the Palmolive Building, built by Holabird & Root in 1928–29 north of Chicago’s
Loop. While she mentions the advertising campaign that sold the building as quasi-suburban, her concerns lie
more in the degree to which its form did or did not demonstrate the importing of a setback-style derived from
New York’s zoning law to Chicago. See Willis, Form Follows Finance, 123–28.
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development into the suburbs. Corbett’s talks and writings during the 1920s recurrently
argued against commercial decentralization. As he saw it, “traffic and the separation of
residence from business” were the two “problems” for which architects were “chiefly”
responsible.59 He devoted little attention to the residential side of that equation, but his
fascination with skyscrapers and traffic was predicated on a twofold premise, that “the
separation of home and business” had made tall buildings possible and that physical
proximity was a precondition for successful business.60 Thus, insofar as commerce was
concerned, “building to a maximum height over a limited area” was preferable to
“[s]preading a city to a moderate height over a large area.”61 Skyscrapers were, according to
Corbett’s rather sophistic logic, “the most practical form of ready relief,” because their
elevators compartmentalized and internalized pedestrian traffic that would otherwise
inundate city streets.62 Tall buildings, in Corbett’s thinking, alleviated traffic congestion. His
solutions thus did not attempt to reduce the number of automobiles in the city. They sought
to more efficiently manage their movements. In doing so, he argued without irony that
Manhattan’s streets could be retrofitted to accommodate a seven-hundred-percent increase in
traffic volume.63

59 Harvey Wiley Corbett, “New Heights in American Architecture,” 696. Curiously, in the same piece, he
envisioned a “building occupying a block [that] could contain a community within itself.” Ibid., 698. He
described a similar scheme in Corbett, “America’s Great Gift to Architecture,” New York Times, March 18,
1928, 84; “Have Skyscrapers Reached the Limit?,” Washington Post, July 15, 1928, 10; Corbett, “Do We Want
Three-Level Streets?,” 244–45. This was, however, more or less incompatible with his ideas about wholesale
commercialization and traffic separation, the issues for which he was better know and to which he devoted
more attention.
60 Corbett, “New Stones for Old,” 16.
61 Harvey Wiley Corbett, “A Vision of Midtown New York,” New York Times Magazine, October 6, 1929, 1.
62 Harvey Wiley Corbett, “The Skyscraper: Babel or Boon?,” New York Times Magazine, December 5, 1926,
1.
63 See “Triple-Decked Streets for Traffic Relief,” The New York Times, February 3, 1924, XX5.
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The Russell Sage Foundation-sponsored Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs
provided the venue for these explorations. Corbett’s reputation had sufficiently recovered
from its early-1910s nadir for him to be appointed chair of the Regional Plan’s committee on
traffic studies in 1923. His proposal consisted of a three-part process that would separate
vehicular from pedestrian traffic. It was first published in the New York Times in February
1924, where it was accompanied by four section diagrams and a perspective rendering (figs.
1.18 & 1.19).64 The first section showed existing conditions, while the other three described a
process of transformation. Stage one placed elevated pedestrian platforms above existing
sidewalks, separating people from cars and loading zones from traffic lanes. It was assumed
in the text, but not visualized, that all rail traffic would be located below grade. The second
stage involved extending pedestrian bridges over intersections, adding shop entrances on the
upper level, and carving additional loading or parking space from the ground floor. The third
and final stage showed monumental arcades replacing the earlier, ad hoc retrofits. Cognizant
of the immense expenditure that this process would entail, Corbett suggested it could be
“tried experimentally a block or unit at a time at a small expense.”65
The culmination of this process revealed several inconsistencies in Corbett’s logic. The
permanence and serenity represented in fig. 1.19 would be the improbable result of rapid
obsolescence and frenzied business activity. Additionally, the very idea of multilevel streets
to manage traffic flow seemed to undermine his notional argument that skyscrapers

64 The same drawings, plus a new set of perspectives that also showed the incremental changes in
perspective, appeared in Harvey Wiley Corbett, “Different Levels for Foot, Wheel and Rail,” American City 31,
no. 1 (July 1924): 2–6 (a version of the rendering that appeared in the Times was used on the cover); Corbett,
“The Problem of Traffic Congestion, and a Solution,” Architectural Forum 46, no. 3 (March 1927): 201–08.
65 Ibid.
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themselves alleviated congestion. He also had virtually nothing to say about parking.66
Neither was his idea particularly original, as he readily acknowledged. A number of other
architects and planners, like Eugène Hénard in Paris and Edward H. Bennett in Chicago,
developed similar schemes throughout the early part of the century.67 But, because Corbett
was an excellent promoter, his talks and texts received wide attention.
He continued to publicize his multilevel-street proposal into the early 1930s. Having
been commissioned by the Regional Plan Association, his diagrams and rendering, appeared
in the 1929 Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs where they were accompanied by a
lengthy explanatory text by general director of the Committee on the Regional Plan Thomas
Adams that also discussed similar proposals by other architects.68 Several months before he
was officially involved in “the proposal which has recently been presented for Mr.
Rockefeller’s development around the new opera house in New York,” he told a January
1929 national housing conference in Philadelphia that it would “definitely” contain elevated
sidewalks so that pedestrians “can move about with some comfort and peace and freedom
and rapidity, if they want to.”69

66 His only real recommendation was that the space beneath the pedestrian arcades be used for parking,
but this was also supposed to be used for loading and, in any case, would not have been able to accommodate
the 700% increase in vehicular traffic he predicted.
67 Corbett cited a plan by Leonardo da Vinci to erect arcades over the streets of Milan and “an important
boulevard which is double decked for some distance” in Chicago, probably Wacker Drive, which was under
construction in 1924. Corbett, “Different Levels for Foot, Wheel and Rail,” 2. He was likely aware of Eugène
Hénard’s turn-of-the-century planning proposals for Paris; the popular frontispiece of Moses King’s King’s
Views: New York, 1908–1909 (New York: C. Francis Press, 1908); the widely circulated July 1913 cover of
Scientific American; and the elevated roadway encircling Grand Central Terminal, completed in 1919. Melville C.
Smith made a plan to elevate Broadway, covering the grade-level railways, as early as 1868. Around the same
time that Corbett was promoting his scheme, Edward H. Bennett published one for Chicago, while Ernest
Flagg and Daniel L. Turner developed similar schemes for New York. See Thomas Adams et al., Regional Plan of
New York and Its Environs, vol. 2: The Building of the City (New York: Regional Plan of New York and Its
Environs, 1931), 284–321; Levine, Urbanism, 153–56.
68 See Thomas Adams et al., Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs, vol. 2: The Building of the City (New
York: Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs, 1931), 306–21.
69 Corbett, “Do We Want Three-Level Streets?,” 243.
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1.3 Frank Lloyd Wright’s “New Dispensation”

For Corbett and many of his contemporaries, resolving the problem of traffic
congestion was inseparable from an assumption that business activities would remain
concentrated in the metropolitan core. The coordinated planning of ever-larger skyscrapers
and better-managed traffic flow would not simply preserve existing patterns of urban
density and suburban dispersion but intensify them. Briefly during the 1920s, Frank Lloyd
Wright seemed to think the same. He likely knew of Corbett’s work and other, similar
proposals that circulated through the pages of national newspapers and trade journals and
through traveling exhibitions during the mid-1920s.70 In or around early 1926, Wright drafted
a “skyscraper regulation” project that included proposals for building setbacks and traffic
separation like those Corbett had begun to popularize (fig. 1.20). Ultimately, however, he
would direct his attention to the metropolitan fringe, where he saw fragmentary evidence of
change that, he presumed, his architecture could transform into a new integrated and
standardized landscape of consumption.
The increasing popularity of automobiles had begun to pull commercial development
into outlying suburban areas of major American cities. Though the focus thus far has
primarily been on Chicago and New York, the most notable early effects of automobiles on
the outskirts of metropolitan America occurred in Los Angeles during the late 1910s and
early 1920s, where Wright happened to have relocated at the same time. Like most American
cities, turn-of-the-twentieth-century Los Angeles was organized around networks of
streetcar lines and railways. The radial patterns of these kept retail districts concentrated to a
few downtown blocks. As automobiles proliferated, they drew retailing and other forms of

70

See Levine, Urbanism, chap. 5; Willis, “Drawing toward Metropolis, 158.
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commerce into new, previously inaccessible parts of the metropolitan landscape. As
historians like Richard Longstreth have shown, this did not simply make suburban retail
corridors economically viable. It entailed a profound remapping of social, cultural, and
economic relations between cities and suburbs.71 Automobiles also encouraged new types of
roadside architecture, like gas stations, drive-in markets and groceries, chain stores,
department store outposts, and motels.72
The most significant of these building types, which not coincidentally became central to
Broadacre City, were the so-called “super service stations” and drive-in markets.73 What
made super service stations “super” was their coupling of facilities for refueling with
additional automotive services, like tire change stations and repair shops, and an an ofteneclectic array of commercial offerings, like cafés, florists, or taxi stands. Drive-in markets
were similarly multifaceted. Their retail operations were anchored by the sale of groceries,
but this was usually accompanied by a bakery, delicatessen, flower shop, pharmacy, café,
laundry, and a filling station. Despite their different primary functions, super service stations
and drive-in markets shared much in common. Both emerged as distinct types out of
experiments in suburban Los Angeles in the years before World War I. They also combined
careful attention to commuters’ driving habits and spending patterns to anticipate and
exploit the needs an increasingly motorized population.

71 Richard Longstreth, City Center to Regional Mall: Architecture, the Automobile, and Retailing in Los Angeles,
1920–1950 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997); Longstreth, The Drive-In, the Market, and the Transformation of
Commercial Space in Los Angeles, 1914–1941 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000).
72 In addition to Longstreth’s works, see John A. Jakle and Kieth A Schulle, The Gas Station in America
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Chester H. Liebs, Main Street to Miracle Mile: American
Roadside Architecture (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1985), especially 7–27; Daniel I. Vieyra, “Fill ‘er Up”:
An Architectural History of America’s Gas Stations (New York: Collier Books, 1979).
73 See Longstreth, Drive-In, 10–11, 18–21, 52–54.
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Developers and architects of service stations and markets broke with retailing
conventions in numerous ways. They typically located them on corner sites in relatively
undeveloped areas, which allowed for high visibility while also avoiding traffic congestion
along major arteries. Corner sites also allowed for the creation of generous forecourts in
which to maneuver and park cars. As planning techniques became normalized in suburban
Los Angeles after World War I, this exterior space was typically framed by an L-shaped
structure that housed the interior selling spaces (figs. 1.21 & 1.22). In a significant departure
from the prevailing logic of earlier roadside architecture, stations and markets were not
treated as part of a continuous row of storefronts. Instead, corner kiosks became highly
visible freestanding objects that disrupted the visual continuity of commercial thoroughfares.
Architecture and advertising were integrated. As Longstreth shows, the norms of service
station and market design had been established in Southern California by 1920, after which
they became a framework for development across the U.S. during the next decade.
Just as in Oak Park, Wright was a witness to and participant in this diffusion. He spent
the late 1910s commuting between Tokyo, Los Angeles, and his new Wisconsin home,
Taliesin, before briefly settling in Los Angeles during the early 1920s. During this time, he
slipped into relative professional obscurity. Personal scandals and professional frustrations
had diminished his once preeminent standing. Although, it is worth noting that he
maintained an office in downtown Chicago until at least 1915, years after he publicly
decamped to rural Wisconsin. He had also become infatuated with automobiles, of which he
collected many.74 The construction of one of his few commissions from this period, Aline

In a 1936 letter Wright’s secretary Eugene Masselink attempted to entice Lewis Mumford to Taliesin by
advertising, “We have a comfortable fleet of cars of several types from station wagon to coupe.” Eugene
Masselink to Lewis Mumford, July 1, 1936, M063D09, FLWFA.
74
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Barnsdall’s Hollyhock House in Hollywood (1919–21), overlapped with the emergence of
Hollywood’s commercial center as one of the first viable suburban rivals to downtown Los
Angeles’s retail district (fig. 1.23).75 Early versions of the master plan for Barnsdall’s Olive
Hill estate included a row of shops surmounted by duplexes that would have culminated the
eastern end of Hollywood Boulevard’s retail district. During the decade that Wright spent in
and out of Los Angeles, super service stations and drive-in markets proliferated across Los
Angeles and its environs. He no doubt familiarized himself with them as he commuted
between his office in the Homer Laughlin Building downtown and construction sites for
houses in Hollywood, Los Feliz, and Pasadena (fig. 1.24).76
In 1927, he designed a service station for the Buffalo-based Harris Oil Company, a
subsidiary of Tidewater Oil Company, also known as Tydol.77 He had been approached by a
former employee of the Buffalo-based Larkin Company, whose administrative building had
been one of the major successes of Wright’s early career. Initially, he was only asked to the
critique plans developed by a local Buffalo architect. After reviewing the Colonial Revival
prototype, Wright complained that “[d]riving up to the door of a sweet-pea cottage to get an
engine-tank refilled with petrol” would constitute a dangerous anachronism. He let it be

75 On the Hollyhock House, see Kathryn Smith, Frank Lloyd Wright, Hollyhock House and Olive Hill: Buildings
and Projects for Aline Barnsdall (New York: Rizzoli, 1992); Robert L. Sweeney, Wright in Hollywood: Visions of a New
Architecture (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994). On Hollywood, see Longstreth, City Center to Regional Mall,
chap. 4.
76 While in Los Angeles, in addition to the Hollyhock House, Wright built the Storer House (1923) and the
Freeman House (1924–25) in Hollywood, the Millard House (1923–24) in Pasadena, and the Ennis House
(1924) in Los Feliz. He also designed but did not realize a speculative development on the Doheny Ranch
property (1923) in Beverly Hills, a school and community playhouse on the Barnsdall estate (1923), and, later,
an apartment building for Elizabeth Noble in Los Angeles (1929).
77 The following account draws from Patrick J. Mahoney, “An Ornament to the Pavement: Frank Lloyd
Wright’s Buffalo Gas Station,” Western New York Heritage 6, no. 3 (Summer/Fall 2003): 18–35; and Jack Quinan,
Frank Lloyd Wright’s Buffalo Venture, from the Larkin Building to Broadacre City: A Catalogue of Buildings and Projects
(San Francisco: Pomegranate Communications, 2012), 168–173.
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known that he would not simply recommend superficial improvements to the proposed
design. Instead, he insisted,
I want to get a gas-station born that lives up to the nature of the affair as I see it here
and coming. […] And it should be done for some company strong enough and farsighted enough to be willing to pay for a creative-thing, reward invention, in other words.
Standard Oil would be the crowd were they not so hide-bound—God knows “success”
is ever failure in this sense. I am tired of camouflage and nasty-nice. The gas-station is
rapidly taking the place of our old railway stations and something else besides. It has a
future but not a pseudo colonial-cottage, mind you, or anything like it.78
Wright’s invocation of Standard Oil is more telling than it may initially appear. First, his
contact at the Harris Company had told him that their own cottage-like scheme was inspired
by Standard Oil’s Colonial Revival service stations, with their signature red fuel pumps, red
tile roofs, and whitewashed walls.79 Second, and more intriguing, Standard Oil’s northeast
division, Socony, spent the 1920s developing a multimedia advertising campaign that used
maps, brochures, and radio programs to capture the market of the northeastern United
States—from Bangor, Maine, to Buffalo, New York—by representing it as “Soconyland” to
consumers (fig. 1.25). One popular 1925 brochure, Historic Tours in Soconyland, detailed
historical landmarks throughout the region, mostly from the Revolutionary era, and
concluded by informing motorists, “When you advance the throttle and glide through
‘Soconyland Tours’ you will be agreeably surprised to find a service station ‘just when you
need one’ throughout the entire territory. […] Nature has supplied the beauty, history has

Frank Lloyd Wright to William R. Heath, transcribed in a letter from Heath to Darwin D. Martin,
October 4, 1927, quoted in Quinan, Buffalo Venture, 168 (italics in original).
79 See Mahony, “Ornament,” 22.
78
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brought forth the interest, unexcelled hotel accommodations comfort and Socony products—
Dependability!”80
“Soconyland” was by no means unique. Most major oil companies pursued similar
campaigns. Popular magazines like Country Life and House & Garden also advocated service
stations as agents in the production of a new cultural landscape.81 Socony’s stations still
physically occupied the heterogeneous metropolitan fringe, but they were also signposts of a
more cohesive imaginary landscape rendered legible to Standard Oil’s customers. Despite
Wright’s denigration of revivalist designs, his notion that service stations were “rapidly
taking the place of our old railway stations and something else besides” belied a similar
project. His desire to find an appropriately “modern” language for service stations also
cohered with other architects in Wright’s orbit, including Richard Neutra, Rudolf Schindler,
and his own son, Lloyd Wright.82
For his own station design, Wright proposed a mass-produced, largely prefabricated, and
adaptable prototype. It was anchored visually, programmatically, and structurally by a
compact concrete cube set back from the intersection on a suburban corner site (fig. 1.26).

80 Standard Oil Company of New York, Historic Tours in Soconyland (New York: Publishers Printing, 1925),
56, 58 (italics in original).
81 See, for example, “Filling Stations for Town Betterment,” House & Garden 47 (June 1925): 94–95;
“Filling Station Architecture,” Country Life 51 (April 1927): 102.
82 His son Lloyd Wright built a drive-in market at Yucca and Vine Streets in Hollywood (1930). See
“Corrugated Galvanized Iron: Yucca-Vine Market, Hollywood, California,” American Architect 141, no. 2605
(March 1932): 22–23. Richard Neutra published different designs for drive-in markets in venues such as Chain
Store Review, American Builder, and Architectural Record. On Wright (Jr.) and Neutra, see Longstreth, The Drive-In,
63–66. Rudolph M. Schindler proposed a service station design for the Union Oil Company in 1933. Slightly
later, in 1936, Walter Dorwin Teague designed a standardized service station for Texaco, of which hundreds
were built across the country by 1950. For Schindler and Teague, see Vieyra, ‘Fill’er Up,’ 62–63, 69–71. Articles
in the architectural press discussed competitions for service stations and advocated its beautification, among
other related topics. See, for example, Rexford Newcomb, “A Word as to the Filling Station,” Western Architect
34 (March 1925): 30-32; Alexander G. Guth, “Small Buildings: The Automobile Service Station,” The
Architectural Forum 45 (July 1926): 33–56; “A Union Oil Company Service Station,” American Architect 133
(March 5, 1928): 331–333; “Class ‘B’ III Projet—‘A Filling Station,’” The Bulletin of the Beaux-Arts Institute of
Design 4 (April 1928): 8–9; K[nud] Lönberg-Holm, “The Gasoline Filling and Service Station,” The Architectural
Record 67, no. 6 (June 1930): 561–84.
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The multi-level interior contained a waiting area and restrooms for the public, with a
salesroom, attendant’s office, sleeping quarters, and storeroom below. Two wings for
refreshments and concessions extended from the rear sides of the block. The most
prominent feature of the design was an L-shaped, copper-clad canopy that extended
overhead toward the street corner (fig. 1.27). Two large masts, which Wright termed
“totems,” shot upward from each wing of the canopy providing both structural support for
the cantilever and anchorage for station signage. Rather than employ conventional surfacemounted pumps, gasoline hoses were to be hung from the underside of the cantilevers,
primarily to declutter the ground plane. Planters along the curbsides would guide motorists
through the forecourt. In variations of the scheme for differently sized sites, the lateral
wings were sometimes inflected to conform to lot boundaries, remade into a compact square
garage, expanded into a large service courtyard, or removed altogether for a more
streamlined kiosk. A model built in 1930 demonstrated this well. (It was ostensibly for a
Texaco commission but was actually created as part of a traveling exhibition initiated by the
Architectural League of New York and its then-president Raymond M. Hood.)83 As figures
1.28a & 1.28b show, the model’s central block could function variously as a small
freestanding pavilion or as the centerpiece of an adaptable super service station. Despite this
flexible design’s formal and structural ingenuity, it demonstrates a clear debt to the
established organizational logic of service station design.
The potential commission from the Harris Company fell through. This was partly
because of concerns over Wright’s understanding of technical matters (the risks associated
with pressurized fuel hoses dangling in the pathways of passing motorists were chief among
83 See Kathryn Smith, Wright on Exhibit: Frank Lloyd Wright’s Exhibitions (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2017), 44, 243.
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them).84 But, Wright also belligerently refused to deliver the designs to Harris executives in
the hopes of obtaining a patent and more lucrative commission from a large oil company,
like Standard Oil.85 He continued to experiment with the design well into the 1930s, mostly
through unsolicited proposals to major oil concerns.86 Nothing came of these. Despite this
disappointing outcome, Wright imbued his service station design with enormous potential.
As the possible Harris job faltered, Wright claimed that he had “made a sketch for a new
dispensation, a practical invention.”87 In 1933, his secretary Karl Jensen sent an unsolicited
proposal to the Cities Services Company, offering a fifty percent stake in constructing a
Wright-designed service station at Taliesin. As Jensen explained, in addition to conveniently
fueling Wright’s growing fleet, the station would serve the community forming around the
recently founded Taliesin Fellowship by containing a post office and restaurant. It also would
be “a practical exemplar for demonstration purposes of the sound and beautiful design of a
modern, standardized gas-station in the best sense instead of those that now fill the
highways.”88
Jensen never received a response (a follow-up letter also went unanswered) and none of
Wright’s designs materialized. But, the architect’s continued experimentation made clear that
the “new dispensation” he had sketched was not a discrete, one-off proposition. As he

See Mahony, “Ornament,” 26.
On the abandonment of the initial project with the Harris Company, see ibid., 28–31; and Quinan,
Buffalo Venture, 171–173.
86 As the likelihood of a commission from the Harris Company dimmed, Wright claimed to have been in
contact with Standard Oil and Texaco. He later adapted the scheme for Phillips 66, Shell, and Skelly, all of
which seem to have been unsolicited. The original 1927 drawings include a Tydol banner between the
“totems,” but a rendering bearing a Phillips 66 logo appeared in The Living City (New York: Horizon Press,
1958), 118–19. A less formally ambitious design was ultimately built in Cloquet, Minnesota, in 1958, as a
Phillips 66 station. A full-scale replica of the original scheme was erected inside the Buffalo Transportation
Pierce-Arrow Museum in 2014. On these later developments, see Mahoney, “Ornament,” 31–35.
87 Frank Lloyd Wright to Darwin D. Martin, October 3, 1927, quoted in Quinan, Buffalo Venture, 170
(italics in original).
88 Karl Jensen to [Karl Latham] Dougherty, February 9, 1933, D014B07, FLWFA.
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outlined in the early publications devoted to Broadacre City, he foresaw service stations
becoming integrated, mass-produced, and standardized components of a new metropolitan
landscape attuned to the automobile. Given Wright’s experience as a sometime resident of
Los Angeles, such an idea was not exactly prophetic. His design was, in many ways, simply a
summary of automobile-induced transformations that had already produced change that
could be felt in the low-density suburbs of Los Angeles and in the increasingly cavernous
avenues of midtown Manhattan.

1.4 Raymond M. Hood’s Metropolitan Models

By 1926, the building boom of the “roaring twenties” was in full effect. As midtown
Manhattan grew denser with towers, a number of architects, planners, and critics began to
question the efficacy of the 1916 zoning resolution. Corbett remained convinced that
setback provisions, coupled with multilevel streets, were sufficient, but others argued for
stricter controls. In the New York Times, Henry H. Curran, a prominent reformer who
engaged in a year-long public debate with Corbett, suggested that “a limited number of
skyscrapers” could be located in “suitable districts” and “surrounded by parks,” as one
“possible means to decentralize New York instead of contributing to its congestion.”89

89 Henry H. Curran, “Against the Skyscraper,” New York Times Magazine, December 5, 1926, 2. Curran’s
article appeared directly opposite Corbett’s “The Skyscraper: Babel or Boon?.” In addition to published articles,
Corbett and Curran debated at a November 1926 meeting of the New York Building Congress, at the
Architectural and Allied Arts Exposition in New York in February 1927, and at a U.S. Chamber of Commerce
luncheon in Washington, D.C., in May 1927. See Corbett, “Up with the Skyscraper,” National Municipal Review
16, no. 2 (February 1927): 95–101; Curran, “The Skyscraper Does Cause Congestion,” National Municipal Review
16, no. 4 (April 1927): 229–34. For summary accounts, see Rose C. Feld, “Now the Skyscraper Is Sharply
Attacked,” New York Times, July 4, 1926; “Is the Skyscraper Doomed?,” National Municipal Review 15, no. 8
(August 1926): 438–39; “Calls Skyscrapers City’s Chief Asset,” New York Times, November 19, 1926, 27; Harold
S. Buttenheim, “To Skyscrape or Not to Skyscrape,” City Planning 3, no. 1 (January 1927): 61–62; “Skyscrapers
Discussed,” The New York Times, February 26, 1927, 27; “For and Against the Skyscraper,” New York Times,
May 22, 1927, W24; Fogelson, Downtown, 172–79.
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Frederic A. Delano, chair of the Regional Plan Association (RPA), and Thomas Adams, the
RPA’s planning director, offered similar suggestions, also in 1926, prefiguring the more
comprehensive arguments of the 1929 Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs.90 In a 1927
article in the trade journal Architecture, Lewis Mumford, a prominent member of the
Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA), fundamentally rejected the economic
logic of tall buildings but conceded that, on purely aesthetic grounds, isolated towers could
be treated as “public monument[s],” if they “occup[ied] sites sufficiently protected against
intrusion to enable the building to be treated as a unity.”91 Despite notable intellectual
differences between these authors, they all agreed that freestanding towers might be used to
ameliorate conditions in Manhattan’s congested center. They all also used the works of
Raymond M. Hood to illustrate that possibility.
Until 1922, Hood had struggled to maintain a solo practice inauspiciously established in
New York in 1914, on the eve of World War I.92 Then, in 1922, he won the Chicago Tribune
Tower competition and was commissioned, a year later, to build a new headquarters for the
American Radiator Company facing New York’s Bryant Park. Both projects were undertaken
in association with the more established John Mead Howells. The international reach of the
Tribune Tower competition and the Radiator Building’s prominent site brought Hood
immediate, widespread attention. Much of the attention these projects received in

90 See Frederic A. Delano, “Skyscrapers,” American City 34, no. 1 (January 1926): 1–9; Thomas Adams,
“The Skyscrapers of New York,” Town Planning Review 12, no. 1 (May 1926): 79–83.
91 Lewis Mumford, “Is the Skyscraper Tolerable?,” Architecture 55, no. 2 (February 1927): 69, 68. In an
earlier, 1924 essay, Mumford had argued “it is much simpler to decentralize the population, and to build new
centers of commerce and industry, than it would be to readapt the existing city to high buildings,” which
succinctly summarized the RPAA’s planning ideal. Mumford, “High Buildings: An American View,” Architects’
Journal 60 (October 1, 1924): 487; also published in American Architect and the Architectural Review 126, no. 2458
(November 5, 1924): 423–24.
92 On Hood’s career, see Walter H. Kilham, Jr., Raymond Hood, Architect: Form through Function in the American
Skyscraper (New York: Architectural Book Publishing, 1973); Robert A.M. Stern with Thomas P. Catalano,
Raymond M. Hood (New York: The Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies and Rizzoli, 1982).
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architecture circles focused on their use of style. The Tribune Tower’s flamboyant neoGothicism received praise for its unified composition and faithful historicism. Louis Sullivan,
who famously preferred Eliel Saarinen’s second-place design, offered an enduring critique
when he proclaimed the winning entry to have been “evolved of dying ideas.”93 The
Radiator Building received more consistent praise, including from Corbett, for whom it was
an “exercise of the free imagination which soars without restraint of the conventions of the
past.”94 By the time both projects were completed—the Radiator Building in 1924 and the
Tribune Tower in 1925—Hood was one of New York’s most well-known and contentious
architects.
Contemporary critics like Sullivan and Corbett were, and subsequent scholars have
continued to be, preoccupied with Hood’s capricious aesthetics.95 During the 1920s, more
established, aesthetically conservative American architects and critics supportive of them
contended with the growing influence of European modernism in the U.S. Hood did not fit
easily into these debates. His academic training at MIT and the École des Beaux-Arts in Paris
made him sympathetic to revivalism, as demonstrated by his student projects and early works
like the Tribune Tower. But he was also keenly interested in recent European developments.
He had likely read Vers une architecture before it appeared in English in 1927. He would have

93 Louis H. Sullivan, “The Chicago Tribune Competition,” Architectural Record 53, no. 2 (February 1923):
153. On the Tribune Tower competition, see Katherine Solomonson, The Chicago Tribune Tower Competition:
Skyscraper Design and Cultural Change in the 1920s (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
94 Harvey Wiley Corbett, “The American Radiator Building New York City: Raymond M. Hood,
Architect.” Architectural Record 55, no. 5 (May 1924): 477.
95 See, for example, Henry-Russell Hitchcock, Jr., “Raymond Hood,” in Modern Architecture: International
Exhibition (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1932), 129–32; Siegfried Giedion, Space, Time and
Architecture: The Growth of a New Tradition, 4th edition (orig. 1941; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1962), 389–91; Manfredo Tafuri, “The Disenchanted Mountain: The Skyscraper and the City,” in The American
City: From the Civil War to the New Deal, tr. Barbara Luigia La Penta (orig. 1979; Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press,
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seen Le Corbusier’s Plan Voisin exhibited at the 1925 Exposition Internationale des Arts
Décoratifs et Industriels Modernes, in Paris, which he attended. As president of the Architectural
League of New York, he unsuccessfully tried to arrange Le Corbusier’s first trip to the U.S.,
in 1929.96 Anticipating critiques of his liberal attitude toward visual style, Hood wryly
insisted that his use of “the ‘vertical’ style” in the Tribune Tower and Radiator Building was
“simply because I happened to make them so.”97 He explained that, instead of style, his
primary concerns lay in a “tendency of today [which] is to treat the entire building as though
it were a detached, freestanding structure, introducing a new spirit of truth and consistency
in external structural expression, which is now evidenced in every successful building.”98
That is, Hood adopted a functionalist approach to architecture in which stylistic questions
were secondary to typological ones.
Hood’s argument, couched in the language of “truth and consistency,” relied on basic
economic considerations. Prior to the introduction of air-conditioning in the 1930s and
fluorescent lighting in the 1940s, large, operable windows admitted as much daylight and
fresh air as possible. As Carol Willis has documented, developers and tenants therefore
preferred offices with high ceilings and shallow depths.99 Corbett ably explained that it was
“better to have less space—less capital investment—permanently rented at a high figure than

96 See Mardges Bacon, Le Corbusier in America: Travels in the Land of the Timid (Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press, 2001), 15–16, 26–27; Kilham, Raymond Hood, 13–14, 90–91.
97 Raymond M. Hood, “Exterior Architecture of Office Buildings,” Architectural Forum 41, no. 3
(September 1924): 97.
98 Ibid., 98.
99 Precise recommendations for proportioning offices varied, but generally an ideal width was eight to ten
feet (so that two partitioned offices could fit within a typical structural bay), ceiling heights were ten to twelve
feet, and depth was fifteen to twenty-five feet. See Dankmar Adler, “Light in Tall Office Buildings,” Engineering
Magazine 4, no. 2 (November 1892): 176–77; Harvey Wiley Corbett, “The Planning of Office Buildings,”
Architectural Forum 41, no. 3 (September 1924): 89–93; Richmond H. Shreve, “The Economic Design of Office
Buildings,” Architectural Record 67, no. 4 (April 1930): 339–59; Arthur Loomis Harmon, “The Design of Office
Buildings,” Architectural Forum 52, no. 6 (June 1930): 819–20; Willis, Form Follows Finance, 19–30, 79–88.
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too much space partially rented at a low figure.”100 Hood’s Radiator Building demonstrated
this well. The structure was held back from adjacent properties in order to create a compact
twenty-three story tower with chamfered corners that guaranteed daylight and ventilation to
offices on all four sides (figs. 1.29 & 1.30). Despite the loss of rentable floor space, the
Radiator Company could charge tenants a premium for what would otherwise have been
poorly lit parts of the interior.
Hood’s impulses derived from his working methods. In a 1924 article on the Radiator
Building, the architect explained his innovative use of “plasteline,” a non-hardening clay:
“Actually the first step in the design consisted in the shaping of a small plasteline model into
the maximum model that the zoning law permitted. This little plasteline model is surprisingly
like the building as it was finally developed.”101 Hugh Ferriss had already described the
zoning law as having analogically “placed upon the property a huge mass of clay” from
which architects could “remove as much as you want, but add nothing to it.”102 Hood’s
design process began by literally creating clay masses from which designs were carved (fig.
1.31). He employed full-time model builders to craft preliminary schemes based on rough
sketches or oral directions. By studying these in relation to existing site conditions, emerging
designs could be augmented based on compositional concerns, zoning requirements, and the
provision of light and air for office interiors. Successively larger models were built to
examine designs in greater detail. Corbett observed, in a 1926 article, that “the curious
workings of the zoning law” made it “almost essential to construct cardboard or plaster
models,” but contemporary profiles of Hood’s work found his model-based design process
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unconventional.103 Most architects continued to work primarily through drawing. For Hood,
drawing was a two-dimensional record of a process carried out in three dimensions. The
creation of a new type of skyscraper required a new mode of architectural production.
Model building impacted Hood’s conception of the tower typology, because it
encouraged him to think of skyscrapers as freestanding, three-dimensional objects in space.
As the contingent product of a speculative real-estate market, however, the urban space in
which these towers stood was highly unstable. To counter this, Hood translated the logic of
corporate consolidation into spatial terms to articulate a vision of the city as an array of
widely spaced towers. Architecturally, this was influenced by, but critical of, Corbett and
Ferriss. He cited Corbett’s influence on the Radiator Building’s design and collaborated with
Ferriss on numerous renderings.104 He also observed that the “great pyramidal masses” they
favored produced dark interiors and that multilevel streets were “mere palliatives.”105 At face
value, Hood’s “own patented dream of a tower city” might seem to align him with the
reformers and intellectuals cited above who used his work to illustrate their various
arguments for reducing urban density.106
In Hood’s conception, however, a city organized around freestanding towers would not
alleviate existing conditions. It would intensify them. He imagined “towers a thousand to
fifteen hundred feet tall. A forest of towers, of spires of commerce, five hundred feet
apart,” replacing Manhattan’s existing, variegated building stock.107 The reclaimed space

103 Corbett, “New Stones for Old,” 17. See the editorial comment appended to Hood’s “Exterior
Architecture of Office Buildings,” 99; Rayne Adams, “Raymond Hood,” Architecture 63, no. 3 (March 1931):
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General Electric Company (April 1925): 9.
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107 Raymond M. Hood, “New York’s Skyline Will Climb Much Higher,” Liberty, April 10, 1926), 21.
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surrounding each tower would become available for both recreation and traffic. As shown in
Ferriss’s dramatic renderings, published alongside Hood’s articles in the New York Times and
Liberty magazine, broad avenues with “light traffic” were interlaced with densely planted
parks, from which rose a seemingly endless number of widely spaced, slender towers (fig.
1.32). In his initial, 1924 proposal, Hood argued for immediate commercial and
environmental benefits, explaining to the Times, “You avoid dirt and dust and insects as you
go higher. […] You not only enjoy cooler air but cleaner air and more sunlight. Noise is
greatly diminished, workers are more contented and efficiency is increased.”108
By 1926, he was more focused on long-term effects and the means to realize them. The
decade-old zoning resolution had become “antiquated and close to obsolescence,” so he
proposed a new regulatory mechanism that would allow property owners to build higher if
they permanently ceded land back to the city.109 This would naturally “favor real estate
operations on a large scale and this has been the trend of all municipal buildings and zoning
laws. Whole blocks would soon develop of their own accord.”110 Hood’s own models and
drawings of the project depicted this transformation in progress, showing individual towers
gradually colonizing the existing urban fabric (figs. 1.33 & 1.34).111 The “city of towers”
translated Hood’s built works of the early 1920s into prototypes of an incrementalist
framework for rationalizing and consolidating the capitalist city.
It is worth reiterating that Hood’s scheme bears a striking resemblance to an early 1920s
project by Auguste Perret that was published in 1922 with a visualization by architect Jacques

108 Raymond M. Hood quoted in Orrick Johns, “Architects Dream of a Pinnacle City,” New York Times
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Lambert (fig. 1.35).112 In 1927, Hood obliquely “[gave] credit for the basic part of his idea to
a French architect who” proposed a peripheral ring “of apartments in the form of towers
with gardens between them” around Paris.113 Other scholars have noted the visual similarities
between Perret’s precedent and Hood’s proposals, but, again, his interest was more
organizational than stylistic. Perret attempted to transfigure the American skyscraper, which
he understood to be the unregulated, ad-hoc product of laissez-faire capitalism, into a
standardized component of a collectivist urban system. Hood selectively repurposed that
desire into his own developing critique to argue that freestanding towers could become
stabilizing units in a rationalized and consolidated capitalist metropolis.
Remaking Manhattan into a monocultural “forest of towers” obviously had broad
implications for the distribution of urban and suburban life. Hood told readers of Liberty
magazine in 1926, “Privately I believe that within a reasonable number of years [… t]here
will be no residence building on the Island of Manhattan.”114 The envisioned city’s
commercial towers, in other words, required a suburban counterpart. One possibility, which
emerged from a 1932 commission, was to transpose the freestanding tower typology into the
design of residential “country towers.” This project is explored in greater depth in chapter 4.
In addition to his designs for freestanding towers, Hood also addressed the
transportation questions with which Corbett was simultaneously preoccupied. He did not
offer anything as detailed than Corbett’s multilevel street proposals, but the few, brief verbal
sketches he included in his articles between 1925 and 1931 were nonetheless revealing of
112 See Jean Labadié, “Les cathédrales de la cité moderne,” L’Illustration 160, no. 4145 (August 12, 1922):
133. See also Carol Willis, “Towering Cities,” review of Stern, Raymond Hood, Skyline (July 1982): 10–11;
Mardges Bacon, “Rockefeller Center: Modernist Paradigm for the Urban Core,” in Therese O’Malley and
Joachim Wolschke-Bulmahn, eds., Modernism and Landscape Architecture, 1890–1940 (Washington, D.C.: National
Gallery of Art, 2015), 287–91.
113 “A ‘Tower City’ Plan to Relieve Traffic.”
114 Hood, “New York’s Skyline,” 19, 21.

60

what he imagined would exist beyond the “city of towers.” In a 1925 New York Times article,
Hood connected Manhattan with its environs quite literally with an idea for dozens of
tower-lined bridges.115 In addition to conveying commuters, the Times’ reporter speculated
that each bridge could “conservatively” house 50,000 people, and would develop its own
“peculiar community pride and ideals,” through its churches, schools, and other facilities.116
In his 1926 Liberty article, Hood clarified that the apartments along each bridge would be
reserved exclusively for “millionaires.”117 The “near-millionaires and professional men”
would live near the bridges, beyond which “will live the workers in comfortable towns, and a
little further out will lie the factories, and farther out the farms.”118 In other words, Hood
proposed to radically reconfigure the entire metropolitan territory, resolving its variegated
landscapes into a neatly organized concentric diagram of capitalist privilege. He was never
entirely consistent about this, in theory or in practice. Though he certainly classed himself
among the “professional men,” he commuted to his office in the Radiator Building from a
rustic waterfront home in Stamford, Connecticut. He also suggested, in a 1931 interview
with the New York Herald Tribune that once Manhattan became “a huge business center where
there is no room for homes,” executives would “liv[e] in the country and commut[e] by
airplane to the metropolis.”119 Whether articulated in terms of adjacencies or transit, Hood’s
conception of the metropolitan landscape was shaped by a singular focus on the
prerogatives and privileges of businessmen.
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In 1929, Hood augmented this vision with a new project, titled “A City under a Single
Roof.” This would combine offices with stores, theaters, restaurants, hotels, and apartments
in a cruciform tower spanning three city blocks (fig. 1.36). The scheme (briefly) reversed
Hood’s arguments about the spatial relationships between city and suburbs, collapsing
offices and homes into a single, vertically integrated structure. Despite this reversal, the text
explicating the project, which appeared in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s journal Nation’s
Business in November 1929, a few weeks after Hood joined the Rockefeller Center design
team, was a direct continuation of Hood’s argument the architecture could facilitate
economic consolidation. Hood explained how laissez-faire urban development was “a
quarrelsome, competitive, destructive battle into which only the shrewdest opportunist or
the most audacious adventurer can afford to put his money.”120 His proposal simply
embraced “a form of amalgamation such as occurs every day in the business world. It means
the application of farsighted direction to a movement that already has shown itself in the
city’s growth.”121 One example of such “enlightened” development was “the New
Metropolitan Opera center at Fifth Avenue and Fiftieth Street.”122
Over the next two years, the midtown opera complex would become Rockefeller Center
and Hood would return to his earlier metropolitan vision. In 1931, he published renderings
of Manhattan as it might appear in 1950, which showed a hypertrophied version of his “city
of towers,” in which the original pinnacles had become enormous pyramidal clusters
connected to the suburbs by way of numerous apartment bridges.123 The same year, he
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defiantly proclaimed to colleagues at an Architectural League of New York luncheon, “No
one should live in Manhattan; everyone should commute.” The city, he concluded, should be
“just as solid as possible and as congested […] Wait until Radio City is finished, I will prove
it.”124 If early works like the Tribune Tower and Radiator Building were prototypes of
Hood’s evolving metropolitan vision, Rockefeller Center would serve as its verification.

1.5 Conclusion

From the 1880s through the 1920s, architecture played a critical role in transforming
metropolitan America. The advent of skyscrapers and then automobiles produced upheavals
in downtowns and remapped social and economic conditions in the suburbs of cities like
Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York. Through writings, lectures, built works, and unrealized
planning proposals, Wright, Corbett, and Hood were among the most influential voices
addressing these changes. The differences in their approaches are obvious and substantial,
but the foregoing offers an opportunity to consider similarities that are less immediately
apparent. Wright’s early planning proposals, Corbett’s studies of New York’s zoning
envelope, and Hood’s “city of towers” were all underpinned by a shared organizational
imperative, namely, that a regulated framework for development was a necessary
precondition for the exercise of individual freedom. Wright and Hood shared an interest in
how emerging typologies—super service stations, for Wright, and freestanding towers, for
Hood—might reorient growth in the metropolitan landscape. This is not to say that their
interests were the same. Wright understood service stations to be precursors of a
thoroughgoing decentralization of economic and spatial structures, while Corbett and Hood
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never fully reconciled their views on commercial centralization and residential
decentralization. What the foregoing does reveal is that, despite these differences,
Rockefeller Center and Broadacre City emerged from a shared set of concerns and a
common context.
The following chapters will continue to explore the changing cultural and material
landscapes of the early-twentieth-century metropolis—a backdrop for a potent comparison
of Rockefeller Center and Broadacre City. Rockefeller Center was a direct outgrowth of
Corbett’s and Hood’s experience building skyscrapers in Manhattan and their unreconciled
efforts to situate them in imagined frameworks that would permit capital and traffic to flow
smoothly through metropolitan space. Wright’s project was rooted in the heterogeneous
suburban landscapes of Chicago and Los Angeles, combining nostalgia for a gradually
disappearing country life with a gendered, classist ideology of domesticity and an
unwavering faith in the automobile’s transformative potential. Both projects embraced the
architectural, technological, and economic innovations that seemed to be ushering in a new
era. Clear and detailed analyses of metropolitan conditions, and their substantive
transformation prior to the 1930s, were essential to both Broadacre City and Rockefeller
Center. By the time Wright exhibited his project in the RCA Building in 1935, their histories
were already intertwined.

64

2. ROCKEFELLER CENTER’S COOPERATIVE CAPITALISM, 1929–1932
On November 1, 1939, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., symbolically completed construction of
Rockefeller Center. Before a crowd of three-hundred business and civic leaders, dignitaries,
Rockefeller employees, Center tenants, laborers, and journalists, Rockefeller “doffed his
overcoat, put on workman’s gloves, and drove home a two-pound silver rivet,” as the New
York Times reported on the following day’s front page (fig. 2.1).1 The sound of Rockefeller’s
pneumatic hammer ricocheted off of the concrete and steel of the U.S. Rubber Company
Building’s unfinished lobby. It also resonated across America’s airwaves. The hour-long
ceremony was broadcast nationwide by the National Broadcasting Company. This was fitting
because, as David Sarnoff, president of the Radio Corporation of America (NBC’s parent
company and Rockefeller’s anchor tenant), had observed moments earlier, the “pioneering
art and industry” of radio had “become a ‘first settler’ in what was then a wilderness of
blue-prints.”2 Sarnoff marveled at “this modern center of the world’s metropolis at the point
of completion.” He also admitted that the Center’s successful completion made it “easy to
forget the tremendous difficulties under which it was started. […] Rockefeller Center is
much more than a triumph of architecture.” It was, he proclaimed, “a living symbol of the
spirit of America.”3
Unsurprisingly, Rockefeller concurred. His own remarks mixed a plea for pacifism (two
months to the day after Germany invaded Poland) with an earnest defense of “the
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fundamental principles and beliefs upon which Rockefeller Center has been built and for
which it stands.”4 These centered on an understanding “that the ultimate object of all
activities in a republic should be the development of the manhood of its citizens,” which
would be realized through an “industrial policy” that guaranteed “the welfare of the
employes as well as the making of profits.”5 For Sarnoff, the nearly completed Center
symbolized a vaguely defined Americanism. In Rockefeller’s mind, it manifested a specific,
gendered conciliation between capital and labor.
Rockefeller Center originated in a late-1920s plan to build a new house for the
Metropolitan Opera. This dissipated in the aftermath of the October 1929 stock market
crash, but not before it established a site and a framework for combining cultural production
with commercial development. Rockefeller Center would take shape within this framework
over the course of the following decade. This chapter explores the first few tumultuous years
of that process. The departure of the Opera created a void at the center of the architects’
developing plans and in Rockefeller’s balance sheets. When the RCA filled it, in early 1930, it
shifted the project’s cultural and commercial commitments. It also provided an opportunity
to promote the project as a manifestation of the benevolent capitalism Rockefeller espoused.
Sarnoff ’s predecessor at RCA, Owen D. Young, understood the corporation to have a social
purpose that he described as “semi-philanthropic.”6 The architects responsible for the
project characterized their role as a cooperative partnership with capital. By examining the
confluence of capitalist ideologies among the project’s stakeholders—patron, tenant,
architects—this chapter examines how Rockefeller Center took shape between 1929 and
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1932, amidst the onset of the Great Depression, as a purported incarnation of progressive
corporatism.

2.1 Operatic Beginnings

Rockefeller Center is often characterized as a commercial enterprise that emerged from
an abandoned cultural endeavor. The decisive moment of that transformation is seen to be
the announcement on December 3, 1929, exactly five weeks after the October 29th stock
market crash, that, due to “insuperable” obstacles, the planned relocation of the
Metropolitan Opera to property leased by John D. Rockefeller, Jr., “has been abandoned.”7
The situation was neither as categorical nor as definitive as the announcement made it seem.
Exploring the Opera’s role in initiating the project and the ways in which its architect,
Benjamin Wistar Morris, established a framework for developing the chosen site help to
understand the somewhat fluid relationship between commerce and culture that would
define the project, even after the Opera’s departure.
In 1926, Otto H. Kahn, a financier and philanthropist who was president of the
Metropolitan Opera Company, began searching for a site on which to build a new opera
house. The Opera’s current home, a yellow-brick structure designed by Josiah C. Cady in
1883, the appearance of which was often likened to a brewery, had become cramped and
technically outmoded. Kahn hired architect Benjamin Wistar Morris in 1927 to develop
plans for a number of possible sites across Manhattan.8 Each design was a variation on the
7 “Re: Metropolitan Opera House,” December 3, 1929, unsigned memorandum, folder 607, box 81, series
C (Business Interests, FA312), Office of the Messrs. Rockefeller Records (OMR), Rockefeller Archive Center
(RAC).
8 Kahn also hired Joseph Urban to work with Morris, but Urban was quickly fired after he prematurely
published his designs, leaving Morris to work alone. See Carol Herselle Krinsky, Rockefeller Center (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1978), 23; Daniel Okrent, Great Fortune: The Epic of Rockefeller Center (New York:
Viking, 2003), 25.
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same theme, which was to combine enough revenue-producing commercial space to cover
the construction and operating costs of the adjoining opera house. Morris preferred
apartment hotels to offices, since he thought the former would maintain an air of cultural
refinement, while generating income for the venture. After conducting a tour of prominent
cultural venues and civic monuments across Europe, the architect argued for a public plaza
as part of the schemes, if space allowed. The local press chronicled each new development:
the announcements of definitive plans to move, the subsequent abandonment of those
plans due to perceived shortcomings of a selected site, rumors of infighting among the
Opera’s leadership.9
Kahn and Morris’s efforts seemed to have stalled until three blocks in midtown came to
their attention in January 1928. The site, owned by Columbia University, was bounded by
48th Street to the south, 51st Street to the north, and Fifth Avenue to the east.10 Because of
a misalignment between the original property lines and the grid projected by the 1811
Commissioners’ Plan, Columbia’s holdings stopped roughly one-hundred feet east of Sixth
Avenue. The University no longer controlled the Fifth Avenue frontage between 48th and
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to dissipate north of Houston Street. The College’s original plan was to build a “suburban” campus on the site
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49th Streets, having sold the sixteen parcels in the 1850s to cover operating costs and other
expenses. The leasehold also originally included a fourth block, between 47th and 48th
Streets, which the University sold in 1904 to fund its new campus in Morningside Heights.
By 1875, the Columbia site was filled with over 250 two- to six-story row homes, grander on
Fifth Avenue, where St. Patrick’s Cathedral neighbored the site, less so along the side streets,
where the Sixth Avenue El trundled overhead (fig. 2.2). When the site came to Benjamin
Morris’s attention, in 1928, these now half-century old structures were filled with a diverse
assortment of apartments, boarding houses, brothels, speakeasies, restaurants, textiles
manufacturers, shoemakers, funeral parlors, laundries, pharmacies, and retail outlets.
Most histories of Rockefeller Center describe the condition of this site in 1928 as being
on the verge of dilapidation and ill-repute. Carol Krinsky, in her still-authoritative
architectural history, observes that “not all of [the site’s tenants] were of good reputation.”11
Daniel Okrent, author of a thorough popular history of the project, describes the Columbia
leasehold more colorfully as a “tawdry collection” of obsolescent buildings, from which
Columbia received a “pathetic” annual income of $300,000; the part closest to Sixth Avenue,
overhung by the El, was “a netherworld of sin and sleaze.”12 Such characterizations
reproduce the gentrifying logic that the University, the Rockefellers, and the architects used
to legitimize the project. Contemporary photographs and accounts in the New York daily
press show the three blocks to have been a lively and diverse cross section of urban life,
where the Goelet mansion could coexist, however uneasily, with a gin mill. It was, in many
ways, the kind of variegated, medium-density neighborhood that Jane Jacobs would celebrate
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Krinsky, Rockefeller Center, 28.
Okrent, Great Fortune, 13, 12.
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in the 1960s.13 Its delegitimization was the first, necessary step in make Rockefeller Center a
reality.
For Benjamin Morris, the Columbia property’s purported disrepute made it an ideal
target for redevelopment, but the fact that such a large area remained under the control of a
single owner made it especially enticing. He presented plans for the site on May 21, 1928, at
the Metropolitan Club, where a dinner had been organized to lure investors. The scheme
consisted of three distinct but interrelated parts: an opera house, a public plaza, and three
revenue-producing towers. The opera house and plaza occupied most of the central block,
so that, as Morris rationalized, “the benefits to be gained accrue exclusively to Columbia and
the Opera,” and not to “the non-contributing owners” on adjacent blocks (fig. 2.3).14 At this
stage, Morris’s plan was to entice a philanthropically minded investor, or group of investors,
to purchase the land for the plaza and opera house from Columbia. The three thirty-fivestory, ziggurat-like towers that bounded the plaza “would be erected by Lessees from
Columbia, as and when demand occurs.”15 Morris’s presentation model was, therefore, less a
formal masterplan than it was a prospective financial framework. It established, in spatial
terms, the conditions of the plan’s economic viability.

13 See fig. 2.2; “Old Residents Sigh at Model for Radio City,” New York Herald Tribune, March 8, 1931.
Somewhat ironically, Jane Jacobs would praise the intimate scale of Rockefeller Center’s outdoor spaces as
humane contributions to urban culture in The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Random House,
1961), 178–86); and earlier in “Downtown Is for People,” Fortune 57, no. 4 (April 1958), reprinted in Samuel
Zipp and Nathan Storring, eds., Vital Little Plans: The Short Works of Jane Jacobs (New York: Random House,
2016), 58–130.
14 Benjamin Wistar Morris, “Description of a Proposed Site for the Metropolitan Opera House,” May 21,
1928, folder 515, box 69, series C, OMR, RAC, 4. The first suggestion for the site, made by a real-estate agent,
had been to locate the house and plaza in the middle of the southern block. See Weisman, “Price Mechanism,”
400; fig. 5 in folder 966, box 91, Series VII, Lectures and Writings, Winston Weisman Collection of
Architectural Photographs (PR 73), Department of Prints, Photographs, and Architectural Collections, The
New-York Historical Society.
15 Morris, “Description of a Proposed Site,” 5.
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By combining the opera house with speculative development, Morris’s plan also created a
mutually beneficial relationship between culture and commerce. The centrally located plaza
was, as the architect put it, “key to the situation.”16 Dubbed “Metropolitan Square,” it would
provide an appropriately dignified forecourt for the opera house. Bounded by elevated
pedestrian arcades, it would also link the various parts of the site together. If the land it was
to occupy were purchased and donated to the city, the plaza could permanently “secur[e]
certain highly valuable and additional building privileges to the Columbia holdings.”17 Put
differently, the provision of open space mid-block would permit taller buildings than
otherwise allowable under the zoning resolution. Morris’s plan neatly resolved the Opera’s
competing exigencies. Cultural refinement and commercial success could be simultaneously
guaranteed, albeit at the expense of the site’s soon-to-be-disenfranchised existing residents.
Morris’s plan was well received, and over the next several months things began to fall
into place. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., did not attend the presentation at the Metropolitan Club.
He sent a proxy instead, who submitted a favorable report one week later.18 By June,
Rockefeller’s real-estate advisors were exploring the possibility of leasing the entire Columbia
property, instead of purchasing part of it.19 Rockefeller began soliciting development advice
in August. One enterprising developer, John R. Todd, had his staff architects L. Andrew
Reinhard and Henry Hofmeister prepare a scheme to present to Rockefeller. Their diagram,
drafted in early September 1928, expanded on Morris’s plan by showing all of the land
controlled by Columbia, rather than just the parcels facing the envisioned plaza, developed as
a mixture of retail, hotels, and commercial lofts (fig. 2.4). To maximize ground-level retail
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Ibid.
Ibid., 6.
See Ivy L. Lee to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., May 25, 1928, folder 607, box 81, series C, OMR, RAC
See Charles O. Heydt to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., June 1, 1928, folder 607, box 81, series C, OMR, RAC.
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frontage, Reinhard & Hofmeister subdivided the site with two private streets running northsouth. As in Morris’s May 1928 scheme, elevated pedestrian arcades would interconnect the
site’s differentiated parts. This plan marked a crucial turning point in the project’s
development. It treated the site comprehensively, proposing one coordinated ensemble that
more fully exploited Columbia’s unified ownership of the three blocks than Morris’s first
plan.
Convinced by the logic of Todd’s and Reinhard & Hofmeister’s proposal, Rockefeller
made a formal commitment to Columbia in October. He organized the Metropolitan Square
Corporation—named for Morris’s proposed plaza—in December to negotiate the terms of
a lease. Rumors immediately began circulating through the daily press about a pending deal
involving the Opera, the University, and Rockefeller. These were categorically denied, until,
on January 22, 1929, Rockefeller signed a twenty-four-year lease with Columbia. The initial
annual rent was $3.6 million; there were three renewal options of twenty-one years each.
Rockefeller made the multi-million-dollar commitment despite having been informed by a
“somewhat embarrassed” Opera, on January 21st, that it might not be able to afford a new
opera house after all.20
The Opera’s “embarrassed” admission precipitated a year of halting progress and
indecision. A prime example of this was an architectural “symposium” organized in
February 1929. “Symposium” functioned as a convenient euphemism for the Metropolitan
R. Fulton Cutting to Thomas M. Debevoise, January 21, 1928, folder 607, box 81, series C, OMR, RAC.
See also “Opera House Development: Tentative Memorandum of Procedure,” December 3, 1928, unsigned
memorandum, folder 798, box 107, series C, OMR, RAC; Thomas M. Debevoise to the Trustees of Columbia
University, December 31, 1928, folder 540, box 71, series C, OMR, RAC; “Denies Buying Opera Site,” New
York Times, November 14, 1928, 54; “Says Opera Board Has Selected Site,” New York Times, December 1, 1928,
22; “Rockefeller Buys $100,000,000 Realty; Part for New Opera,” New York Times, December 28, 1928, 1;
Harrison S. Dimmitt, “That Was New York: An Agreement Is Sealed,” New Yorker, August 18, 1934, 46–51;
Balfour, Rockefeller Center, 9–10, 15; Krinsky, Rockefeller Center, 30–36; Okrent, Great Fortune, 48–56; Weisman,
“Price Mechanism,” 400.
20
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Square Corporation to gather ideas from architects while avoiding compliance with the
American Institute of Architects’ regulations on competitions.21 The Metropolitan Square
board invited seven architects to contribute design ideas and three others to serve as
advisors. They were given a site plan that located the planned opera house and plaza and also
identified the areas uncontrolled by Columbia. They were asked to submit a site plan, three
sections—one longitudinal, two transverse—a written report, and any other graphic material
deemed necessary. The deadline was May 13, 1929. The only two submissions that the
advisors—John Russell Pope, Cass Gilbert, and Milton B. Medary, Jr.—found noteworthy
were those by Benjamin Morris and Corbett, Harrison & MacMurray.22
Morris’s invitation was predicated on his attachment to the Opera, but he also had
experience with commercial development. For example, he was responsible for the Cunard
Building (1917–21), built by developer John R. Todd directly across Broadway from the
Standard Oil Building (see fig. 1.14). For the Metropolitan Square “symposium,” he
submitted two schemes. “Scheme A” showed two slab-like towers flanking the opera house
near Sixth Avenue, mid-rise buildings enclosing the plaza, and an outsized, freestanding
tower sealing the plaza off from Fifth Avenue. “Scheme B” divided the Fifth Avenue tower
in two, permitting vehicular access to the opera house, and incorporated the uncontrolled
Fifth and Sixth Avenue frontages. (Morris claimed to know that the Sixth Avenue El was to
be imminently demolished and advised Rockefeller’s associates to begin acquiring the Sixth

21 See John Russell Pope to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., October 16, 1928, folder 794, box 106, series C,
OMR, RAC. Pope attached his correspondence with William A. Delano, president of the New York chapter of
the America Institute of Architects, which clarified what would and would not constitute a competition.
22 See [Milton B. Medary, Jr.,] “Board of Consulting Architects, in re: Metropolitan Square Corporation’s
Lease of Columbia University Property,” February 29, 1929, folder 794, box 106, series C, OMR, RAC. Aside
from Corbett’s firm and Morris, the other entrants were William T. Aldrich (of Boston), Edward H. Bennett
(of Chicago), Cross & Cross, and York & Sawyer. Cass Gilbert had been invited to contribute as a designer, but
after one of the original advisors, Charles Platt, dropped out, Gilbert’s role was redefined.
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Avenue properties adjacent to the Columbia leasehold, which unbeknownst to him, was
something they were already exploring.)23 The additional real estate permitted Morris to
more fully exploit the zoning law’s buildable envelope, on the one hand, and to subject the
entire three-block composition to an unyielding symmetry, on the other. As evidenced by the
perspective renderings of the schemes, the overwhelming scale, coordinated massing, and
visual uniformity of Morris’s schemes presented a vision of midtown transformed through
an imposing, even imperious, architectural intervention (fig. 2.5).
The gentrifying imagery of Morris’s proposal was made more precise through detailed
programmatic prescriptions. The lower five levels of the northern and southern blocks were
to be devoted to high-end retail, above which would be a hotel “of the highest class.”24 The
twin Sixth Avenue towers would be for apartments. Office space would be limited to the
Fifth Avenue tower(s), rentable only to businesses “of the highest grade, so that a mutually
cumulative influence toward class and stability will result.”25 This carried the logic of his May
1928 proposal to its logical conclusion. It also prefigured the argument of Hood’s “City
under a Single Roof,” which was published later in 1929, albeit in cultural rather than
commercial terms. Hood would argue, as discussed in chapter 1, that “enlightened,”
“amalgamated” control over multiple urban blocks would eliminate the “quarrelsome,
competitive, destructive battle” of laissez-faire development.26 For Morris, the existing
Columbia site seemed to need such “enlightened” intervention, while the Opera’s cultural

23 See Charles O. Heydt, May 7, 1929, untitled memorandum, folder 515, box 69, series C, OMR, RAC;
Okrent, Great Fortune, 88.
24 Benjamin Wistar Morris, “Report on Proposed Development to Metropolitan Square Corporation, Part
1,” May 11, 1929, folder 515, box 69, series C, OMR, RAC, 15.
25 Ibid., 14.
26 Hood, “A City Under a Single Roof,” 20, 209.
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ambitions would be guaranteed by the upmarket exclusivity that “amalgamated” control
made possible.
Corbett, Harrison & MacMurray’s proposal was the only one that did not assume the
location of Morris’s opera house to be fixed. They shifted it away from Sixth Avenue and
placed it in the center of an elevated pedestrian plaza that was connected via pedestrian
bridges to arcades across 49th and 50th Streets. A broad, sloping promenade rose from Fifth
Avenue to meet the plaza (fig. 2.6). The two pavilions that framed the promenade were the
endpoints of a continuous, colonnaded circuit that linked the Avenue, the Opera, two levels
of shops, and the lobbies of the seven, thirty-five- to sixty-story towers that were dispersed
along the perimeter of the site. The firm’s written report has been lost, but the proposal
clearly manifested Corbett’s earlier speculations on zoning and multilevel streets.27 The
“symposium” advisors commended the scheme for “creat[ing] a continuous composition
surrounding and enshrining the Opera House and produc[ing] an effect of great dignity as
seen from the avenue.”28
In general, the advisors were unimpressed with the “symposium” results.29 So too was
the Metropolitan Square board. Their only follow-through was to allow Morris to work

In January 1929, at a housing conference one month before being invited to the “symposium,” Corbett
remarked on a “proposal which has recently been presented for Mr. Rockefeller’s development around the new
opera house in New York,” which “definitely propose[d] to elevate the sidewalks one level throughout that
region.” Corbett, “Do We Want Three-Level Streets?,” 243. Only two of the architects’ reports have been
preserved. The RAC has a copy of Morris’s (see above), and Harvard’s Francis Loeb Library has Edward H.
Bennett’s (the architect gifted it to the Library in 1930). Three renderings by Hugh Ferriss of Corbett’s scheme
appeared in the 1929 Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs. See Adams, Regional Plan, vol. 2, 112, 113, 115.
Drawings for all of the proposals, except Bennett’s, are in Winston Weisman’s papers at the New-York
Historical Society. See figs. 10–21 in folder 966, box 91, Series VII, Weisman Collection, NYHS.
28 John Russell Pope, Cass Gilbert, and Milton B. Medary, Jr., to the Metropolitan Square Corporation,
attn. Arthur H. Woods, May 22, 1929, folder 515, box 69, series C, OMR, RAC, 3.
29 Not only was their official report decidedly ambivalent, one of the advisors, Cass Gilbert, submitted a
separate, dissenting memorandum, which began by bluntly asking whether the chosen site was “the best
location that can be found for the Opera House.” Cass Gilbert, “Re: Metropolitan Square Corporation (Opera
House Project),” May 29, 1929, memorandum, folder 799, box 107, series C, OMR, RAC, 1. It may be of note
27
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without a contract through the summer, which he spent synthesizing his “symposium”
schemes with Corbett’s.30 As Morris tinkered, Metropolitan Square began diligently acquiring
unexpired leases on the Columbia property. Rockefeller also surreptitiously organized the
Underel Holding Corporation to begin buying property on Sixth Avenue (under the el). The
Opera, meanwhile, refused to commit. In mid-August, when one of Rockefeller’s associates
complained of the Opera’s equivocations, his boss cabled in reply, “IF [the] OPERA DID NOT
COME IN

[an] EQUALLY SATISFACTORY TENANT WOULD TAKE ITS PLACE.”31 Morris, too, was

falling out of favor. The same associate thought that the “few rough sketches” the architect
presented over the summer “were so disappointing” that he “felt no progress was being
made.”32 In fact, Morris produced dozens of detailed studies between May and September
1929 and, for his part, insisted that his “architectural progress” was constrained by
unspecified “vital real estate questions.”33 Nevertheless, by September 1929, the consensus
among Rockefeller’s associates was that the design project was rudderless and in need of
redirection.
As a result, Rockefeller was persuaded to hire John R. Todd, the developer whose staff
architects Reinhard & Hofmeister produced the influential September 1928 site diagram, to

that on the signature page of the official report, all three advisors’ names were typed, but only Pope and
Medary signed the document.
30 See the following documents in folder 515, box 69, series C, OMR, RAC: Benjamin Morris, “Report to
the Metropolitan Square Corporation,” July 2, 1929; Morris to Arthur H. Woods, July 2, 1929; Morris to John
D. Rockefeller, Jr., July 13, 1929; Morris, “Re: Metropolitan Square Corporation,” memorandum, August 22,
1929; Morris, “Re: Metropolitan Square Corporation,” memorandum, September 6, 1929; and in folder 802,
box 107, series C, OMR, RAC: Morris, “Re: Metropolitan Square Corporation,” memorandum, June 18, 1929;
Morris to Heydt, July 30, 1929.
31 Rockefeller to Heydt, August 21, 1929, folder 607, box 81, series C, OMR, RAC.
32 Charles O. Heydt to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., December 23, 1929, folder 515, box 69, series C, OMR,
RAC.
33 Morris, “Re: Metropolitan Square Corporation,” memorandum, August 22, 1929, 3.
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manage the project.34 Todd’s mandate was to oversee, in Rockefeller’s oft-quoted words, the
production of “a unified and beautiful architectural whole […] compatible with an adequate
return on the investment.”35 He also recommended that Reinhard & Hofmeister be
responsible for “the practical working aspect,” while “[s]ome competent, well known
architect—perhaps Mr. Ben Morris” develop “the artistic architectural appearance of the
buildings.”36 When Todd’s appointment was announced to the press on October 4, 1929, the
New York Times perfectly captured the project’s then-uncertain status. The move “presaged”
the commencement of “actual work” on plans “to erect on a gigantic scale a model centre
of retail trade and business in conjunction with a new Metropolitan Opera House.” And yet,
“The general scheme of building is yet to be laid out.”37
Three weeks later, Todd announced that Reinhard & Hofmeister would be assisted by a
trio of consultants: Benjamin Morris, Harvey Wiley Corbett, and Raymond Hood. Corbett
and Hood were brought in because of their name recognition and experience building
skyscrapers in midtown, while Morris, with whom Rockefeller’s associates had become
disillusioned, was retained solely because of his connections to the Opera.38 The
announcement of this working arrangement appeared, inauspiciously, in the Times on
Tuesday, October 29th, under the equivocating headline, “Architects Picked to Plan
Rockefeller Centre, Which May Have Opera House as a Nucleus.” By the end of the day,

34 This entailed the hiring of two separate management firms, the Todd, Robertson & Todd Engineering
Corporation, run by John R. Todd, his brother James, and Hugh Robertson, and Todd & Brown, which was
headed by John’s son Webster and Joseph Brown.
35 John D. Rockefeller, Jr., untitled memorandum, August 28, 1929, folder 631, box 83, series C, OMR,
RAC, 2.
36 Ibid.
37 “Engineers Engaged for Opera Centre,” New York Times, October 5, 1929, 21.
38 Morris had also worked with Todd, the new project manager, on several projects, including the Cunard
Building, which Todd developed. Their relationship had soured over the course of building the Cunard
Building, such that by the time Rockefeller brought them together again in 1929, “the ill feeling between the
two men was now palpable,” according to Daniel Okrent. Okrent, Great Fortune, 105.
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news that a “first definite step toward the creation by John D. Rockefeller Jr. of an ideal city
unit in the midst of New York” had been lost in the fallout of the Black Tuesday market
crash.
One month later, on November 28, 1929, Reinhard & Hofmeister produced a site
diagram that made subtle adjustments to the now nearly year-old plans. On December 3rd,
the Metropolitan Square board announced the Opera’s departure. Morris, citing his original
commitment to the Opera, acrimoniously exited the project.39 With Columbia unwilling to
modify or nullify the lease, with a twelve-to-one discrepancy between rent owed the
University and revenue produced by the existing leases, and with a desire to salvage what
would otherwise have proved to be a catastrophically ill-timed investment, Rockefeller
decided to double down on sunk costs. Reinhard & Hofmeister’s next plan, dated January 8,
1930, replaced the opera house with “Major Building No. 1,” a fifty-story skyscraper.
The substitution of a skyscraper for an opera house marked a critical turning point in
the project’s development, but the organizing logic of what would become Rockefeller
Center was already in place. In the existing literature, Morris’s influence on the eventual
project’s formal composition is readily acknowledged.40 The predilections for symmetry and
axiality, the uniform moderne visual language, the centrally located plaza, even the promenade
Morris would continue to develop schemes for a new opera house on other sites until the mid 1940s.
However, he did not depart the Rockefeller-sponsored project quietly. He became embroiled in a months-long
dispute with Rockefeller over unpaid fees. When he resigned in December 1929, Morris claimed that he was
owed $234,156.29 for his work but would graciously accept $170,000. After protracted and increasingly bitter
exchanges with Rockefeller’s legal advisors, he eventually settled, in September 1930, for $50,000. See the
following correspondence in folder 515, box 69, series C, OMR, RAC: Heydt to Rockefeller, December 23,
1929; Benjamin Morris to Arthur Woods, January 22, 1930; Raymond B. Fosdick to Thomas M. Debevoise,
August 27, 1930; Fosdick to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., September 11, 1930. See also Okrent, Great Fortune, 130–
32.
40 See Bacon, “Rockefeller Center,” 283; Balfour, Rockefeller Center, 19; William H. Jordy, American Buildings
and Their Architects: The Impact of European Modernism in the Mid-Twentieth Century (Garden City, NY: Doubleday,
1972), 35–36; Rem Koolhaas, Delirious New York: A Retroactive Manifesto for Manhattan (orig. 1978; New York:
The Monacelli Press, 1994), 178–81; Okrent, Great Fortune, 28–29; Winston Weisman, “Who Designed
Rockefeller Center?,” Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians 10, no. 1 (March 1951): 12.
39
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framed by two small pavilions that preceded the plaza, can all be traced back to his work
during the project’s original, operatic phase (fig. 2.7). More significantly, his work determined
the epistemic parameters on which the later project would continue to rely. His May 1928
presentation transmuted the lively atmosphere of the existing Columbia site into a “tawdry”
and underperforming leasehold that a combination of cultural refinement and large-scale
commercial development could rectify. The May 1929 “symposium” schemes amplified this
initial proposition into a totalizing vision of “mutually cumulative” relations between
commerce and culture. Benjamin Morris was not the unwitting author of Rockefeller Center,
but he did establish the terms of the project’s development.

2.2 Becoming Radio City

The long-range damage from Black Tuesday took some time to settle in. The front page
of the October 31, 1929, New York Times, for example, announced that the Rockefellers had
spent the days since the crash investing in “sound common stocks,” which had “electrified
the Wall Street community and accelerated the recovery which was already well under way.”41
When the market’s short-lived rally foundered in mid-November and much of the globe
began to descend into a protracted Great Depression, John D. Rockefeller, Jr.,’s investment
in three blocks of midtown Manhattan real estate took on a decidedly different character and
purpose. The entry of the Radio Corporation of America into the project in mid-1930, as a
replacement for the Opera, has been treated in the existing literature on Rockefeller Center
as “a definitive shift from a cultural to a commercial enterprise,” according to Mardges
Bacon’s recent treatment.42 This undervalues the degree to which real-estate speculation
41
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“Rockefeller Buys, Allaying Anxiety,” New York Times, October 31, 1929, 1.
Bacon, “Rockefeller Center,” 284.
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determined the project’s “cultural” phase and also the sociocultural value attached to radio in
the early twentieth century. When RCA joined the project, it brought with it a high-minded
corporatism that accorded with Rockefeller’s purported goal of cooperation between capital
and labor introduced above. These distinct, but interrelated, ideologies of corporate
capitalism show that the Depression forced the project’s original premise to be recalibrated,
but not abandoned.
The diagram mentioned above that Reinhard & Hofmeister produced on January 8,
1930, helps to understand this recalibration. Labelled G-3, this scheme would prove to be
the most consequential of dozens produced in the wake of the Opera’s announced
departure (fig. 2.7). Its significance has often been judged in terms of its prefiguration of the
eventual project’s formal composition.43 The programmatic and organizational ideas
embedded in it are perhaps more revealing. First, aside from the obvious elimination of an
opera house, the scheme made critical programmatic departures from the previous eighteen
months of work. Benjamin Morris surrounded his opera house with retail, apartments, a
hotel, and offices, all “of the highest grade,” making his schemes self-contained urban
enclaves that would have replaced the site’s existing socioeconomic diversity with cultural,
commercial, and residential exclusivity. The G-3 scheme erased this possibility by removing
Morris’s residential component, along with the operatic centerpiece. Reinhard &
Hofmeister’s fifty-story tower was accompanied by two department stores, two rows of
shops that framed a promenade leading to a diminished plaza, a loft building, and four

43 For such interpretations, see Bacon, “Rockefeller Center,” 284; Balfour, Rockefeller Center, 18; Jordy,
American Buildings, 38; Koolhaas, Delirious New York, 182, 183; Krinsky, Rockefeller Center, 50; Tafuri,
“Disenchanted Mountain,” 467–68; Weisman, “Price Mechanism,” 401. In his unpublished dissertation,
Winston Weisman provides a more detailed and nuanced appraisal of the G-3 scheme’s relationship to the final
project. See Winston Weisman, “The Architectural Significance of Rockefeller Center” (Ph.D. diss., The Ohio
State University, 1942), 32–36.
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thirty-story office towers near the corners of the site. As examined in detail in chapter 4, the
removal of the apartments and hotel precipitated a series of infrastructural and residential
projects, mostly unrealized, that had the collective intent of remaking the metropolitan
region according to the needs of the Center and its ideal tenants: wealthy, white
businessmen.
Aside from these programmatic changes, the G-3 scheme perpetuated the established
logic of Morris’s earlier work. This is clear from a February 1930 letter John R. Todd, the
recently hired project manager, sent to a perplexed Rockefeller. At a recent meeting,
Rockefeller had mistaken the tower at the center of the new plan as an inversion of the
earlier schemes’ spatial logic. Despite appearances to the contrary, Todd explained that this
relied on the same basic premise of Morris’s work—that a central open square would
maximize development potential—while also “creating important tower rights” that, if not
used on the former opera house site, would “simply disappear.”44 Echoing Hood’s arguments
in favor of freestanding towers, Todd believed that this would “help our income materially”
across the site, while also guaranteeing “wonderful light and air on all sides.”45 He concluded
with a hedge. The diagram was “not intended to end our efforts in layout,” but would be
used to “intelligently establish prices” for prospective tenants.46 In other words, the G-3
scheme reconciled the competing exigencies of the zoning law, speculative development, and
a self-imposed imperative to produce a work “as beautiful and as outstanding as possible on
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John R. Todd to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., February 11, 1930, folder 582, box 78, series C, OMR, RAC,

45

Ibid., 2, 3.
Ibid., 3.

2.
46

81

a profitable basis,” as Todd paraphrased Rockefeller’s edict.47 Put simply, it translated the
absence of an opera house into new organizational possibilities.
It was in that capacity that the G-3 diagram was put to use, as part of negotiations with
the Radio Corporation of America and its affiliates.48 According to most accounts, Wallace
Harrison, Corbett’s junior partner, initiated discussions with RCA in mid-December 1929,
within weeks of the Opera’s announced departure.49 In May 1930, RCA agreed to lease one
million square feet of space, which included offices for RCA, NBC, RKO, RCA Victor, and
Photophone, more than two dozen radio, film, and television studios, and up to six theaters
for cinema and stage productions, including opera. (By April 1932, the number of theaters
had been reduced to two and the opera house had once again been eliminated.) The diagram
provided a spatial framework for reconciling RCA’s complex programmatic requirements
with Rockefeller’s need for revenue.
Radio was, in fact, an apt substitute for opera. If opera represented the Old World
aspirations of high-society New York, radio was a medium of mass communication and
popular entertainment. For Rockefeller Center’s public relations director Merle Crowell, “the
word ‘radio’ has, and probably always will have, an element of mystery, of scientific

Ibid., 1.
In Todd’s February 11, 1930, letter to Rockefeller, he made coded reference to this: “At the time of our
meeting on Monday, February 3rd, our whole architectural forces were working on plans for one concern of
which you know.”
49 On Harrison’s role, see Balfour, Rockefeller Center, 20; Victoria Newhouse, Wallace K. Harrison, Architect
(New York: Rizzoli, 1989), 39. Carol Krinsky gives Hood credit for approaching RCA. He had designed new
studios for NBC in 1927, and according to Krinsky, “proposed that the Radio Corporation of America which
controlled NBC, RKO motion pictures, and other interests be invited to rent space in the office building which
would have to replace the Opera House.” Krinsky, Rockefeller Center, 50. However, in July 1929, more than three
months before Hood’s first involvement with the project, one of Rockefeller’s real-estate advisors assembled “a
list of the type of tenants that we would expect to interest in the Metropolitan Square property,” which
included the observation, “We understand confidentially that the National Broadcasting Co. is greatly in need
of additional space and might be interested to erect a monumental building for its own use.” Harry Hall to
Charles O. Heydt, July 9, 1929, folder 799, box 107, series C, OMR, RAC.
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achievement, of something above and beyond the routine pale of events.”50 Because it
seemed to be capable of making information and entertainment instantaneously accessible
across geographic and social divides, RCA presented its products as devices capable of
overcoming stratifications introduced by earlier generations of industrial technologies.
During the 1920s, consumers were told that by purchasing a Radiola Regenoflex they were
“building America into a real democracy” (fig. 2.9). High-fidelity broadcasts of political
speeches, news bulletins, and cultural programming—from opera and classical music to
religious services to talks on education, fashion, and household improvements—among an
ever-changing variety of other offerings, would make “every farm—every city living room—
every corner radio store” into “a gathering place for the people, listening in.” Democracy, for
RCA, had less to do with social egalitarianism or government by popular consent than it did
with expanding the possibilities for informed consumption.
During the 1920s, radio programs began to “interweave” advertising with
entertainment.51 Broadcasts became both cultural media and marketable commodities, a
hybridization of aesthetics and economics analogous to Rockefeller’s own ambitions for
Rockefeller Center. Despite the communications industry’s oligopolistic tendencies—RCA
resolved a federal antitrust suit as it negotiated the lease agreement with Rockefeller’s
associates—the founding head of RCA, Owen D. Young, could portray the company’s
activities in 1926 as “semi-philanthropic.”52 By 1930, radio was an increasingly
Merle Crowell to John R. Todd, August 4, 1931, folder 608, box 81, series C, OMR, RAC.
Marchand, Advertising the American Dream, 92–108.
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(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); Susan J. Douglas, “Amateur Operators and American
Broadcasting: Shaping the Future of Radio,” in Imagining Tomorrow, ed. Corn, 35–55; Douglas, Listening In: Radio
and the American Imagination (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004); Robert W. McChesney,
Telecommunications, Mass Media, and Democracy: The Battle for Control of U.S. Broadcasting, 1928–1935 (New York:
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commercialized corporate product, but it was also still perceived to be a transformative
cultural agent. Thus, as “Metropolitan Square” became “Radio City,” its office towers,
theaters, and other facilities came to collectively embody such ostensibly progressive
corporate ideals.
Rockefeller only ever characterized his relationship with RCA as transactional, but the
media corporation’s efforts to “interweave” commercial success with cultural uplift
dovetailed with Rockefeller’s own aims.53 This was true of his specific aspirations for
Rockefeller Center, which framed the project’s potential in terms that blurred the lines of
aesthetic value and market value, and also more broadly in his purported desire to ameliorate
relations between labor and capital. To appreciate this, a brief digression is necessary.
As introduced above Rockefeller understood corporatism to be fundamentally
benevolent, a kind of “industrial democracy” in which capital and labor could cooperate to
the mutual benefit—and profit—of both. This conciliatory theory of labor relations had its
beginnings over a decade earlier, in the “Great Coalfield War” of 1913–14. For two years, the
United Mine Workers of America attempted to organize the eleven thousand colliers
employed by the Rockefeller-owned Colorado Fuel and Iron Company. Their efforts were
resisted, violently. On April 20, 1914, machine gun-wielding members of the Colorado
National Guard killed nineteen men, women, and children at a miners’ tent colony known as
Ludlow. In retaliation, rioting miners murdered thirty guardsmen and destroyed several

53 In response to a letter from famed radio commentator H. V. Kaltenborn that commended Rockefeller’s
“contribution to radio,” one of his associates retorted, “The company which he caused to be incorporated for
the purpose of taking over the lease of the Columbia Tract is only subletting portions of the tract to the Radio
Corporation of America and affiliated companies. The transaction is a purely commercial one.” Thomas M.
Debevoise to H. V. Kaltenborn, June 24, 1929, folder 652, box 87, series C, OMR, RAC.
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mines and company towns. The Ludlow Massacre and its aftermath remain one of the
bloodiest episodes in American labor history.54
As the violence raged across southern Colorado, Rockefeller offered unwavering support
for the mine’s management, laid sole blame for the violence on the striking miners, and
refused to see the guardsmen as anything but blameless “defenders of law and property.”55
Helen Keller labeled him the “monster of capitalism.”56 Thousands of protesters descended
on the Standard Oil Building, the Rockefellers’ 54th Street homes, and the family’s Pocantico
Hills estate (fig. 2.10). A year after the Massacre, the ongoing strike had spiraled into a
national political crisis. Faced with an unrelenting barrage of negative publicity and a
congressional inquiry, Rockefeller hired consultants to help repair the entwined reputations
of his family and industrial capitalism. The more moderate approach to labor relations that
resulted informed the development of Rockefeller Center.
In early 1915, Rockefeller began making more conciliatory statements on labor’s right to
organize, while also insisting that capital had an equal right to resist. He also undertook a
two-week sojourn to southern Colorado. For the better part of a year, photographs of bleak
Colorado “battlefields” and demonstrating crowds in lower Manhattan had circulated
alongside portraits of an impassive Rockefeller. To counter this, upon arrival in coal country
in late September 1915, Rockefeller traded his three-piece suit and top hat for denim
coveralls and canvas mining cap, embodying the appeasement he hoped to achieve. His
wardrobe at the “last rivet” ceremony in 1939—a pinstripe suit paired with leather
workmen’s gloves—was influenced by this public-relations strategy, as was his speech. The
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54

85

1939 speech regurgitated many of the tenets that Rockefeller first articulated to miners on
October 2, 1915. The earlier talk outlined his newly formulated “Industrial Constitution,”
which the national press immediately dubbed the “Rockefeller Plan.”57 It would permit the
formation of a company union—but prevent independent ones—and establish joint labormanagement committees to address mine safety, sanitation, housing, health, education, and
recreation. Put differently, it defeated the miners without upsetting the corporate status quo.
Rockefeller believed these provisions to be “broader and more democratic” than an
independent union.58 They were also not paternalistic because, as he argued, “Paternalism is
antagonistic to democracy.”59 He continued to believe this well into the 1930s. As he
rhapsodized in a March 1938 letter to one of Rockefeller Center’s managers, “I believe that
employers and employees are partners, not enemies. That their interests are essentially
common interests, not antagonistic. That the highest well-being of both can best be
obtained by cooperation, not by warfare.”60 If this seemed like a departure from the
predatory tactics that created his family’s wealth, it is worth noting that the Senior
Rockefeller had preferred to describe his monopolist maneuvers as “cooperative”
alternatives to the “wasteful” competition of the free market.61 Unsurprisingly, then, the
Junior Rockefeller could tout the “common interests” of capital and labor, while
simultaneously complaining that “the stockholders’ position is not infrequently forgotten,”
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58 “Delegates Adopt Rockefeller Plan,” New York Times, October 3, 1915, 20.
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while labor’s “duties and responsibilities” to capital were too often ignored.62 By imagining
corporations to be cooperative partnerships, the Rockefeller Plan was by no means
democratic, and, while it did carry a paternalistic air—whatever Rockefeller’s protestations—
it was not strictly speaking paternalistic. Paternalism at least recognized the fundamental
power imbalance between classes under industrial capitalism, even as it exploited and reified
that imbalance. Rockefeller’s cooperative ideal did not necessarily operate differently, but its
central conceit did more to obscure the everyday, insidious violence of capitalism. Events
like the Ludlow Massacre were, for Rockefeller, not reprisals against systemic injustices, but
simply anomalous misunderstandings between “partners.”
Rockefeller’s peculiar vision of “cooperative” capitalism was not the only force dictating
the project’s direction after the Opera’s departure. RCA brought its own “semiphilanthropic” corporatism to the project. So too did the architects bring their own
compatible ideas, Raymond Hood in particular. Hood’s 1929 “City under a Single Roof ”
proposal was premised on the notion of corporate “consolidation and mutual aid against
individual conflict.” Echoing RCA’s advertising, the architect also extolled the achievements
of “business scientists who, by means of mass production, are bringing hitherto unheard-of
luxuries within the reach of common men.”63 In January 1932, Hood introduced a ten-part
series on Rockefeller Center (or, “Rockefeller City,” as it was then known) in Architectural
Forum with an article that fully assimilated his own thinking with Rockefeller’s.64 “We have
Rockefeller to Robertson, August 1, 1939, folder 757, box 100, series C, FA312, OMR, RAC.
Hood, “City Under a Single Roof,” 209, 19.
64 The project was semi-officially known as Rockefeller City between 1930 and early 1932. Internally, the
managers still used “Metropolitan Square.” Public relations director Merle Crowell’s early press releases spoke
cumbersomely of “John D. Rockefeller, Jr.’s mid-city building center,” while the newspapers used a variety of
monikers, most commonly “Radio City.” See, for example, the February 12, 1932 press release in folder 608,
box 81, series C, OMR, RAC. Though Crowell liked “Radio City,” other members of Rockefeller’s publicrelations staff worried “that the radio people are capitalizing their expected tenancy of the project to the utmost
extent,” which might discourage prospective tenants unattached to the entertainment industry. T. J. Ross, Jr., to
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been given a great opportunity. In a sense, for the first time in the history of building
development, capital has allied itself with building as a partner,” he professed, “If
Rockefeller City is successful, we shall prove what architects have contended—that, given a
great opportunity, they will accept the responsibility and show that order and commercial
success are not incompatible.”65 Though they each articulated it on different terms, the
project’s patron, its first major tenant, and its architects were all in agreement about the
presumed cultural benefits of a supposedly high-minded corporate capitalism.
News that RCA would replace the Metropolitan Opera in Rockefeller’s planned
development began to appear in mid-June 1930, several days before an official
announcement was made. The press captured the sense of purpose professed by the
project’s stakeholders, while also inadvertently revealing incongruities embedded in it. The
front page of the June 14, 1930, New York Times announced, “Rockefeller Plans Huge
Culture Centre; 4 Theatres in $350,000,000 5th Av. Project.”66 The article provided a cogent,
if oversimplified, account of the project’s transformation. “Mr. Rockefeller,” the Times
reported, “is said to have been persuaded that an opera was an aristocratic enterprise and
that the real democratic benevolence was to arrange for the modern popular forms of
entertainment ‘on the highest plane’ and to give his site to those forms.” The “democracy”
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that the Times imagined Rockefeller and RCA would manifest centered on the paper’s
understanding of radio’s twofold status, as “a cultural medium so young that it had no
traditions, only a future,” and as “a service operation to give the public a reason for buying
radio sets.”67
Of course, thinkers like Lewis Mumford and Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno
understood radio’s social purpose in similar, but more critical terms. For Mumford, in
Technics and Civilization (1934), radio had made possible “a widened range of intercourse”
with “more numerous contacts,” but its potential for “evil” was not to be underestimated, in
particular the degree to which it “may increase the amount of mass regimentation.”68
Adorno and Horkheimer went further, famously arguing in Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947)
that radio exemplified the homogenizing effects of a “culture industry” that “provided
[something] for everyone so that no one can escape.”69 In 1930, as the stock market
continued to plunge, as joblessness continued to rise, and as banks began to fail, the vast
sums that Rockefeller was prepared to spend and the cultural uplift that radio still seemed to
promise obviated consideration of the endeavor’s potential downsides.
Rockefeller’s agreement with RCA was announced to the press on June 16, 1930. In a
few brief lines, it encapsulated much of the foregoing and pointed toward the issues that
would shape the project’s development over the next few years, while also introducing the
project’s soon-to-be-famous moniker. The statement, published in the Times, spoke directly
to the project’s melding of corporate capitalism with mass culture. Todd characterized “this
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new radio city” as a comprehensively planned intervention that “will radically alter the
skyline in midtown New York, establish new standards of city planning and provide an
enduring architectural monument that will vie with the world’s greatest metropolitan
projects.”70 He also outlined the imminent transformation of “a business and residential
area” into “a great institutional centre devoted to the entertainment and cultural arts” that
would also “house the various industries and services associated with the development of
the electrical communication and entertainment arts.”71 In other words, “radio city”
amalgamated the pretensions of Morris’s opera house with the organizational possibilities of
Hood’s “City under a Single Roof.” Corporate capitalism would provide more than just the
liquidity necessary to gentrify three blocks of midtown simultaneously. Whether
euphemistically characterized as “cooperative,” “semi-philanthropic,” or “enlightened,” it
would also produce a new cultural landscape.

2.3 The Story of Rockefeller Center

Throughout 1932, at the nadir of the Depression, Architectural Forum published a series
of ten articles on the development of Rockefeller Center. The seventh entry in the series, by
public relations director Merle Crowell, was published in May and addressed how the
project’s cultural ambitions were being received by critics. It responded specifically to a
recent article about the project in Harper’s Magazine. Harper’s editor Frederick Lewis Allen
had written a detailed analysis that centered on the question posed in his title, “Radio City:
Cultural Center?” His response was dissenting, “They may—and undoubtedly will—call
their entertainment what they please, but it will have the limitations of mass-entertainment,
70
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and there is no use hoping for anything better.”72 If Allen’s argument prefigured some of the
pretentiousness that accompanied Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique of the “culture
industry,” Crowell’s rebuttal foreshadowed the totalizing logic that the two theorists would
attribute to mass media.73 According to Crowell, “none of us is bold enough to believe that
we are producing a cultural center in those three midtown Manhattan blocks.”74
Nevertheless, he insisted, “Rockefeller Center represents a sincere attempt to incorporate art
into business, into entertainment, and into all the activities which may be housed there.”75
Beyond reaffirming the project’s unique and all-encompassing blend of commerce and
culture, the very fact that Crowell felt compelled to correct the record points toward the
degree to which development of the Center’s design was conditioned by a desire to control
the project’s media narrative.
The Architectural Forum series is a perfect case in point. Ten articles appeared in the
popular trade journal between January and October 1932. The topics ranged from the
complex organization of the architects’ offices to the acoustical engineering of the
International Music Hall (later Radio City Music Hall) and the technical sophistication of
NBC’s twenty-seven broadcast studios.76 This provided readers with a thoroughgoing, but

Frederick Lewis Allen, “Radio City: Cultural Center?,” Harper’s Monthly Magazine 164 (April 1932): 544.
Horkheimer and Adorno’s commentaries on jazz, for example, have long been criticized for what is at
best a Eurocentric aloofness to American culture and, at worst, a reactionary, even racist, attitude toward the
medium.
74 Merle Crowell, “The Story of Rockefeller Center: VII. A Question Answered,” Architectural Forum 56,
no. 5 (May 1932): 425.
75 Ibid., 427.
76 Entries one, two, three, and seven are discussed in the text. For the remainder, see Webster B. Todd,
“Testing Men and Materials for Rockefeller City,” Architectural Forum 56, no. 2 (February 1932): 199–204;
Henry Hofmeister, “The Story of Rockefeller Center: V. The International Music Hall,” Architectural Forum 56,
no. 4 (April 1932): 355–360; H. G. Balcom, “The Story of Rockefeller Center: VI. The Structural Frame of the
International Music Hall,” in ibid., 407–10; Ernest L. Smith, “The Story of Rockefeller Center: VIII.
Supervising Construction and Controlling Costs,” Architectural Forum 56, no. 5 (May 1932): 497–500; O. B.
Hanson, “The Story of Rockefeller Center: IX. The Plan and Construction of the National Broadcasting
Company Studios,” Architectural Forum 57, no. 2 (August 1932): 153–60; Eugene Clute, “The Story of
Rockefeller Center: X. The Allied Arts,” Architectural Forum 57, no. 4 (October 1932): 353–58.
72
73

91

carefully framed, window into their creation. The articles were richly illustrated. Site plans,
perspective renderings, images of study models, technical drawings, contractors’ requisition
forms, budget spreadsheets, and photographs of ongoing demolition and construction work
saturated the essays, giving readers a seemingly complete multimedia survey of the project’s
evolution from conception to realization. The series capitalized on the immense, nationwide
interest in the project—due to its all-but-unprecedented scale and scope and to its status as
one of the few ongoing projects during the early years of the Depression. It also allowed the
architects, engineers, and managers an opportunity to overlay a sense of narrative clarity on
what had been a process marked by uncertainty, frustration, and improvisation.
A trio of essays in the January 1932 issue by Raymond Hood, Andrew Reinhard, and
Wallace Harrison inaugurated the series, and established the degree to which the architects’
work coincided with a broader set of public-relations strategies. Between October 1929 and
June 1930, Reinhard & Hofmeister had been the project’s architects of record, with Hood
and Corbett providing creative oversight as consultant architects. They all operated more or
less independently—as the simultaneity of Hood’s and Corbett’s “fling” and Reinhard &
Hofmeister’s refinement of the G-3 scheme made clear. Their new contracts, signed in July
1930, brought on board the consultants’ partners and made the three offices into a single
consortium of Associated Architects. This made Hood, Frederick A. Godley & J. André
Fouilhoux; Corbett, Harrison & William H. MacMurray; and Reinhard & Hofmeister
collectively responsible for the design. (Although their names appeared on the contracts and
many early drawings, neither Godley nor MacMurray played a significant role.)77 Reinhard’s

Godley accepted a professorship at Yale in 1932 and retired from professional practice. MacMurray was
primarily responsible for the logistical, rather than creative, activities of his office, which limited his ability to
contribute to Rockefeller Center, given the outsized role played by project manager John R. Todd.
77

92

and Harrison’s Forum articles examined the pragmatic qualities of this arrangement—the
rigorously bureaucratic methods that organized the architects’ office and their adaptation of
Hood’s model-based design process—while Hood addressed its broad implications in
relation to the project’s larger aims (figs. 2.11 & 2.12).78
Rockefeller Center would be, according to Hood, nothing short of a referendum on
architecture in a capitalist society. As noted above, he thought that the historical significance
of the project was the “partnership” of architecture and capital on which it was ostensibly
premised. The import of this apparent watershed was twofold. First, the project’s scale and
complexity necessitated collaboration among architects and related professions, which
brought “the day of the architectural one-man show” to an unequivocal end.79 Second, but
related, the supposed vagaries of “individual expression” would become subject to the “two
words which have come to mean so much in the architect’s vocabulary—‘cost’ and
‘return.’”80 For Hood, in other words, Rockefeller Center was an exaggerated, but not
atypical, example of the professional exigencies that capitalist development imposed on
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architects. Hood’s solution was to assimilate the architects’ work to the cultural and
economic logic of Rockefeller’s “cooperative” capitalist ideology.
Hood even freely embraced one of Rockefeller’s central contradictions, namely, that
subordinates assumed unreciprocated “duties and responsibilities” to shareholders.
Immediately after proclaiming the benefits that would accrue to architecture through its
“partnership” with capital, he admitted that if the project failed, “it may be many years
before capital will give another such opportunity to architects.”81 This acquiescence was also
instilled in the architects’ July 1930 contract, which took nineteen pages to detail the
manifold ways in which the architects were “subject at all times […] to the control, direction
and supervision” of the owners and managers.82 One final page explained the architects’
recourse to binding arbitration, as their sole means of exercising limited agency. The
eagerness with which the architects’ accepted the terms of their contract, as evidenced by
the adulatory tone of Hood’s Forum article, showed them to be untroubled by the
asymmetries inherent in Rockefeller’s “cooperative” capitalism.
The images accompanying Hood’s Forum article were not simply illustrative. They
constituted a kind of parallel narrative, through which the architects’ and managers’ efforts
to control the project’s narrative could be glimpsed. A dramatic rendering of the RCA
Building faced the first page. Its tight cropping and golden sheen communicated more about
the bright capitalist future it evoked than the design it represented (fig. 2.13). The first full
spread showed an array of site plans, leading readers from the “earliest” opera house
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proposal through the “fling of imagination” that filled the architects’ time while
management negotiated with RCA to the then-current design.83 That “earliest” plan was not
one of Benjamin Morris’s, but rather Reinhard & Hofmeister’s September 1928 scheme (see
fig. 2.4). If the Forum series thus constituted the first authorized account of the project,
Hood effectively wrote Morris out of it. Following this were model photographs, a typical
plan of the RCA Building (see fig. 2.20), several renderings, and some photographs that
documented demolition, excavation, and the beginnings of construction on the midtown
site.
One of the most revealing images in the article was a rather awkwardly framed aerial
perspective of the two six-story buildings that would frame the landscaped promenade
leading from Fifth Avenue to the centrally located plaza (fig. 2.14). Its significance might not
be immediately apparent, but the lengthy caption below it pointed toward the multilayered
public-relations fiasco that it almost single-handedly attempted to resolve. The caption
noted, in part, “These buildings replace the oval building which was included in the
announcement of Rockefeller City plans and serve as a Fifth Avenue gateway to the entire
Rockefeller City development. This picture indicates an interesting feature of the Rockefeller
City design: the roof gardens which are being developed as an important part of the
project.” Recalling the announcement of the project’s plans and its aftermath help to explain
why the absence of an oval building and the presence of roof gardens were both critical to
the project’s early history.
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On March 5, 1931, the architects and managers debuted “Radio City” to the public
through a meticulously staged but disastrously received press event. They lined the walls of
the largest drafting room in the architects’ two-level suite in the Graybar Building with
drawings, but the enormous model at the end of the room, spinning atop a massive
turntable and illuminated from within, was the unrivaled centerpiece of the evening’s event
(fig. 2.15). Seen against the backdrop of the Depression-plagued city—as much as the black
velvet curtain that hung behind the model and blocked the city from view—the preliminary
mock-up appeared to be a “new shimmering city” of offices, theaters, and retail that
“glistened like a mirage,” at least to one New York Times reporter.84 The scheme it
represented, evolved from the “five-spot” composition of the now-year-old G-3 diagram,
was dominated by a five-foot-tall tower, variously identified as fifty- to seventy-stories. The
same Times reporter thought it looked “like a gigantic slab set on end,” prefiguring
subsequent critics and architectural historians who would use the same designation to trace
Rockefeller Center’s influence on the design of post-World War II office towers.85
The other noteworthy feature of the model and the one on which critics focused most
of their attention—or ire—was the oval building located on Fifth Avenue and facing the
central tower across a scaled-down public plaza. The substitution of the two separate
buildings shown on Reinhard & Hofmeister’s earlier plans, and also many of Morris’s, for a
single, ovoid structure had been made for programmatic reasons. The Rockefeller-affiliated
Chase National Bank wanted to relocate to the Rockefeller-funded development, so the
architects revised their plans to create “a readily recognizable marker” for the bank, as
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Andrew Reinhard explained, that would also, he continued, “open up the line of vision into
the plaza and shopping center.”86 For numerous critics, the oval building was more readily a
marker of the project’s deficiencies. Likening it to “monstrous hat box” became an easy way
to disparage the entire scheme.87
Coverage of the event was sustained, widespread, and aside from the Times’ initial
assessment, almost uniformly negative. “Experts” consulted by the New York Herald declared
the design to be “ugly and futile.”88 The New York Evening Post dubbed its awkward forms
Rockefeller’s “Oil Can City.” The Nation’s architecture critic Douglas Haskell suggested,
histrionically, that the central, slab-like tower was “tall enough to produce a sense of awe,
which the dulness and drabness shade into horror.”89
If these ridiculing asides captured the general sense of disappointment with which the
design was met, a number of architects like Ralph Adams Cram and Frank Lloyd Wright
proffered more substantive, if no less scathing, arguments., while Benjamin Morris
resurfaced to offer an alternative design proposal. Cram, a traditionalist who had been
Hood’s first employer, told readers of American Mercury that the design’s “manifestly
decadent forms” amounted to a rejection, for commercial purposes, of “man’s six thousand
years of varied, yet somehow consistent culture.”90 The lengthy article that Wright wrote for
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88 “Radio City Plans Ugly and Futile, Experts Declare,” New York Herald (European Edition), June 22, 1931,
2. There were some reviews that praised the scheme or, at least, did not condemn it. See “Radio City to Create
New Architecture: Model and Ground Plan of the Radio City,” New York Times, March 6, 1931, 3; Arthur
Warner, “Radio City to Rise in Scientific Plan,” New York Times, March 15, 1931, 130; H. I. Brock, “Problems
Confronting the Designers of Radio City,” New York Times, April 5, 1931, 125.
89 Douglas Haskell, “Architecture: The Rockefeller Necropolis,” The Nation 136, no. 3543 (May 31, 1933):
624.
90 Ralph Adams Cram, “Radio City—and After,” American Mercury 23, no. 91 (July 1931): 291.
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the New York Evening Post argued that the design faltered, not because it forsook tradition,
but because it failed to harness “the kinetic energy of this Age.”91 Wright held that this
“energy”—a combination of industrial, economic, and material advances—was better suited
to dispersion, an argument that would, of course, materialize at Rockefeller Center as
Broadacre City several years later.
Benjamin Morris published a plan for “Metropolitan Avenue” in the New York Times. It
would locate an opera house on the west end of a block-long public square across from St.
Patrick’s Cathedral—i.e. on one-third of Rockefeller’s site—at the midpoint of an avenue cut
between Fifth and Sixth Avenues running from Bryant Park to Central Park. Morris’s plan
was endorsed by influential civic and planning organizations, like the RPA and Municipal
Arts Society, who lobbied Rockefeller, privately and publicly, on Morris’s behalf.92 It also
exploited Radio City’s ongoing public-relations imbroglio “to make sure that it coordinates
with and does not block more far-reaching schemes for the improvement of the region
which is the very heart of Manhattan.”93
The New Yorker’s architecture critic, Lewis Mumford, offered one of the most sustained
and insightful early critiques of Rockefeller Center. He not only summarized the sentiments
of most other critics. He also zeroed in on the reasons why Hood’s January 1932 Architectural
Frank Lloyd Wright, “Architect Calls Radio City False,” New York Evening Post, June 30, 1931, reprinted
as “Radio City,” in Bruce Brooks Pfeiffer, ed., Collected Writings, vol. 3: 1931–1939 (New York: Rizzoli, in
association with the Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation, 1993), 60. Pfeiffer erroneously dates the article to 1932.
92 When it was published in 1931, the Fine Arts Federation of New York, the Municipal Arts Society, and
the Regional Plan Association implored Rockefeller to alter his plans according to Morris’s scheme. See “New
Avenue from 42nd to 59th St. Urged to Cut through Radio City on Three Levels,” New York Times, May 8,
1931, 1, 18. In folder 511, box 68, series C, OMR, RAC, see Municipal Art Society, “Copy of Resolution
Unanimously Adopted at the Annual Meeting of the Fine Arts Federation of New York on Thursday, April 30,
1931;” Joseph H. Freedlander to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., May 1, 1931.
93 “New Avenue from 42nd to 59th St.,” 1. Morris had already privately pitched this idea to Rockefeller’s
associates in 1928 but was rebuffed because of the projected cost of acquiring the necessary real estate. See
Harry Hall to Charles O. Heydt, July 27, 1928, and Heydt to Hall, July 30, 1928, both in folder 540, box 71,
series C, OMR, RAC. A map of Morris’s plan, dated March 18, 1929, is in folder 632, box 83, series C, OMR,
RAC.
91
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Forum article framed work on Rockefeller Center as a high-stakes effort to balance financial
exigency with civic obligation. For Mumford, the shortcomings of the debuted design
resulted, as he saw it, from a breakdown between “the fundamental architectural and civic
problem that Radio City might have attacked, and the financial criteria that actually dictated
the present designs.”94 The critic captured something of the general sense of disillusionment
toward the project that settled in over the summer of 1931 when he admitted, “Given the
possibility of treating those blocks as a unit, people willfully, unfairly, unreasonably thought
that they could expect a touch or two of public spirit from Mr. Rockefeller.”95 Instead, they
got something that “looked exactly like the helter-skelter, hit-or-miss constructions that
make up the rest of the city.”96
The months of sustained negative coverage convinced the Associated Architects that
they would be fired. Instead, Rockefeller recalled how, in the aftermath of the Ludlow
Massacre, he had inured himself to “things that would be too painful to read”—about
himself, apparently, and not murdered miners—and encouraged the architects to do the
same as they revised their designs.97 Hood went a step further, taking a page from
Rockefeller’s post-Ludlow public-relations playbook. His Forum article was, in effect, an
attempt to craft a narrative of the project’s early history that could neutralize critics’
complaints by assimilating their biggest concerns into the architects’ ongoing work.98

94 Lewis Mumford, “Frozen Music or Solidified Static? Reflections on Radio City,” New Yorker, June 20,
1931, 36.
95 Ibid., 28.
96 Ibid.
97 Harrison relayed this remark in a 1978 interview, conducted under the auspices of Columbia University’s
Center for Oral History, which is quoted in Newhouse, Wallace Harrison, 40.
98 Initially, the architects had simply suggested that critics misunderstood what the model communicated.
It was not indicative of “any architectural treatment,” Andrew Reinhard argued, but only “represents the
rentable cubage.” His assertion, in April, that “a sound plan, like a machine, can always be made beautiful,” was
not particularly well received, as evidenced by the continuing criticism. Reinhard, “What Is the Rockefeller
Radio City?,” 281. See also “Radio City Critics Called Too Hasty,” New York Times, April 4, 1931, 17.
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This is why the rendering of the two buildings in fig. 2.14 is so significant. Chase Bank
had withdrawn from the project several months after the model’s debut, when the managers
refused to grant them exclusive banking rights to the complex. This allowed the architects to
reintroduce the promenade framed by two small buildings, an idea borrowed from Benjamin
Morris’s opera schemes (see fig. 2.7). Hood had also begun to advocate for the addition of
roof gardens, as a revenue-producing public amenity that would combine civic and cultural
with commercial value. The promenade and gardens were thus a kind of transposition of
Rockefeller’s euphemistic “partnership” between capital and labor transposed into landscape
architectural terms: they could mollify critics without fundamentally altering existing plans.
Thus, fig. 2.14 can be read as a visual rejoinder to critics like Cram, Morris, and Mumford. Its
oblique aerial perspective undercut the argument for “Metropolitan Avenue” by forging a
civic relationship, however circuitous, between the sunken plaza and the Cathedral. Even if,
compositionally, the schemes renewed axiality showed evidence of the architects’ lingering
aesthetic conservatism, as critics from Siegfried Giedion to Rem Koolhaas have contended,
the twin buildings on Fifth Avenue, the promenade, and the roof gardens were also tactical
maneuvers in a skilled public-relations campaign.99 The rest of Hood’s article—and, indeed,
the entire Architectural Forum series—performed a similar function. They disseminated the
evolving design while also managing public perception.

***
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2.4 Corporate Takeover

The first wave of demolition, excavation, and construction on Rockefeller Center’s threeblock, midtown Manhattan site coincided with the worst years of the Depression.100 The
contrast between the “shimmering new city” that began to take shape between May 1930
and December 1932 and the breadlines, homeless camps, and other evidence of worsening
economic conditions was not the only incongruity that defined the project’s realization. As
laborers began to arrive on site, as management recruited new tenants, and as the architects
continued to refine their designs, the realized complex was as much an expression of
Rockefeller’s “cooperative” capitalism as it was an internalization of its numerous
contradictions.
Demolition began on May 17, 1930, at the same time that the lease agreement with RCA
and its affiliates was being finalized and one month to the day before President Herbert
Hoover signed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, a misguided protectionist measure that
aggravated conditions in the already floundering economy. Over the next year, as banks and
businesses began to fail, the Metropolitan Square and Underel Corporations continued to
acquire leases on the Columbia property that had not yet expired and bought up
uncontrolled parcels on the site uncontrolled by the University. Several significant
holdouts—like the two row houses that still bookend the Sixth Avenue façade of the RCA
Building—would remain, but otherwise three quarters of the site’s 250 existing structures
had been razed by the time excavators arrived in July 1931.101 Two months later, the mostly
100 In addition to further sources cited below, the following draws from a chronology of events, through
December 1931, in Hood, “The Design of Rockefeller City,” 8; and from Balfour, Rockefeller Center, 37–53;
Krinsky, Rockefeller Center, 44–69; Okrent, Great Fortune, 83–98, 164–167, 187–202.
101 Note the two row houses in fig. 2.16. The owners of the parcels on and near Fifth Avenue, between
48th and 49th Streets, proved equally obstinate; some of the properties would be acquired by the Center in the
1960s. The Sixth Avenue frontage on the southern block would not be obtained until later in the 1930s, in time
for construction of the U.S. Rubber Company Building, where Rockefeller drove the “last rivet” in 1939.
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empty brownstones that remained stood on the edge of the nearly-eighty-foot deep craters
from which the site’s first towers were set to rise.
In September 1931, the foundations for the interlinked RKO Building and International
Music Hall were laid in the northwest corner of the site, even as plans to replace the muchderided “hatbox” at the eastern end were still being revised. Also in September, amidst what
the New York Times described as “moderately quiet realty conditions,” Rockefeller obtained a
$65 million dollar mortgage from Metropolitan Life to finance the project.102 The steel
skeleton of the RKO Tower began to rise on November 30, 1931, and indicative of the pace
at which construction would proceed over the next several years, was finished by February 8,
1932 (fig. 2.16). The cornerstone of the British Empire Building—which was one of the
twin buildings to have replaced the “hatbox”—was laid on July 3, 1932, the same week that
the free-falling stock market reached its all-time low. Work on RCA’s central, sixty-six-story
tower began in early 1932; the last piece of limestone was set in the façade on December
7th. Writing in April 1932, Harper’s Magazine editor Frederick Lewis Allen wondered whether
“the hard staccato of the drill and the metallic clatter of the riveter” that echoed from the
site through an otherwise jobless city was “a portent of the days when hope for the
economic future of America shall again return, or simply […] a belated echo of the strident
nineteen twenties, when skyscraperdom, like the stock market, was reaching for the cheerful
heavens.”103
At the time, New York’s city government was deeply in debt, its tax base eviscerated by
joblessness and bankruptcies. Federal money for building projects, public works, and other
forms of relief would not begin to materialize until mid-1933, with the creation of the first
102
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New Deal programs. In the absence of publicly funded construction projects, while most
other private enterprises were downsizing or shuttering, the design, construction, and
staffing of Rockefeller Center provided for an immense labor force. The architects’ office
held space for Hood, Corbett, and the other principals, an accountant, six secretaries, a
specifications writer, and seventy draftsmen and model builders. (Women played only minor,
ancillary roles until Caroline Hood, the architect’s niece, succeeded Merle Crowell as publicrelations director in 1944.)104 According to Crowell’s often-embellished press releases,
somewhere between 40,000 and 75,000 laborers were employed “directly or indirectly” on
the project. They included the excavators, riveters, and other tradesmen on the midtown site,
but also miners in Colorado and Dutch Guiana (now Suriname); loggers in the American
South and the Philippines; quarrymen in Vermont and Italy; and fabricators in New York
and Pennsylvania.105 The project’s management framed its globe-spanning materials sourcing
and the vast army of laborers involved as “our responsibility to industry.”106 They also used
the Depression as leverage over suppliers and laborers, to drive down prices, to suppress
wages, and to accelerate work schedules. The local chapter of a sheet-metal workers union
wrote to Rockefeller, effusively thanking him “in behalf of Humanity […] for the
magnanimous spirit you displayed in favoring only a 15% reduction in our wages.”107 There
were a number of work stoppages, but the rising rate of nationwide unemployment and the
high costs associated with delays usually led to quick resolution.

104 See “Caroline Hood Carlin, 72, Is Dead,” New York Times, June 5, 1981. Hood began working at the
Center in 1934, was made a vice president in 1964, and retired in 1973.
105 Arthur Warner, “Radio City Materials Brought in from Afar,” New York Times, February 21, 1932, XX5;
Okrent, Great Fortune, 190.
106 Todd, “Testing Men and Materials for Rockefeller City,” 204.
107 Welfare Committee of Local Union No. 28 to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., July 27, 1932, folder 580, box
78, series C, FA312, OMR, RAC.
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Rockefeller expressed a notion in his “last rivet” speech that a project like Rockefeller
Center could do more than provide employment for a large number during a period of crisis.
It could also, he professed, cultivate “the manhood of [American] citizens.” Such a gendered
ideal was circumscribed by more than the previously discussed classism of Rockefeller’s
“cooperative” capitalism. In mid-1931, organizations like the NAACP and the Harlem-based
Cooperative Committee on Employment expressed concern that among the estimated
thousands in Rockefeller’s employ, “as few as four and not more than ten Negro mechanics
and laborers have been employed at Rockefeller Center.”108 (It seems that the “dozen Negro
housewreckers” that the New York Herald Tribune observed on the site in March 1931 were
not included in the NAACP’s count.)109 Management insisted in reply that hiring was the
responsibility of subcontractors, whom they were certain had no “intention of
discriminating against any colored man,” as long as he held union membership.110 That
response ignored—willfully, to be sure—how most American labor unions kept “Negroes
and Mexicans and other elements of common labor, in a lower proletariat as subservient to
their interests as theirs are to the interests of capital,” as W.E.B. Du Bois charged in a May
1933 Crisis article.111 The NAACP implored Rockefeller to at least issue a statement, given his
well-known philanthropic support for African-American causes. He remained silent.
As construction progressed, management installed a field office on Fifth Avenue
overlooking the excavations of the central block. It included a glassed-in observation
platform, in which was installed a large plaster model of the project (see fig. 0.1). The

108 Walter F. White to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., October 4, 1932, folder 511, box 68, series C, FA312,
OMR, RAC. See also, in the same folder, Wilberforce D. Simmons, May 2, 1931.
109 “Old Residents Sigh at Model for Radio City.”
110 Charles O. Heydt to Wilberforce D. Simmons, May 5, 1931, folder 511, box 68, series C, FA312, OMR,
RAC.
111 W.E.B. Du Bois, “Marxism and the Negro Problem,” Crisis 40, no. 5 (May 1933): 104.
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centerpiece of the scheme remained the stepped, slab-like RCA Building, already looming
over the site though only half finished at the time. North of it, on Sixth Avenue, was the
nearly completed RKO Building. Adjoining it to the east was the International Music Hall,
which would open in December 1932, as Radio City Music Hall. On Fifth Avenue, in the
central block, would be the two six-story buildings that replaced the “hatbox.” The
remaining parts of the scheme would remain in a state of flux through much of the rest of
the decade, as the managers and architects continued to reconcile the variables of tenant
requirements and land acquisition with the constants of zoning and finance.
Despite the formal and visual coherence of the plaster simulacrum on Fifth Avenue, the
project had begun to develop into what was, in effect, two unrelated projects that happened
to share a site and a patron. In the spring of 1932, management recruited British and French
syndicates to lease the two six-story buildings on Fifth Avenue. The impetus for this was as
much an embrace of Manhattan’s history of cosmopolitanism as it was Rockefeller’s belief
that trade among nations would reduce the possibility of geopolitical conflict, a position he
reiterated in his “last rivet” speech. The twin buildings became known as the British Empire
Building and La Maison Française, and the promenade between them aptly named the
Channel Gardens. A 1932 Act of Congress permitted the installation of a duty-free
warehouse, materially facilitating Rockefeller’s vision of improved transatlantic commerce. A
similar scheme was planned for the Fifth Avenue frontage on the northern block. The site
had originally been reserved for a department store, but it was now being planned as a
Palazzo d’Italia and Deutsches Haus. The latter was reluctantly abandoned almost a year
after Hitler assumed dictatorial powers, while the former was built but then had its Italian
associations suppressed during World War II. That was not the only potential problem the
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Center’s new international agenda encountered. When rumors began circulating, in early
1932, that three foreign would be hired to paint murals in the RCA Building, management
was forced to respond to a chauvinist backlash, insisting disingenuously that American artists
would be privileged. The latter issue is discussed further in chapter 4, but what was already
clear was that, as Radio City was nearing completion on the western portion of the site, its
eastern edge was becoming a hub of economic cosmopolitanism, with the specter of
fascism and xenophobia haunting the margins.
The site needed to be reunified. The architects explored three possible means of doing
so—a subterranean retail concourse, uniformly articulated façades, and an elaborate series of
gardens. The below-grade concourse was a vestige of the elaborate networks of pedestrian
arcades in the earliest proposals by Benjamin Morris and Harvey Wiley Corbett, providing
access to shops and physical connectivity across the three-block site. As discussed in greater
detail in chapter 4, the concourse was one of the first ways in which the Center began to
imagine how it could cultivate its own “public.”
Aside from elevator shafts and vehicle ramps, this lower level was initially divorced from
what was being proposed above it. This changed as the architects refined the design of the
plaza and promenade. In early plans, the plaza was at grade. By late 1931, it had been sunken
to draw shoppers from Fifth Avenue to the lower-level retail concourse. The architects
experimented with a range of strategies before settling for a time on a gently graded,
elaborately planted promenade that would guide pedestrians toward a grand staircase
descending to a fountain-filled, shop-lined plaza, the only exits from which were into the
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concourse (see fig. 2.14 & 2.18).112 The less ostentatious version that was built contained a
series of stepped planting beds and pools in the center of the promenade that kept
pedestrians close to the retail-lined outer edges. The plaza, as originally built, was emptied of
fountains to allow for seasonal installations and special events (fig. 2.17).113 Even in its
simpler form, this landscaped sequence was designed to perform a twofold function that was
not dissimilar from the intermingling of programming and advertising that would soon
emanate from the nearby radio studios. The promenade and plaza attempted (with only
partial success) to combine cultural refinement with commercial viability.
The development of this cosmopolitan “gateway” to the project overlapped with Hood’s
advocacy for roof gardens. As discussed above, these emerged in the aftermath of the
poorly received March 1931 design debut, partly as a response to critics’ complaints that the
scheme defaulted on presumed civic and cultural obligations. Hood was the gardens’ primary
proponent, but his ideas were not entirely original. Hugh Ferriss had already imagined
“hanging gardens,” in a 1922 New York Times article, as integral to life of the near future in
Manhattan’s “upper strata.”114 Corbett also occasionally incorporated terrace gardens into his
visions of multilevel streets. Le Corbusier encouraged the use of roof gardens, in order to
restore the “nature” displaced by building. Hood was also likely familiar with the brief
history of the botanical garden that had occupied Rockefeller Center’s site for several years
at the turn of the nineteenth century, a fact that the project team discovered early in the
design process. The most ambitious of Hood’s schemes, published in May 1932, would have

112 For different version of this scheme, see “Proposed Radio Center,” Architectural Forum 55, no. 4
(October 1931): 461–63; Hood, “Design of Rockefeller City,” 3, 6, 10–12; Crowell, “A Question Answered,”
426; “Rockefeller Center, New York, N.Y.,” Architectural Forum 57, no. 1 (July 1932): 18.
113 In the 1940s, the original grand stair leading from the promenade into the plaza was replaced with one
that consumed less space to make room for the annual installation of a skating rink.
114 Ferriss, “The New Architecture,” 8.
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made the entire roofscape into a sprawling botanical garden suspended 140 feet above street
level (fig. 2.18 & 2.19). The plan showed the rooftops as a dense tapestry of fountains, pools,
flower beds, hedgerows, and small trees, with bridges connecting the gardens across 49th
and 50th Streets.115 This continuous aerial circuit through the site would have been divided
into discretely programmed spaces—an open-air sculpture gallery, an amphitheater, a
restaurant, a marionette theater, a conservatory.
The ideas informing the gardens were overdetermined by a range of historical,
discursive, and programmatic ideas, but their purpose was clear. Insofar as Hood was
concerned, they were an aerial complement to the promenade, plaza, and retail concourse
below. They would unify the site and provide “beautiful vistas” for office workers and the
paying public alike.116 In doing so, they would also generate a novel source of revenue, in the
form of increased rents and entry fees. Hood thus clearly imagined the roof gardens to be
“semi-philanthropic” in the same way that RCA imagined its corporate purpose to be, but
they were also a rather cunning contribution to the project’s gentrifying aims. They
reproduced (and attempted to monetize) an early episode in the site’s history in order to
more completely erase the memory of purported ill-repute that had been made to define its
more recent past. The author of a 1932 monograph on Hood was thus correct when he
assessed the proposed gardens to be “profitable to the owner in the same manner as are
other forms of legitimate advertising.”117
On different terms, but directed toward similar ends, the buildings’ façades were
designed to make the site’s disparate parts coherent. They were a more or less direct

Regulatory restrictions prevented the realization of these street-spanning pedestrian bridges. For this
and budgetary reasons, the garden plans were ultimately scaled back.
116 Hood, “Design of Rockefeller City,” 5.
117 North, Raymond Hood, 11.
115
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expression of the economic logic that gave form to the project’s towers, for which the RCA
Building served as the prototype. The tower’s general size and location were determined by
the zoning law, but strict economic calculus produced its stepped, slab-like profile. As
discussed in chapter 1, architects and developers preferred offices with shallow depths and
high ceilings, since well-lit, well-ventilated offices could be rented at a premium. The
Associated Architects and their managers decided that offices with a depth of twenty-seven
feet would produce the highest rate of return. The plan translated this into a uniformly
dimensioned ring of space around an oblong elevator and utility core (fig. 2.20). To ensure
efficient vertical circulation in a tower of this size, the structure’s sixty-six floors were
organized into five vertical zones, each serviced by a particular elevator bank. The building’s
stepped profile resulted from the architects’ desire to preempt shadowy “deep space,” as the
elevator shafts serving lower-level zones were terminated. This economic-cum-spatial logic
provided a formula that could be repeated, with some minor modifications, in the Center’s
other towers. It could also be transposed onto the buildings’ façades.
Two of Hood’s recently completed works provided possible precedents. The McGrawHill Building was sheathed in continuous, horizontal bands of glazing divided by teal-colored
terra-cotta spandrels, which contemporary critics like Henry-Russell Hitchcock read as more
aesthetically “modern” than the Daily News Building’s graphic vertical striations of red- and
cream-colored brick (fig. 2.21a).118 In the end, the architects settled on a system derived from
the News Building that interposed double-hung windows with aluminum spandrels between
limestone piers (fig. 2.22).119 Though the architects could often be flippant in their

See Hitchcock, Modern Architecture: International Exhibition, 130–31.
The News Building is the obvious reference for Rockefeller Center’s exteriors, because it was a largescale commercial development recently completed only a few blocks away. But another apt comparison, which
also served as a precedent for the News Building, is Hood’s ten-story apartment building at 3 East 84th Street.
118
119
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discussions of choosing a visual style for Rockefeller Center, this was not a superficial
aesthetic decision.120 Horizontal strategies limited where partitions could be placed, whereas
vertical systems of windows and piers easily accommodated tenants’ unpredictable needs, as
historians like William Jordy have noted.121 In the RCA Building, this meant that office
partitions could be placed anywhere along the regularly spaced 6’-3” wide structural columns
or the intervening 3’-6” wide supports. Put differently, the façades were able to visually
absorb the risk associated with speculative real-estate development, masking inexorable
flexibility behind apparent fixity.
This system was devised for the RCA Building and then applied to the remaining
buildings. From its constituent parts to the complex as a whole, the design of Rockefeller
Center merged the conceptual logic of Corbett’s speculations on zoning with Hood’s “City
under a Single Roof ” and Rockefeller’s “cooperative” capitalism. The unifying effect of the
Center’s façades operated similarly to the planned roof gardens. Together they encapsulated
the driving force of the project’s capitalist ambition. Rockefeller Center took shape amidst a
prolonged and ever-worsening crisis of capitalism. The complex was imagined to be capable
of imposing the kind of order that could overcome the convulsions of the free market and
make possible “the development of manhood” that Rockefeller desired, which meant,
simply, the ability of the capitalist class to be untroubled by turmoil as it received a return on
investment.
The News Building’s brick stripes were all of a uniform width. The apartment building, more akin to
Rockefeller Center, used limestone piers of varying width and contrasted them with metal spandrels. Both the
News Building and apartment building were built for the same client, Joseph M. Patterson. See North, Raymond
Hood, 52–53.
120 In an April 1931 article, written in response to criticism of the early design, Andrew Reinhard discussed
the various “treatment” options for the façades that the architects were then exploring. They included options
that, as Reinhard suggested, might have variously appealed to “horizontalists,” “verticalists,” “the decoratively
inclined,” or “the functionally-minded.” Reinhard, “What Is the Rockefeller Radio City?,” 281.
121 Jordy, American Buildings, 71; see also Martin, Organizational Complex, 89.
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2.5 Conclusion

Construction photographs of Rockefeller Center’s rapid, coordinated ascent above
midtown’s existing brownstones and pyramidal towers demonstrated the project’s capitalist
ambitions well. They visualized the rhetorical argument of Hood’s 1929 “City under a Single
Roof,” demonstrating how “a single directing intelligence” could unilaterally “control its own
environment,” stabilizing and rationalizing what “a score of mutually destructive interests of
relatively feeble financial strength” had produced.122 Rockefeller Center’s architectural
uniformity manifested this “enlightened” corporate takeover of the urban landscape. It also
effected a radical, homogenizing, and exclusionary transformation of urban culture. The
hundreds of “tawdry” establishments, from brothels and bookstores to speakeasies and
cafés, that had populated the site were evicted and eradicated to make way for millions of
square feet of “legitimate” forms of work, entertainment, and consumption. Lewis
Mumford was not necessarily sympathetic to what had been lost, but he nonetheless
captured something of the obverse of the boosterism Hood exemplified (and scholarship
has by and large reproduced) when he revisited the project in another New Yorker article, in
December 1933. An image like fig. 2.22 simply showed, to Mumford, “buildings [that] will
constitute a planned chaos not to be distinguished objectively from the unplanned chaos
around them.”123
A decade later, after the Center’s first building campaign had been completed, Siegfried
Giedion offered another interpretation of the complex’s visual form and its relationship to
the surrounding landscape. In Space, Time and Architecture, Giedion praised the Center’s
asymmetrical massing as a dramatic demonstration of comprehensive modernist planning,
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“forcefully conceived in space-time” (see fig. 4.21).124 That he underemphasized the degree
to which the Center’s visual dynamism was the ad hoc result of financial considerations,
zoning restrictions, and intransigent neighboring property owners was as significant as the
meanings he attached to it. On the one hand, the complex imposed a kind of visual order
over its environs that he thought was capable of catalyzing widespread regional change. As
explored in chapter 4, the Center’s architects and managers spent much of the 1930s
exploring this idea, albeit on different terms than Giedion imagined. On the other hand, the
historian understood the “organization of [freestanding] volumes around the plazas,” to
have been a realization “for the first time [of] open planning on the new scale—
accomplishing for town planning what the small Chicago houses of Frank Lloyd Wright in
the nineties accomplished for the free and open planning of the single house” (see fig.
1.1).125 That is, for Giedion, there was a direct link between the organizing logic of Wright’s
suburban homes and Rockefeller Center’s urban skyscrapers. As Wright developed Broadacre
City during the same years that Rockefeller Center took shape, such conceptual linkages were
indeed apparent—although Wright would have been incapable of recognizing them—but
they were directed toward different, decentralizing ends.
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3. BROADACRE CITY’S CENTRIFUGAL METROPOLITAN
LANDSCAPE, 1929–1932
On February 9, 1932, Frank Lloyd Wright addressed an overflowing audience at the City
Club of Chicago. Almost two decades earlier, in 1913, a City Club competition had
facilitated the architect’s interest in suburban planning. That competition entry had proposed
techniques for using residential architecture to manage the processes of suburbanization (see
figs. 1.9 & 1.10). Though he did not do so, Wright might have connected that early project
with the new topic he discussed over lunch in 1932. His talk proposed that advances in
transportation and telecommunications—in particular, the near-simultaneous popularization
of automobiles and radio—had begun to induce societal changes that were ill-suited to the
spatial conditions of America’s historically centralized cities.1 “We live now in cities of the
past, slaves of the machine and of traditional building,” he declared, “We will spread out,
and in so doing will transform our human habitation sites into those allowing beauty of
design and landscaping, sanitation and fresh air, privacy and playgrounds, and a plot whereon
to raise things.”2 The City Club Bulletin wryly noted that Wright seemed more preoccupied
“with individualism than with architecture.”3 His talk was also largely a reiteration of themes
he had introduced almost two years earlier, in May 1930, in a lecture at Princeton University.
What made this event significant was that, until then, he had not given his ideas about
technology-induced dispersion a name. During what the City Club Bulletin characterized as “a

1
2
3

“Frank Lloyd Wright Tells of the Broad Acre City,” City Club Bulletin 25, no. 7 (February 15, 1932): 27.
Ibid., 27, 29
Ibid.
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barrage of questions” following the lecture, Wright exclaimed, “The broad acre city, where
every family will have at least an acre of land, is the inevitable municipality of the future.”4
In the months after his (apparently) extemporaneous designation of “broad acre city,”
Wright wrote newspaper and journal articles further detailing the project. The Disappearing
City, published in September 1932, expanded on and, in some cases, augmented the project’s
themes. This chapter explores how Wright used typologies—skyscrapers, service stations,
and homes, in particular—to structure a critique of not only American cities, but American
society more broadly, a critique often fraught with regressive but commonplace ideas about
race and gender. Wright relied primarily on the written and spoken word but made strategic
use of architectural models and drawings to elaborate his project. Though the model built in
1934–35 would offer a more complete visualization of Broadacre City, Wright’s lectures,
exhibitions, and texts from the early 1930s employed a limited, but almost always insightful,
interplay of rhetorical and visual arguments. Through these discussions of the architectural
types and various media through which the project took shape, Wright’s work is shown to be
less defined by a rejection of “the urban” in the name of self-professed “democratic” ideals,
as Wright himself and much of the existing literature suggest. It would be more accurate to
say that Broadacre City was developed as a framework for recomposing existing
metropolitan phenomena into a decentralized culture of consumption.

***
4 Ibid., 27. See also “Broadacre City Set as Ambition of Architects,” Christian Science Monitor, February 10,
1932, 3. The City Club lecture is the first recorded usage of the term “broad acre city” by Wright. Robert
Twombly cites an April 18, 1929, article in the Weekly Home News, a local Spring Green, Wisconsin, newspaper,
in which one of Wright’s apprentices remarked on a ranch named “Broad Acre” near the site of the temporary
Ocotillo camp, which Wright and his apprentices built in Arizona in 1929 while preparing for the ill-fated San
Marcos in the Desert project. Twombly suggests that the ranch might be the source of the project’s title. See
Twombly, Frank Lloyd Wright, 220, 238n15.
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3.1 Discursive Beginnings

Wright’s coinage of “broad acre city” belatedly named a set of ideas that he had been
actively promoting for almost two years. These ideas were first publicly presented on May 14,
1930, in the last of six lectures he delivered at Princeton University. The architect had been
invited by the University’s Department of Art and Archaeology to present the Kahn
Lectures, an annual series sponsored by the financier and philanthropist Otto H. Kahn.5 This
was the same Otto H. Kahn who, as president of the Metropolitan Opera Company,
initiated the development that, in May 1930, was about to become “Radio City,” which
would seem to make Kahn the unwitting and incidental progenitor of both Rockefeller
Center and Broadacre City. Wright’s Princeton lectures were published in 1931 as Modern
Architecture: Being the Kahn Lectures for 1930. In his last lecture, succinctly titled “The City,” the
architect elaborated a critique of existing American cities and of Le Corbusier’s urbanism
before briefly outlining his own alternative vision. To appreciate the relationships among
these themes, however, it is useful to understand the backdrop of personal and professional
frustration against which they were articulated.
As noted in chapter 1, Wright spent the 1920s and early 1930s largely out of work and
mired in scandal. His already diminished public image reached its low point, in 1926, after he
was charged with adultery by his estranged second wife. He was briefly arrested before
fleeing Taliesin, the “Wisconsin love nest” of the “much married Mr. Wright,” per a
sensationalized front-page Washington Post story.6 He was arrested again later that year after

See Neil Levine, introduction to Frank Lloyd Wright, Modern Architecture: Being the Kahn Lectures for 1930
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), ix–lv.
6 “Can’t Escape the Wife He Wants to Lose,” Washington Post Magazine, December 12, 1926, 1
5

115

living for six weeks under an assumed identity at a lakeside cottage in rural Minnesota.7
Professional work, already scarce, became scarcer. Two jobs that originated in 1927 were
exceptional: the gasoline service station discussed in chapter 1 and four apartment towers for
the Church of St. Mark’s-in-the-Bouwerie, in New York, discussed below. They did little to
alleviate Wright’s financial stress, since neither was realized, but as explored below they
became critical components of Broadacre City. With no real source of income, Wright sold
his collection of Japanese prints and mortgaged Taliesin to pay down some of his mounting
debt. When this proved insufficient, wealthy friends and former clients formed Frank Lloyd
Wright, Inc., in August 1927, to cover the high cost of the architect’s divorce settlement; the
corporation also recovered Taliesin after the Bank of Wisconsin foreclosed on his overdue
mortgage, in July 1928.8 During these tumultuous years, publishing offered his only real
source of income, as well as a means of reestablishing himself professionally.
He began working on his Autobiography while on the lam in Minnesota, but this would
not be published until 1932. In the meantime, Architectural Record made Wright a lucrative
offer for fifteen articles, fourteen of which appeared in the popular trade journal between
May 1927 and December 1928.9 The series title that Wright chose, “In the Cause of
Architecture,” directly linked his efforts at professional rehabilitation with his early-career
prestige. He had published several articles titled “In the Cause of Architecture” between

See “Wright Still Holds Fort; Wife Planning Next Move,” Atlanta Constitution, June 5, 1926, 5; “F. Lloyd
Wright and His Olga Are Arrested,” Chicago Daily Tribune, October 21, 1926, 1; Levine, Architecture, 195–97.
8 “‘Wright, Inc.,’ Is Organized to Pay Divorce Debts,” Chicago Daily Tribune, August 30, 1927, 5; “Architect
Loses Estate,” New York Times, July 31, 1928, 44.
9 Wright was paid $7,500 for the articles, which would be just over $100,000 in 2018. For an introduction
to the series and facsimiles of the fourteen articles, see Frederick Gutheim, ed., In the Cause of Architecture: Frank
Lloyd Wright’s Historic Essays for Architectural Record, 1908–1952, with a Symposium on Wright and Architecture (New
York: Architectural Record, 1975). The articles are also reprinted, without original illustrations and interspersed
with two originally unpublished essays, in Wright, CW 1: 225–316.
7
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1908 and 1925, the first two of which also appeared in Architectural Record.10 In this attempt
to capitalize on his own early success, Wright also used the new series to reclaim a position
of preeminence that he felt had been usurped by a younger generation of more
commercially successful American architects and more avant-garde European architects,
especially Le Corbusier. He addressed themes familiar from his earlier writings, such as
mechanization, standardization, the “logic of the plan,” and appropriate usages of materials.
In the first “In the Cause of Architecture” article, subtitled “The Architect and the
Machine,” Wright revisited the themes of his influential 1901 essay “The Art and Craft of
the Machine,” while also accusing American architects of “sentimental absurdity” and
“superficial” eclecticism, because they had not heeded his early example.11 The next year, in a
1928 review of Le Corbusier’s recently translated Towards a New Architecture, Wright praised
its author as “no sentimentalist.”12 Wright saw the Parisian architect as someone who
understood “the ‘new’ beauty” of the machine, even if his thinking was derivative of ideas
realized “in the work of Louis Sullivan and myself—more than twenty-five years ago.”13
Wright was reframing his earlier thought and critiquing contemporaries to reposition himself
within the altered terrain of late-1920s architectural discourse. The Princeton lectures were a
direct continuation of this project.

These also appear in ibid., 84–100, 126–37. Unrelated to the two early articles or the 1927–28 series,
Wright published three other essays titled “In the Cause of Architecture.” Two appeared in Western Architect, in
November 1923 and February 1924, with the subtitle “In the Wake of the Quake—Concerning the Imperial
Hotel, Tokio;” the other was subtitled “The Third Dimension” and published in the Dutch journal Wendingen in
1925. All three are reprinted in CW 1: 183–92, 209–14.
11 Frank Lloyd Wright, “In the Cause of Architecture: I. The Architect and the Machine,” Architectural
Record 61, no. 5 (May 1927), reprinted in Gutheim, ed., In the Cause of Architecture, 133.
12 Frank Lloyd Wright, “Toward a New Architecture,” review of Le Corbusier, Towards a New Architecture
(1927), World Unity 2 (September 1928), reprinted in CW 1: 317.
13 Ibid.
10
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The thematic content of Wright’s “In the Cause of Architecture” series heavily
influenced his first five Princeton lectures, which treated the machine, stylistic expression,
and material integrity, among other issues. In fact, the first lecture largely consisted of
Wright “read[ing] into the record, once more,” a heavily redacted version of “The Art and
Craft of the Machine.”14 The sixth lecture, with its focus on “the city,” introduced a topic to
which the architect had devoted only cursory attention in the published Record articles. One
“In the Cause of Architecture” article, published in October 1927 and subtitled “The New
World,” included a list of historical architectural phenomena, accompanied by pithy insights
into their “new world” incarnations. It included, “The Skyscraper—vertical groove of the
landlord? Laid down flat wise. A trap that was sprung. […] The City? Gone to the
surrounding country.”15 He did not elaborate on what a horizontal skyscraper or a
countrified city might mean.
As Wright scholar Neil Levine has discovered, however, Wright’s sixth Princeton lecture
likely originated as the fifteenth “In the Cause of Architecture” article that Wright owed
Architectural Record but never delivered.16 An unpublished typescript in the Wright Foundation
Archives that closely approximates the text of the final Princeton lecture bears the title, “In
the Cause of Architecture: The City.”17 The typescript is dated September 29, 1929. This is
significant, because Wright variously located Broadacre City’s origins as early as 1924—

Wright, Modern Architecture, 7. Wright claimed twice while introducing “The Art and Craft of the
Machine” at Princeton that he was reading from a “twenty-seven year old” manuscript (5). Not only does the
1930 text differ substantially from the original, but Wright also misdated the manuscript. Twenty-seven years
prior to 1930 would have been 1903. He delivered the original lecture in March 1901, and it was published the
same month.
15 Frank Lloyd Wright, “In the Cause of Architecture: V. The New World,” Architectural Record 62, no. 4
(October 1927), reprinted in Gutheim, ed., In the Cause of Architecture, 149.
16 See Levine, introduction to Modern Architecture, xlv; Levine, Urbanism, 157, 161.
17 The first part of the title has been struck through in the edited typescript. See Frank Lloyd Wright, “In
the Cause of Architecture: The City,” typescript, MS 2401.064, FLWFA.
14

118

claiming in An Autobiography to have begun a nonexistent essay titled “The Usonian City”
that winter—and as late as 1932, the year in which he gave the project its name and
published The Disappearing City.18 Since Wright’s Princeton lectures were not delivered until
May 1930 or published until 1931, scholars have had a tendency to treat Broadacre City as a
vision of decentralized prosperity “[c]onceived in theoretical terms immediately after the
Stock Market Crash of 1929,” as Anthony Alofsin has asserted.19 Given the date on the
unpublished manuscript—exactly one month before Black Tuesday—it would be more
accurate to say that Broadacre City began as a reaction to the building boom of the 1920s
and the growing influence of European modernism in the United States, while the project’s
reception and further development were conditioned by socioeconomic realities of the
1930s.
Wright began his last lecture at Princeton by counterposing the history of centralized
cities with the implications of new technologies. Cities, in his understanding, emerged from
“necessity,” because a lack of “swift, universal means of transportation” and a reliance on
“various direct personal contacts” for communication compelled and sustained concentrated
settlements.20 A certain equilibrium existed between spatial density and social integrity, “until
electricity, electrical intercommunication, motor cars, the telephone and publicity came. […]

18 In An Autobiography, Wright referenced an essay titled “The Usonian City,” which he supposedly wrote
during the winter of 1924–25. “The Usonian City” is a subheading in the Autobiography, but the text largely
duplicates the sixth Princeton lecture. See Wright, CW 2: 306, 340–49. Wright alternately claimed to have
originated the project “at the depth of depression—1932,” in a 1939 lecture in London. See Frank Lloyd
Wright, An Organic Architecture: The Architecture of Democracy, The Sir George Watson Lectures of the Sulgrave Manor
Board for 1939 (orig. 1939; London: Lund Humphries, 2017), 28.
19 Alofsin, “Broadacre City,” 8. Former Taliesin Fellow Cornelia Brierly, who worked on and toured with
the Broadacre model in 1935, echoed that characterization in a 1991 interview. See John Meunier, “A Model
for the Decentralized City: An Interview with Cornelia Brierly,” in The Phoenix Papers, 36; see also, in the same
volume, K. Paul Zygas, “Broadacre City as Artifact,” 18.
20 Wright, Modern Architecture, 102.
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Accepting all these, everything changes.”21 The problem was that, according to Wright, the
decentralizing imperative that these technologies signaled had been unheeded. Instead,
skyscrapers exploited what Wright frequently referred to as humanity’s “herd instinct,” a
collective inertia induced by acclimation to living in concentrated settlements. Skyscrapers’
verticality impeded, for the sake of commercial gain, the “Greater Freedom to spread out
without inconvenience” that new technologies enabled.22 For Wright, the conflicting
demands of skyscrapers (to “pile up”) and automobiles (to spread out) were leading toward
“an inevitable collision between mechanistic factors.”23
Wright’s critique relied on historical reasoning similar to Lewis Mumford’s, a supportive
critic and regular correspondent. In a May 1925 Survey Graphic issue given over to the
“regionalist” concerns of the Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA), Mumford
contributed an article that theorized the apparent conflict between existing cities and new
technologies on terms similar to Wright’s. Mumford saw evidence of a “fourth migration”
that followed on three earlier “periods of flow” in American history—an initial wave of
pioneer settlement, an era of industrial expansion, and the more recent concentration of
people and financial capital in major metropolitan centers.24 He identified automobiles,
telephones, radio, and electric power as agents of a technological “revolution which has
made the existing layout of cities and the existing distribution of population out of square
with our new opportunities.”25 Despite the obvious parallels, Wright did not credit Mumford,
nor did he express any interest in projects like Sunnyside Gardens, New York (1924–28),
Ibid., 103.
Ibid., 104.
23 Ibid.
24 Lewis Mumford, “The Fourth Migration,” Survey Graphic 7 (May 1925), reprinted in Carl Sussman, ed.,
Planning the Fourth Migration: The Neglected Vision of the Regional Planning Association of America (Cambridge, MA:
The MIT Press, 1976), 56.
25 Ibid., 61.
21
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Radburn, New Jersey (1928–33), or other Garden City-inspired reform efforts supported by
Mumford and his colleagues at the RPAA. Instead, the architect twice briefly invoked Henry
Ford, whom Mumford also cited, and his “Seventy-Five Mile City,” a 1922 plan to mix
industrial decentralization with intensive agriculture and hydroelectric energy along the
Tennessee River, near Muscle Shoals, Alabama.26 The majority of Wright’s critical attention
was focused not on concerns related to Mumford’s regionalism or Ford’s industrialism,
however. He concentrated instead on “the new Machine-city of Machine-prophecy as we see
it outlined by Le Corbusier and his school.”27
Through the first five Princeton lectures, Wright directed occasional barbs at Le
Corbusier without naming him directly. The “cardboard houses of the ‘modernistic’
movement” were, for example, “a childish attempt to make buildings resemble steamships,
flying machines or locomotives.”28 This pejorative remark from the fourth lecture captured
what Wright understood to be the conceptual and material flimsiness of the Corbusian
dictum, “A house is a machine for living in,” which appeared in Towards a New Architecture
surrounded by photographs of steamships.29 In the last Princeton lecture, Wright offered a
more sustained, if also dismissive and oversimplified, critique of Le Corbusier’s urban
thought.
The opening lines of the lecture disparaged Le Corbusier as a “philosopher,” whose idea
of a “future city” amounted to little more than “pictures reducing everything to a mean

26 See Wright, Modern Architecture, 109, 113; Mumford, “Fourth Migration,” 59. On Ford’s plan, see Littell
McClung, “The Seventy-Five Mile City,” Scientific American 127, no. 3 (September 1922): 156–57, 213–14;
Heather B. Barrow, Henry Ford’s Plan for the American Suburb: Dearborn and Detroit (Dekalb, IL: Northern Illinois
University Press, 2015): 38–41.
27 Wright, Modern Architecture, 103.
28 Ibid., 66.
29 Le Corbusier, Towards a New Architecture, tr. Frederick Etchells (orig. New York: Payson & Clarke, 1927;
Mineola, NY: Dover, 1986), 95.
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height—geometrically spaced.”30 Whether the “pictures” that Wright had in mind were the
plans and perspectives of cruciform, glass-clad towers or the zig-zagging, concrete
apartments, both of which appeared in Towards a New Architecture, he was certain of their
deleterious effects. “In order to preserve air and passage,” he exclaimed, “this future city
relegates the human individual as a unit or factor to pigeonhole 337611, block F, avenue A,
street No. 127” (fig. 3.1).31 Not only did this dystopian circumstance purportedly reduce
individual humans to bureaucratically administered automatons, it also seemed, to Wright, to
collapse society into one undifferentiated category.
Wright reiterated this concern later in the lecture, but in the process appeared to
misunderstand a key aspect of the Parisian architect’s argument. Wright fretted about the
residents of the Corbusian city who would be “standardized like an army, marched not only
to and fro but up and down. […] Is this not to reduce everyone but the mechanistic devisors
and those who may secure the privileges of the top stories, to the ranks—of the poor?”32
Wright seemed to think that all, regardless of class, would be confined to residential
skyscrapers. This may have been because Frederick Etchells, the translator of Towards a New
Architecture, suggested that the cruciform towers at the heart of Le Corbusier’s scheme “will
shelter the worker.”33 A more accurate translation would read, “will house the work”
(abriteront le travail).34 Etchells also inexplicably identified a plan of these towers as, “A project
for Apartments or Flats,” despite the fact that the very same caption also insisted “that such
buildings would necessarily be devoted exclusively to business purposes. […] Family life
Wright, Modern Architecture, 101.
Ibid., 102.
32 Ibid., 106, 107.
33 Le Corbusier, Towards a New Architecture (1927), 58.
34 Le Corbusier, Toward an Architecture, tr. John Goodman (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2007),
125. On Etchells’ translation, see Jean-Louis Cohen, introduction to Le Corbusier, Toward an Architecture (2007),
48–50.
30
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would hardly be at home in them, with their prodigious mechanism of lifts.”35 Wright either
deliberately misconstrued the role of skyscrapers in Le Corbusier’s plan or was led astray by
a cursory reading of Etchells’ liberal translation. He also mischaracterized Le Corbusier’s
mass-production housing. For Le Corbusier, standardized housing types, based on his
“Dom-Ino” proposal, were not intended as a mechanism of social leveling. The “Dom-Ino”
frame provided a basic unit of construction that was adaptable to a variety of domestic
circumstances, which produced, he explained, a notional “link between the rich man’s house
and the poor man’s.”36 What Le Corbusier conceived as a rationalization of the building
industry in the name of “moral” reform, Wright interpreted as a dehumanizing program of
social regimentation that exacerbated the problems it attempted to resolve.37
When Wright finally began to schematize his own vision toward the end of the lecture,
Le Corbusier continued to provide a foil. He explained that existing cities would retain
certain “utilitarian” purposes—as marketplaces and financial centers, to which people would
commute for six-hour workdays, three days a week—while the remainder of “human life”
would spread “to the country.”38 This dispersion would be driven by a chauvinist sociospatial imperative: “Ruralism as distinguished from Urbanism is American, and truly
Democratic.”39 The hyperbole of this formulation can be misleading. He made no mention
of activities or environments typically associated with “the country,” like farming, at least not
yet. He did comment favorably, however, on “the splitting up of Los Angeles and Chicago

35 Ibid., 56. Etchells’ reference to “Apartments or Flats” was pure invention. The original caption
identified the plan as a “land subdivision proposal” (proposition de lotissement). Le Corbusier, Toward an Architecture
(2007), 124. The passage concerning business purposes and family life is a more faithful, if somewhat awkward,
rendering.
36 Le Corbusier, Towards a New Architecture (1927), 234–35.
37 Ibid., 263.
38 Wright, Modern Architecture, 108
39 Ibid., 109.
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into several centers, again to be split into many more.”40 His frequent invocations of “the
country”—as in, “the tall building has its real future in the country”—should be read,
therefore, in terms of the semantic interchangeability of “country” and “suburb” mentioned
in chapter 1.41 Wright’s retention of an urban core, however minimized, and his attention to
the polynuclear growth of cities in which he had lived and worked does not point to a rural
alternative to existing urban conditions. Instead, he seemed to be proposing a radical
reconfiguration of existing metropolitan phenomena according to the presumed dictates of
decentralizing technologies.
The published version of “The City” devoted only four of fourteen pages to Wright’s
envisioned alternative, just before his conclusion. His first recommendation, following on
the idea that cities be retained for “utilitarian” purposes, was that each family be guaranteed
one acre of land as a “democratic minimum.”42 After this were brief synopses of the
institutions and establishments that would support a population dispersed along the “great
highways [that] are in process of becoming the decentralized metropolis.”43 These included
gasoline service stations, chain stores, single-family homes, schools, theaters, and community
centers. Wright devoted no more than a paragraph to each of these, but collectively they
established the means by which “Man” would “find all the city ever offered him, plus the
privacy the city never had and is trying to teach him that he does not want.”44 Similar
formulations of the advantages of the city reconstituted in the country had been a byword
for suburbanization since the mid-nineteenth century.45 This is significant, because it shows
Ibid., 105.
Ibid., 104.
42 Ibid., 109.
43 Ibid., 110.
44 Ibid., 111.
45 For instance, in an 1871 report on conditions in Staten Island, New York, Frederick Law Olmsted
defined “suburban” as “detached dwellings with sylvan surroundings yet supplied with a considerable share of
40
41
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that Wright’s project was not a wholesale departure from existing metropolitan trends. As
Wright continued to lecture on and publish the ideas that would become Broadacre City, he
developed this brief list of building types into a robust framework for managing the change
he perceived to be already reshaping metropolitan America.

3.2 Configuring Broadacre City

“The City,” Wright’s sixth Princeton lecture, established the discursive framework from
which Broadacre City would emerge. The verbal sketch of “the decentralized metropolis”
with which he concluded could be brief because of the peculiar format of the lectures
themselves. Though the Kahn Lectures were typically organized as an eight-part series,
Wright proposed six talks to be accompanied by an exhibition of his work. (He rationalized
this by observing, with characteristic bravado, “In six days the world was made, on the
seventh the work was visible and the maker no doubt viewing it.”)46 In general, Wright was
disinclined to accompany his lectures with slides, preferring “discourses uninterrupted by
pictures.”47 Even though the organizers at Princeton insisted on concluding each talk with
their own assembled collection of images, they agreed to the exhibit as a supplementary
form of visual accompaniment. The show opened in Princeton’s McCormick Hall on May
12, 1930, two days before Wright delivered his final, urban-themed lecture. Its purpose, as
conceived by Wright, was to be a dialogical counterpart to the lectures. The models of a
freestanding tower, service station, and numerous others spanning Wright’s career to date,

urban convenience.” Frederick Law Olmsted et al., Report to the Staten Island Improvement Commission of a
Preliminary Scheme of Improvements (New York: James Sutton, 1871), 9.
46 Frank Lloyd Wright to E. Baldwin Smith, February 8, 1930, quoted in Levine, introduction to Modern
Architecture, xviii.
47 Wright to Smith, April 1, 1930, quoted in ibid., xx.
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were dispersed among easel-mounted drawings and photographs. Because Wright wove
references to his own works throughout the first five lectures, the exhibition represented a
kind of manifestation of the argument Wright was developing over the course of his time at
Princeton. The sixth lecture began to form it into one coherent rhetorical idea.
Broadacre City has come to be understood as an idea that was developed textually before
it took visual form in the large model debuted at Rockefeller Center in 1935. The
relationship between the Princeton lectures and exhibition suggests a more nuanced
interplay of verbal and visual media in the project’s early development. After Princeton, the
exhibition traveled to the Architectural League of New York. It was, in fact, the League’s
president Raymond Hood who initiated the idea of an exhibit, which Wright then
incorporated into his plans for Princeton. Between June 1930 and March 1931, it was
installed at the Art Institute of Chicago; the University of Wisconsin, Madison; a private
gallery in Milwaukee; the University of Oregon, Eugene; and the University of Washington,
Seattle, with Wright usually accompanying the show on a lecture tour (fig. 3.2).48 The
installation then made stops in the Netherlands, Germany, and Belgium, though Wright did
not accompany it. The Princeton lectures and the traveling exhibition would together mark a
turning point in Wright’s career, which made his decision to limit the use of visual material
in the resulting 1931 publication, Modern Architecture, somewhat strange. Like the other five
lectures-cum-chapters, “The City” was preceded by a single image of a project from Wright’s
early career.49 Despite this privileging of a rhetorical argument over a visual one, Wright’s
limited use of images in the project’s early development helps to better understand the ways
in which Broadacre City developed through 1932. Images of skyscrapers—photographs of
48
49

See Levine, introduction to Wright, Modern Architecture, xxi; Smith, Wright on Exhibit, 44–66, 233.
See ibid., xxv–xxvi.
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existing cityscapes and drawings of Wright’s own designs—augmented the architect’s
evolving and expanding argument, however obliquely. Exploring these images provides
insights into the rather tendentious social critique that would ultimately underpin The
Disappearing City, the publication that culminated Broadacre City’s initial, literary phase of
development.
Before turning to The Disappearing City, however, it is necessary to briefly introduce the
skyscraper project to which Wright would recurrently make reference. This is the
aforementioned project for revenue-producing apartment towers commissioned by the
Church of St. Mark’s-in-the-Bouwerie, a historic Episcopal parish in Manhattan’s Lower East
Side. Wright was approached by the Church’s rector in 1927, but he did not produce a design
until 1929 (figs. 3.3 & 3.4). As the Depression grew worse, the Church eventually abandoned
the project in 1931, by which time it had already become a key component of Broadacre
City.
The site plans for the St. Mark’s project usually showed four freestanding towers
clustered around the Church in a park-like setting. (Sometimes there are only three.) The
plan of each tower was identical, although their heights varied. The slabs of four duplex
apartments were cantilevered from a cruciform concrete circulation-and-utility core. The
towers were clad in glass-and-copper curtain walls. Stuyvesant Street bordered the site’s
southern edge, and its thirty-degree rotation from the Manhattan grid was reproduced in the
plan’s pinwheel. The resulting plan geometries created double-height spaces in the apartment
interiors and protruding balconies on the exterior. The glass curtain walls, cruciform core,
and duplex apartments showed the undeniable influence of Le Corbusier’s towers and
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housing proposals, as historians like Hilary Ballon have shown.50 In fact, when Architectural
Record published the St. Mark’s plans, in January 1930, the accompanying text observed, “In
this project, Frank Lloyd Wright realizes some of the most advanced aims professed by
European architects.”51 The project also updated and transposed the organization logic of
Wright’s turn-of-the-century quadruple block plan, first published in 1901 (see fig. 1.8). The
earlier, inwardly oriented individual homes became outwardly focused duplexes, but despite
its relocation from a suburban to an urban setting, the intent remained the same. The project
text in Architectural Record used language that was reminiscent of both the original Ladies
Home Journal project and, intriguingly, Raymond Hood’s “City of Towers.” It explained that
the towers’ structural independence permitted “a high degree of privacy, plenty of daylight
and utilizable space,” while the shared park-like setting guaranteed “these towers will always
stand free.”52
By the time the possibility of realizing the St. Mark’s Tower evaporated in 1931, the
project had already been incorporated into Broadacre City. A fifty-three-inch tall model of
the tower was built for the Princeton exhibition. The same model would also loom large
over the 1935 installation of Broadacre City at Rockefeller Center (see fig. 5.1). A rendering
of the St. Mark’s design illustrated a March 1932 article in the New York Times Sunday
Magazine. The project’s original lower Manhattan context had been replaced with a verdant,
pastoral setting (fig. 3.5). The article, titled “‘Broadacre City’: An Architect’s Vision,” was the
Hillary Ballon, “From New York to Bartlesville: The Pilgrimage of Wright’s Skyscraper,” in Anthony
Alofsin, ed., Prairie Skyscraper: Frank Lloyd Wright’s Price Tower (New York: Rizzoli, 2005), 104–108. See also
Alofsin, Broadacre City, 8, 12, 14, 35; Henry S. Churchill, “The Social Implications of the Skyscraper,” in Four
Great Makers of Modern Architecture: Gropius, Le Corbusier, Mies van der Rohe, Wright, A verbatim record of a symposium
held at the School of Architecture from March to May 1961 (New York: Trustees of Columbia University, 1963), 44–
54; Donald Leslie Johnson, Frank Lloyd Wright versus America: The 1930s (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press,
1990), 101–105, 110; Levine, Urbanism, 158–160.
51 “The Glass House for America: St. Mark’s Towers,” Architectural Record 67, no. 1 (January 1930): 1.
52 Ibid.
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first published use of that name for the project. The text also began to outline the project in
greater detail. As explored in the next section, it devoted greater attention to the highways
and their role in shaping the infrastructure of a renewed and dispersed culture of
consumption. For now, Wright’s use of a skyscraper as the sole means of visually
demonstrating Broadacre City’s decentralizing potential requires explanation.
At face value, the decision to use a perspective drawing of the St. Mark’s Tower appears
illogical. Wright wrote the piece in response to the Times’ publication, in January, of Le
Corbusier’s urban ideas. The opening lines of Wright’s article dismissed proposals to
improve conditions in existing cities as “skyscraperites’ expedient imagery” and derided Le
Corbusier’s urbanism as “feudal towers a little further apart.”53 He made no effort to explain
how his drawing differed from either. This apparent disjunction between text and image
becomes clearer when considered intertextually. Wright had proposed in his penultimate
Princeton lecture, titled “The Tyranny of the Skyscraper,” that tall buildings constructed of
“steel and glass and copper”—an obvious allusion to the St. Mark’s Tower—could be
located “in any village, town, or city, but especially in the country,” so long as they were
appropriately “standardized.”54 The structural integrity and freestanding independence of
Wright’s tower design made it adaptable to contexts other than its original urban one,
although as Wright would subsequently make clear, the conditions of that adaptability were
peculiarly masculine.
Wright also used the drawing in the Times to reengage with Le Corbusier. The Parisian
architect’s own earlier Times article was illustrated with an aerial image of lower Manhattan,
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captioned as “A Tornado, a Cataclysm … Utterly Devoid of Harmony,” juxtaposed with an
axonometric rendering of Le Corbusier’s cruciform towers set in an orderly landscape of
parks, traffic arteries, and apartments (fig. 3.6).55 Wright, too, juxtaposed his own design with
photographs of an overcrowded sidewalk and a vertiginously framed Empire State Building,
creating a visual parallelism between the two articles that served to heighten their ideological
differences. In contrast with what Wright supposed to be collectivist anonymity of Le
Corbusier’s disembodied axonometric view, Wright’s ground-level perspective seemed to
embody the “democracy” that he defined in his article as “the systematized integration of
small individual units.”56 Though it would not likely have been apparent to Times readers,
Wright’s use of the St. Mark’s Tower rendering made a coded, multilayered visual argument
about the type of society Broadacre City would produce.57
The Disappearing City, published six months later, largely eschewed such an interplay
between rhetorical and visual arguments. Its ninety pages of text were interspersed with just
six photographs (figs. 3.7–3.9). The first, facing the title page, was a Fairchild Aerial Survey
view of midtown Manhattan cloaked in fog and smoke. The second was a view from
midtown, showing lower Manhattan as a dense mass of high-rises. The next three showed a
small, centrally planned city; a sprawling rail yard; and a lone figure walking through a
pastoral landscape. With captions like “FIND THE CITIZEN,” for the second image, and
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“BEYOND THE VORTEX,” for the fifth one, these photographs’ purpose was more provocative
than explanatory. The sixth photograph was a portrait of Wright. The Disappearing City thus
relied primarily on prose to elaborate ideas like Wright’s contention that skyscrapers could be
both the cause of and a partial remedy for existing urban ills. The text also framed the
problems of the present through a historical lens. If this made the project’s social vision
more robust, it also relied on all-too-typical racial and gender biases.
In the beginning pages of The Disappearing City, Wright invoked what he apparently
considered to be an unfulfilled promise of Anglo-American racial superiority. As he
explained, the revolutionary origins of the United States contained the potential for a
renewal of Anglo-Saxon culture untethered from burdensome Old World traditions. Instead,
“such arts as had come to the new country with the decency of the early colonials” were
betrayed by “the advent of many nationalities,” which produced “eclecticism in art and
architecture. […] The incongruities were enormous and begot abortions.”58 This was not the
only instance where Wright portrayed stylistic eclecticism as an unfortunate cultural
byproduct of racioethnic diversity. A 1925 essay, titled “In the Cause of Architecture: The
Third Dimension,” which appeared in the Dutch journal Wendingen (independent of the later
Architectural Record series), is best known for introducing the term “Usonia” into Wright’s
lexicon. The first usage of what would become Wright’s preferred moniker for the United
States occurred in a passage that also derided the Renaissance as an “admixture of ideals and
races [that] necessarily confused origins and so stultified them,” which when imported to
America became, “a mongrel admixture of all the styles of all the world.”59
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The few instances where the architect addressed race directly largely reinforced these
analogies. In her recent study of Wright’s Rosenwald School project (1928), Mabel O. Wilson
quotes the architect’s patronizing admiration of the “colorful, joyful spirit of the negro.”60
Wilson could also have cited Wright’s reflection, in a 1929 letter to Lewis Mumford, that
designing the Rosenwald School was like “another modest excursion into the nature and
feeling of an alien race such as was the Tokio [sic] hotel on a grand scale.”61 Fittingly, Wright
concluded the historical narrative in The Disappearing City by turning to a well-trod literary
trope that, as Toni Morrison has argued, used “darkness” to signal a loss of white agency.62
Wright bemoaned a “Jeffersonian democratic ideal” that “lacked nourishment in culture and
so languished,” leaving “American Culture” to become “a following after into the general
darkness.”63
As The Disappearing City turned from historical to contemporary problems, Wright traded
coded racial language for an explicitly gendered one. He construed the anonymity and
limited individual agency he associated with the modern city as a “man-trap of gigantic
dimensions, devouring manhood, [that] denies in its affected riot of personality any
individuality whatsoever.”64 Those “whose metier is the crowd” were “impotent,” while
“neuters” constituted “the dam across the stream flowing toward freedom.”65 The term
Wright quoted in Mabel O. Wilson, “Rosenwald School: Lessons in Progressive Education,” in Frank
Lloyd Wright: Unpacking the Archive, eds. Barry Bergdoll and Jennifer Gray (New York: The Museum of Modern
Art, 2017), 97.
61 Frank Lloyd Wright to Lewis Mumford, January 7, 1929, in Frank Lloyd Wright & Lewis Mumford: Thirty
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“neuter,” it is worth noting, was not a new one for Wright. In early 1932, upset that the
curators of the Museum of Modern Art’s “Modern Architecture: International Exhibition”
were going to display his work alongside “eclectics” like Richard Neutra and Raymond
Hood, Wright wrote but never published an essay called “To the Neuter.” It derided
proponents of “internationalism” as “eunuchs,” characterized stylistic eclecticism as a
“rendezvous with the prostitute,” and concluded by arguing that Wright’s own “organic”
architecture was a “capacity for love [that] will create anew and fructify the future.”66 These
forms of urban and aesthetic emasculation were interrelated, as Wright explained in The
Disappearing City,
[T]he same old thought that looked for freedom by way of arbitrary laws having no
foundation in basic economic structure nor in the character of our ideal […] has
made of this form of centralization we call the city a conspiracy against manlike
freedom just as it made American architecture a bad form of surface decoration.67
This gendering of the metropolitan landscape expanded on the critiques of skyscrapers and
European modernism in the Princeton lectures. The same applied to his idea of
transplanting skyscrapers “to the country.” Toward the end of The Disappearing City, Wright
explained that apartment towers, designed as “prismatic metal and glass shafts” set in thirty-

66 Frank Lloyd Wright, “To the Neuter,” in CW 3: 65–66. On January 19, 1932, Wright sent a letter to
Lewis Mumford seeking his advice on whether to withdraw from MoMA’s upcoming “Modern Architecture:
International Exhibition.” He proudly attached a copy of “To the Neuter” to rationalize his thinking. Bruce
Brooks Pfeiffer and Robert Wojtowitz, editors of Wright’s and Mumford’s collected correspondence, speculate
that “neuter” may have functioned, for Wright, as a pun on Richard Neutra’s surname. Wright complained at
length about Neutra in his letter to Mumford. See Wright & Mumford, 126n14. Pfeiffer’s editorial comment
preceding “To the Neuter” in Wright’s Collected Writings attempts to obscure its prejudices by describing the
architect’s tone as “rather caustic—in fact, sarcastic,” and his conclusion as “a plea for a more humane, and
therefore more natural, approach to architecture.” The latter claim is disingenuous, while the former implies
that Wright’s language was uncharacteristic or, at least, unserious. Yet the same gendered language appears
throughout Wright’s published writings of the period, including in The Disappearing City; “Of Thee I Sing,”
Shelter 2, no. 3 (April 1932), reprinted in CW 3: 113–15.
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acre gardens, would serve as an “infirmary for the confirmed ‘citified.’”68 They would
operate, he suggested, as a kind of conversion therapy for those “unable or unwilling (it is
the same thing) to establish themselves in the country otherwise.”69 To remove any
ambiguity, this section was titled, “FOR THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN EMASCULATED BY THE
PRESENT CITY.”

Already in his last Princeton lecture, Wright had begun to frame the potential for
Broadacre City in such terms. He warned that Corbusian urbanism was “an expedient to
enslave man to the machine and make him like it.”70 If “Man” would instead forsake the city
for the country, he “will find manlike Freedom for himself and his that Democracy must
mean.”71 The manliness of this “democratic” freedom was reiterated, more belligerently, in
The Disappearing City: “[H]ere now may be a manly man, in Usonia, living in manlike
freedom.”72
This aspect of Broadacre City has received scant attention in studies of the project,
perhaps because it runs counter to the more palatable progressivism that Wright could also
evince. He had been involved, of course, with Jane Addams’s Hull House in Chicago at the
turn of the century and, in 1932, he established a coeducational apprentice program at
Taliesin. Yet, as the architect continued to develop Broadacre City through the 1930s, these
sexist and racist tendencies were not diminished but amplified. For example, he began a
February 1936 speech to the Woman’s Congress in Chicago with a litany of the United
States’ cultural deficits. Included among them was the lament that the country’s “popular
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music was a gift from the Negro.”73 His conclusion argued that, through Broadacre City,
“sanity may be restored to culture.”74 Other developments of the late 1930s are explored
more fully in chapter 5, but it is worth briefly considering a passage from a 1937 book,
because it helps to weave together the issues explored in this section.
Wright co-authored Architecture and Modern Life with the journalist and academic Baker
Brownell in 1937. The text attempted to explain how the architect’s design work—and
Broadacre City specifically—could instigate social and cultural renewal. Its opening lines
imagined a “stainless, light-filled tower” standing “alone, like a virgin above the soiled
frumperies of her older sisters below.”75 The allusion, as at Princeton and in The Disappearing
City, was clearly to the St. Mark’s Tower. Wright and Brownell continued, describing how
“she”—that is, the “virgin” tower—demonstrated architecture’s ability to mediate social
transformation by maintaining a critical aloofness from the apparently undesirable qualities
of existing cities. This aloofness constituted an “excess [that] brings inevitable change. An
organic architecture such as this not only embodies social structures but suggests other and
better ones.”76 Put differently, Wright argued that the sexualized “purity” of his “organic”
architecture would generate a desire capable of eventually producing a new social reality.
This passage belatedly added another dimension to the sometimes-tenuous relationship
between Broadacre City’s rhetorical and visual dimensions. The image of the St. Mark’s
Tower in the March 1932 New York Times article was more than just a repurposed image of
an abandoned project. It was also more than just a coded attempt by Wright to reposition
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himself in response to the growing influence of Le Corbusier in America. It could also be
read as a gendered emblem of Wright’s self-proclaimed creative virility and its ability to
overcome the “man-trap” of existing cities and the “affected riot” of their eclectic
architecture.

3.3 An Advance Agent of Decentralization

The shimmering glass-and-copper curtain walls of Wright’s St. Mark’s Tower functioned,
rhetorically, as a prism for Wright’s curious ideas about social change. In The Disappearing City,
Wright’s commentaries on race and gender were scattered sparingly across a ninety-page
narrative, but they were integral to Broadacre City’s conceptual framework. Gasoline service
stations played a central role in elaborating the combination of spatial and economic
decentralization that was central to Broadacre City. The discourse that Wright built around
them can also be read in terms similar to those introduced above.
To be certain, Wright never really articulated a fully formed theory of economic
decentralization. Rather, he extrapolated from his own work and from observations of
existing trends. The service station discussed in chapter 1 is a prime example. Wright was
invited to design it by friends in Buffalo, but the possibility of a commission quickly
evaporated when the architect thought he might be better served by selling his scheme to a
conglomerate like Standard Oil. Wright was so pleased with the design—composed of a
cubic concrete service volume, from which cantilevered a butterfly-shaped, copper-clad
canopy—that he declared it to be “a sketch for a new dispensation, a practical invention” (see
figs. 1.26 & 1.27). Given the potential he clearly felt that the project held, it is not surprising
that the service station played an early and important role in the development of Broadacre
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City. His apprentices constructed a model of the 1927 scheme for the 1930–31 exhibition
(see figs. 1.28a & 1.28b). It also figured prominently in his schematic vision of “the
decentralized metropolis” at Princeton.
After explaining how automobiles had irrevocably undermined arguments in favor of
urban concentration, Wright observed that the “splendid highways” originally built to deliver
motorists to the city “will eventually hasten reaction away from it.”77 Service stations would
obviously be critical to this automobile-induced dispersion, but their purpose, as Wright saw
it, was to do more than facilitate refueling. They would constitute “future city service in
embryo. Each station that happens to be naturally located will as naturally grow into a
neighborhood distribution center, meeting-place, restaurant, rest room or whatever else is
needed. A thousand centers as city equivalents to every town or city center we now have, will
be the result of this advance agent of decentralization.”78 Each station would be combined
with a chain store. Together they would operate as mechanisms of a “more perfect
machinery of distribution than could ever be had by centralization in cities.”79 By
augmenting their primary functions with an array of attendant activities, Wright did more
than propose a slightly more elaborate version of existing super service stations. As
subsequent publications would make clear, he positioned them as harbingers of a new
socioeconomic era.
Wright was not alone in understanding service stations on these terms. As discussed in
chapter 1, Standard Oil of New York used its “Soconyland” advertising campaign to guide
motorists through episodes from American history and to its service stations (see fig. 1.25).
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In terms of its argumentation, Wright’s conception of service stations as agents of
socioeconomic change also owed another unacknowledged debt to Lewis Mumford. In the
same 1925 Survey Graphic article cited above, Mumford observed, in terms somewhat more
circumscribed than Wright’s, that automobiles would “disperse population rather than
concentrate it,” a condition that was already bringing “goods and markets together, not
linearly, as the railroads tend to do, but areally.”80 Notably, for Mumford, “Chain stores have
been quick to grasp the advantages of covering territory in this fashion.”81 If Mumford
anticipated the broad terms through which Wright would approach the economic
possibilities of motorized decentralization, the Danish-born architect Knud Lönberg-Holm
provided existing evidence of networked service stations as hubs of modern communities.
In a lengthy, largely technical article in the June 1930 issue of Architectural Record,
Lönberg-Holm inserted a brief excursus on the ways in which “[c]rude competitive
advertising” put the commercial realities of service stations into conflict with “community
interests.”82 Instead of utilizing the potential of mass production to create a “plastic unity”
that would “satisfy the demand of economy, comfort, and appearance,” mass-produced
service stations, for the most part, imitated the forms of traditional structures.83 LönbergHolm concluded his article with an example that demonstrated both the possibilities and
limitations of current service station design. He drew readers’ attention to the efforts of the
California-based Richfield Oil Company, which had begun constructing stations as “links in
a chain designed to reach from the Mexican border to Canada.”84 Each station was adjoined
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by a 125-foot tall, neon-lit aeronautical tower, which was intended as a beacon for both
motorists and pilots (fig. 3.10). The stations were sited, Lönberg-Holm explained, “as nuclei
for future community developments.”85 Unfortunately, as the architect perceived it, the
Spanish Revival stylings of the stations themselves treated communality as “superficial
uniformity,” while the “commercial spirit” of the towers subverted “community rights.”86
Such an equation of form and type cohered with Wright’s own conception of “organic”
architecture as a signifier of “democratic” ideals. More significantly, Lönberg-Holm showed
that the future Wright envisioned was already taking shape, albeit imperfectly.
Wright’s account of the service stations in subsequent publications largely reiterated
what he had already said at Princeton, but he added some crucial insights and made a few
alterations. In 1930, he thought that rail systems would still be used for “the ‘long haul,’” but
by the time he published his 1932 New York Times article he foresaw rail travel supplanted
entirely by “low-gravity truck-train[s].”87 These would traverse the six-lane highways
alongside “the swiftly moving fleet” of personal automobiles and “luxurious motor-buses.”88
Elimination of grade crossings would ensure the “safety and gayety” of road trips, while
“varied and well designed” planes would make air travel “noiseless, compact and safe.”89 This
was, as Wright understood it, not a radical proposition, but an intensification of existing
trends in transportation.
Similarly, the filling stations scattered along the nation’s roadways were apparently “crude
and seemingly insignificant units,” but they were also, as he recapitulated in The Disappearing
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City, embryonic evidence of the centripetal effect automobiles were already having on
metropolitan America.90 He also reiterated, but in greater detail, the addition of
“merchandise of all sorts” to the station’s specifically automotive functions, as well as
“various schemes for automatic parking; beguiling entertainments; cabarets, cafes, and
restaurants, and comfortable overnight accommodations for transients.”91 Advertising would
encourage healthy competition among stations, while also “not too suddenly depriv[ing] the
age of its characteristic art.”92 This would understandably make each standardized service
station “the most diversified single modern unit to be found in all the features of the
Broadacre City.”93
For Wright, the significance of diversification did not necessarily lie in programmatic
complexity itself, but rather in the organizational possibilities it could offer. He continued his
account in The Disappearing City by describing these augmented stations dispersed logically
along the highways and situated as nodes within precisely calibrated networks of
consumption, through which purchasing and distribution for each individual establishment
would be standardized and coordinated. This was not, he insisted, wholesale invention, but
rather “only slight changes for the better of an ideal that is already doing its work; and that
ideal—reintegration of decentralization—must, to go on working, follow the law of change
as Marshall Field followed when he established stores at outlying suburbs.”94 He also cited
Sears-Roebuck’s chain stores and Woolworth’s suburban outposts as precedents. In other
words, Wright imagined augmented super service stations to be critical components of an
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organizational logic that would guide an already suburbanizing consumer culture toward “the
next step in decentralization and the integration that is Democracy.”95
This last observation is critical for a number of reasons. First, it helps to clarify what
otherwise appears to be an amorphous idealism that defined the project’s early development.
As Neil Levine has recently contended, “The apparent lack of interest in the visual—or
reliance on the verbal—are indicative of the utopian character of the project.”96 In this
telling, it was only with the construction of the model over the winter of 1934–35, that the
project began to “cohere as an image.”97 There is another way to understand the project’s
apparent formlessness. As Wright’s discourse on service stations suggests, he was not
necessarily searching for a single coherent image around which to organize his project.
Rather, he was interrogating existing conditions in and around American cities, where he
found what he considered to be evidence of change in places like service stations. He
merged this quotidian architecture with other decentralizing precedents—namely, chain
stores and suburban department store satellites—to produce the purported harbinger of a
new socioeconomic era. Wright was not struggling to devise a utopian form. He was
developing a framework capable of assimilating the cultural, economic, and infrastructural
transformations of the 1920s into a new geography of consumption.
Second, Wright’s use of democracy requires some clarification. Despite his frequent
invocations of the term, Wright was rarely as interested in social or political equality as he
was in economic individualism, although he too frequently obscured the distinction. Take,
for example, the way he correlated spatial conditions with systems of economic and political
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power in his March 1932 New York Times article. For Wright, “Monarchy was the ideal of
centralization—the unit compelled to revolve around a common centre. Democracy is the
ideal of integration—many units free in themselves functioning together in freedom. […]
Our capitalistic system, if it persists as a form of centralization, stands to fall.”98 It is true
that, in The Disappearing City, Wright would claim that Broadacre City “has nothing to do with
capitalism, or communism, or socialism.”99 But, as explored in greater detail in chapter 5, he
would also eventually settle on “organic capitalism” as the best descriptor of Broadacre
City’s organizing logic. In the meantime, he conveyed the capitalist content of his
“democratic” project through descriptions of a reconfigured metropolitan landscape. In a
May 1932 American Architect article, Wright encouraged readers to imagine service stations
and other facilities distributed along a “great architectural highway,” which would enable a
new release of human activity soon integrated into economic systems eliminating the
waste of time and motion and human stricture now inevitably imposed on man’s life
by great centralization, whether as city or factory, finance, university, or school. […]
An interchange of products is easily had by continuous movement each way without
waste motion to charge up to the consumer. A man sits in his car, […] and sees with
his own eyes the plenty of the earth in attractive places—free to seek the best of
everything. […] Business has taken on a different complexion. It is a form of
freedom, and architecture bursts into bloom.100
In other words, the “manlike freedom […] that Democracy must mean” would be facilitated by
the automobile, realized through architectural means, and assessed in economic terms.
Democracy was, for Wright, less a system of governance than it was a reconstituted capitalist
economy. Capitalism as it existed was at risk of faltering, because it retained too many
centralized, “monarchic” traits. Wright’s proposal, which was underpinned by universal
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mobility and commercial efficiency, was “democratic” not because it rejected capitalism, but
because it improved upon it. It was not an alternative to capitalism, but an alternative form of
capitalism. In economic terms as well as programmatic terms, Broadacre City was being
extrapolated from the decentralizing trends of the 1920s. The “form of freedom” that it
signaled would be, in Wright’s estimation, a more fully realized consumer economy than a
centralized producer economy could allow.
Indeed, despite the importance accorded to farming by Wright and by subsequent
scholars, actual sites of production were largely rendered invisible in Wright’s discourse on
Broadacre City. In The Disappearing City, he devoted considerable attention to energy
production. Coal and oil, he proposed, would be converted to electric power “at the source,”
from where it would be “relayed from station to station to the consumer.”101 Factories would
become “beautiful, smokeless and noiseless.”102 In fact, the entire infrastructural complex of
the existing industrial economy—its “gas plants, coal burning power houses, train sheds,
roundhouses, coal yards, lumberyards,” telephone poles, and transmission wires—would be
“swept away out of sight.”103 Even the farms, which are explored below, were construed as
integrated parts of Broadacre City’s burgeoning consumer culture, not as self-sufficient
agrarian homesteads.
This thread of Wright’s argument had less of a basis in reality, but is, for that very
reason, revealing. In 1935, a coal lobbyist informed the architect that “many studies have
been made of the problem of generating power at the mines and transmitting it to the
cities,” but that a solution had proved elusive “due to the pollution of the streams by the
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sulphur mine water.”104 He wondered if Wright had insights to which the coal industry might
not be privy. Unlike his attention to service stations, Wright’s interest in Broadacre City’s
infrastructural landscape did not extrapolate from existing trends. Instead, it represented a
desire to translate the possibilities of a dispersed consumer culture into an all-consuming
environmental aesthetic. In this respect, it is useful to point again to the similarities between
Wright’s ideas and “Soconyland.” The Standard Oil advertising campaign made its service
stations waypoints in an easily digestible journey through early American history by
obscuring their role as visible points of access to otherwise murky networks of extraction,
refinement, and politico-economic power. In order to bring one landscape (of consumption)
into focus, the other, productive landscape had to be obscured. Wright’s project was, in this
respect, no different. As Broadacre City constructed a new, dispersed metropolitan
landscape, those aspects of the existing landscape that did not cohere with its logic of
consumption were not necessarily overcome. They were, as Wright articulated, simply “swept
away out of sight.”
This was not the only invisible dimension of Broadacre City. In one sense, the project
itself already existed fragmentarily and “unperceived at first” in the forces reshaping the
metropolitan fringe.105 It was, as Wright often said, “nowhere or everywhere.”106 Its eventual
visibility was not conditional on the imposition of a master plan, but rather on individual
self-actualization. As the architect understood it, “The individual’s horizon has widened by
means of the ubiquitous motor car. […] It is in the nature of the automobile that the city
spreads out thus and far away. It is in the nature of flying that the city should disappear. It is
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in the nature of universal electrification that the city should not exist.”107 However, the
notion that Broadacre City’s realization would be achieved through the ability to act with
uninhibited individual agency itself encoded other forms of invisibility.
Women and minorities, for example, did not experience the same unchecked freedom
behind the wheel as the fully liberated “man” of Wright’s American Architect article, who was
“free to seek the best of everything” from his car.108 For African Americans, in particular, car
ownership brought partial reprieve from the pervasive injustices of Jim Crow-era public
transit, but Victor. H. Green’s popular Negro Motorist Green Book revealed limits to the
automobile’s liberating potential. In the 1949 edition of the Green Book, the editors recalled,
“With the introduction of this travel guide in 1936, it has been our idea to give the Negro
traveler information that will keep him from running into difficulties, embarrassments and to
make his trips more enjoyable.”109 The Green Book (for which Standard Oil was a major
sponsor) circumscribed a landscape within which black motorists could avoid the
“difficulties” that would otherwise greet them at businesses catering to “whites only.” Given
the racial tropes that structured Wright’s understanding of American history, it was not clear
that his conception of “manlike freedom” extended to the segregationist conditions that
necessitated the Green Book. Race relations were accorded the same fate, it would seem, as
Broadacre City’s industrial infrastructures: “swept away out of sight,” but not resolved.
These conceptual limitations, infrastructural and demographic, were symptomatic of
Broadacre City’s organizational logic. The project was extrapolated from those aspects of the
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metropolitan landscape that Wright understood to be capable of ushering in a new
socioeconomic era. It was not, as he explained in the conclusion of The Disappearing City, just
“another Utopia,” but rather a “tentative outline” drawn from his “experience trying to get
an organic architecture born for these United States.”110 The ultimate purpose of this outline
was to guide the “new forms of our modern life”—“the roadside service station an
important one among them”—into “an intelligent interpretation of democracy.”111 Other
conditions of modern life, like racism, fell by the wayside.

3.4 Domestic Connections

Broadacre City, as Wright contended in the closing pages of The Disappearing City, did not
diverge from conditions “on the edges of the congestion.”112 It augmented and intensified
them. This condition—that Broadacre City was a not a departure from given realities, but a
selective intensification of them—also informed the project’s early critical reception. In a
review of The Disappearing City, published in the Journal of Land & Public Utility Economics,
architect George Frederick Keck acknowledged that he was intrigued by Wright’s desire to
make every family “semi-independent,” but he also worried about “the beauty of the
countryside, once it becomes webbed with giant highways and flecked with super-filling
stations.”113 Catherine Bauer concurred. In a January 1933 Nation review, she insisted that it
was “just not possible to spread the town all over the country and preserve the virtues of
either.” Otherwise, “what does one find but something not unlike our present upper-class
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suburbs?”114 Equally troubling to these critics, was Wright’s apparent inattention or even
indifference to the social consequences of his imperative to decentralize. The root cause, for
Bauer, was Wright’s limited conception of a house as “a place where a man puts his car in
the garage and is king of all he surveys,” and not as “an integral part of a planned and
equipped community unit.”115
Domestic concerns were, of course, central to Broadacre City. The project’s name
derived from its guarantee of at least one acre per family. Wright also repurposed an earlycareer motto—“The horizontal line is the line of domesticity.”—that had been used to
rationalize the visual language of his prairie-style homes to summarize his new, broader set
of concerns: “The sense of freedom in space is an abiding human desire, because the
horizontal line is the line of domesticity—the Earthline of human life. The City has taken
this freedom away.”116 The wide-ranging possibilities of the automobile and its service
stations would facilitate Wright’s aims, but it was in the domestic realm that this hoped-for
“freedom” would be achieved. Unsurprisingly, Wright’s conception of domesticity was
interwoven with the same concerns about masculinity, race, and consumer culture examined
above.
At Princeton, his attention to housing grew out of his critique of Le Corbusier’s “new
Machine-city of Machine-prophecy.” As previously discussed, Wright was concerned about
the social leveling he understood mass-produced residential architecture to imply. He also
used the Corbusian city as a cipher for the “problem of the tenement, the none-too-pretty

114 C[atherine] K. Bauer, “When Is a House Not a House?,” review of Wright, Disappearing City, Nation 136,
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picture of wholesale housing of the poor” in the United States.117 That is, alongside an
explicit, if self-serving and oversimplified, argument against a competing architectural
ideology, Wright also used his discussion of Corbusian urbanism to introduce an elliptical,
and largely subtextual, critique of the American housing market. Note, for instance, the
language Wright used to express his concerns. He worried, “not only are the living quarters
of the poor to be made germ-proof, but life itself, wherever individual choice is concerned,
is to be made just as antiseptic, if we trust our own eyes.”118 The last dependent clause was,
of course, a parody of Le Corbusier’s indictment of “eyes which do not see” the artistic
merit of machine-age innovations, in Towards a New Architecture.119 But Wright’s invocation of
“individual choice” was rooted in presumptions of privilege that willfully ignored the
discriminatory lending practices, restrictive covenants, and other means of denying adequate
housing to the poor and to racial and ethnic minorities. Adopting social housing models
from Europe would be to deny “individual freedom for all, rich or poor,” resulting in what
Wright considered to be an even more egregious form of dehumanization.120 Prefiguring
concerns about emasculation and race in The Disappearing City, Wright warned that
collectivized housing would distort “democracy” into “an expedient to enslave man to the
machine and make him like it.”121
There were, as he saw it, two alternative possibilities. First, concerning the poor, he
proposed that access to fresh air and a garden plot “would do more to abolish their poverty
than any benefice mechanistic devisors can ever confer.”122 This was little more than a
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passing comment in the last Princeton lecture, but by 1932 he had developed it into a
program of standardized self-built homes for the poor. The other proposal from Princeton
calls into question the long-held assumption that self-sufficient homesteads formed
Broadacre City’s socioeconomic locus. The “home of the individual social unit,” as
conceived in his lecture, would better be described as a networked apparatus of
consumption.123 It was through access to a wide array of media—“broadcasting, television,
and publication”—not a guarantee of self-sufficiency, that Wright would ensure “individual
choice” and “manlike freedom.”124 Moreover, the distribution networks that flowed through
Wright’s augmented service stations would ensure that every “category of foodstuffs or
supplies” would be readily available “[w]ithin easy distance of any man’s dwelling.”125 This
made Wright’s vision of domesticity a curious blend of Edward Bellamy’s late-nineteenth
century utopian fiction—his popular Looking Backward (1888) featured homes similarly linked
to vast networks of consumption and communication—and the more recent advertising
strategies of the Radio Corporation of America—which purported to be “building America
into a real democracy,” as discussed in chapter 2.126 It was also, in an important sense, a more
abstracted version of the same logic that informed Wright’s turn-of-the-century quadruple
block plan. In Broadacre City, individuation would be made possible by coordinated
networks of distribution and consumption.
This is not to say that there were no communal facilities imagined for Broadacre City.
The service stations would include neighborhood meeting places. There would also be small,
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specialized schools and what Wright called “automobile objectives.” The name of the latter
derived from a project for a spiral-shaped, mountain-top tourist destination in rural
Maryland that Wright designed in the mid-1920s.127 As described in the sixth Princeton
lecture, these might include a planetarium, race track, concert hall, theater, museum, and art
gallery, the combination of which would satisfy “the get-together instinct of the
community.”128 Situated in “natural places of great beauty,” these would also be places from
which to experience the outdoors, from the comfort of one’s car.129 These facilities
nonetheless seemed to be more contingent than necessary. They offered, as Wright
understood it, “special entertainment not yet available by a man’s own fireside,” where
broadcasts and other media could “be heard more satisfactorily in congenial company.”130
Many critics have seen in this preference for individualized entertainment a potential for
social atomism, including George Frederick Keck, who wondered whether “so complete a
lack of community organization [would] be amenable to the inhabitants,” and Catherine
Bauer, for whom the project lacked any “sort of organic social grouping.”131 Though Wright
could be susceptible to similar forms of environmental determinism—that is, what Keck
and Bauer seemed to understand as an essential relationship between social health and
physical environment—he did not seem to be here. In Broadacre City, social relations would
cohere through a more nebulous web of technologically mediated contacts.
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By 1932, Wright had added two new features to Broadacre City’s domestic landscape.
The first built on his earlier, abbreviated recommendation for alleviating poverty. The other
introduced an agrarian dimension to the project. Both further entangled individual homes
with consumer culture. Concerning the first, Wright outlined, in The Disappearing City, a
program whereby the poor could use wages received from a guaranteed factory job to
purchase a prefabricated bathroom to which other standardized components would be
incrementally added.132 He acknowledged that completion of a “scientifically modern” home
might take over a year to complete, so he suggested tax relief, bus fare or a second-hand
Ford, cooperative energy exchanges, and the opportunity to sell surplus produce from
kitchen gardens at local markets as ways to offset costs.133 This poverty-relief scheme is
revealing of Broadacre City’s domestic politics in two somewhat conflicting ways.
First, Wright’s scheme echoed other contemporary efforts to modernize the American
residential building trades. During the 1910s and 1920s, high labor and material costs,
combined with limited options for financing and an increasing number of necessary services
like plumbing, heating, and electricity, made entry-level homeownership financially
burdensome.134 Streamlining construction was one way to lower costs. In July 1932, Wright
delivered a speech to the Convention of the National Association of Real Estate Boards,
which outlined his idea of the “assembled house” as an opportunity to introduce Fordist
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efficiency into the contemporary building industry.135 He argued that a prefabricated sheetmetal home, constructed from a lavatory core, would lower the financial barrier to
homeownership while also exerting “organic” control over residential construction. This was
reiterated, in similar but less detailed terms, as The Disappearing City’s poverty-relief program.
Second, Wright’s proposal was not only linked discursively to ideas about housing
reform, it was also based on prevailing, informal practices by the suburban working poor. As
scholars like Richard Harris and Becky Nicolaides have shown, owner-built homes were
common among early-twentieth-century laborers who required housing near outlying
factories but were unable to afford the high upfront costs of a developer-built or mail-order
home.136 Owner-builders would usually begin with a rudimentary single-room structure that
would be enlarged as time and funds allowed. As one of the few avenues to homeownership
for cash-strapped laborers prior to the ready availability of federally backed mortgages (for
white homebuyers), self-building offered a semblance of self-determination amidst
persistent market volatility. The sale of backyard produce and other forms of domestic
entrepreneurship provided further economic insulation. Like much of the rest of Broadacre
City, Wright’s ideas about poverty relief reinforced existing suburban trends. But his
emphasis on standardization, while theoretically lowering the financial bar to
homeownership, would have usurped some of the limited agency claimed by laborers, which
would seem to run counter to his reverence for “individual choice.”
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The agrarian dimension that Wright also introduced in 1932 should also be understood
as similarly suburban, both in its origins and intentions. The New York Times article,
published in March, was the first to mention “roadside markets, integrated with groups of
three, five and ten acre intensive farm units.”137 These markets would be “scattered along the
highways, but each series integrated as links in a great chain,” while the farm units would
provide “a basis for a safe, rich life for the rearing of families […] in architecturally planned
association.”138 The farm units would be within a ten-mile radius of the markets. In The
Disappearing City, Wright elaborated the farms further. Despite occasional references to “farm
relief,” Wright disclaimed any interest in “the grain and beef-raising of machine-farming” of
“the great western open spaces of the United States.”139 His interests lay, instead, with “the
farmer in the more thickly settled regions of the country,” whom he hoped to reestablish “as
a suburban citizen in the new city.”140 Twice in the text, Wright made reference to a project
for farms and markets “being worked by Walter V. Davidson” to clarify his intentions.141 Like
the standardized housing for the poor, exploring the Davidson project helps to clarify its
position in Broadacre City.
Wright had previously built a home for Davidson in Buffalo, when the latter was an
accountant for the Larkin Company. By the late 1920s, Davidson was a freelance consultant
living on Long Island, with a self-described expertise in retailing and warehousing logistics.142
He reconnected with Wright in 1927 when he commissioned the architect to illustrate a
Wright, “Broadacre City” (1932).
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139 Wright, Disappearing City, 35, 66, 63.
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prospectus for a chain of self-service grocery stores.143 The project evaporated after the 1929
market crash, but Davidson returned to Wright in January 1932 with a more ambitious
proposal that would integrate the distribution and sale of groceries with agricultural
production. He outlined his idea in an exhaustively detailed, four-page letter. He planned to
form a corporation to purchase a 640-acre site in suburban Long Island, twenty-five to forty
miles from Manhattan, which would be subdivided into 200 intensive farms, of one to five
acres each.144 These would provide produce, meats, and other goods to a market also
controlled by Davidson’s company. Each of the farmers would be “a rent-paying tenant” of
the corporation, with their planting and cultivation schedules regulated by supervisors.145
Communal kitchen and laundry facilities, shops and restaurants, recreational areas, and a
prohibition on fences—except to contain livestock—would instill a sense of cooperation
among the farmers. Despite Davidson’s self-proclaimed business acumen, he could never
secure funding for the project. (On the eve of the Depression’s first wave of bank failures,
he assured Wright, “Prospects for 1932 seem very good.”)146 In 1934, after realizing that
private financing would not materialize, he lobbied the Department of Interior’s Subsistence
Homestead Division.147 When the New Deal agency informed him that for-profit ventures
were ineligible for public funding, Davidson abandoned the project.
Wright, for his part, never seemed too concerned with the corporate or cooperative
dimensions of Davidson’s proposal. His site plan for the farms tract was an unimaginative
See the letters from Davidson to Wright on March 11, 1927, D003B03; April 4, 1927, D003B02; and
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variant of one the client provided him. (Contrary to what Davidson outlined in his letter,
both plans showed only 98 units on 320 acres.)148 Instead, Wright devoted his attention
almost exclusively to designs for the market and an individual farm unit. Though Wright
mentioned the markets in The Disappearing City, he would devote considerably more attention
to them later in the decade, as discussed in chapter 5. For the farm unit, Wright combined a
three-bedroom home, greenhouse, grain silo, and livestock pens in one compact,
prefabricated structure (fig. 3.11).149 Like the “assembled house” for the poor, it would be
built of standardized, insulated sheet-metal panels.
The perspective views that Wright used to represent the farm unit actually seem to run
counter to Davidson’s expressed interest in corporate-sponsored cooperation, but they do
cohere with the architect’s own desire to use farming to rehabilitate “white-collarites” who
were “now unhappy as city parasites.”150 One rendering showed the farm from above, in near
isolation (fig. 3.12). A second unit is partially visible in the upper left corner, but the rows of
trees along the drawing’s edges, the rows of crops that appear to extend to the horizon, the
tight framing, and the dramatic aerial perspective make the structure at center appear less like
one part of a larger ensemble and more like its own independent compound. As Dianne
Harris has documented, similar drawing conventions were used by architects, developers, and
advertisers to market suburban homes as secluded retreats to the white middle-class after
World War II.151 Wright also produced an interior perspective of the living room that looks
toward the kitchen, at right, and out through an open wall of folding glass doors into a
148 See “EXHIBIT A: TYPICAL TRACT OF LITTLE FARMS,” in drawings folder 3205, FLWFA, and
drawing no. 3202.025, FLWFA.
149 He also produced a larger, five-bedroom variant, as requested by Davidson, but only ever published or
exhibited the smaller design.
150 Wright, Disappearing City, 66.
151 See Dianne Suzette Harris, Little White Houses: How the Postwar Home Constructed Race in America
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), chap. 3.
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flower garden, at left (fig. 3.13). A hearth—one of the most important and enduring
elements of Wright’s domestic architecture—prominently fills the center of the
composition. The framing, especially of the garden, is noteworthy. It does not play off of
potential contrasts between the domestic interior and agricultural exterior. Instead, a tree and
clusters of tall flowers obscure the productive landscape beyond. The result could be read as
something like the postwar representations of backyard gardens as extensions of living
rooms, “as sites of leisure rather than of labor,” that Harris has also detailed.152 Yet, this
does not seem to be precisely what the drawing communicates. The content of this image
and the design of the farm unit generally were less an attempt to erase labor and more of an
effort to sublimate it, to create a suburban simulation of “village life on the soil, both
because it is good for [a suburbanite’s] health and because it gives him esthetic satisfaction,”
as sociologist Harlan Paul Douglass theorized in 1927.153 The compositional details of these
two drawings suggest that agrarianism, as a suburban phenomenon, fit neatly into Wright’s
remapped metropolitan consumer culture.
Seen in this light, Broadacre City’s farms can function as a kind of précis to the project
as a whole. They relied on shared resources—Wright suggested that a communal tractor and
harrow would lower costs—but communality was not, for Wright, an end in itself. Rather, it
was a means of ensuring an edifying “manlike freedom” for each individual. They were also
sites of production, but that production was integrated into the project’s culture of
consumption. In this sense, Catherine Bauer’s concern that Broadacre City represented
“something not unlike our present upper-class suburbs” was not inaccurate, but it was
incomplete. With its streamlined networks of distribution and consumption; its standardized,
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self-built homes for the poor; and its comfortable, small-scale farms, Broadacre City was
fundamentally suburban, but it offered a more variegated tableau than Bauer allowed.

3.5 Conclusion

Agrarian homesteads populated by self-reliant farmer-motorists have been central to
most interpretations of Broadacre City. The project’s early development was, however, more
preoccupied with roadside commercial architecture and media networks. Wright used them
to support an envisioned consumer culture and to define a process of metropolitan
dispersion. The significance that Wright accorded service stations—as existing evidence of
decentralizing trends transformed into multifaceted institutions where commerce and culture
would intertwine—suggests that suburban commuters, rather than Jeffersonian yeomen,
were the envisioned citizens of Broadacre City. It is worth noting that Wright’s first mention
of Jefferson in relation to the project was not in connection with agrarian idealism, but as
part of his racial recounting of America’s supposed cultural decline. Wright’s discussions of
race and gender are, for that very reason, significant. Broadacre City hewed closer to existing
social and material conditions than is typically presumed. It was as critically attentive to
evidence of incipient socio-spatial change as it was uncritically informed by existing forms
of privilege and prejudice. All of which is to say that Wright’s project was not really a
proposal to abandon the existing metropolis in favor of a reconstituted ruralism, despite
some of the architect’s claims. Broadacre City proposed a framework through which to
dramatically remap the metropolitan landscape, reconfiguring its existing components into a
presumably more robust, decentralized, and variegated consumer economy.
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The Disappearing City offered a complete literary account of Broadacre City, but it did not
serve particularly well as a foundational text. Wright later admitted that it was “badly”
written—since much of the text was cribbed from his Princeton lectures, it would be more
accurate to say that it was badly edited.154 Literary merits aside, the book also struggled to
find an audience. It was a short-run publication and, by April 1933, had sold only 560
copies.155 Wright and his publisher, William Farquhar Payson, targeted critics and
professional colleagues with copies of the book, ensuring it would receive wide notice, but
Payson went bankrupt in 1934. Wright’s Autobiography, also published in 1932, was more
widely read. It included a short section on Broadacre City, but readers were more likely
drawn to the details of Wright’s tumultuous middle age than his program for urban
reform.156 It would not be until 1935, when Wright debuted Broadacre City in model form at
Rockefeller Center, that it gained a wider audience. By that point, Rockefeller Center had not
only reached a further stage of completion. Its architects and managers had also begun to
consider, in ways counter to Wright’s, how decentralizing trends were affecting their
midtown endeavor.
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a book that otherwise betrays a general lack of self-criticality. Especially where Broadacre City is concerned, A
Testament is riddled with factual inaccuracies and chronological errors. For example, Wright gave the date for
The Disappearing City as 1921, rather than 1932, and later in the text claimed the Broadacre City model was
“prepared […] at Taliesin in 1932,” while it was built in Arizona over the winter of 1934–35 (221).
155 See the royalty statement sent from William Farquhar Payson to Frank Lloyd Wright, April 5, 1933,
P020C01, FLWFA.
156 See Wright, Autobiography (1932), 340–49. Wright proposed a new chapter titled “Broadacre City” for
the revised and expanded 1943 edition of An Autobiography, but it was cut by the publisher because Wright
persistently failed to meet his deadlines. The text was ultimately included in the posthumously published
edition. See Johnson, Wright versus America, 37.

158

4. ROCKEFELLER CENTER’S CENTRIPETAL
METROPOLITAN LANDSCAPE, 1932–1940
On November 9, 1931, Raymond Hood addressed the American Woman’s Association.
The Association’s clubhouse had recently been completed by Benjamin Wistar Morris, and
Hood made a point of referring, snidely, to Morris’s abandoned opera house plans as he
introduced Rockefeller Center.1 “When the Metropolitan Square project was first
announced,” he explained, “everyone thought that the golden days of the Medicis and Louis
XIV had returned, and that at last we would be able to forget this commercial era and the
city of New York in which we live.”2 In fact, he attributed the widespread criticism of the
scheme he and his colleagues had debuted earlier that year to critics’ misplaced belief that it
should “conform to the patterns of the older civilization.” What they failed to appreciate, as
Hood saw it, was that the “much maligned skyscraper” enabled “a huge part of the
population [to] work free of the dust, noise and gasoline fumes of the street, in a much
brighter atmosphere than is evident in the low cities of London and Paris.”
It was not just that a development like Rockefeller Center would provide better working
conditions, it would also purportedly produce a “better organized” city. In late 1931,
construction had yet to begin on the midtown site, but as Hood foresaw it, “the

1 Interestingly, the American Women’s Association clubhouse has a tangential connection to Rockefeller
Center. Morris designed a first clubhouse for the AWA, in 1924, on West 23rd Street. By 1927, they had
outgrown the site and purchased land for a new building between 57th and 58th Streets, near Ninth Avenue,
across the street from a site that Otto H. Kahn had selected for the Metropolitan Opera. Since Morris was to
be architect of both the clubhouse and the opera house, the former was planned to create a dialogue with the
latter. This plan fell apart once the Opera decided to move to the three-block Columbia University leasehold
before then deciding not to move at all, which paved the way for Rockefeller Center. See Christopher Gray,
“Streetscapes: The Henry Hudson Hotel, 353 West 57th Street, from Women’s Clubhouse to WNET to $75 a
Night,” New York Times, January 4, 1998, RE5.
2 Raymond M. Hood quoted in “Supremacy of City Laid to Skyscraper,” The New York Times, November
10, 1931, 27.
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neighborhood in which we are to build will be a business section as intensive as the
downtown financial district.” The hundreds of row homes and apartment buildings being
cleared from the Center’s site were, for Hood, just a prelude to further commercialization.
Observing, hyperbolically, that only “a few” residences remained below Central Park, he
predicted, “within a few years they will have doubtless retired gracefully to the outlying
sections.” In Hood’s mind, Rockefeller Center was not simply a model commercial
development. It was a catalyst for reshaping the metropolis itself.
Beginning in the early 1930s and continuing until 1940, Hood, his architectural
colleagues, and the Center’s management positioned the midtown development within a
larger metropolitan context in several different ways that were not always ideologically
consistent. They realized that the Center was relatively inaccessible to commuters, despite its
prominent location, because of the distance its tenants had to walk from the closest subway
stations and Grand Central Terminal. In response, the project’s leadership spent the middle
years of the 1930s pursuing infrastructural projects that included a private midtown subway
loop and a commuter rail terminal. These would, at least, better integrated the complex into
the city’s existing transportation networks and, at most, reconfigure parts of the
metropolitan region to better serve the Center’s needs. The need to address the Center’s
transportation deficiencies was due, in part, to its lack of a residential program. Between
1932 and 1940, members of the Associated Architects developed several housing schemes
that they used to stake larger, and sometimes competing, claims about metropolitan trends
and the Center’s role in shaping them. For Hood, the Center would become the magnet for
affluent suburban commuters; for Wallace Harrison, it was an opportunity to remake
midtown as an elite enclave.
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Most of these infrastructural and residential projects were, in the end, unrealized. They
are nonetheless more revealing of Rockefeller Center’s continued development than the
ongoing construction on the midtown site during the same years. By offering critical insights
into Rockefeller Center’s metropolitan ambitions, this expanded scope also creates
opportunities to put the Center in dialogue with contemporary discourse, especially the
Regional Plan Association’s 1929 Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs. In order to
appreciate the ideas underpinning the Center’s efforts to transform more than its three-block
site, the chapter begins with an examination of the arts program. The circumstances
surrounding Diego Rivera’s hiring and firing, in particular, help to connect the ideas
concerning “cooperative” capitalism discussed in chapter 2 with the metropolitan ideals
explored in what follows. What that episode reveals by proxy—and many of the others
discussed below more directly—is that, while the various participants involved with
Rockefeller Center all understood the project to be a linchpin in the production of what
Hood believed would be a “better organized” city, they were not necessarily in agreement
about what that meant.

4.1 Frontier Mentality

Early in the planning of Rockefeller Center, the architects proposed that the lobby of
the RCA Building be treated as something more than just an entrance to an office building.3
By 1932, this had developed into an elaborate, thematically linked network of murals and
sculptures that would adorn each of the lobbies, façades, and semi-public spaces throughout
the Center. The arts program is perhaps best known for the work that was excised from it.

3

See Krinsky, Rockefeller Center, 56.
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As discussed below, Diego Rivera’s “Man at the Crossroads,” which was to occupy the
entrance wall of the RCA Building lobby, was scrapped by Rockefeller’s managers after the
Mexican muralist painted Vladimir Lenin into the scene. In fact, examining this episode and
several other unrealized aspects of the arts program helps, on the one hand, to locate the
project’s “cooperative” capitalism in the shifting sociocultural landscape of the 1930s and,
on the other hand, to see how the project was imagined to be the linchpin of a renewed
metropolitan region.
The artworks planned for Rockefeller Center were loosely organized around the theme
“New Frontiers.”4 As outlined in a four-page synopsis, successive conquests of territorial
frontiers had shaped the United States’ national character, but, by 1932, the “development
of civilization is no longer lateral; it is inward and upward.”5 These “new frontiers” were
intellectual, economic, social, and scientific. This paraphrase of Frederick Jackson Turner’s
famous 1893 “frontier thesis” was supposed to produce “a unified and comprehensive
story” that would communicate the Center’s sense of cultural purpose to “the great masses
of reasonably intelligent people.”6 In doing so, it would supplement the work of the façades
and gardens to weave the Center’s disparate parts together. For example, the promenade and
plaza could “show pictorially the intrepid adventurers who headed their sailing ships from
the Old World to the New World.”7 A walk from one end of the site to the other would thus

See “New Frontiers,” undated typescript, folder 704, box 93, series C, OMR, RAC. This theme was an
amalgamation of ideas from a range of earlier proposals drafted between late 1931 and early 1932. For these
and correspondence related to the theme’s development, see folder 704, box 93, series C, OMR, RAC. On the
development and realization of the arts programs, see Balfour, Rockefeller Center, 137–191; Christine Roussel, The
Art of Rockefeller Center (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2006).
5 Ibid., 1.
6 Ibid., 4. See Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History (1893),” in
Rereading Frederick Jackson Turner: “The Significance of the Frontier in American History” and Other Essays (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1998), 31–60.
7 Ibid., 3.
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leave behind imperial Europe for America’s radio-powered capitalist democracy, turning the
Center into a microcosm of the twentieth century’s emergent Americentric geopolitical
landscape.
The “new frontiers” theme was conceived to impose a consistent narrative on the site,
while being flexible enough to represent the varied wants of the Center’s corporate,
commercial, theatrical, and international tenants. Even if that flexibility ultimately
undermined the theme’s capacity for narrative consistency, “new frontiers” nevertheless
served to organize and sublimate the project’s gentrifying ambitions. As discussed in chapter
2 and further below, “pioneer” or “frontier” analogies abounded in discussions of
Rockefeller Center. The public relations office, which was responsible for drafting the
thematic synopsis, even used the narrative of the Center as an embodiment of “pioneering”
progress in press photographs of a display at the 1933 Century of Progress International
Exposition in Chicago. Corbett and Hood had been part of the design team for the
exposition, so it seemed logical that the Center would advertise itself there. In July 1934, the
publicity office released a photograph of two Native Americans scrutinizing a six-foot-tall
model of the RCA Building that bore the caption, “From Tepees to Skyscrapers” (fig. 4.1).
Whether dictating the content of a lobby mural or advertising the project at a world’s fair,
“new frontiers” captured Rockefeller Center’s self-serving sense of historical importance.
As the largest and most significant building in the complex, the entry and corridors of
the RCA Building were a particular focus of the arts program. In the same way that Hood’s
Daily News Building provided a model for the Center’s façades, its lobby served as a likely
source of inspiration for the RCA Building. Hood typically turned the entrance halls of his
skyscrapers into minor spectacles. The Chicago Tribune Tower’s entry, for example, was a
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chapel-like space outfitted with a faux-timber ceiling, travertine walls, a marble floor inset
with an inscription from John Ruskin, and an enormous map of North America hung like an
altarpiece.8 In the News Building, designed for a tabloid owned by the same family, similar
visual tropes were transformed into a more mass-market extravaganza (see fig. 2.25b). The
space was dominated by a globe rotating under a faceted black-glass dome. Metal inlays in
the terrazzo floor pointed out the distance and direction of world cities. The walls were lined
with instruments displaying weather and other scientific data. An early suggestion for the
RCA Building was to cover the walls with maps of global trade networks and the ceiling with
a moveable zodiac, “giving a moving and news-character depiction of the habitable globe”
and visible cosmos.9 As outlined in the “new frontiers” synopsis, the space would be
embellished, less ambitiously, with “murals showing historical highlights in the development
of American civilization […] from colonial days to the present time.”10
The Center’s managers and architects divided this task among three artists. On the large
wall facing the entry from the plaza, Diego Rivera would represent “man at the crossroads
and looking with uncertainty but with hope and high vision to the choosing of a course
leading to a new and better future.” Frank Brangwyn would use the four end walls of the
elevator banks in the south corridor to illustrate “man’s new relationship to society and his
fellowman.” And José María Sert would paint scenes of “man’s new mastery of the material
universe” on the corresponding walls of the north corridor.11 The selection of these three

See Solomonson, Tribune Tower, 285–88.
[Henry Hofmeister et al], “Thematic Synopsis (1930),” Specifications for The Rockefeller Center Development:
Radio City—New York, N.Y. (N.p., n.p., ca. 1934), 4. As noted in the introduction, the 1930 date attributed to
this document is erroneous. Serious thought was not given to the arts program until early 1932.
10 “New Frontiers,” 4.
11 “Theme re Painting in Great Hall of No. 1 Building Rockefeller Center,” September 30, 1932, quoted in
Catha Paquette, At the Crossroads: Diego Rivera and His Patrons at MoMA, Rockefeller Center, and the Palace of Fine
Arts (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2017), 123.
8
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for some of the most prominent commissions captured something of the American art
world’s well-established conservatism encountering newer modernist trends. Brangwyn’s and
Sert’s conservative aesthetics were ideally suited to the program’s desired didacticism. Rivera
meanwhile had recently been the subject of a 1931 retrospective at the newly founded
Museum of Modern Art. He was also, as was well known, a committed communist. As
Rockefeller candidly observed, Rivera’s notoriety would be good “for advertising
purposes.”12
The murals by Brangwyn and Sert constructed untroubled narratives of historical
progress, while Rivera’s suggested more complex relations between past and future. In the
south corridor, Brangwyn’s four panels depicted an Edenic world of noble savages, the
advent of agrarianism, the introduction of industrial technologies, and the Sermon on the
Mount. To avoid misconstruction of their intended meanings, each mural was captioned.
Sert was more trusting of viewers’ visual acuity. His murals showed humanity’s deliverance
from “painful” labor, from disease, from slavery, and from war.13 The third panel, titled
“Abolition of Bondage,” is noteworthy simply because it contained more black laborers than
were actually employed in the Center’s construction (fig. 4.2).
Rivera’s mural concentrated on an industrial worker standing at the titular crossroads. He
was surrounded by a collection of vignettes that contrasted warfare with revolution, rich
with poor, scientific discovery with the persistence of disease. Such dialectical imagery
conflicted with Brangwyn’s and Sert’s facile histories. It also subverted the conciliatory logic
of Rockefeller’s “cooperative” capitalism, which had been restated in the “new frontiers”
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John D. Rockefeller, Jr., to Raymond M. Hood, October 12, 1932, folder 704, box 93, series C, OMR,

13 “Rockefeller Center Decorative Program,” undated press release, quoted in Roussel, The Art of Rockefeller
Center, 113.
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synopsis as a “new understanding, and the new desire for understanding, between capital and
labor.”14 It was not just that, in one vignette, Rivera showed Vladimir Lenin joining the hands
of a multi-racial group of laborers and soldiers. Lenin’s visage precipitated Rivera’s dismissal,
but management was equally concerned with the artist’s “general treatment” and its lack of
“harmony with the artistic and architectural conception of the great hall,” according to a
statement released to the Times.15 By representing conciliation as an act of collaboration
among the working classes—mediated by Leninism—rather than cooperation with the
capitalist class, Rivera’s mural undermined the basic assumptions of Rockefeller’s
“cooperative” worldview.16
Rivera was fired on May 9, 1933, and the unfinished mural was hidden behind a scrim. A
few hundred pro-Rivera demonstrators clashed with police outside the RCA Building when
the artist’s dismissal became public.17 Leftist organizations and artists groups mounted a
campaign to have Rivera reinstated.18 Other, conservative artists’ and labor organizations
cheered Rivera’s ouster, rehashing jingoist complaints that accompanied the decision to hire
him. A group of New School art students, for example, had already protested Rivera’s
appointment in an open letter to Rockefeller and the architects published in the New York
Times, which claimed that Rivera and Sert were “alien” artists—but not, for some reason,
Brangwyn, a Belgian-born Briton—incapable of “interpret[ing] American life.”19 The

“New Frontiers,” 2.
“Rockefellers Ban Lenin in RCA Mural and Dismiss Rivera,” New York Times, May 10, 1933, 3.
16 The mural’s politics were more nuanced and subtle than a simple confrontation between communism
and capitalism. As art historian Catha Paquette has argued, the painting’s message of worker solidarity, which
was articulated through the specific types of protest depicted and the figures included in them, also addressed
divisions between pro- and anti-Stalinist communists. See Paquette, At the Crossroads, 145–82.
17 See “Rockefellers Ban Lenin.”
18 See “Rivera Defended by Artists’ Group,” New York Times, May 16, 1933, 3; “A Plea for Rivera Sent to
Rockefeller,” New York Times, May 28, 1933, 13; Paquette, At the Crossroads, 174–82.
19 “Want Native Art in Rockefeller City,” New York Times, January 20, 1932, 21. The director of the New
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reactionary Advance American Art Commission proclaimed that Rivera’s firing “illustrates
the error in bringing foreign artists to this country.”20 The American Federation of Labor’s
leadership offered similar, if less overtly xenophobic, support, having understood Rivera’s
ouster as part of “a thoroughly wise plan to encourage the artistry of our own painters and
decorators rather than to bring in foreign artists.”21 If Rivera’s unfinished mural threatened
to reveal the limits of Rockefeller’s “cooperative” capitalism, the controversy surrounding its
abandonment brought a vocal leftist culture into conflict with a resurgent nativism.
The story of Rivera’s dismissal has been well documented and analyzed.22 The effort to
replace his work is less well-known and, insofar as the present study is concerned, equally
intriguing. The first suggestion came from the Museum of Modern Art’s Philip Johnson. He
had been contacted over the summer of 1933 by Nelson Rockefeller, who asked him for
advice on creating a cartographic display. In a November 3rd, letter to Rockefeller, Johnson
proposed that the lobby wall be filled with a map of Manhattan. A complicated color
scheme would be used to represent building heights like topographic contours, to
differentiate built areas from parklands and waterways, and to clarify the different
transportation networks threaded across the island, all of which would be rendered “as maplike and machine-like as possible.”23 For the two return walls leading into the north and
south corridors, Johnson suggested a map of the metropolitan region, “as defined by the
Regional Plan Association,” on one side and, on the other, “a pure transportation map of
for the Americans.’” Alvin Johnson quoted in “Urges Neutrality in Radio City Art,” New York Times, January
23, 1932, 22. See also “Rockefeller City Gets Alien Artists,” New York Times, October 10, 1932, 17.
20 “Rivera Again,” Art Digest 7, no. 16 (May 15, 1933): 41.
21 Matthew Woll [Third Vice President, American Federation of Labor] to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., May
12, 1933, folder 706, box 94, series C, OMR, RAC.
22 Catha Paquette’s recent At the Corssroads provides a detailed art historical account of Rivera’s
involvement with the Rockefellers, at Rockefeller Center and elsewhere. See also Balfour, Rockefeller Center, 181–
91; Koolhaas, Delirious New York, 220–29; Okrent, Great Fortune, chap. 18.
23 Philip Johnson to Nelson Rockefeller, November 3, 1933, folder 704, box 93, series C, OMR, RAC, 1.
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the region,” showing roadways, railways, tramways, and bus routes.24 Rockefeller does not
seem to have followed up with Johnson, but six months later, in May 1934, he contacted
Lawrence M. Orton, general secretary of the Regional Plan Association (RPA), with a similar
idea. He had heard that the RPA was constructing an eighteen-by-twenty-four-foot model of
the metropolitan region that Rockefeller hoped could be installed, even temporarily, in place
of the Rivera mural.25 By the time he shared this plan with the managers, they informed him
that plans were “definitely under way” for a replacement mural, which put an end to
Rockefeller’s plan to make the RCA Building lobby the focal point of a regional vision.26
The assertion that plans for replacing Rivera’s work were “definitely under way” was not
true. In May 1934, Rockefeller Center’s architects and managers had no idea what they were
going to put on the wall. Rivera’s mural had been surreptitiously destroyed in February,
despite ongoing negotiations to donate the work to MoMA.27 As late as September 1936, the
architects were still exploring options that ranged from a fourteen-foot-tall clock to carved
black-glass bas reliefs of navigational equipment.28 Unable to agree on any other option, they
decided, in December 1936, to simply have José María Sert fill the wall with another mural.
Sert, who by 1937 was an outspoken pro-Franco fascist sympathizer, completed
“American Progress” the next year.29 It depicted large groups of men assisting two
colossuses as they transfer the fruits of “physical labor” to the outstretched arms of another
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colossus, euphemistically named “mental labor” (fig. 4.3). Harper’s Magazine editor Frederick
Lewis Allen shrewdly described this peculiar allegorization as “a man on a scaffold throwing
a tree at another man on another scaffold.”30 The silhouetted profiles of the RCA and
International Buildings loom in the background. This scene depicted the same “desire for
understanding between capital and labor,” as outlined in the “new frontiers” synopsis, that
Rivera’s destroyed mural would have shown, but it did so on fundamentally different terms.
Whereas Rivera envisioned that understanding occurring on the other side of a revolutionary
crossroads, Sert envisioned it as a peaceful, suspended moment of conciliation. Of course,
since the action of the mural was unidirectional—that is, “mental labor” offered nothing to
“physical labor” in return—it perfectly visualized the paternalist asymmetries of
Rockefeller’s “cooperative” capitalism.
The Center’s arts program is a perfect medium through which to grasp the status of the
project as it began to materialize. Though it was conceived as an effort to bring narrative
clarity to the complex’s disparate parts, it fractured into a collection of loosely connected
visual ideas, due both to the demands of individual tenants and the conceptually vague “new
frontiers” theme. The decision to replace Rivera with Sert, a communist for a fascist, also
reveals the degree to which the Center, with its international ambitions, tried but failed to
smooth over the fractured social landscape of the 1930s. In a different sense, Nelson
Rockefeller’s attempt to fill the RCA Building’s lobby wall with representations of the
metropolitan region, however fleeting, would have drifted even further from the ambitions
of the “new frontiers” synopsis, but it did show in a limited sense that the Center was being
thought of as more than just a self-contained three-block development. It was the
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centerpiece of a broader metropolitan vision. Rockefeller’s unrealized cartographic proposal
pointed toward the infrastructural and residential projects that would preoccupy the Center’s
management and architects as the midtown development took shape during the 1930s.

4.2 Infrastructural Imaginaries

The Rockefeller Center arts program attempted to unite the three-block complex’s
disparate parts through a coherent visual narrative. These aims were only partly achieved, but
the desire for control that the arts program represented also informed the project in other
ways. The coordinated massing of the complex’s towers and their almost-identical, vertically
striated façades are the most obvious examples. They have provided the medium through
which a number of architectural historians have interpreted the project’s attitude toward its
context. For Siegfried Giedion, the Center provided a model for future large-scale civic
interventions, because it stood apart from, “indeed tyrannize[d] over,” the existing city as a
cohesive, visually dynamic “architectonic organism.”31 In similar terms, but toward different
ends, Manfredo Tafuri understood the project to be an isolated “closed and circumscribed
intervention” that “was completely divorced from any regionalist conception and […]
thoroughly ignored any urban considerations beyond” its three block site, which prevented it
from attaining “comprehensive control of the urban organism.”32 More recently, Reinhold
Martin has argued that the Center did succeed “in projecting organic unity onto the
disaggregated field of commerce […] not in some residually futile effort to unify the civic
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realm but as a marketing tool.”33 In each case, the project’s visual form has served to
demonstrate, on somewhat different terms, its apparent dislocation from its surroundings.
From the beginning, however, the Rockefeller Center’s architects and managers were as
concerned with creating a coherent architectural “organism” as they were with establishing
control through infrastructural means. That is, they explored several different approaches to
transportation technologies that would bring people to the Center and move them through
it. Among them were proposals for a nearby rail terminal, the demolition of the Sixth
Avenue El, and connections to the city’s extant transit networks. Beyond the more direct
questions of moving large masses of people to and through the project, these proposals
were also means of communicating for whom the Center was being designed. Put
differently, they were envisioned as ways of creating new subjects, of using material means
to produce a “mobilization of affect,” as anthropologist Brian Larkin has theorized.34
To appreciate this, the best place to begin is below ground. The architects’ earliest plans
included substantial subterranean facilities. The much-derided scheme that they debuted in
March 1931 showed a shopping concourse spanning the three blocks one level below grade.
Below that, an equally expansive parking and delivery subbasement would also include one
or more transcontinental bus terminals and connections to extant and envisioned subway
lines (fig. 4.4).35 The rationale for this was simple. Given its scale, the Center would generate
such a volume of foot, car, truck, and commuter traffic that displacing some of it from
street level was seen to be a necessity. Since these subterranean concourses and tunnels
would pass below the public rights-of-way—and, in these early plans, two skyscrapers and,
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perhaps, some pedestrian bridges would pass over them—they required permission from the
city to build them. A March 1932 draft of the franchise petition that the Metropolitan
Square Corporation submitted to the Board of Estimate helps to frame the Center’s
infrastructural program.36
The petition spelled out the public benefits such a franchise would bring, as the Center’s
leadership understood them. It would preemptively relieve the traffic congestion that the
Center’s construction would otherwise cause. It would produce increased property values,
“not only of the Development but of all the surrounding area,” which would lead to
increased tax revenue for the city.37 It would establish a precedent for the resolution of
traffic problems “by private initiative and at private expense” and in accordance with what
were understood to be the Regional Plan Association’s recommendations for underground
facilities.38 It would, finally, “enhance the beauty of the City and […] attract widespread
public interest.”39
The petition’s treatment of relationships between public and private was particularly
telling. In one sense, the city, as public authority, was being asked to choose between two
different private constituencies: the extant “old-fashioned brownstone private dwellings”

See Metropolitan Square Corporation, “Re: Certain Areas below the Street Surfaces of West 49th and
West 50th Streets, between Fifth and Sixth Avenues, in the Borough of Manhattan, City of New York,” draft
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37 Ibid., 6.
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which included Corbett’s, all involved elevated sidewalks. Moreover, the Metropolitan Square petition ignored a
central conclusion of the Regional Plan’s section on parking and loading facilities, namely a desire to curtail “the
replacement of low buildings by higher ones.” See Lewis and Goodrich, Regional Survey, vol. 3, 96–98; Adams et
al., Regional Survey, vol. 6, 79–80, quote 80. In a kind of distorted feedback loop, the Regional Plan cited the
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a larger system of elevated pedestrian walkways. See Adams et al., Regional Plan, vol. 2, 411.
39 Ibid., 7.
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that, according to the petition’s imperious reasoning, were not “in keeping with the potential
usefulness of the property” versus the “unified group of modern commercial buildings”
that would “obviously result in a great enhancement in value of the area.”40 Since the
gentrifying logic of this argument was understood to be self-evident, the petitioners
requested that the city “co-operate” with their plans.41 Otherwise, “the entire burden” of
relieving midtown traffic “will have to be assumed by the City.”42 Rockefeller Center was not
alone in treating the consequences of private development as problems for public authority
to resolve, but its scale and the exigencies of the Depression made its argument particularly
coercive.43 The “cooperation” it proposed, a translation of Rockefeller’s “cooperative”
capitalism into civic terms, carried a decidedly threatening tone.
In another sense, “the public” represented, for the Metropolitan Square petitioners, the
collective subject who would traverse the subterranean passageways. The petition estimated
that the complex’s “daily transient population” would number at least 160,000 and imagined,
prescriptively, that it would be composed of theater- and concertgoers, shopkeepers and
shoppers, office tenants and their clients, sight-seers and other “casual visitors,” and
eventually subway riders.44 Given this volume of people, the petition argued that the Center
would be doing the city a service by diverting pedestrian traffic from already congested
sidewalks into below-grade passages. A diversion that required a significant caveat, as the
petition explained: “The surface and subsurface passageways located inside of the buildings
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will, of course, be subject to such reasonable restrictions and such use of the property as are
ordinarily imposed and retained by the owner in the case of private commercial buildings.”45
The same caveat was reiterated after the petition speculated, in conclusion, “that these
subsurface connections will be the forerunner of a vast subsurface network of pedestrian
passageways under this entire part of the city.”46 In other words, the Center imagined an
infrastructural colonization of the land below midtown that fit neatly into the understanding
of infrastructure introduced above. It combined material systems with sociocultural desire to
propose a carefully delimited private alternative to public space.
The Center’s leasing practices put this desire for a regulated “public” into practice. An
early memorandum from September 1928, three months before Rockefeller signed the lease
with Columbia University, recommended “absolute control” over “who may or may not
become tenants of the whole or part of any building,” because “if only one second-rate
tenant obtained possession of the whole or part of any building it would jeopardize the
whole improvement.”47 The leasing agents thus aggressively sought out select tenants and
rigorously screened others, mixing predation and moral pretext in tactics that seemed drawn
from the Standard Oil playbook. Though not different in kind from the prejudicial practices
of other developers and landlords, the Center’s scale and Rockefeller’s substantial liquidity
allowed it to operate on categorically different terms. The leasing office engaged in outright
market manipulation, offering space for as low as $1 per square foot and, on several
occasions, assuming responsibility for tenants’ outstanding leases elsewhere.48 In one case,
Ibid., 16.
Ibid., 20.
47 John A. Osborne, “Memorandum for Mr. Debevoise and Mr. Heydt, in re: Columbia College
Leaseholds and Opera House Site and Square,” September 4, 1928, folder 572, box 77, series C, OMR, RAC.
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they went so far as to purchase the entire thirty-three-story Sinclair Oil Building to coerce
Consolidated Oil from its headquarters in the financial district.49 The Center’s lease
agreements also included a so-called “high-hat” clause. This gave management “the right to
prohibit any advertising by any tenant, which, in the opinion of the Landlord, tends to
impair the reputation of the building or its desirability as a building for offices.”50 In practice,
management used this morality clause to limit the sale of liquor after ratification of the 21st
Amendment and to threaten a small publisher with offices in the RKO Building for printing
purportedly “salacious” material.51 They were unconcerned, however, with Consolidated Oil
CEO Harry F. Sinclair’s conviction for jury tampering in the 1922 Teapot Dome scandal.
By the middle of 1933, the first wave of construction was drawing to a close, and the
leasing office’s aggressive tactics appeared to be paying off. Radio City Music Hall had been
open for six months. The RKO Building was already half full. The British Empire Building,
Maison Française, and the RCA Building were nearing completion. Twice a day, the publicity
office would release statements about newly secured leases to the press. While the city’s
commercial real-estate market was plagued with vacancies, bankruptcies, falling rents, and
mounting debts—including the Empire State Building’s 2.25 million square feet of nearly
empty offices—the Center seemed otherwise insulated from these realities. In truth, the
leasing office was struggling to “keep ahead of the Publicity Department,” according to its
chief leasing agent, who added, with gross understatement, “Conditions have not been ideal
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for making leases for office space.”52 By the end of the year, leases in the Center’s four
completed buildings accounted for only fifty-nine percent of available space.53
The situation seemed to improve over the course of 1934. Deluxe clothiers, milliners,
and shoemakers, antique booksellers, and other high-end retailers, a post office, and
telegraph station quickly populated the ground-level and concourse-level storefronts (fig.
4.5). The Rockefellers moved the family’s office and several of their philanthropies to the
upper floors of the RCA Building, which led an Architectural Forum contributor to quip that
Rockefeller “paying himself rent” was the real basis of the Center’s “theoretical solvency.”54
Otherwise, the leasing office’s primary tactic for filling acres of office space was to use one
major company as a lure for others in the same industry. Thus, RCA and NBC’s presence
turned the west end of the development into a haven for the entertainment industry.
Standard Oil of New Jersey became the second largest tenant after RCA when it leased ten
floors in the RCA Building, which soon brought a host of other petrochemical companies.
By recruiting the Sperry Corporation and Curtiss-Wright, the Center attracted the aviation
industry. After management agreed to pay the rest of American Cyanamid’s lease in a nearby
building, Dow Chemical and Monsanto followed. The RCA Building became a veritable
cross-section of corporate America. It was also a preview of the types of corporations—
military contractors, oil conglomerates, television broadcasters—that would wield particular
influence during the post-World War II years.

52 Lawrence A. Kirkland, untitled leasing report to Todd, Robertson & Todd, March 17, 1933, folder 683,
box 91, series C, OMR, RAC.
53 Okrent, Great Fortune, 263.
54 “A Phenomenon of Exploitation,” 296. For this and the following, see Okrent, Great Fortune, 259–62;
Kirkland, untitled leasing report, March 17, 1933; Charles O. Heydt to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., June 7, 1934,
folder 683, box 91, series C, OMR, RAC.
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This influx of corporate tenants gave the completed parts of the Center a seventy-ninepercent occupancy rate by the middle of 1934. This was enough to encourage Rockefeller
and the managers to begin construction of the International Building, a thirty-eight-story
echo of the RCA Building in the northeast corner of the site. Despite this decision, the
complex as a whole was far from a resounding economic success. The plaza proved to be
less an inducement into the Center and more of a dead end. As the architects, managers, and
shopkeepers discovered, pedestrians would wander through the Channel Gardens, peer into
the plaza, and return to Fifth Avenue. Shops in the subterranean concourse struggled to
attracts customers; many failed.55 In January 1935, they conducted a survey of pedestrian
traffic through the complex, measuring fluctuations in volume based on time of day, weather
conditions, point of entry, and direction of movement, in hopes of better understanding
how people used the Center’s spaces and for what purposes (fig. 4.6).56 The real problem,
though, was not that people found the site difficult to navigate. The site itself was, according
to the same Architectural Forum contributor cited above, “a location considered inaccessible”
for commercial development.57
The Center’s own internal assessments proved the point. Studies conducted in 1933 and
1934 showed that tenants had to walk an average of 1,810 feet from the nearest rail and
subway stations to the doors of the RCA Building, which was almost double the distance
deemed acceptable by most developers.58 Ridership on the Sixth Avenue El, which abutted
Charles O. Heydt to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., November 13, 1935, folder 512, box 68, series C, OMR,
RAC; Krinsky, Rockefeller Center, 91–93; Okrent, Great Fortune, 356–57.
56 See Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc., “Suggestions Regarding Transportation Studies Affecting
Rockefeller Center,” September 20, 1934, folder 714, box 95, series C, OMR, RAC; and the material in folder
584, box 78, series C, OMR, RAC.
57 “A Phenomenon of Exploitation,” 296.
58 See L. Alfred Jenny and Company, untitled report to Todd, Robertson & Todd, March 14, 1933, folder
714, box 95, series C, OMR, RAC, 2–4; Lockwood Greene, “Suggestions Regarding Transportation Studies
Affecting Rockefeller Center,” 4–5.
55
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the west side of the complex, was declining. Its removal had been programmed into the
Center’s earliest plans, so its relevancy was discounted. Management explored a number of
possible remedies for its “disadvantageous” situation between 1933 and 1935. These varied
in scale, complexity, and feasibility, but they shared a common purpose. It was not simply a
matter of bringing more people to the Center. New means of transportation, as Nelson
Rockefeller bluntly put it at a Transportation Committee meeting in November 1934, were a
matter of “vital importance” to ensure “a continuous flow of the right kind of people to the
Center.”59
They did not take seriously proposals for dealing with automobile traffic, despite the fact
that Harvey Wiley Corbett, who spent the 1920s advocating for multilevel streets to manage
traffic congestion, was a lead designer. The subterranean concourse was, perhaps, a kind of
diluted and inverted variant of Corbett’s elevated sidewalks. The private street through the
site was as much about handling traffic as it was about increasing retail frontage. The central
part of the southern block served as a parking lot until the Eastern Airlines Building was
built, in 1939, but the elaborate parking structure built into the Eastern Airlines Building was
the only serious—and much belated—effort to address automobile access to the Center.
The first major infrastructural project the Center explored was a new subway line
through midtown. L. Alfred Jenny, a railroad engineer and consultant, was commissioned to
study its feasibility. His March 1933 report, envisioned a loop between Grand Central
Terminal and the 50th Street station of the new Eighth Avenue subway, with stops at the
Center and two other westside subway stations along the way (fig. 4.7). For Jenny, the subway
would fulfill a twofold purpose. On the one hand, the Center’s ultimate economic success
59 Nelson A. Rockefeller, remarks recorded in the minutes of the Committee on Subway Construction,
November 1934, quoted in Robert Fitch, The Assassination of New York (London: Verso, 1993), 198.
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was entirely dependent on the provision of “first class transportation facilities.” It would not
matter how “ideal and beautiful” the development was, “if it is inconvenient for
[businessmen] and their clients to reach.”60 On the other hand, “much of the territory that
would be served by such a line is today relatively undeveloped. […] As a whole, it is a fertile
territory for future development.”61 What Jenny meant, he added, echoing the Center’s own
neighborhood-colonizing logic, was “that many comparatively small buildings are located in
this zone, housing numerous small business undertakings.” What was left unsaid was that the
tens of thousands of people associated with those businesses—and the occupants of the
area’s many apartments and homes—were decidedly not the proposed subway’s envisioned
passengers.
Suburban commuters were. Whereas the Sixth Avenue El noisily shuttled a dwindling
number of passengers between midtown and the financial district, the westside subway lines
were engineered to funnel commuters from upper Manhattan, the Bronx, Queens, and
Brooklyn to jobs below 59th Street.62 Yet, as Jenny’s characterization of the midtown
landscape made evident, the “Radio City Subway” would do more than just connect the
Center to the city’s commuter network. Even the design of the subway cars—with their
silent, rubber-lined wheels, light-weight aluminum frames, and “numerous other modern

Jenny and Co., untitled report to Todd, Robertson & Todd, March 14, 1933, 10.
Ibid.
62 In a December 1935 radio address announcing the demolition of the Sixth Avenue El, Mayor LaGuardia
proclaimed, the El’s “discontinuance as an artery of transportation will not be felt, and its ultimate removal as
an unnecessary and obsolete obstruction to traffic and business will be a blessing.,” whereas the new Sixth
Avenue subway would complement existing lines “to enable the people to travel conveniently to and from their
homes and places of business or employment.” Fiorello H. LaGuardia, “The Demolition of the Sixth Avenue
Elevated: Broadcast from Station WJZ, Friday, December 20, 1935—6:15 P. M.,” transcript of radio address,
folder 714, box 95, series C, OMR, RAC, 2. See also Fogelson, Downtown, chap. 2.
60
61
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developments”—communicated the proposal’s potential as an agent of socioeconomic
transformation (fig. 4.8).63
In tandem with the proposed subway loop, management also actively explored the
possibility of locating an immense rail terminal on a multi-block site abutting the west end
of Rockefeller Center. The rationale for this translated the subway proposal’s localized
agenda into a kind of metropolitan imperialism. A July 1934 Transportation Committee
progress report argued, for example, that the Center’s “ultimate desirability” was contingent
on its “relative accessibility to the whole Metropolitan area.”64 As the same report also made
clear, the Center’s leadership did not think it was sufficient to simply better connect their
development to existing transportation networks. The metropolis itself, or at least a
substantial part of it, needed to be reconfigured to better accommodate Rockefeller Center.
The rail terminal provided one possible means. It would become the new endpoint for trains
from New Jersey, replacing the ferries that currently brought commuters into Manhattan. It
would accommodate 56,000,000 passengers a year—a far-fetched estimate that substantially
exceeded the annual passenger volumes of Grand Central and Pennsylvania Station. It would
also, as the progress report anticipated, “be an important factor in developing Northern
New Jersey.”65
The geographic specificity of this last remark is noteworthy, because it brings
Rockefeller’s “right kind of people” into greater focus and draws the Center’s ambitions into
critical dialogue with those of the 1929 Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs. Alfred
Jenny again consulted on the terminal and rapid transit proposals. He argued that continued

Jenny and Co., untitled report to Todd, Robertson & Todd, March 14, 1933, 8–9.
Nelson A. Rockefeller et al., “Progress Report on Terminal and Transportation Study for Rockefeller
Center,” July 17, 1934, folder 714, box 95, series C, OMR, RAC, 9.
65 Ibid., 7.
63
64
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reliance on “the antiquated ferry” had “retarded the proper development of New Jersey,
particularly the northwestern portion of the State.”66 To remedy this apparent handicap, he
proposed that the midtown passenger terminal be linked to a web of new rapid transit lines
serving would-be commuters in Hudson, Bergen, and Passaic Counties (fig. 4.9). These three
counties in the northeastern corner of the state were not as underdeveloped as Jenny would
have them seem.67 Bergen County was and remains one of the state’s wealthiest parts.68 The
population of the three counties, together accounting for one-third of the state’s, was
dispersed among working-class townships, semi-rural villages, and elite enclaves. It was also
ninety-eight percent white. In a 1935 lecture to Bergen County residents, Jenny tried to
convince this privileged population that they had been, in fact, marginalized within the
burgeoning metropolis, a status from which his proposal would deliver them. He encouraged
them to imagine “great electrically motored trains” and “glistening viaducts […] rising from
the Jersey meadows” that would whisk “millions of rushing people” to Manhattan from
their “quiet homes throughout north Jersey, more quickly than ever before.”69 The correlate
of this was Jenny’s pitch to Rockefeller Center’s managers. By sponsoring this “glistening”

66 L. Alfred Jenny quoted in Randall Norris, “Looking Forward: An Audience Hears of 1800’s Transit
Slowing 1935 Jersey,” Bergen Evening Record, April 9, 1935.
67 The following is drawn from Fifteenth Census of the United States: 1930—Population, vol. III, part 2, 845–80.
Data for the three counties is combined in the text, but they break down as follows. Bergen County’s
population in 1930 was 364,977, of which 272,020 were classified as native-born white; 83,850 were foreignborn white; 8,872 were black; and 235 were “other races.” The combined white population was 97.5% of the
county’s total; the combined minority population was 2.4%. Hudson County was more populous (690,730
residents), while Passaic County was slightly smaller (302,129). Proportionally, the demographics of the three
counties were consistent: Hudson was 97.6% white; Passaic 98.1%. The three counties were thus whiter than
New Jersey as a whole; 94.8% of the state’s 1,357,836 residents were white.
68 The 1930 census did not report median income, but one gauge of Bergen County’s socioeconomic
status was its median home value. At $9,270, it was 25% higher than the median value in New Jersey ($7,426)
and almost twice the value nationwide ($4,778). The median home value in Hudson County was $8,997 and in
Passaic, $7,351. See Fifteenth Census of the United States: 1930—Population, vol. VI, 864–65.
69 L. Alfred Jenny quoted in Randall Norris, “Looking Forward: U.S. Approval for Transit Plan Foreseen
as Vital Public Work,” Bergen Evening Record, April 10, 1935.
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suburbanization, they could turn affluent, white New Jerseyans into the commuters they
desired.
In addition to revealing the demographic prejudices through which the Center’s tenants,
customers, and patrons were selected, these transit proposals also drew the project into
ongoing debates about regional reform. Specifically, the rapid transit terminal and its tens-ofmillions of estimated passengers were a kind of challenge to the recommendations of the
RPA’s 1929 Regional Plan. In general terms, the aims of Rockefeller Center and the RPA were
aligned. They both sought to maintain Manhattan as the region’s commercial and cultural
hub while displacing residences—at least for the lower classes—industry, and other
ostensibly “inappropriate uses” to outlying areas.70 The breadth of the RPA’s proposals is
taken up again below, but the Plan’s specific recommendations for New Jersey’s Hackensack
Meadow are germane to the present discussion. The Meadow was a 26,000-acre wetland
occupying parts of Bergen and Hudson Counties. (Manhattan is, by comparison, about
14,500 acres.) Insofar as the Regional Plan was concerned, this ecologically complex product
of colonial-era deforestation was, among other negative qualities, “unattractive,”
“unproductive,” and “unsanitary.”71 Luckily, a “haphazard” and fragmented “subdivision of
ownership and authority has helped prevent any large scale development in the past,” which
meant that there was still time “to prepare a comprehensive plan.”72
If the RPA’s language translated Rockefeller Center’s attitude toward the midtown
neighborhood into exurban and environmental terms, its proposal to dredge, canalize, and

70 Thomas Adams, foreword to Robert Murray Haig and Roswell C. McCrea, Regional Survey of New York
and Its Environs, vol. 1: Major Economic Factors in Metropolitan Growth and Arrangement (New York: Regional Plan of
New York and Its Environs, 1927), 4.
71 Harold M. Lewis, Regional Survey of New York and Its Environs, vol. 4: Transit and Transportation (New York:
Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs, 1928), 151.
72 Ibid., 150.
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backfill the Meadow was oriented toward different ends. The reclaimed land could become a
“self-contained development,” with light manufacturing, workers’ housing, recreational areas,
and commercial facilities (fig. 4.10).73 The reclamation of the Meadow and the
suburbanization of northern New Jersey would be accompanied by mass transit. The RPA
agreed with Jenny and Rockefeller Center that a rail terminal in Manhattan was a good idea
but considered its “proper location” to be upper Manhattan. This would establish more
connections between outlying areas, “thereby fostering decentralization.”74 The Center’s
interest in a midtown terminal was diametrically opposed. It would lead millions of white
commuters directly to the complex’s corporate offices.
Neither the subway loop nor the rapid transit terminal was realized. The Center’s
management seriously pursued them as remedies to its relative isolation but ultimately balked
at their price tags—$5.1 million for the subway and up to $20 million for the terminal.75
They also belatedly realized a paradox in their oft-repeated desire to couple better
connectivity for the Center itself with the “improvement” of its immediate vicinity. As the
1934 Transportation Committee progress report observed of the terminal, the
“concentration of passenger traffic” would be “beneficial to Rockefeller Center, but the
building development necessary to carry the land will result in serious competition.”76
Management continued to voice support for the rail terminal until 1939, but after 1936 they
devoted their primary attention to the impending demolition of the El and construction of
the Sixth Avenue subway. The subway began operation in December 1940. Though this

Ibid., 153.
Ibid., 58.
75 Jenny and Co., untitled report to Todd, Robertson & Todd, March 14, 1933, 12; Rockefeller et al.,
“Progress Report,” July 17, 1934, 10.
76 Rockefeller et al., “Progress Report,” July 17, 1934, 7.
73
74
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scaled back the Center’s infrastructural ambitions, it still constituted a deliberate regional
strategy. Beyond “improving” the Sixth Avenue streetscape, it extended the Center from the
lower-level concourse through the turnstiles and white-tiled station to suburban destinations
across the Bronx and Queens (figs. 4.11 & 4.12). This may not have constituted the
“comprehensive control of the urban organism” that Tafuri sought, but it did succeed, in
whatever limited capacity, in making Rockefeller Center a new center of gravity in the
metropolitan landscape.

4.3 The Business of Living

Rockefeller Center is frequently described as a “city within a city.” In the Center’s own
promotional material and in the historical literature, this has served as shorthand for the
project’s combination of coordinated planning and programmatic complexity, but it glosses
over a crucial fact of the complex’s status within the city. Though the in-house magazine
Rockefeller Center Weekly advertised that the myriad shops, theaters, and offices “seem[ed] to
cover the whole curriculum of human wants,” there was no residential program.77 Benjamin
Morris’s original plans had proposed to complement the opera house with grand retail
arcades and a 2,300-unit apartment hotel “of the highest class.”78 When the Opera departed
the project, Morris’s residences were excised as well. As Raymond Hood put it in his
November 1931 lecture at the American Woman’s Association, the project’s new aim was to
produce “a business section as intensive as the downtown financial district,” which would
compel the area’s existing residences to “retire gracefully to the outlying sections.”

“Center Saunter,” Rockefeller Center Weekly, pre-publication number (August 30, 1934), 18. Of course,
neither were there educational, religious, medical, or other facilities that one might typically associated with a
complete city.
78 See Morris, “Report on Proposed Development,” May 11, 1929, 14–15.
77
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This is not to say that the project then became entirely divorced from residential
concerns. Representatives of existing midtown apartments turned their newfound proximity
to the Center into an advertise-able amenity. One agent for two nearby buildings promised,
in opposition to Hood’s predictions, “to save Rockefeller City Tenants time and money at
these fine, modern and convenient apartment homes” (fig. 4.13). More substantially, as
discussed above, the Center’s leadership spent two years actively exploring the possibility of
using an infrastructural project to suburbanize North Jersey before settling instead on
integrating the lower-level concourse into the city’s subway system. During the same time
period, as construction continued on the midtown site, members of the Associated
Architects also used residential projects to explore the distribution of business, culture, and
domesticity across the metropolitan region. Hood built two apartment buildings on the east
side of midtown and proposed a collection of “country towers” for a suburb north of the
city. Harrison realized a Rockefeller-commissioned apartment building several blocks north
of the Center and proposed a cultural complex that would physically link the two. These
domestic projects at once complement and complicate the foregoing discussion of
infrastructure. They situated Rockefeller Center in a broader metropolitan context, but they
did so on sometimes contradictory terms.
Two apartment buildings, together known as the Beaux Arts Apartments, provide a good
place to begin. The Beaux Arts Institute of Design financed and developed the project, and
Raymond Hood and Kenneth M. Murchison designed it. The two nearly identical structures
were completed in early 1930 on either side of 44th Street between First and Second
Avenues (figs. 4.14 & 4.15). They replaced a number of “old rookeries,” as part of a broader
effort to gentrify the largely poor, mostly Irish, still heavily industrialized Turtle Bay
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neighborhood.79 On the exterior, the buildings communicated their efficient, middle-class
modernity through large casement windows set in alternating horizontal bands of beige- and
maroon-colored brick. The interiors were filled primarily with one-room apartments, each
outfitted with electric refrigerators, custom-designed kitchenettes, and fold-down beds. More
than half of the tenants were women, eighty percent of whom identified as businesswomen,
professionals, or artists. According to the architects, the apartments’ high-tech but costeffective amenities, as well as the intimate scale of the ground-floor restaurant and the
“enormous” telephone switchboard, had been designed specifically with the “fair sex” in
mind, since professional women presumably wanted the same “freedom from housekeeping
that men require,” but “wishe[d] to retain the facilities for housekeeping, not only as a
measure of economy, but as a form of relaxation.”80
There were enough of what the New York Times identified as “career women” living there
that, by 1933, a private bus service had been established to shuttle them to jobs at
Rockefeller Center.81 In 1930, the Center’s management vigorously opposed a plan to run a
public bus route through the Center.82 Yet, in 1934, they highlighted the Beaux Arts bus
service, with its exclusive supply of “career women,” to encourage running additional private
bus lines to other strategic destinations in Manhattan, like Grand Central and Times

79 Kenneth M. Murchison, “Designed, Financed and Built By Architects,” American Architect 132 (March
1930): 26.
80 Ibid., 76; “Beaux Arts Tenants,” New York Times, July 27, 1930, 139.
81 See “Beaux Arts Tenants;” Lockwood Greene, “Suggestions Regarding Transportation Studies Affecting
Rockefeller Center,” 2.
82 The immediate justification was that buses running along 49th and 50th Streets would interfere with
construction, but Charles O. Heydt, one of Rockefeller’s associates, admitted, “After the work is completed, we
would be very loath to see a bus line running through those two streets.” Charles O. Heydt to W. J. Scanlan,
November 6, 1930, folder 511, box 68, series C, OMR, RAC. See also, in the same folder, Charles O. Heydt to
Hugh S. Robertson, October 23, 1930, and Robertson to Heydt, October 28, 1930. Crosstown bus service was
nonetheless established in the early 1930s by the Green Bus Lines. See “Three Bus Routes Get City Permits,”
New York Times, February 12, 1935, 42.
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Square.83 The Beaux Arts Apartments provided management with a more immediate and
practical means of ensuring access to the Center than remaking the transportation networks
of an adjacent state.
They also fit well within the framework of the 1929 Regional Plan of New York and Its
Environs, even if they were built too late to be treated in the plan itself. The plan’s agenda can
be briefly summarized as follows: the RPA argued that the parts of New York, New Jersey,
and Connecticut within the socioeconomic orbit of Manhattan, which was how they defined
“the region,” were becoming dangerously overbuilt. Manhattan’s financial district and
midtown were key examples. Other areas remained “unfortunately” underdeveloped, such as
New Jersey’s Hackensack Meadow. To this end, the plan advocated a balance of density and
dispersion. What this meant, as detailed in the group’s ten-volume published report, was that
lower Manhattan would remain the locus of commercial, financial, and cultural activities, as
well as home to the wealthy.84
As noted above, this would be achieved by removing lower-class residences, industrial
activities, and other “inappropriate uses” to suburban sections of the metropolitan region.
Thus, Upper Manhattan, the City’s other four boroughs, and much of North Jersey would
become a new “industrial zone,” where working- and lower-middle-class suburbs would
allow for a carefully planned mix of medium-density residences and small-scale
manufacturing. The “outlying region” would create a pastoral buffer against sprawl, home to
private estates, farms, and large parks. Concentric rail networks would allow movement

83

2.

See Lockwood Greene, “Suggestions Regarding Transportation Studies Affecting Rockefeller Center,”

The plan was published between 1927 and 1931 in ten volumes, eight of which constituted the Regional
Survey. The two Regional Plan volumes were more richly illustrated summaries of the Survey material. On the
development, content, and legacy of the Plan, see Robert Fishman, “The Regional Plan and the Transformation
of the Industrial Metropolis,” in The Landscape of Modernity, eds,. Ward and Zunz, 106–23.
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through and between these zones, while also ensuring they remained clearly differentiated.
This “diffused re-centralization”—as Thomas Adams, the plan’s general director, termed
it—would be facilitated by cooperation among business and political elites and managed by
technocratic oversight (fig. 4.16).85
In the sixth volume of the Regional Survey, which addressed “Buildings: Their Uses and
the Spaces about Them,” Adams and his colleagues used the east side of midtown as a local
example of the type of gentrification they had in mind for most of Manhattan. The area’s
working-class homes, slaughterhouses, power plants, and dockyards were, according to the
planners, “a confused mixture of uses which is caused by want of planning.”86 In their view,
rezoning the blocks between Second Avenue and the East River for “high class residence”
would preserve the exclusivity of the existing Park Avenue corridor, complement nearby
business and retail districts, and generally follow “along the lines of progress in the direction
of effecting a proper balance between business and residential use” (fig. 4.17).87 Though
developed independently of Rockefeller Center and the Regional Plan, the Beaux Arts
Apartments provided the “right kind of people” performing the “appropriate” type of
activities sought by both.
Hood also argued in multiple lectures and interviews throughout 1931, however, that
“no one should live in Manhattan,” and that once “Radio City is finished, I will prove it.”88
He even suggested that Manhattan would become one “vast office,” to which people would
commute by plane from “the country.”89 Though such statements were deliberately

85 Thomas Adams et al., Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs, vol. 1: The Graphic Regional Plan (New
York: Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs, 1929), 149.
86 Adams et al., Regional Survey, vol. 6, 158.
87 Ibid., 157, 158.
88 Hood quoted in Jacobs, “Architects Discuss Future Building.”
89 “Drawings to Plot City of Future in Arts Exposition,” New York Herald Tribune, March 29, 1931, 72.
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hyperbolic, he used a 1931 commission for what he called “country towers” to sustain his
argument. Insofar as it was designed for a client other than Rockefeller, this project was only
loosely connected to Rockefeller Center, but Hood clearly conceived of it as part of the
same metropolitan framework in which he also located the Center. The “country towers”
have also been given little more than cursory—and sometimes imprecise—treatment in the
existing literature on Hood, despite the fact that a model of them was used to represent the
architect’s work in the landmark 1932 “Modern Architecture: International Exhibition” at
the Museum of Modern Art.90 Hood’s proposal resonates with foregoing discussions of
Rockefeller Center’s efforts to cultivate suburban commuters and the Regional Plan’s sociospatial ambitions. It also provides a foil for Broadacre City’s apartment towers. For these
reasons, it is worth treating in some detail.
Hood’s “country towers” were designed for a site in Dobbs Ferry, an affluent village on
the Hudson River in suburban Westchester County. As an undated press release from the
realtor handling the project advertised, Dobbs Ferry was “only nineteen miles from the
Grand Central Station” and the “‘Radio City’ project now underway in the mid-town area.”91
In 1930, its 5,741 residents were almost ninety-nine percent white.92 Hood was
commissioned by Joseph M. Patterson, the same newspaper publisher for whom he designed

90 See Kilham, Raymond Hood, 189–90; Stern, Raymond Hood, 17. Kilham quotes from an obscure Providence
News Tribune article on the project, but otherwise provides no background on the project. Stern meanwhile “is
not clear whether Hood was commissioned to design the housing for Dobbs Ferry or whether he pursued the
problem on his own.”
91 Kenneth Ives & Co., “News Item,” folder 1, box 84, subseries 1 (Real Estate, 1923–1946), series 6
(Personal Business Papers, 1913–1946), Joseph Medill Patterson Papers (1901–1950), Lake Forest College
Archives and Special Collections. All of the Patterson Papers material cited below is located in the same box
and folder.
92 In the 1930 census, there were 4,305 native-born whites in Dobbs Ferry, 1,372 foreign-born whites, 58
black residents, and 6 of “other races.” The village was too small to have its median home value listed, but the
median in Westchester County was $13,091 (about 2.75 times the national median). Of the village’s 584 owned,
non-farm homes, 371 were valued at or above $10,000. See U.S. Census: 1930, vol. III, part 2, 293; U.S. Census:
1930, vol. VI, 933, 943.
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the Daily New Building, a ten-story apartment building in Manhattan’s Upper East Side
(1928), and a rambling private home in Ossining, New York (1928–30).93 In March 1931,
Patterson purchased Dobbs Ferry’s Villard Estate, a wooded 100-acre tract, at the center of
which stood a McKim, Mead & White-designed mansion surrounded by gardens, meadows,
and numerous outbuildings, some dating to the mid-19th century (fig. 4.18).94 Between
March and April 1931, Hood outlined a fee schedule, developed at least two schemes for ten
freestanding apartment towers, and received zoning approval from the village council.95 In
May, Patterson informed the architect, without notice or explanation, that he would instead
just build a road through the site. Later that year, the tract was subdivided into plots for
individual homes.96
Despite the fact that the project was so short-lived, Hood published two articles on it
months after it had been abandoned, one in January 1932 in the Providence, Rhode Island,
News Tribune and another in the April 1932 issue of the National Real Estate Journal. In
between he also exhibited a model of one “country tower” at the Museum of Modern Art.
In the two articles, which were similar in content and brevity, Hood rationalized the use of
apartment towers in suburban planning with the same logic of consolidated control that he
applied to office towers in midtown. He argued that the infrastructure required to support
typical suburban development—where each detached home required individual access to
roadways, sidewalks, driveways, telephone wires, gas and water mains, and sewers—ruined
Patterson’s family owned the Chicago Tribune, and he had been involved in the 1922 competition that
Hood and John Mead Howells won. Hood collaborated with the engineer J. André Fouilhoux for the Dobbs
Ferry project, but the other Patterson commissions were all done in association with Howells.
94 See the Kenneth Ives & Co. real-estate brochure, Patterson Papers; Dobbs Ferry Historical Society,
“Villard Family at ‘Thorwood’—48 Years in Dobbs Ferry,” Ferryman 15, no. 2 (December 2000): 2–3.
95 See Raymond M. Hood to Joseph M. Patterson, February 27, 1931; Hood to Patterson, April 2, 1931;
Hood & Fouilhoux to Bentro Real Estate Corporation, May 19, 1931, Patterson Papers.
96 See Patterson to J. André Fouilhoux, May 8, 1931; Hegeman Harris Co. to Bentro Real Estate
Corporation, October 15, 1931, Patterson Papers.
93
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“the natural beauty of the site and the charm of the country.”97 Hood contended that ten
freestanding towers spaced one-thousand feet apart could more economically and efficiently
supply the same facilities for suburban living as one-hundred or more individual homes,
while also preserving the site’s pastoral qualities (figs. 4.19 & 4.20). “The city man lives
outside the city because he likes the country,” he contended, “Why not give him the country
as is? He can have his house in the tower where all the business of living is concentrated—
yet with plenty of personal privacy, mind you—and the country at his very door, wild and
unspoiled.”98 Never mind that the site was by no means “wild and unspoiled,” for Hood
apartment towers were a better way of procuring the supposed benefits of suburban living
than a detached home.
If the Beaux Arts Apartments fit neatly into the ambitions of the Regional Plan, the
“country towers” were a critical rejoinder to it. The RPA argued that, with few exceptions,
apartment buildings were ill-suited to the suburbs, especially in those areas, like Dobbs Ferry,
where land was readily available. In their view, “outlying districts” should put in place zoning
restrictions, “in harmony with a low density,” in order to curb speculation and prevent
overcrowding.99 Moreover, since apartments in multi-family buildings were usually rented
rather than sold, they could not have the same “influence in stabilizing society” that
detached single-family homes presumably did.100 The details of Hood’s design implied a
fundamentally different conception of suburban domesticity and its social significance.

97 Raymond M. Hood, “Country Towers: Proposed New Type of Suburban Housing,” National Real Estate
and Building Journal (April 1932): 27.
98 Raymond Hood in Providence News Tribune, January 1932, quoted in Kilham, Raymond Hood, 190.
99 Adams et al, Regional Survey, vol. 6, 254.
100 Ibid., 255.
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The exterior of each “country tower” was defined by continuous brick-clad spandrels,
exposed concrete floor slabs, and terra-cotta-clad steel columns that interrupted otherwise
continuous bands of double-hung windows. As in Hood’s commercial towers, like those at
Rockefeller Center, this exterior uniformity permitted wide-ranging interior flexibility. By
concentrating utilities and circulation in a compact core, the apartment interiors were,
according to Hood, “substantially shelves on which each tenant will build his apartment, just
as the office tenant in the city builds his office arrangement into a skyscraper.”101 This would
permit a degree of customization through with the “city man” would be able to exercise
near limitless agency. Windows could “be taken out at will to form porches or terraces
wherever desired and of any size desired” and “if a tenant desires more than one floor, all
steel save the girder beams can be eliminated.”102 On top of this, by sharing the cost of
services and amenities, a unit in one of the “country towers” would be one-quarter what one
might expect to pay for a single-family home of comparable size.103 For Hood, despite his
rhetoric about preserving “wild and unspoiled” nature, this project was not really about
adapting an urban type to suit suburban needs. It made the logic of suburban domesticity
conform to urban, commercial ideations. The same modular adaptability that was used at
Rockefeller Center to account for the commercial real-estate market’s demands for absolute
fungibility could just as easily be used to redefine the possibilities of a suburban desire for
individuation.
A model of the “country tower” was displayed in the Museum of Modern Art’s
“Modern Architecture: International Exhibition,” which opened in February 1932. In the
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accompanying catalogue, Henry-Russell Hitchcock treated the project at length. He
ultimately concluded that it was “ingenious rather than radical.”104 What this meant, on the
one hand, was that because Hood’s scheme “implie[d] a high rent level,” it “ha[d] no
particular sociological significance.”105 In their codification of what they understood to be an
emergent “International Style,” Hitchcock, Philip Johnson, and the other contributors to the
catalogue used “sociological” to distinguish large-scale, reform-minded housing for the
working classes from the ostensibly socially disengaged preoccupations of middle- and
upper-class homes.106 Of course, Hood’s guarantees of “personal privacy” amidst
“unspoiled” nature for “the city man,” did carry particular sociological significance. His
choice of terms encoded promises of socioeconomic and racial exclusivity, and his design
was a kind of mechanism for the exercise of male agency. On the other hand, the “country
tower” demonstrated, for Hitchcock, the degree to which Hood was skilled at coordinating
the demands of businessmen, realtors, and technicians, but was “not a creative artist.”107 As
Hitchcock detailed the formal and material qualities of Hood’s design, he found the
architect’s overall intention to be intriguing, but his inattention to aesthetic details was
“unfortunate.” It demonstrated that his technical and commercial “successes must be
measured in terms which are not directly applicable either to the houses of Wright or Le
Corbusier or to the housing of [Walter] Gropius and [Otto] Haesler.”108 The location of
Hood’s model in a gallery separate from both the “founders” of the International Style and

104 Henry-Russell Hitchcock, Jr., “Raymond Hood,” in Modern Architecture: International Exhibition (New
York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1932), 132.
105 Ibid., 133.
106 The term was attached to projects like Le Corbusier’s Pessac housing and George Howe & William
Lescaze’s Christie-Forsythe housing development. Walter Gropius was identified as “the most sociologically
minded” of the exhibited architects. Alfred H. Barr, Jr., foreword to ibid., 16.
107 Ibid., 132.
108 Hitchcock in Modern Architecture, 132.
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from Lewis Mumford’s housing installation communicated the degree to which the MoMA
curators considered his work to be “exceptional” rather than exemplary in their conception
of “modern” architecture.109
Despite Hitchcock’s insistence that Hood’s work be considered on terms different than
other “modern” architects, the real significance of his “country towers” can be best
appreciated in dialogue with Wright. The stripped-down, concrete-and-glass aesthetic of the
“country towers” shows a likely Corbusian influence, but Wright’s St. Mark’s Tower provides
a better foil. As discussed in chapter 3, Wright used this design for an apartment tower
adapted his turn-of-the-century strategy for managing suburbanization—his “quadruple
block plan”—to urban skyscrapers, arguing that a compact central core and pinwheeled
duplex apartments could guarantee the same type of individuated “privacy” for urban
denizens that suburbanites enjoyed. In The Disappearing City, published several months after
Hood’s essays on the “country towers,” Wright relocated the St. Mark’s Tower to “the
country,” where it became a critical component of Broadacre City’s effort to rehabilitate
“citified” men. For Hood, a nearly identical set of architectural elements was used to make
“the country” urbane. Put differently, Wright and Hood used the same architectural idea
couched in similarly gendered rhetoric but oriented it toward drastically different ends.
Wright’s decentralized skyscrapers would mediate Broadacre City’s generalized dispersion,
while Hood’s “country towers” would reinforce the centripetal pull of Rockefeller Center.
The paradoxical mixture of hyperbole and pragmatism that permeated Hood’s work also
defined the first five years of Rockefeller Center’s development. Between 1929 and 1934, the
complex took shape as a hybrid of financial calculus and civic-minded corporate
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benevolence; a radical act of gentrification, displacing thousands of longtime residents and
small business owners, and, as eulogized by Harper’s editor Frederick Lewis Allen in 1938, a
“streamlined, chromium-plated, electric-eyed American paradise” where the Depression’s
“ugly realities recede from view” and “incorrigibly middle-class” tourists could “see Paradise
Regained.”110 After 1934, however, the Center’s ambitions began to shrink. Hood died in
August of that year, at fifty-three, following a protracted illness. Corbett and Harrison
dissolved their partnership in 1935. Though Corbett’s name remained on the drawings, his
role was reduced to design consultant. The International Building (1934–35), the Time &
Life Building (1936–37), the Associated Press Building (1937–38), the Eastern Airlines
Building (1939–40), and the U.S. Rubber Building (1939–40), where Rockefeller drove the
“last rivet,” were all the responsibility of Harrison, Hood’s former partner J. André
Fouilhoux, Reinhard, and Hofmeister. Aside from the novelty of the Eastern Airline
Building’s six-story parking garage, these were, for the most part, variations on an established
theme (fig. 4.21). 1934 was also the year that the Transportation Committee, of which
Nelson Rockefeller was chair, abandoned plans to build a rapid transit terminal for New
Jersey commuters. As discussed above, management’s attention then shifted to providing
support for construction of the city’s Sixth Avenue subway line. Two projects by Wallace
Harrison and his new collaborator Fouilhoux—one realized, one not—provide the clearest
illustrations of the Center’s altered metropolitan ambitions during the late 1930s.
The first was an apartment complex, the Rockefeller Apartments (1935–36), financed by
the Rockefellers on Rockefeller-owned property west of Fifth Avenue, between 54th and
55th Streets, three blocks north of Rockefeller Center. The project consisted of two nearly
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identical eleven-story buildings—one facing 54th Street, the other 55th—mirrored about a
shared garden (figs. 4.22 & 4.23). The apartments’ sand-colored brick exteriors and
semicircular bay windows were a nod to both the façades of the neighboring, turn-of-thecentury brownstones and to the streamlined aesthetic of the recently codified “International
Style.” Lewis Mumford compared the Rockefeller Apartments to Hood & Murchison’s
Beaux Arts Apartments, which had been “the first capitulation to modern design in
apartment houses.”111 Harrison & Fouilhoux’s handling of the exterior was more adept than
the “superficial stylistic stereotype” of Hood’s earlier work. For Mumford, the apparent
functionality of unadorned brick and large swathes of glass made the Rockefeller
Apartments “the most successful example of modern architecture in the city—at least in
apartment houses.”112
Insofar as Harrison was concerned, the apartments’ modernity served one clear purpose,
which was socioeconomic rather than functionalist or aesthetic. The unattributed text of a
January 1937 Architectural Forum article explained that the layout of the “small, luxurious
apartments” placed an emphasis on “good light and ventilation” in order to appeal directly
to “business executives and wealthy commuters.”113 Harrison himself explained in a March
1936 essay for Rockefeller Center Weekly, that the project was “a natural, almost inevitable,
result of the development in mid-Manhattan which Rockefeller Center initiated. For there
has grown up here, now, a commercial city of 100,000 population, resident and transient,
complete with business offices, shops, restaurants, amusement and cultural activities. But it is
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a city with no residential section.”114 If such an observation confirmed what Hood had
predicted five years earlier and appealed to the same exclusive demographic as the “country
towers,” Harrison reached a fundamentally different conclusion. A Depression-era hiatus in
the construction of new apartment buildings, combined with increased traffic congestion,
meant that “business men are finding it more and more convenient to live within walking
distance of their offices.”115 The Rockefeller Apartments signaled a conceptual retreat from
the colonizing ambitions of Hood’s “country towers.” However improbable Hood’s notion
that businessmen might also commute between city and country by plane, Harrison was
content with ensuring midtown’s status as a walkable white-collar enclave.
In a June 1936 address to a real-estate group reported in the New York Herald Tribune,
Nelson Rockefeller affirmed Harrison’s sentiment, arguing that Rockefeller Center and the
Rockefeller Apartments together demonstrated the necessity of focusing attention on
midtown’s redevelopment. In his view, suburbanization was a negative reaction to the city’s
high taxes, “obsolete buildings,” and overcrowded conditions. The future of Manhattan was
at risk, unless property owners, developers, financiers, and other real-estate interests could
“create a wider market for this great city of ours by rebuilding a large portion of our
buildings. […] The feasibility of this building program has been proved by the unique
success of Rockefeller Center and more recently by the success of the apartment houses
which my father is erecting on Fifty-fourth and Fifty-fifth Streets.”116 That the apartments
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were not yet complete when Rockefeller proclaimed their success was, in his view, irrelevant.
They were already ninety-percent rented, which was enough of a metric to recommend them
as a model for the wholesale reconstruction of midtown.117
Throughout the second half of the 1930s, the Rockefellers acquired properties on the
three blocks between Rockefeller Center and the family’s existing holdings on 54th Street,
which included the Rockefeller Apartments, in hopes of building a northward extension of
the Center. Shortly after his 1934 election, Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia began promoting the
idea of a municipal arts center as a local supplement to federal New Deal relief projects.
After lobbying from Nelson Rockefeller, the city agreed to locate the arts center along a new
street running north from Rockefeller Plaza.118 By the time Harrison & Fouilhoux were
invited by the city to collaborate with Benjamin Morris’s office on the proposed cultural
center, in 1938, the Rockefeller-sponsored Museum of Modern Art had commissioned
Philip L. Goodwin and Edward Durell Stone to build a six-story structure on 53rd Street, on
land donated by the Rockefellers directly south of the Rockefeller Apartments. The plans by
Harrison and his collaborators treated the Museum as the northern terminus of an elevated,
two-block-long plaza that would have spanned 52nd Street and been bounded by a
Metropolitan Opera House, Guggenheim Museum, headquarters for the Columbia
Broadcasting Company, and a commercial building (figs. 4.24).

The Rockefeller Apartments were not the Rockefellers’ only foray into housing around this time.
During the 1920s and into the 1930s, they used their philanthropic activities to support low-cost housing
initiatives, especially cooperative schemes, and slum-clearance studies. Alongside several projects outside the
city, the family financed the Thomas Garden Apartments, a development for middle-income whites in the
Bronx, and the Paul Lawrence Dunbar Apartments, a middle-class black cooperative in Harlem, both of which
were designed by architect Andrew Thomas and completed in 1928. Notably, however, the Rockefeller
Apartments, home to wealthy professionals, were the only Rockefeller-sponsored housing project linked
directly to Rockefeller Center. See Radford, Modern Housing, 157–59; Richard Plunz, A History of Housing in New
York City, rev. ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 155–60.
118 See Krinsky, Rockefeller Center, 84–87; Newhouse, Wallace Harrison, 52–55.
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The Rockefeller Apartments and the ultimately unrealized arts center were illustrative of
Rockefeller Center’s altered ambitions after 1934. Earlier proposals like the rapid transit
terminal and Hood’s “country towers” treated the first few buildings built at Rockefeller
Center as the catalyst for a wholesale transformation of the metropolitan landscape. They
did not propose to do so through “organic” extensions of the midtown complex itself, but
rather extrapolated its organizing logic into complementary infrastructural and domestic
programs. Wallace Harrison’s and Nelson Rockefeller’s arguments against decentralization
amounted to a retrenchment of the project’s original conceptual underpinnings. The Center
would still ensure its supply of white, wealthy professionals, but its sphere of influence was
smaller.

4.4 Conclusion

In his study of the 1929 Regional Plan, Robert Fishman notes that the RPA’s ambitions
exerted a significant but selective influence on the metropolitan region after the 1930s. One
of the most notable divergences between the plan’s proposals and the subsequent shape of
the metropolis was that the planners could only conceive of automobile highways, in
Fishman’s words, as “subordinate to a centralized rail system that would continue to define
the region. […] The authors of the plan saw only dimly the impetus that the automobile
would give toward decentralization.”119 The same could be said of Rockefeller Center.
Vestiges of Corbett’s ideas for multilevel streets appeared in the meandering subterranean
concourse, but his ideas about managing traffic flow were cast aside. The residents of
Hood’s unrealized “country towers” would have presumably commuted by rail (in spite of
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his speculations about airborne commuters). While Harrison argued that midtown should be
made walkable—and exclusively upper-class—the rest of the Center’s leadership advocated
for construction of the Sixth Avenue subway, so that those tenants and employees whose
domestic preferences—or economic circumstances—required commuting could still easily
reach the Center.
Only belatedly did Rockefeller Center accommodate motorists. The base of the sixteenstory Eastern Airlines Building, which was the second-to-last to be built, in 1939, was
organized around a six-level parking garage. Three levels were below grade, and the other
three were encased in a multistory retail podium. As Architectural Forum noted when it
published the project in January 1940, “Save for the entrances off the one-way streets at
either side of the building, there is little evidence of a storage capacity of 800 cars. The
entrance level is a thoroughly distinguished piece of utilitarian design.”120 Neither the
streamlined, generously glazed enclosure, nor the patented ramp system that enabled
hundreds of cars to maneuver through the garage’s compact footprint, were what Nelson
Rockefeller found compelling about the Center’s new parking garage. In a 1938 letter to a
city council member, written to curry favor while the Center’s application to install fueling
and oil-change stations in the garage was still pending, Rockefeller explained, “If we were
allowed to sell gas and oil in this garage, not to the general public, but only to the patrons of
the garage, this additional income would make the proposition a sound one from an
investment standpoint.”121 For Rockefeller, at least, the garage was as much a necessary
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concession to changing commuting habits as it was one more way to ensure the
development’s exclusivity.
Rockefeller Center’s inattention to automobiles and their potential to transform the
metropolitan landscape was surprising, given Corbett’s involvement. Management’s focus on
rail transportation in their infrastructural undertakings and late-1930s efforts to use projects
like the Rockefeller Apartments and the unrealized municipal arts center as bulwarks against
decentralization would ultimately make the Center an awkward fit for the post-World War II
era, when corporate tenants considered following their white, middle-class employees to the
suburbs. In the meantime, Frank Lloyd Wright continued to develop his argument for
wholesale, automobile-induced dispersion. In April 1935, Rockefeller Center provided a
venue for him to push his ideas into new, visual terrain with the construction of a model of
Broadacre City.
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5. BROADACRE CITY’S ORGANIC CAPITALISM, 1935–1940
On or around April 15, 1935, Frank Lloyd Wright led a tour through Broadacre City. The
ideas that the architect had been promoting for the past five years had recently taken material
form in a twelve-by-twelve-foot model, thanks to the collective effort of his young
apprentices. The model was installed in the RCA Building as part of the 1935 Industrial Arts
Exposition. It was surrounded by a collection of other models and drawings that depicted
individual architectural components of the larger scheme and was supported by plywood
panels emblazoned with slogans that proclaimed Broadacre City’s myriad benefits (fig. 5.1).
Wright was in town to introduce the project to the American public by way of a radio
address on opening night of the exposition. He was dropped from NBC’s broadcast
schedule at the last minute but hung around the show for several days, informing journalists,
curious students, and bemused New Yorkers of the “new freedom for living in America”
that the introductory panel to the installation promised Broadacre City would bring.
An unnamed reporter for the Associated Press recounted Wright’s tour through the
exhibition. The architect walked his audience through the project’s main themes,
gesticulating with his walking stick to reinforce his claim that automobiles, radios, and
telephones had already enabled the type of dispersion that Broadacre City presumed to
intensify and manage. Most of what Wright explained to exposition visitors was not new. He
had already published two books, several articles, and delivered numerous lectures since 1930
that explained his thinking about technological catalysts for socio-spatial change. He did
convey one new thing, however. As the AP reporter recalled, “Wright said he proposed his
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governmental system would be ‘a form of capitalism.’ He added that his plan could not work
under a socialistic or communistic government.”1
In his early writings on the project, Wright was critical of “the inevitable centripetal
action of capitalistic centralization,” and contended that the “individuality” around which
Broadacre City would be organized “has nothing to do with capitalism, or communism, or
socialism.”2 During the second half of the 1930s, Wright gradually clarified his thoughts on
the politico-economic system that would underpin his envisioned society. The Industrial Arts
Exposition—or, more accurately, the critical reaction to it—initiated this process. As Wright
began responding to critics, he was forced to clarify his claims. Another engagement with his
critics, after a 1937 trip to the Soviet Union, led Wright to begin using the phrase “organic
capitalism” to describe Broadacre City’s economic logic. The language that he used in the
obscure article that contained his first use of “organic capitalism” resonated with ideas
espoused by the proto-fascist “radio priest” Charles E. Coughlin, bringing Broadacre City
into dialogue with the reactionary politics of the late 1930s. By 1940, Wright had linked this
dubiously formulated idea of “organic capitalism” with a specific architectural typology, the
roadside market. Different incarnations of the market appeared in his writings and on the
model, but in each case it served to symbolize his economic ideal in the form of a smallscale capitalist spectacle. This chapter explores how the project’s visualization and Wright’s
flirtations with white supremacists substantially transformed the project during the second
half of the 1930s.
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5.1 Living in America

Between 1930 and 1934, Broadacre City existing primarily as a literary project. From the
Princeton Lectures of 1930, published as Modern Architecture in 1931, to The Disappearing City,
which appeared in late 1932, Wright constructed an increasingly detailed rhetorical landscape
that provided insights into the social, cultural, and economic qualities of Broadacre City.
Visual media did play a role that was, as discussed in chapter 3, critical but secondary. A
December 1934 invitation from the National Alliance of Art and Industry changed that.
When the organizers of the Alliance-sponsored Industrial Arts Exposition solicited Wright’s
participation in the 1935 show—to be held in the Forum of the RCA Building from April
15th to May 15th—they created an opportunity for the architect to collaborate with his
apprentices to translate verbal arguments into visual ones. The twelve-by-twelve-foot model
that resulted would eclipse Wright’s writings as the primary medium through which critics
and historians would evaluate the project. Exploring the curatorial aims of the National
Alliance of Art and Industry, the circumstances that led to Wright’s installation of Broadacre
City at Rockefeller Center, and the spectacle of the exposition itself helps to understand
continuities and disjunctions between the project’s early, literary existence and its later
development.
The Industrial Arts Exposition was an annual showcase of residential architecture,
homewares, and consumer goods sponsored by the National Alliance of Art and Industry.
The Alliance had been formed in 1932 as a Rockefeller-funded corporation meant to foster,
as its name suggested, “a closer relationship between artists, manufacturers and consumers
in the production of utilitarian objects.”3 Harvey Wiley Corbett and Raymond Hood were
3 “Art Centre Forms a New Corporation: National Alliance of Art and Industry Will Take Over and
Expand Work of Old Group,” New York Times, March 26, 1932, 8.
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founding members of the board. Hood died in 1934, the same year that the Rockefellers
withdrew funding for the Alliance.4 Corbett was first vice president and director of the 1935
exposition. In 1933 and 1934, the Alliance held the annual exposition in its offices on the
sixty-second floor of the RCA Building, where it also maintained a gallery and library and
hosted social events.5
In planning the 1935 exposition, Corbett was assisted by Thomas J. Maloney, a thirtyyear-old advertising executive. They decided to enlarge the show and move it from the
Alliance’s upstairs offices to the Forum, a twenty-thousand-square-foot exhibition space that
occupied parts of the concourse, ground, and mezzanine levels of the RCA Building near
the Sixth Avenue entrance (fig. 5.2). 6 By increasing the exposition’s visibility and expanding
its scope, Corbett and Maloney hoped to offer visitors an expansive “Preview of Prosperity,”
as the 1935 show was titled. The premise of this “preview” was to demonstrate to cashstrapped, Depression-era New Yorkers that good design—which encompassed “everything
from ash trays to railroad trains”—could pave the way to economic recovery.7 The Alliance
outlined a fourfold purpose for the exposition, which was,
first, to bring before the public the outstanding accomplishments of American industry;
second, to show how these industrial projects improve living conditions and make for
As Kathryn Smith notes in her recent study of Wright’s exhibitions, the Rockefellers had withdrawn
funding for the Alliance by 1934, but Thomas J. Maloney, manager of the 1935 Industrial Arts Exposition,
managed to “persuade Nelson Rockefeller to aid us” for the event at which the Broadacre City model was
debuted. Thomas J. Maloney to Alon Bement, April 10, 1935, M052D01, FLWFA.
5 The first exposition had been held, in 1932, at the Art Centre on East 56th Street. See “Rockefeller
Center Houses Art Alliance: Art Centre Building, Scene of 667 Exhibits in 13 Years, Has Been Leased,” New
York Times, April 21, 1933, 15; Carl Greenleaf Beede, “Developing an American Style,” Christian Science Monitor,
July 7, 1934, 5; Smith, Wright on Exhibit, 88.
6 The exposition brochure gave the Forum’s area as 44,000 square feet. Maloney, the exposition manager,
told Wright that it was 20,000 square feet. Based on partially dimensioned plans of the RCA Building published
in the October 1933 issue of Architectural Forum, the space appeared to be about 22,000 square feet. The Forum
continued to operate as an exhibition venue until 1949, when it was deemed to be an unprofitable use of space
and infilled for leasing to retail tenants.
7 “The Industrial Arts Exposition: 1935,” Rockefeller Center Weekly: Industrial Arts Exposition Number, April
11, 1935, 14.
4
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fuller lives in the lower income groups; third, to encourage experiment and the use of
new materials in industrial production; and fourth, to demonstrate that beauty and utility
are now determining factors in the minds of all types of consumers.8
This vision of populist uplift through design was organized into five curatorial
categories—housing, home appliances, transportation, communication, and leisure. The
exposition brochure illustrated these categories as concentric rings emanating from “the
average man” (figs. 5.3). As distributed across the Forum’s three levels, exposition-goers
would find radios, televisions, vacuum cleaners, sewing machines, washing machines, and
other labor-saving “scientific marvels;” model homes that showed the levels of comfort and
affordability offered by prefabrication and electricity; model trains and full-sized
automobiles; and, of course, Wright’s model of Broadacre City. Wright was one of the few
invited exhibitors. Most of the others paid to display their wares. The organizers used
exhibitor fees to help cover the exposition’s costs, but critics like the Nation’s Douglas
Haskell complained that it reduced the show to “so much paid space, like advertisements in a
magazine.”9
Wright’s involvement in the exposition was perplexing for several reasons. Despite the
fact that Hood had been instrumental in rehabilitating Wright’s career, by inviting him to
exhibit his work at the Architectural League of New York in 1930, Wright’s opinion of the
New York architect soured after he declined to include him in the team responsible for the
1933 Century of Progress International Exposition. (Corbett was also a member of the
team.)10 Hood tried to make light of the matter in a February 1931 letter, informing Wright
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that, as “a strong individualist,” he would make the necessarily collaborative effort more “a
fight than a fair.”11 Wright proved Hood’s point later that month when he used an
appearance at a meeting of the American Union of Decorative Artists and Craftsmen
(AUDAC) in New York to publicly air his grievances. Lewis Mumford introduced Wright,
claiming “a fair without Mr. Wright is an insult.” Wright himself compared the efforts of
Hood and his colleagues to those of Daniel Burnham and the other architects of the 1893
Chicago world’s fair, asserting that “there is not an element in the whole exhibition that can
be traced as modern.”12 He also presumed to offer unsolicited alternative designs for the
fairgrounds, one of which—a massive skyscraper capable of housing the entire exposition—
would become the government center on the Broadacre City model.13 Later, in June 1931,
Wright also published a blistering critique of Rockefeller Center, dismissing the early plans as
an aggrandizement “for money—[of] the worst elements of our economic, industrial and
aesthetic situation.”14
Wright’s decision to participate in an exposition organized by an architect for whom he
had little respect in a building that he found distasteful thus appears puzzling. It might have

Schrenk, Building a Century of Progress: The Architecture of Chicago’s 1933–34 World’s Fair (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2007).
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opinion of Hood remained ambivalent. In an unpublished 1931 review of Arthur Tappan North’s monograph
on Hood, Wright thought, “Mr. Hood talks somewhat like an advertising expert, who, somehow, got into
architecture,” but insisted, “‘Ray’ himself is another matter.” Frank Lloyd Wright, “Raymond Hood,” in CW 3:
29, 28. Upon receiving word of Hood’s death in 1934, Wright wrote to the designer Paul Frankl, “Architecture
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been that he saw some congruence between the Alliance’s desire to foster collaboration
between designers and manufacturers and his own ideas, first articulated in his 1901 “The
Art and Craft of the Machine,” that advocated a similar aim.15 The likelier reason is that the
Depression had exacerbated and prolonged his ongoing financial problems, making any
opportunity for income—or at least publicity—welcome.
Wright was originally invited to participate in the Industrial Arts Exposition as a jury
member for the Alliance’s sponsored awards. The idea for a model of Broadacre City
evolved from discussions between Maloney, the exposition manager, and his friend Karl
Jensen, Wright’s former secretary who had left Taliesin to work for Walter Davidson, the
logistics expert for whom Wright designed the farm units and market in 1932. The two
discussed Wright’s possible role in the exposition on several occasions during the fall of
1934. On November 8th, Jensen sent Wright a letter explaining that he had told Maloney
that “a model of the ‘broadacre city’ as you would visualize the pattern” would be the most
“appropriate exhibit for the Industrial Arts show.” He continued, envisioning the model
surrounded by “large-scale photographs showing old city-patterns and congestion. […] It
was my hope that you would take on this model-job and turn it over to the Fellowship as an
interesting object-lesson for them to do.”16 Jensen also indicated that the Alliance could
probably provide a $1,000 subvention to cover the cost of the model. Shortly thereafter,
Maloney followed up with Wright, suggesting that ten square feet of exhibition space could

15 In his 1901 lecture, Wright advocated the formation of an Arts and Crafts Society that would be a
vehicle for “mutual education” between artists, craftspeople, architects, “sociological workers,” and
manufacturers. Frank Lloyd Wright, “The Art and Craft of the Machine,” lecture delivered at Hull House,
Chicago, March 6, 1901, orig. published in Catalogue of the Fourteenth Annual Exhibition of the Chicago Architectural
Club (Chicago: Chicago Architectural Club, 1901), reprinted in CW 1: 66. In his second lecture at Princeton in
1930, titled “Style in Industry,” Wright advocated what he called “Industrial ‘Style’ Centers,” which would be
industry-sponsored schools attached to major universities. See Wright, Modern Architecture, 41.
16 Karl Jensen to Frank Lloyd Wright, November 8, 1934, J022C06, FLWFA.
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be made available for a Broadacre City model and that he could indeed subsidize the
architect’s expenses.17
Wright had not received a major commission in over a decade, which meant that in
addition to his ongoing financial woes, the recently established Taliesin Fellowship had little
to do. So he was understandably amenable to Jensen and Maloney’s proposal, but he seized
the opportunity to suggest a more elaborate (and self-promotional) display. Ten square feet
were insufficient, he thought. A twelve-by-twelve-foot model, divided into quadrants for
easier handling, would better communicate his ideas. This would require, he argued,
an awful lot of intelligent work. Hard for anyone to realize how much. And if we
didn’t have much of the material already we couldn’t undertake it at all. We could
illustrate in detail most of the units like the tall building, the automobile objective,
the theatre—the gas station—the luxurious, machine-age house—the little farm
unit—the acre subsistence homestead—etc, etc, by models we already have.18
This expanded scope made external funding a necessity. But instead of accepting the
Alliance’s offer, Wright independently approached the Pittsburgh department store magnate
Edgar J. Kaufmann, Sr., whose son had recently joined the Taliesin Fellowship and with
whom he had recently begun discussions that would lead to the design of the Kaufmanns’
vacation home, Fallingwater. Kaufmann agreed to underwrite the construction of the model,
on condition that it be exhibited at his Pittsburgh department store after the show at
Rockefeller Center closed.
With funding in hand, Wright’s participation was confirmed. He then almost immediately
threatened to withdraw. A series of miscommunications with Maloney led the architect to
believe that his work would be relegated to the sidelines of the show. In an angrily worded
17
18

Thomas J. Maloney to Frank Lloyd Wright, November 9, 1934, M050A03, FLWFA.
Wright to Maloney, n.d. [ca. November 10, 1934], M041C02, FLWFA.
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letter to Maloney on November 29, 1934, he declared that Broadacre City was “a show in
itself, probably rivalling in significance and beauty anything heretofore. It should have plenty
of space to have full effect.”19 What plenty of space meant, for Wright, was two-thousand
square feet, or fully ten percent of the Forum. He sent a drawing to Maloney, via Jensen, that
he claimed would justify his extortionate demand for space. The exact drawing to which he
referred is not clear, but a perspective sketch in the Wright Foundation Archives, with
dimensions indicating a forty-five-by-forty-five-foot area (or two-thousand square feet) for
the installation, approximates his written description (fig. 5.4). It showed the new, large-scale
model, several models of individual buildings that would accompany it (as indicated in his
earlier letter), a number of wall-mounted drawings, and a network of interlocking plywood
panels that would support the models.
In response, Maloney reminded Wright that, unlike most of the other participants, he
was not a fee-paying exhibitor. He did, however, agree to a compromise, offering Wright
one-thousand square feet and guaranteeing that the model “was to be placed in the most
commanding position in the Exhibit and was to become the focal point of the entire
show.”20 To further assuage the architect’s concerns, Maloney and Jensen separately
encouraged Wright to visit the Forum in person. In mid-December he did and, satisfied that
he had indeed been given “the center of the stage and enough of it,” he and his apprentices
set to work.21
The task that occupied them between January and April 1935 was threefold. The new
twelve-by-twelve-foot model needed to be designed and built. The other “collateral” models,

19
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Wright to Maloney, November 29, 1934, M041D09, FLWFA.
Maloney to Wright, December 12, 1934, M05C05, FLWFA, 1–2.
Wright to Edgar J. Kaufmann, Sr., December 26, 1934, K019C01, FLWFA.
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most of which were already on hand, needed to be prepped, as did a small collection of
drawings. And the system of plywood panels that would support the models needed to be
designed and emblazoned with the block letters that would elucidate Broadacre City’s thesis
to exposition-goers. This work would be completed in Chandler, Arizona, a small suburb of
Phoenix. Wright had been drawn to Chandler a few years earlier, when he was hired for a
since-aborted project, the San Marcos in the Desert resort. Infatuated with the desert
landscape, he spent time searching for land on which to build a permanent winter home—
what would become Taliesin West, in nearby Scottsdale, in 1937—while twenty-five
members of the Taliesin Fellowship set up a workshop in the open-air courtyard of
Chandler’s La Hacienda Hotel. Wright was responsible for the original pen-and-ink sketch
plan of the model, but the process of translating the sketch into built form fell largely to
collaboration among the fellows.22
The sketch plan showed a landscape subdivided into discrete sections by a sinuous
network of highways (fig. 5.5). Handwritten notations surrounding the drawing indicated the
plan’s component parts. The gridded quadrant in the upper left corner contained subsistence
homesteads. The oblong plots along the bottom and right edges were “little farms.” The
upper right corner was for “more luxurious” homes. There were factories and a roadside
market in two small sections near the left and right edges. The middle area was filled with a
park, golf course, and polo grounds. A number of gas stations could be found throughout
the landscape. The sketch seemed to show what Catherine Bauer’s review of The Disappearing

22 In addition to the sketch plan, there is a collection of working drawings that were used to assist in the
model construction. These show individual architectural components of the large model, studies for the text on
the plywood panels, and preliminary layouts of the installation. The paint drips and smears across most of the
drawings show them to have been guides for the model makers. See the drawings in folders 3406–3416,
FLWFA.
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City had feared. Its constellation of functions seemed to be little more than a well-planned
upper-class suburb. Its tony selection of recreational activities suggested that it would be
exclusively white. The fellows spent the winter of 1935 transferring the sketch onto four sixby-six-foot sheets of plywood, making its landscape more rectilinear and, with the addition
of several skyscrapers, more broadly metropolitan, rather than simply suburban (fig. 5.6).
During the first week of April, the fellows trucked the model from suburban Arizona to
midtown Manhattan, where it was installed in time for the exposition’s opening night.
The festivities began at eight o’clock on April 15, 1935, when Franklin Roosevelt pressed
a golden telegraph key in the Oval Office. As the New York Times reported, this “started an
electric impulse that set off 120 flash bulbs in the Forum of Rockefeller Center, turned on
fifty floodlights, started a siren, dropped an American flag, and turned on the current on an
electric organ.”23 Speakers included Mayor LaGuardia, Corbett, the Federal Housing
Authority commissioner (whose remarks were broadcast “over a beam of light” from
Washington), and Wright, although as recounted in the introduction his address was dropped
from NBC’s coverage of the event.24
Scholars have had some difficulty situating Wright’s installation within the space of the
Forum, in part because the exposition was poorly documented. In her recent and thorough
study of Wright’s exhibitions, Kathryn Smith has identified two extant photographs of
Broadacre City at Rockefeller Center. One by the Keystone View Company shows Wright
inspecting the nearly completed installation; the other, by Fay S. Lincoln, is more widely
known and shows the finished display (see fig. 5.1).25 Both photographs are tightly framed,
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“Arts in Industry Glorified in Show,” New York Times, April 16, 1935, 23.
Ibid.
See Smith, Wright on Exhibit, 93–95.
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which means that they are missing parts of Wright’s display and also devoid of context.
There is, however, a third photograph, which appeared in a photographic supplement to the
April 21, 1935, New York Times, and which has apparently eluded scholars. It was taken near
the entry to the Forum, at the top of the grand staircase, looking down into the gallery,
where the entirety of Wright’s installation can be seen between two late-model Fords,
immediately below the unfurled American flag (fig. 5.7).
As the opening night crowd began to descend the Forum’s grand staircase, they would
have been guided toward the corner of the Broadacre display by the four-foot-tall model of
the St. Mark’s Tower, perched beacon-like next to the large-scale model. The block letters on
the L-shaped plywood panel that supported the tower and one corner of the main model
spelled out what amounted to the installation’s title: “A NEW FREEDOM FOR LIVING IN
AMERICA.”

Below this, on the left panel, was a map of the model, although without a legend

it offered little clarification of the model’s contents. (Wright stationed apprentices in the
Forum for the duration of the exposition to perform this function.) Text next to the map
indicated that land was to be parceled out in one-acre allotments; that most governmental
functions were to be devolved to the county level and carried out via radio and “aerotor;”
that “character and topography” would determine regional variations from the representative
section of Broadacre City on display; and that there would be “no major or minor axis.” The
other panel is at least partly obscured in photographs. Its similarly aphoristic content read in
full:
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PUBLIC NEEDS
LANDLORD AND TENANT
HOUSING ▪ NO “SUBSISTENCE” HOMESTEADS
TRAFFIC PROBLEM ▪ NO BACK AND FORTH HAUL
RAILROAD ▪ NO STREETCARS
GRADE CROSSINGS
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NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

POLES ▪ NO WIRES IN SIGHT
DITCHES ALONGSIDE THE ROADS
HEADLIGHTS ▪ NO LIGHT FIXTURES
GLARING CEMENT ROADS OR WALKS
TALL BUILDINGS EXCEPT AS ISOLATED IN PARKS
SLUM ▪ NO SCUM
PUBLIC OWNERSHIP OF PRIVATE NEEDS

▪ NO ROADSIDE ADVERTISING

This specific attention to the project’s infrastructural and organizational minutiae distilled the
sometimes-meandering arguments of The Disappearing City into pithy sloganeering. The
preclusion of “housing,” “slum,” and “scum” recapitulated Wright’s earlier, race-tinged
commentaries on housing reform. The exposition opened less than one month after a March
19th race riot in Harlem, for which discriminatory rental practices, substandard housing, and
disproportionately high unemployment among black New Yorkers were causes. Given
Wright’s understanding of African Americans as essentially other and inferior, his “new
freedom for living in America” was less the remedy that Harlemites sought and more of a
dog whistle for white exposition-goers.
Turning to the large-scale model itself, visitors would have seen a representative foursquare-mile section of Broadacre City that also functioned as a precise diagram of Wright’s
envisioned future. Much of the model’s flat, gridded middle was filled with enough one-acre
allotments to house most of the plan’s 1,400 families, positioning middle-class domesticity as
central to the project’s social, economic, and moral agenda. In contrast to the otherwise
rectilinear landscape, “house[s] of machine-age luxury” were nestled into the contours of a
sylvan corner hillside. These were also identified as “five-car houses.”26 That there were one-,
two, and three-car homes distributed across the model, too, was evidence of a society that

26 Frank Lloyd Wright, “Broadacre City: A New Community Plan,” Architectural Record 77, no. 4 (April
1935): 253.
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would be, according to Wright, hierarchical but not exploitative and fully motorized. Three
“apartment houses”—miniature versions of the larger St. Mark’s Tower nearby—were
scattered across the hillside as well, coded emblems of Wright’s anxieties about rehabilitating
“citified” men (fig. 5.8). (Seven more towers would appear in later years, as Wright’s
apprentices continually revised the model.) Primary schools occupied the centermost
position, indicative of education’s role in the interpellation of new subjects. Civic and
cultural institutions, entertainment venues, recreational facilities, commercial establishments,
industrial campuses, a “tourist camp” (or motel), a meandering public park, rows of farms
and vineyards, and two roadside markets lined the peripheral highways. The perimeter’s
functional and figural variety revealed the project’s intertwining of commerce and culture.
As visitors navigated their way around the model, they would have made their way
through a circuit of plywood panels that led them through a collection of “collateral”
models that showed individual examples of Broadacre City’s building types. These included
the House on the Mesa—an example of “machine-age luxury” originally built for the
Museum of Modern Art’s 1932 “International Style” show—a multilevel highway
intersection, a motel, a standardized service station, and several types of “minimum” and
“medium”-sized (or one- to three-car) single-family homes, including the farm unit designed
for Walter Davidson. The rear wall of the installation was filled with mounted drawings of
the House on the Mesa, the Davidson farm unit, and a cabin originally design for a Lake
Tahoe resort colony (1923–24). As Kathryn Smith has noted, Wright did not indicate that
these individual models and drawings represented abandoned projects. He dissociated them
from real clients and actual places, giving them “an abstract quality” that permitted visitors

215

to imagine the entire display as imbued with transformative potential, rather than as a
collection of recent frustrations.27
It is worth noting that, at face value, the large-scale model might seem to undermine the
assertion in chapter 2 that Broadacre City was a framework for managing socio-spatial
change intuited from changing conditions in the metropolitan fringe. In most readings of
the project, the construction of the model signifies a transition from formlessness to
utopian master plan.28 Yet in an April 1935 Architectural Record article that Wright had
reprinted as a pamphlet to sell to exposition-goers, he warned against interpreting the model
as a utopian departure from existing trends. “Any one studying the model should bear in
mind the thesis upon which the design has been built by the Taliesin Fellowship,” he
implored, “built carefully, not as a finality in any sense but as an interpretation of the
changes inevitable to our growth as a people and a nation.”29 That is, Wright treated the
Broadacre City model in the same way that he did the 1913 suburban plan for the City Club
of Chicago competition, as an intensification of existing trends not as a departure from
them. The model would thus be best approached not as a definitive representation of a fixed
plan, but as one possible means of managing metropolitan change distilled into contingent
form.
Treating the model as a contingent artifact helps to explain why the visual and rhetorical
dimensions of Broadacre City never fully aligned. Wright’s apprentices continually altered
the model until his death in 1959, but there were also numerous discrepancies, from the
beginning, between its components and their counterparts in Wright’s own writings. Perhaps

Smith, Wright on Exhibit, 95.
See, for example, Ciucci, “The City in Agrarian Ideology,” 362–63; George R. Collins, “Broadacre City:
Wright’s Utopia Reconsidered,” in Four Great Makers of Modern Architecture, 59–65; Levine, Urbanism, 168–70.
29 Wright, “Broadacre City: A New Community Plan,” 254.
27
28
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the most significant related to Wright’s conception of governance in Broadacre City. In The
Disappearing City, Wright insisted that “in a democracy” the “offices of public officialdom”
should be housed in modest structures and “not in the braggadocio buildings now
customary. These functions are utilitarian.”30 Yet, on the model, Wright identified a lakeside
skyscraper near the far corner as the county’s administrative seat (fig. 5.9). Contrary to
Wright’s 1932 recommendations, its verticality made it one of the models’ most conspicuous
components. Its two interlocking, teal-colored slabs were derived from one of Wright’s
unsolicited proposals for the 1933 Century of Progress Exposition. They also bore an
uncanny resemblance to the staggered profile of the RCA Building. More significantly, it
embodied the autocratic role that Wright now gave to “the architect.” As he explained in his
April 1935 Architectural Record article, “The agent of the state in all matters of land allotment
or improvement, or in matters affecting the harmony of the whole, is the architect.”31 A
similar declaration was emblazoned on the plywood panel nearest the government tower. By
treating such misalignments between text and model as part of an open-ended effort to
interpret and control socio-spatial change, Broadacre City’s numerous internal contradictions
become easier to assess, if not resolve.

5.2 Critics, Community, Roadshow

The National Alliance of Art and Industry estimated that 250,000 people would see the
1935 Industrial Arts Exposition.32 In reality, about 40,000 people came.33 One of those was
Wright, Disappearing City, 67, 68.
Wright, “Broadacre City: A New Community Plan,” 246.
32 “The Industrial Arts Exposition: 1935,” 13.
33 Wright claimed that fifty-thousand saw the exposition. See Frank Lloyd Wright, “A Note on the
Models,” New Frontier, 22. Anthony Alofsin cites an unidentified New York Times article put attendance at fortythousand. See Alofsin, “Broadacre City,” 18. I have been unable to independently locate Alofsin’s source, but
Edgar Tafel, an apprentice who manned the installation for the duration of the exposition, wrote to the
30
31
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Roy L. Gray, a fifty-year-old, white, middle-income resident of Fort Madison, Iowa, whom
American Magazine selected, in 1927, as the most “average man” in America. Because the
exposition was oriented toward fostering new habits of consumption among “the average
man,” the Alliance invited Gray to New York. (The exposition organizers also selected a
“Miss Typical Consumer”—Verna Long, of the Bronx—who presided over events in the
Forum and otherwise promoted the Exposition.)34 When Gray arrived at Rockefeller Center
on April 22nd, he was, according to the New York Times, “unimpressed.”35 So, too, were
critics like the New Yorker’s Lewis Mumford, the Nation’s Douglas Haskell, and New Masses’
Stephen Alexander. Understanding their critiques and Wright’s responses to them, as well as
the larger discourse of housing reform with which the Broadacre City model engaged as it
made a brief tour during the summer of 1935, helps to pave the way toward the architect’s
eventual schematization of “organic” capitalism.
As noted above, the Nation’s Douglas Haskell complained that the number of fee-paying
exhibitors gave the Industrial Arts Exposition the quality of “advertisements in a magazine.”
To make matters worse, most high-profile designers boycotted the show. Henry Dreyfus,
Norman Bel Geddes, and Walter Dorwin Teague had participated in the 1934 exposition,
but were among a group that accused the Alliance’s decision to allow companies to buy their
way into the 1935 show as an abandonment of genuine design advocacy for commercial
boosterism.36 In the New Yorker, Lewis Mumford quipped that, since the boycott “included
most of the people […] who are doing good or even passable work, you can draw your own
architect on May 2, 1935, estimating that 36,000 people had seen the show to date. See Edgar Tafel to Frank
Lloyd Wright, May 2, 1935, T009B04, FLWFA, 2.
34 See Fred Jackson, “Meet Miss Typical Consumer,” Rockefeller Center Weekly: Industrial Arts Exposition
Number, April 11, 1935, 4; “Typical Consumer Is Ferreted Out,” New York Times, April 11, 1935, 23.
35 “’Average Man’ Here and Is Unimpressed,” New York Times, April 23, 1935, 23.
36 See “Arts in Industry Glorified in Show;” Helen Johnson Keyes, “Art and Industry Exhibition,”
Christian Science Monitor, April 14, 1934, 5.
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conclusions about the exhibition.”37 Similarly, Stephen Alexander, art critic for the leftist
journal New Masses, had difficulty identifying worthwhile design “amidst the general welter
of junk.” He advised potential exposition-goers “not to waste your time or money on it.”38
The boycott left Wright as the only designer with name recognition included in the show.
Mumford and Alexander both agreed that his contribution was its sole redeeming quality,
although they did so on somewhat different terms and with varying degrees of enthusiasm.
For Alexander, the Broadacre model was a welcome relief from the exposition’s
otherwise overwhelming commercialism, but he had reservations about the future it
proposed. Alexander commended Wright, because the critic thought he was “virtually alone
among prominent architects of this country in his approach to the fundamental problems of
present-day architecture as primarily socioeconomic.”39 Wright’s purportedly “anti-capitalist
position” was especially noteworthy, but Alexander lamented the architect’s “naive
concoction of adolescent idealism and Wellsian it’s-all-done-with-push-buttons fiction,”
which produced a type of “community planning” that would be imposed “by arbitrary
fiat.”40 Wright responded to Alexander’s critique in a letter to the editors that appeared in the
July 23, 1935, issue of New Masses. Curiously, he did not take issue with the critic’s
accusations of naivité but rather with his assumptions about the economic ideology
Broadacre City envisioned. Wright allowed that communism “may be the only way labor has
learned from the very capitalism that enslaved laborers,” but he also insisted,
Broadacres has proposed a life as anti-capitalistic as it is, in this sense, anti-Communistic.
[…] It was a preliminary study for the decentralization that to me seems necessary to
37

Lewis Mumford, “The Skyline: Mr. Wright’s City—Downtown Dignity,” The New Yorker, April 27, 1935,
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humane freedom. I know decentralization is anathema to Communism where
Communists are trying to get action by organizing centralization to get the efficiencies
that characterized the capitalistic interest turned the other way around in order to lead
labor forward.41
This garbled attempt to equate communism with centralization was willfully misleading.
Wright elsewhere acknowledged familiarity with Marx’s writings, and would thus have been
aware of their occasional commentaries on reconciling town and country.42 He was also wellacquainted with the anti-urbanism of William Morris’s romantic socialism. He corresponded
with Soviet architectural journals and newspapers in the early 1930s—and was generally
attuned to Soviet culture, especially film—so he should have been at least somewhat aware
of recent, decentralizing planning projects in the Soviet Union.43 More to the point, Wright
had already told a tour group at Rockefeller Center that Broadacre City was “a form of
capitalism,” but he equivocated in his response to Alexander, claiming that the project was
neither capitalist nor communist. At this point in the project’s development, Wright seemed
to be capable of identifying the fragmentary evidence of a decentralizing culture of
consumption, but he was as yet unable to name the system that would organize it.
Stephen Alexander’s critique of Broadacre City turned on what he understood to be
Wright’s superficial approach to “community planning.” Lewis Mumford offered a more
generous assessment of the same topic in his New Yorker review. He thought that Broadacre
City provided “something that has been lacking in Mr. Wright’s individual projects for

41 Frank Lloyd Wright, “Freedom Based on Form,” letter to the editors, New Masses 16, no. 4 (July 23,
1935): 23.
42 See Wright, An Organic Architecture, 28–29; Wright, “Book Six: Broadacre City,” unpublished supplement
to An Autobiography (1943), in CW 4: 243–44.
43 See Wright, “First Answers to Questions by Pravda,” in CW 3: 139–42; “Categorical Reply to Questions
by ‘Architecture of the U.S.S.R.,” December 7, 1933, in CW 3: 143–45. Wright may have encountered articles
on Soviet planning, such as “Recent Developments of Town Planning in U.S.S.R.,” Architectural Review 71, no.
426 (May 1, 1932): 209–12.
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wealthy patrons—the conception of a whole community.”44 The plan’s treatment of traffic
patterns and land-use divisions seemed, to Mumford, to resonate with the arterials and
super-blocks of Radburn, New Jersey, the RPAA-supported garden suburb that, though
unfinished because of the Depression, had already become a prototype for community
planning (fig. 5.10). Given Mumford’s comparison, a brief consideration of the ideas
Radburn embodied and their relationship to Broadacre City is instructive.
Radburn was planned by RPAA members Clarence Stein and Henry Wright in 1928. The
ideals it exemplified were best articulated, however, by another planner, Clarence Perry, and
his idea of the “neighborhood unit.” He first presented this idea in the mid-1920s before it
was published in the Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs (fig. 5.11). As defined by Perry,
community planning sought to instill a sense of social cohesion among “people of similar
tastes” through the provision of civic, commercial, cultural, educational, and recreational
facilities in self-contained residential districts.45 Strict environmental control and clearly
delineated boundaries would overcome the disruptive effects of automobile traffic and
laissez-faire real-estate development.46 The “neighborhood unit” was, in essence, an effort to
combine social homogeneity with (relative) functional variety in a walkable, self-contained
space.
The 1935 exposition offered Wright an opportunity to critically intervene in this
discourse. The Architectural Record article that he turned into a pamphlet for exposition-goers
at Rockefeller Center was titled, “Broadacre City: A New Community Plan.” Its first line

Mumford, “Mr. Wright’s City,” 79.
Clarence A. Perry, “The Neighborhood Unit,” in Regional Survey of New York and Its Environs, vol. 7:
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46 See Radford, Modern Housing, 37–43. On Wright and the issue of community planning, see David Smiley,
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defined his “ideal community” as “a general decentralization and architectural reintegration
of all units into one fabric.”47 Despite Mumford’s favorable comparison of Broadacre City to
Radburn, the critic thought Wright’s ideal fell short, because he “should have permitted
himself to dream more generously” in his proposals for low-income residents.48 Radburn,
like Perry’s “neighborhood unit” diagram and Wright’s 1913 suburban plan, included
medium-density apartment blocks along its periphery. The “minimum” houses were, for
Mumford, Broadacre City’s weakest point, a condition that could be overcome if Wright
would consider European-style social housing as a viable alternative to single-family homes
for all.
Wright queried Mumford about this criticism in a letter sent the same day the New Yorker
article was published. He was “puzzled” by the critic’s apparent preference for “the German
tenement and slum solution.” In his view, “an individual little free-holding” was inherently
more “sightly and dignified” than a “tenement unit in the rank and file.”49 In response,
Mumford let Wright know that, as long as he held “dogmatically” to the position “that
anything except a single family house on its own broad acre of land is a slum,” Broadacre
City would amount to little more than “a contemporary suburb with a few light
manufacturing industries.”50 Wright’s inability—or unwillingness—to consider the viability
of multifamily housing pointed to the degree to which “community” remained a means to
an end for him. A direct line connected the planning ideals of the turn-of-the-century
quadruple block plan with the more expansive and polemical aims of Broadacre City:
coordination and cooperation mattered only insofar as it facilitated individuation.
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As Wright was engaging his critics over the summer of 1935, the Broadacre model
embarked on a heavily promoted but haphazardly organized tour of Washington, D.C.,
Pittsburgh, and several intermittent stops in Wisconsin. Edgar Kaufmann financed the
model construction, so the display was supposed to travel to the Kaufmann’s department
store as soon as the show at Rockefeller Center closed on May 15th. Instead, Thomas
Maloney, the Industrial Arts Exposition manager, independently devised plans to exhibit
Wright’s work in the nation’s capital. He knew that the Resettlement Administration was
planning a “greenbelt” towns near Milwaukee and thought that if commissioners could see
Broadacre City firsthand Wright would get the commission.51 It is not clear that Wright was
ever seriously considered for such a commission, but the possibility of a D.C. exhibit quickly
took priority over Pittsburgh.52 Plans were soon thrown into disarray, however, when Wright
insisted that the installation be mounted in the Corcoran Gallery rather than the lobby of
the Department of Commerce building, which had been Maloney’s suggestion. Given the
ensuing delays, the models had no clear destination when the Industrial Arts Exposition
closed. Instead of Pittsburgh or D.C., they were shipped to Wisconsin, where they were
installed at the State Historical Society in Madison, from June 7th to 14th.
Broadacre City then traveled to Pittsburgh, arriving a month later than planned, on June
18th. It became the centerpiece of a Federal Housing Authority-sponsored exhibition called
“New Homes for Old.” During the show’s ten-day run, Wright made headlines by trading
barbs with the mayor of Pittsburgh after the mayor dismissed Broadacre City as “pure
socialism […] something like Roosevelt wants to do.”53 A media firestorm ensued when
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Wright retorted, “It would be cheaper to abandon [Pittsburgh] and build another real one.”54
This has overshadowed a more interesting aspect of Broadacre’s presence in Kaufmann’s
eleventh-floor auditorium, where the model was surrounded by housewares and homebuilding materials. Advertisements informed prospective homebuyers that “experts” would
be on hand to explain the opportunities afforded by new federally backed mortgages and
“everything you need to know about Home Modernization” (fig. 5.12). In other words, the
department store setting and the FHA sponsorship made the model into an exemplar of
suburban consumer culture. While on display in Pittsburgh, the Broadacre model was
transmuted, more specifically, into an advertisement for what federal funding could make
readily accessible to aspiring white homeowners. The irony of this is that Wright’s domestic
projects after 1935 would be almost systematically denied FHA-insured loans.
By the time the models made their way to Washington, the original purpose for sending
them had evaporated. Wright was likely never in consideration for the Milwaukee
“greenbelt” commission, but Maloney had also promised him that “the president would be
keenly interested and that everyone of importance” would come see Broadacre City.55
Instead, when the exhibition at the Corcoran opened on July 3rd, the capital had already
emptied for the summer (fig. 5.13).56 Given the controversies, delays, and disappointments
that followed the Broadacre model across the eastern U.S. over the summer of 1935—most
of them of Wright’s own making—the architect complained that the tour had been “mostly
See “Famed Architect Shows His Idea of Utopian City,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, June 18, 1935, 5; Wright,
“Broadacres to Pittsburgh,” Pittsburgh Sun-Telegraph, June 24, 1935, reprinted in Wright, New Frontier, 30–32;
“Designer of Future City Answers Mayor’s Attack,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, June 27, 1935, 7; James A. Baubie,
“Flings Sneers at Pittsburgh,” Pittsburgh Sunday Sun-Telegraph, June 30, 1935, 13; “Industrial Centers to Give Way
to Gardens, Pittsburgh Hears,” Christian Science Monitor, July 6, 1935, 3; Wright, New Frontier, 32–34.
55 Maloney to Wright, May 5, 1935.
56 Wright even made a personal entreaty to Eleanor Roosevelt to attend the show, despite his growing
antipathy for the President, but was informed that the First Lady would not return to Washington until after
the exhibition’s end. See Thomas J. Doyle to Frank Lloyd Wright, July 17, 1935, R014C07, FLWFA.
54
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in vain.”57 The last stop was in September at a county fair in Mineral Point, Wisconsin, near
Taliesin.
The frustrations that accompanied the model’s travels led Wright to decline most
invitations to display it over the next five years, until he accepted one from the Museum of
Modern Art for a major retrospective in 1940. Despite the architect’s own perception of the
1935 tour, the foregoing episodes presaged a significant conceptual development. Wright’s
response to Stephen Alexander revealed that Broadacre City’s economic underpinnings
remained un-theorized. His sense of being snubbed by “everyone of importance” in
Washington led to a growing disillusionment with the Roosevelt administration that would
boil over, in the late 1930s, as the U.S. weighed entry in World War II, into a virulent
isolationism. These two issues—clarifying the project’s economics and protesting the
American government’s foreign policy—would become intertwined as Wright borrowed
ideas from anti-war xenophobes to outline his idea of “organic capitalism.”

5.3 The New Frontier

From the beginning, Broadacre City was defined by socioeconomic concerns. Wright’s
critiques of the existing industrial metropolis addressed the different ways in which its
crowded conditions, centralized transit networks, and landlords conspired to deny individuals
opportunities for achieving economic autonomy. Gasoline service stations were, meanwhile,
“agents of decentralization” that would become nodes in dispersed but coordinated
networks of consumption. “Business” would thus “tak[e] on a different complexion. It is a
form of freedom, and architecture bursts into bloom,” as Wright wrote in American Architect
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in 1932.58 Even his conception of domesticity was inseparable from ideas about consumer
culture. Broadacre’s measure of success would be that “everything needed in the category of
foodstuffs or supplies which the city itself can now supply” would be made available “within
easy distance of any man’s dwelling,” as he had announced at Princeton in 1930.59 Given the
degree to which economic ideals permeated Broadacre City, it is rather odd that Wright
struggled throughout most of the 1930s to identify what exactly the project’s economics
were.
During the early part of the decade, as the severity of the Depression became
increasingly apparent, Wright offered intriguing but intermittent critiques of the existing
capitalist economy. An unpublished 1931 essay, titled “Character Is Fate,” used terms
familiar from writings on Broadacre City, but treated economic concerns more cogently than
Wright’s contemporaneous published works. As he understood present conditions, a
“gambling, capitalist autocracy” had reduced “this machine-age civilization” to “a triple
slum, lower slum, middle slum, and scum.”60 The “late unpleasantness we like to call
‘depression,’” was “really the end of an epoch,” because “capitalist centralization” was
beginning “to die of its own habit and is flowing into channels more normal to the life of
the human being.”61 What this meant was that “the human habitation as a ‘home’” would
replace “big corporate business” as “the only centralization that democracy will tolerate
because any rational interpretation of that ideal must mean exactly that.”62 Such a
tautological conclusion relied, on the one hand, on an elision of “democracy” and
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“capitalism” that recurred in Wright’s thinking and revealed, on the other hand, that he did
not yet have a language for articulating his own alternative economic ideas.
The Disappearing City leveled similar complaints. Aside from occasional, vague critiques of
the “adventitious” tendencies of laissez-faire economics, it did not contain any sustained
economic argument. It did include, however, one one brief remark on what an alternative
system might be. Wright commended the thinking of nineteenth-century economist Henry
George, whose influential Progress and Poverty (1879) advocated a “single tax” on land as a way
to curb real-estate speculation and reward productive labor.63 For Wright, George’s theory of
“communal ownership by way of taxation of all communal resources is not necessarily
communism.” It was an “entirely democratic” way to effect the “systematized integration of
small individual units.”64 Based on the scattered evidence his early-1930s writings provided,
land tenure, homeownership, and economic individualism formed the outlines of Wright’s
inchoate economic ideal.
In most studies of Broadacre City, discussions of the project’s socioeconomic
underpinnings typically point to the architect’s affinity for thinkers like George, Silvio Gesell,
Peter Kropotkin, and Thomas Jefferson. Or they cite parallels between Wright’s assumed
agrarianism and contemporary back-to-the-land experiments like Ralph Borsodi’s.65 It is
worth noting, however, that George’s “single tax” was the only one of these economic ideas
that Wright cited in his early writings on Broadacre City. Jefferson was only mentioned in The

63 See Henry George, Progress and Poverty: An Inquiry into the Cause of Industrial Depressions and of Increase of
Want with Increase of Wealth … The Remedy (orig. 1879; New York: Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 1992).
64 Wright, Disappearing City, 33.
65 See, for example, Ciucci, “The City in Agrarian Ideology,” 353; Collins, “Wright’s Utopia
Reconsidered,” 68–71; Fishman, Urban Utopias, 146–47; Stephen Grabow, “Frank Lloyd Wright and the
American City: The Broadacres Debate,” Journal of the American Institute of Planners 43, no. 2 (April 1977): 117;
Johnson, Wright versus America, 49–53; Sergeant, Usonian Houses, 134; Smiley, “Broadacre and Narrow Lots,”
195–96.
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Disappearing City in connection with Wright’s lament of a “democratic ideal” that had
withered in “the general darkness” of racial diversity. In 1936, the architect participated in a
symposium with Borsodi, but while introducing Broadacre City in a 1939 lecture in London,
he declared, “I do not believe in a ‘back to the land’ movement.”66 This is not to deny the
obvious affinities between Wright’s anxieties about industrialization and urbanization and
similar concerns in George’s Progress and Poverty or Borsodi’s This Ugly Civilization (1929). It is
to suggest instead that Wright developed his economic thinking by other means, first
through several invitations from Soviet architects and then in dialogue with American
Communist Party members and anti-communist white supremacists.
The Soviet state newspaper Pravda and the journal Architecture of the U.S.S.R. both
contacted Wright in late 1933 with questionnaires that gave him opportunities to expound
on his ideas concerning American society, culture, and architecture. His reply to Pravda
labeled capitalism “a gambling game” that “no tinkering can effect,” and praised the Soviet
Union as “a heroic endeavor to establish more genuine human values in a social state than
any existing before.”67 That laudatory response, combined with Wright’s newly reclaimed
professional stature, likely contributed to his invitation to the All-Union Congress of Soviet
Architects. This high-profile gathering, held in Moscow in June 1937, was organized to
ensure that the Russian architectural profession was falling into line with the cultural
imperatives of Stalinism.68 Wright’s address to the Congress excoriated the perceived
shortcomings of American architecture, warned the Russians to avoid “palatial
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grandomania” in their architecture, and, predictably, offered Broadacre City as a model that
could be easily adapted to Soviet “democracy.”69
The speech itself did not advance Wright’s economic thinking, but media furor upon his
return did. He wrote an article about his experience in Moscow that was excerpted in several
newspapers, including the American Communist Party’s Daily Worker, in August, and then
published in full in October in Soviet Russia Today, a pro-Soviet American magazine, and
Architectural Record.70 His trip—which, it is necessary to note, occurred at the height of the
purges—gave him peculiar insight, he thought, into conditions in the Soviet Union that
“‘self-styled’ American Communists” lacked.71 “If Comrade Stalin, as disconcerted outsiders
are saying, is betraying the revolution,” he presumed to clarify, “then, in light of what I have
seen in Moscow, I say he is betraying it into the hands of the Russian people.”72 The reaction
in the American press to this praise of Stalinism was, as Wright recalled in the 1943 edition
of his Autobiography, “openly hostile.”73 The one response to which Wright felt compelled to
reply was neither hostile nor, in fact, critical of his pro-Stalin credulousness. It was an open
letter published in the Madison Capital Times written by a group of University of Madison
faculty members, who were also Communist Party members. They explained that they were
unconcerned by his praise for Stalin, which they thought was “fair.” What worried them
instead was the architect’s denigration of American communists. He seemed to “confus[e]
some campus bohemians with Communists,” which played into misleading caricatures of
See “My Dear Comrades,” address to the First Congress of Soviet Architects, 1937, typescript, MS
2401.208 D, FLWFA.
70 See “Wright Praises New Soviet Constitution,” Daily Worker, August 12, 1937; Frank Lloyd Wright,
“Architecture and Life in the U.S.S.R.,” Soviet Russia Today 6 (October 1937): 14–19; Wright, “Architecture and
Life in the U.S.S.R.,” Architectural Record 82, no. 4 (October 1937): 59–63; reprinted in Wright, Autobiography
(1943), 549–56.
71 See “Wright Praises New Soviet Constitution.”
72 Wright, “Architecture and Life in the U.S.S.R.,” Soviet Russia Today, 15.
73 Wright, An Autobiography (1943), 548.
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communism in “the capitalist press.”74 Wright’s reply, which appeared in the Racine,
Wisconsin, Journal Times, in August 1937, led him to finally articulate the economic ideal he
would then attach to Broadacre City.
He began with a non-apology for his apparent denigration of leftist politics, but his
primary focus was an attempt to clarify his stance on political and economic issues. The
problem with trying to articulate a politico-economic theory, as he saw it, was that terms like
communism, socialism, republicanism, progressivism, and “even the grand term,
Democracy, ha[ve] been bought and oversold by party politics and fakirs.”75 “Social Justice,”
he thought, “sounds better to me than any ism. I could march under a banner that stood
squarely upon that idea made definite.” He reiterated, “Democracy itself is no more or less
than Social Justice,” and then offered a five-point program to clarify his meaning. (1) Every
“man” would be guaranteed the right to work, but (2) no “able man” would be allowed to
eat unless he worked. (3) A Georgian single-tax and a “free medium of exchange” would
replace existing fiscal policy. (4) “General decentralization” would produce less crowding and
smaller government. (5) All natural resources and “utilities common to all by way of which
our people live” would be nationalized. This included everything from earth, air, and water
to oil, gas, and coal to radio, telephone, and telegraph networks. Education and medicine
would also be free. These goals would be realized “gradually,” by way of “taxation or some
form of purchase by capitalizing the country itself over and above a fair living for every
man, woman, and child in it.” Wright tried to smooth over the apparent contradiction
between his desire for limited government and wide-ranging nationalization by claiming, in

The Faculty Branch of the Communist Party, University of Wisconsin, “An Open Letter to Frank Lloyd
Wright,” reprinted in ibid., 557.
75 Frank Lloyd Wright, “Reply: To Our University Communists,” typescript for Racine Journal Times, ca.
August 1937, U043, FLWFA; reprinted in ibid., 558–59.
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conclusion, that his propositions were neither socialism nor communism but “true
capitalism—the organic capital of an organic Democracy: the only basis of organic
architecture or indigenous Usonian culture.”76
Before turning to his further treatment of “organic capitalism” in the 1940 Taliesin
pamphlet The New Frontier, it is worth unpacking Wright’s word choice in the foregoing
passage. Out of context, “social justice” sounds innocuous, but it would have been difficult
in the late 1930s not to connect it to the controversial “radio priest” Charles E. Coughlin, a
Catholic cleric based in suburban Detroit. Coughlin used an immensely popular weekly radio
show and his Social Justice newsletter to promote an anti-communist, anti-Semitic form of
populism. His growing opposition to the New Deal, his virulent anti-interventionism, and
his proto-fascist support for Hitler and Mussolini led him to be effectively silenced in 1939
when the Vatican, under pressure from the Roosevelt administration, ended his broadcasts.
Beginning with the October 5, 1936, issue of his newsletter, the editorial page began listing
sixteen “Principles of Social Justice.” They included access to a “just, living, annual wage;”
the “nationalization of important public resources,” but “private ownership of all other
property;” recommendations on monetary policy; a “broadened base of taxation;” and the
“simplification of government and lower taxes.”77 Though Wright’s five points could
conceivably be traced to other sources, like Henry George, there was clear resonance
between Coughlin’s “principles” and Wright’s use of “social justice.”
Moreover, the convergence of Broadacre City and proto-fascism was neither fleeting nor
coincidental. The cover story for the June 18, 1935, issue of New Masses, in which Stephen
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Alexander’s review of the Industrial Arts Exposition appeared, was a discussion of thirdparty politics that made mention of Coughlin’s populist monetary policies.78 Reports of a
“vicious atmosphere of potential fascist emotionalism” among Coughlin supporters at a rally
in Cincinnati was published in a letter to the editors on the same page as Wright’s reply to
Alexander in the July 23rd issue.79 Less circumstantial was a review of Wright and Baker
Brownell’s Architecture and Modern Life (1937) by art historian Meyer Schapiro. In the book,
Brownell and Wright authored alternating chapters, with the architect expounding on ideas
from architectural history and his coauthor floridly describing the type of society Broadacre
City would make possible. Writing in Partisan Review in early 1938, Schapiro gave only brief
attention to Wright. The architect’s naive commentary on Stalinism following his 1937 trip to
Moscow was, for Schapiro, evidence of his “blindness to the facts of social and economic
power.”80 Schapiro excoriated Brownell’s contribution at length. His philosophical gloss on
Broadacre City was “as insignificant as the lyrical delicacies of the more learned Nazis.”81 In
particular, Brownell’s preference, as summarized by Schapiro, for a “homogenous racial and
natural stock” and a “return to the soil” seemed to “resemble the fascists to a hair.”82
Together, Wright’s architecture and Brownell’s theories revealed “the reactionary side of
[Wright’s] shabby, streamlined Utopia.”83
Wright betrayed his own reactionary side when, in 1940, he tried to join the isolationist
America First Committee (AFC), with which Coughlin was affiliated. Wright had grown
See John Broman, “What Kind of Third Party?,” New Masses 15, no. 12 (June 18, 1935): 9–11.
See Edward S. Grund, “Coughlinites in Cincinatti,” letter to the editors, New Masses 16, no. 4 (July 23,
1935): 23.
80 Meyer Schapiro, “Architect’s Utopia,” Partisan Review 4, no. 4 (March 1938): 46. This essay and others
are collected in Felicity Scott, ed., “Looking Forward to Looking Backward: A Dossier of Writings on
Architecture from the 1930s,” Grey Room 6 (Winter 2002): 66–109.
81 Ibid., 43.
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increasingly disillusioned with the Roosevelt administration, partly because he was passed
over for several federal commissions and partly because he was vehemently opposed to
American involvement in another “foreign war.”84 The architect’s application was denied on
the grounds that “he has quite a reputation for immorality,” according to internal AFC
correspondence.85 He nevertheless maintained correspondence with the AFC’s celebrity
spokesman, Charles A. Lindbergh, into the 1940s. This was after the famed aviator published
an article in a November 1939 issue of Reader’s Digest that argued against war in Europe as
“racial suicide” and touted aviation as “one of those priceless possessions which permit the
White race to live at all in a pressing sea of Yellow, Black, and Brown.”86 Several months
later, in May 1940, Wright sent Lindbergh a telegram that read: “We knew you could fly
straight, but now when everywhere is equivocation and cowardice you not only think straight
but you dare to speak straight.”87 He proudly reprinted this note in the 1943 edition of his
Autobiography. All of which is to say that the implications of Wright’s invocation of “social
justice” were neither incidental nor accidental. The architect’s bitter opposition to U.S.
intervention in World War II has been well documented, but the fondness for white
supremacists that came along with it cannot be dismissed as an unfortunate byproduct.88
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Given the commentaries on race in The Disappearing City and other writings of the 1930s,
Wright’s racism has to be considered integral to Broadacre City’s organizing logic.
That Broadacre City manifested a “form of capitalism,” as Wright told the tour group at
Rockefeller Center in April 1935, was never really in doubt. Despite his equivocating claims
that it was as “anti-capitalistic” as it was “anti-communistic,” his gendered “democratic”
ideal and his intuitions about an emergent consumer culture always pointed toward a critique
of capitalism as it existed rather than a rejection of it. What the foregoing shows is that it
was not through the familiar constellation of intellectual references—Edward Bellamy,
Henry George, Silvio Gesell, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Thomas Jefferson, Peter Kropotkin,
and so on—that Wright articulated his economic theories. Rather, his idea of “organic
capitalism” emerged through a confrontation with communists, with terms borrowed from
isolationist reactionaries. In 1940, Wright issued a pamphlet called The New Frontier—the
same name, incidentally, given to Rockefeller Center’s arts program—that further elaborated
his idea of “organic capitalism.”
Accounts of Broadacre City’s publication history often skip from The Disappearing City to
its revised and expanded republication in 1945 as When Democracy Builds. But The New Frontier
is in itself a fascinating and critically important document. Its publication coincided with a
1940 retrospective of Wright’s work at the Museum of Modern Art. The exhibition ended
up being a fairly haphazard affair because of Wright’s constant interference with the
Museum’s curatorial staff.89 The Museum planned for a festschrift to accompany the gallery
show, but Wright quashed the publication after reading a draft that he thought unflatteringly
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portrayed him as more committed to experimentation than clients’ needs. He would later
collaborate with Henry-Russell Hitchcock on In the Nature of Materials (1942) to belatedly
memorialize the 1940 exhibition. In the meantime, he self-published The New Frontier.
Though the MoMA exhibition covered the entirety of his career to date, the pamphlet
focused exclusively on Broadacre City.
Its forty pages were filled with a wide range of written and photographic material (fig.
5.14). There was a lengthy open letter to Mies van der Rohe that offered new, often
meandering insights into the social and cultural life of Broadacre City; a number of short
statements on the project’s individual components; an account of the 1935 model tour,
which included reprints of Wright’s response to Stephen Alexander in New Masses and his
feud with the mayor of Pittsburgh; a transcript of the radio broadcast that Wright was
supposed to deliver at Rockefeller Center, titled “A New Freedom for Living in America,”
presented as though he had actually delivered it; and a selective bibliography of Wright’s
writings. The spreads were generously illustrated with photographs of the fellows
constructing the large-scale model, of the installation at Rockefeller Center, and of
individual “collateral” models like the farm unit and standardized service station.
The first essay in The New Frontier, titled “A New Success Ideal,” helps to draw many of
the threads discussed above and in chapter 3 together. In a single passage, Wright defended
Broadacre City against critics, embedded the project in the geopolitical upheavals of the late1930s, reinforced the idea that the project was a framework for managing metropolitan
trends, and demonstrated his tendency to conflate “democracy” and “capitalism.” He
insisted that the Broadacre model was “not a finality in any sense, but an interpretation of
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the changes inevitable to our growth as a people and a nation that are taking place around us
everywhere today,” continuing,
Any totalitarian or communist threat would have little significance in such [decentralized]
circumstances. Fear would be hard to arouse in a people so situated. What I have been
describing here is really a capitalist society but a capitalist society based broadly and
firmly upon the ground […] When the models of Broadacres were first exhibited at
Rockefeller Center some of the newspapers assured their readers that the scheme was
pure communism, others that it was totalitarianism or state socialism, others that it was
plain socialism. Not one critic could see in it the fact that it was a plastic form of a
genuine democracy.90
For Wright, true democracy would be determined by its economic effects. It was less a
system of participatory governance than it was a reconstituted capitalist economy. As he
recounted, urban denizens were alienated from both their labor (as perpetual wage-earners)
and from their “birthright,” the land (as residents of skyscrapers), which meant that
capitalism as it existed retained too much of the “afterglow of feudalism.”91 It also
manifested in large-scale phenomena, like monopolies and metropolises, which Wright
believed denied individuals opportunities for self-determination. Broadacre City would thus
make possible a supposedly more “genuine” form of “‘Organic Capitalism,’ because a
citizen of Broadacre City is an actual capitalist, not merely a potential one. […] He may own
the fruit of his labor or adding his unit of effort to a whole effort become entirely
sympathetic and cooperative.”92 Universal mobility, commercial efficiency, and economic
autonomy, all overseen (paradoxically) by an architect endowed with autocratic power, would
inaugurate, in Wright’s estimation, a more fully realized, consumer-driven capitalism than
existing urbanized society could allow.
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This was as close as Wright got to elaborating a systematic theory of “organic
capitalism.” Instead, as with most other aspects of the project, he used an unrealized
architectural project to provide a concrete example of abstract economic ideas. In this case,
it was the market originally designed to sell what the farmers in Walter Davidson’s 1932
corporate-owned farming cooperative produced.
In Davidson’s original plans, the market was to be built in the ground floor of a “large,
well located apartment house” in Manhattan.93 Wright seems to have taken it upon himself
to propose that the market be placed instead on an unspecified site somewhere along a
suburban highway. This shifted the farms’ imagined consumer base from Manhattanites to
suburban commuters. It also transformed what would have been a typical urban grocery
store into something akin to the drive-in markets discussed in chapter 1, with which Wright
became acquainted while in Los Angeles during the 1920s (see fig. 1.22). Davidson was
initially skeptical of the proposed change—primarily because he thought that “almost all
wayside markets and farmer’s stands are the ‘bunk’”—but eventually he acquiesced.94
Wright’s design for the market was an open-air pavilion filled with produce stalls, meat
counters, a fishmonger, a bakery, a restaurant, a delicatessen, a lunch counter and coffee bar,
a milk bar, a soda fountain, a beauty parlor, a florist, a model kitchen, a home furnishings
department, a crèche, gift and convenience shops, gender-segregated lounges, and back-ofhouse facilities. Most of these were organized along the perimeter of the market’s single-

93 Davidson to Wright, January 18, 1932. In his letter, Davidson did not specify a location for the “large,
well located apartment house” he had in mind. He did cite upcoming meetings with developers Alexander M.
Bing, Henry Mandel, and Frederick F. French to discuss locating the market in one of their buildings. Bing was
instrumental in the development of Sunnyside Gardens, in Queens, and Radburn, New Jersey, both garden
suburbs of the New York, but Davidson’s interest in a large apartment building points toward a Manhattan site.
Bing’s apartment buildings were only located there, and Mandel and French worked almost exclusively in
Manhattan.
94 Davidson to Wright, n.d. [ca. January 1933], D014A01, FLWFA.
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story, prefabricated concrete base, while more display-friendly vendors, like the soda
fountain and flower shop, filled the central atrium (figs. 5.15 & 5.16). The central space was
located beneath a pyramidal, copper-and-glass structure lined with hanging plants. Outside,
angled parking spots and plantings regulated traffic flow. The parking lot also contained a
filling station. This varied mix of goods and services was only slightly more robust than a
typical suburban drive-in market.
A massive fountain at the center of the plan demonstrated the scheme’s cultural
aspirations. It was to shoot upward through the glass and cascade down through the plants
lining the canopy’s interior. The aquatic centerpiece projected a lively, communal atmosphere
that failed to impress Davidson. The client calculated that the market needed to earn $3,000
a day—or attract an estimated 2,000 daily customers—to be profitable.95 He worried that the
architect’s extravagant interior would tempt people to linger longer without buying much.
For Wright, who spent most of his career in the red, Davidson’s bottom line of little interest.
The wayside market offered an opportunity to imagine a variety of capitalism that
manifested through a festive consummation of commerce and culture.
Curiously, the two markets on the Broadacre model were different from the drawings
produced for Davidson. When the fellows built the model, they replaced the then-two-yearold glass-and-copper pyramid with two variants of a market organized around a large,
oblong quadrangle framed on three sides by stalls, with a smaller, lozenge-shaped ziggurat in
one corner (fig. 5.17). The installation at Rockefeller Center included a large model and
several drawings of the Davidson farm unit, but the markets were only represented in altered
form on the large-scale model. In The Living City (1958), Wright published the obviously
95 Davidson to Wright, May 17, 1932, 2. In 2018 dollars, Davidson’s projected daily turnover would be a
little more than $55,000.
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different designs side-by-side, without explanation of their obvious differences.96 When he
discussed the markets in The New Frontier, however, he verbally recalled the visual
extravagance of the Davidson design. They were “a perpetual fair where the citizen and his
wife come to buy and sell and see and learn.”97 Like the standardized service station, the
market transformed a decentralizing consumer culture into a permanent roadside spectacle.
If Wright never articulated a complete theory of “organic capitalism,” the market’s festivallike interior served as a proxy for the capitalist renewal he imagined: “The curse is taken off
commerce by its mutuality and here again—beauty.”98

5.4 Conclusion

The construction of the Broadacre City model might seem to mark the end of the
project’s conceptual development. Though Wright continually revisited the project during
the post-World War II years, the physicality of the model has seemed, to many scholars, to
have arrested the sometimes nebulous arguments of texts like The Disappearing City into fixed,
coherent, concrete form.99 In fact, the model, its exhibition, critics’ reception of it, and
Wright’s responses to those critiques collectively paved the way for the eventual
identification, in 1937, of “organic capitalism” as the project’s organizing socioeconomic
logic. The formulation of Broadacre City’s capitalist underpinnings in dialogue with
communist critics and conservative reactionaries did less to clarify unresolved issues in the

96 See Wright, Living City, 98–101. The four full-page illustrations are a photograph of the markets as built
on the model, a perspective drawing of the Davidson market, an elevation and section of the Davidson market,
and a plan of the Davidson scheme. All are simply identified as “roadside markets,” and their obvious formal
discrepancy are unacknowledged.
97 Wright, New Frontier, 17.
98 Ibid., 18.
99 See, for example, Alofsin, “Broadacre City,” 28–34; Ciucci, “The City in Agrarian Ideology,” 363–75;
Levine, Urbanism, 179; Sergeant, Usonian Houses, 123; Smith, Wright on Exhibit, 107.
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early project’s nebulous rhetorical constructions than it did to introduce a new set of
contradictions.
This was clear in the open letter to Mies van der Rohe in The New Frontier. Toward the
end, Wright included a brief remark on religion in Broadacre City. As he outlined the
project’s accommodation of different belief structures, translating his own Unitarianism into
a kind of bland pantheism, he insisted, “Of course there will be religion. Protestants,
Catholics, Darkies and the Synagogue will be with us.”100 The desire for ecumenism and the
undercurrent of racism in that statement was symptomatic of the myriad internal conflicts
of Broadacre City. Wright’s “organic capitalism” presumed to guarantee citizens of
Broadacre City the ability to determine their own economic fate, but it was also entangled
with the racist rhetoric of figures like Charles Coughlin and Charles Lindbergh. On
somewhat different terms, the relationships between Broadacre City’s visual and rhetorical
dimensions remained tenuous and unresolved. Wright’s texts and the Broadacre City model
never quite added up to a coherent whole. The culture of consumption that bound these
verbal and visual, progressive and reactionary threads together would take on yet another
dimension when, in 1945, Wright implored “white men [to] pioneer along a new frontier:
decentralization!”101

100
101

Wright, New Frontier, 17.
Wright, When Democracy Builds, 120.
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CONCLUSION: YESTERDAY’S CITIES OF TOMORROW
Rockefeller Center and Broadacre City exited the 1930s uneasily. It was not necessarily
that they had become so associated with the exigencies of the Depression years that, to
borrow Lewis Mumford’s 1962 characterization of Le Corbusier’s work, each immediately
became “yesterday’s city of tomorrow” once the American economy began its recovery.1
Neither was it necessarily that the two projects’ contrasting and seemingly incompatible
promises of density and dispersion had been usurped and then synthesized by General
Motors and industrial designer Norman Bel Geddes. Geddes’s immensely popular Futurama,
a “vast cross-section of America in 1960” at the 1939–40 New York World’s Fair, conveyed
visitors, via a meandering, eighteen-minute “sky-ride,” over a more complete rendition of
Broadacre City’s automotive landscape strewn with miniature Rockefeller Centers (fig. 6.1).2
(Wright had offered his services to General Motors, which declined them; after the fair
closed, sections of Futurama were installed at Rockefeller Center, in the same space
Broadacre City was debuted.)3 Rather, the issue was that each project continued to change
but struggled to adapt to altered conditions during and after the 1940s.

See Lewis Mumford, “Yesterday’s City of Tomorrow,” Architectural Record 133 (November 1962),
reprinted in The Urban Prospect, 116–27.
2 Norman Bel Geddes, Magic Motorways (New York: Random House, n.d. [ca. 1940]). See also Adnan
Morshed, Impossible Heights: Skyscrapers, Flight, and the Master Builder (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
2015), chap. 3. Futurama was far more popular than Henry Dreyfuss’s “Democracity,” another model of a
utopian city housed in the Harrison & Fouilhoux-designed Trylon and Perisphere.
3 In April 1938, Thomas Maloney, erstwhile manager of the 1935 Industrial Arts Exposition, wrote on
Wright’s behalf to General Motors and seven other major automobile manufacturers, including Ford, Chrysler,
and Studebaker, offering Wright’s services to design a corporate pavilion or, at least, to incorporate Broadacre
City into one already planned. None took him up on the offer. Neither did the governments of Belgium, Great
Britain, France, or the Soviet Union, which Maloney also solicited. See, among other correspondence, Paul W.
Garrett to Thomas J. Maloney, April 5, 1938, M073A06, FLWFA; Maloney to Wright, April 18, 1938,
M073A07, FLWFA. On Futurama at Rockefeller Center, see “Futurama Is Kept as Museum Piece,” New York
Times, December 16, 1940, 23. My thanks to Nathaniel R. Walker for bringing the Futurama-Rockefeller Center
connection to my attention.
1
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Almost as soon as The New Frontier was published, in October 1940, Frank Lloyd Wright
unmoored Broadacre City from the “concrete” metropolitan realities with which it had been
engaged. In November 1940, at the height of the Battle of Britain and one week before his
retrospective at the Museum of Modern Art opened, Wright informed a reporter for the
New York Times, “I would not say that the bombing of Europe is not a blessing, because at
least it will give the architects there a chance to start all over again. Concentration of
population is murder—whether in peace time or in war.”4 The model of Broadacre City, he
suggested, represented “the only bomb-proof city I know of.”
Over the next year, he continued to transform the project into a piece of self-serving
isolationist propaganda through a series of sixteen self-published pamphlets called the
Taliesin Square-Papers. The first six of these appeared between January and August 1941; they
were angry and self-aggrandizing.5 Wright celebrated himself as a “liberal individualist and
moderate democratic nationalist;” condemned Roosevelt as a closet imperialist and “selfappointed saviour of the world;” proposed that the United States be broken into a “tri-state
Federal Union”—composed of Usonia, Usonia South, and New England—in order to curb
the influence of Washington, D.C., and Manhattan over the remainder of the country (fig.
6.2); and admonished “America!” to “Wake up!”6 Throughout, he also predictably and
recurrently cited Broadacre City as “democratic,” exemplary of “true capitalism,” and a place
where “war would be impossible.”7 The second Square-Paper, which labeled the Roosevelt

4 Frank Lloyd Wright quoted in “‘Bomb-Proof City’ Shown as Model,” New York Times, November 11,
1940, 17.
5 The remaining ten appeared between 1944 and 1953.
6 Frank Lloyd Wright, “Of What Use Is a Great Navy with No Place to Hide?,” Taliesin Square-Paper 2
(May 1941): 1; “Good Afternoon, Editor Evjue,” Taliesin Square-Paper 3 (ca. June 1941): 1; “Usonia, Usonia
South and New England: A Declaration of Independence, 1941,” Taliesin Square-Paper 6 (August 1941): 4; “Of
What Use Is a Great Navy,” 3.
7 Frank Lloyd Wright, “To London,” Taliesin Square-Paper 1 (January 1941): 2.
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administration “an out-and-out pseudo-fascist empire” and bemoaned possible American
involvement in another “world-war on foreign shores,” led Lewis Mumford to publicly
castigate Wright’s “moral callousness” and to equate him with Charles Lindbergh as “a
spreader of active corruption.”8
In 1945, Wright published When Democracy Builds, a revised and expanded version of The
Disappearing City. The text, which was interspersed with model photographs, continued to
embellish Broadacre City’s culture of consumption, while also adapting Wright’s isolationist
paranoia to an inchoate postwar context. The roadside market, which Wright had
emphasized in The New Frontier as an architectural exemplar of his “organic capitalism,”
became a permanent “county fair” containing such a variety of goods that “one might turn
aside into charming grounds to pick up in the natural to-and-fro of everyday life all of
anything needed or desired at home.”9 The book’s conclusion revealed antipathies beneath
the veneer of this post-scarcity consumer economy. Wright parroted the language of
Lindbergh’s bigoted 1939 Reader’s Digest article to warn that the imminent industrialization of
Asia would lead to “war between Orient and Occident: East and West, yellow and white.”10
In order to avert a race war and achieve the technologically mediated ethnic-economic
renewal of Anglo-America that Broadacre City promised, he implored “white men [to]
pioneer again along a new frontier: decentralization!”11 Despite its resonance with the
emergent racial politics of “white flight,” the contours of Wright’s project had begun to
diverge from the metropolitan realities that it had originally presumed to manage. If the

8 Ibid., 3, 1; Mumford to Wright, May 30, 1941, in Wright & Mumford, 181–82, published as “Frank Lloyd
Wright’s Defeatism Aids Slave Empire—Mumford,” New Leader 24 (June 14, 1941): 8.
9 Wright, When Democracy Builds, 94.
10 Ibid., 120.
11 Ibid.
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model originally showed “concrete ideas of a new way of life,” as the architect would have
told radio listeners when it was debuted in 1935, the science-fiction renderings that
illustrated The Living City, the last Broadacre publication of 1958, belatedly revealed what the
project had become since 1940, a reactionary escapist fantasy (fig. 6.3).
Rockefeller Center, meanwhile, embraced the war effort. The plaza and promenade
hosted ceremonies, government-sponsored exhibitions, and impromptu rallies (fig. 6.4).
Though John D. Rockefeller, Jr., had argued at the “last rivet” ceremony, in November 1939,
that war was “destructive of prosperity and other values,” it was a boon for Rockefeller
Center.12 The rental office was overwhelmed with applications for space from tenants who
needed to expand and from others who wished to relocate, such that the Center began to
turn a profit in 1942. By 1944 it was ninety-nine percent leased with a four-hundred-namelong waiting list.13 The war also provided management with an excuse to exploit labor.
Rather than grant a request from waitstaff in the top-floor Rainbow Room for a modest
wage increase, they closed the restaurant in January 1943, disingenuously blaming an
“increasing shortage of manpower due to the demands of the armed forces.”14
A friend of John D. Rockefeller III’s wife heard of the Center’s purported wartime labor
shortage and proposed, in a January 1943 letter to Mrs. Rockefeller, that hiring black workers
to fill in for conscripted white ones “would be a small step in trying to overcome the
gathering race hatred.”15 In a patronizing response to Mrs. Rockefeller, management
dismissed the idea of “replacing white workers with colored workers” as untenable and

Rockefeller, “Address: We Believe…,” in The Last Rivet, 41.
See Okrent, Great Fortune, 408–15.
14 Rockefeller Center press statement quoted in “Rainbow Room and Grill to Close for Duration,” New
York Times, December 20, 1942, 41.
15 Nancy Dubois to Blanchette Rockefeller, January 23, 1943, folder 512, box 68, series C, OMR, RAC.
12
13
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fallacious, not least because they speculated that her friend was a socialist.16 Rockefeller
Center was supposed to cultivate “the manhood of [American] citizens,” as Rockefeller
professed in his “last rivet” speech, but his gendered ideal continued to be just as
circumscribed by race as Broadacre City’s “manlike freedom” was.
As soon as the war ended, construction at the Center resumed. The extensive waitlist
limited tenants’ ability to expand as the postwar economy began to boom. Standard Oil of
New Jersey (now operating as Esso) was the first to threaten to leave for lack of space. In
1944, Robert I. Carson and Earl H. Lundin, who had risen through the ranks of the
Associated Architects to take over as staff architects in 1939, began work on a new thirtythree-story tower on a Rockefeller-owned plot between 51st and 52nd Streets, directly north
of the private street. Upon completion in 1947, the Esso Building was the first fully airconditioned skyscraper in the city, a technical achievement that served, ironically, to
undermine the original complex’s initial success.17 Throughout the early 1950s, major tenants
like NBC and Time, Inc., cited the limitations on rentable space and the lack climate control
when they threatened to relocate across town or even to the suburbs.18
To ensure the Center wasn’t eclipsed by newer, more technologically up-to-date
construction like Skidmore, Owings & Merrill’s Lever House or Mies van der Rohe’s
Seagram Building, completed in 1952 and 1958, respectively, the original buildings were

16

RAC.

Arthur W. Packard to Blanchette Rockefeller, January 29, 1943, folder 512, box 68, series C, OMR,

See Krinsky, Rockefeller Center, 103–06.
See the correspondence and memoranda from 1948 to 1950 in folder 2086, box 207, series L, NAR,
RAC; Nelson A. Rockefeller, “Summary of Problems Facing Rockefeller Center, Inc., and Columbia University
and Suggested Methods of Dealing with Them,” June 15, 1950, folder 2236c, box 221, series L, NAR, RAC;
Nelson A. Rockefeller, “Rockefeller Center and Columbia University, N.B.C.—R.C.A., T.V., Avenue of the
Americas,” memorandum, October 29, 1951, folder 2135, box 212, series L, NAR, RAC; “New $70,000,000,
47-Story Time & Life Building to Be Erected in Rockefeller Center,” press release, November 29, 1956, folder
2219, box 219, series L, NAR, RAC, 4; Krinsky, Rockefeller Center, 106–15.
17
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retrofitted with air-conditioning systems and fluorescent lighting.19 In 1954, Wallace Harrison
and his new partner Max Abramovitz also provided some additional space when they
replaced the failing Center Theater on the west end of the southern block with offices.
Between 1958 and 1974, they also facilitated the Center’s migration across Sixth Avenue,
which was rechristened the Avenue of the Americas in anticipation of the extension. The
four buildings they built on the west side of the Avenue for Time & Life (1958–59), Exxon
(1963–71), McGraw-Hill (1963–73), and Celanese (1963–73) were promoted as “an exciting
integral extension of Rockefeller Center in design, concept and philosophy” (fig. 6.5).20 Their
vertically striated façades, sunken plazas, and underground connections made this technically
true, but Harrison had already indicated the degree to which their bland serialized designs
symbolized a betrayal of the original project’s vast metropolitan ambitions. At a November
1948 New York Times symposium on the future of Manhattan, he insisted that the city’s
prospects would be secured through pragmatic attention to “proper planning and proper
policing,” that the outer boroughs should be left to “develop as they will,” and that “we
should leave to the dreamers the pleasure of planning Broad Acres.”21

***

See, for example, “Dynamics in the Center,” Architectural Forum 114, no. 3 (March 1961): 132
Rockefeller Center press statement, August 5, 1971, quoted in Okrent, Great Fortune, 427. The Hilton
Hotel at the northwest corner of Sixth Avenue and 53rd Street was technically also part of this expansion, but
its distance from the Center has left it physically and conceptually disconnected. It was developed jointly by
Hilton, Rockefeller Center, Inc., and the Uris Buildings Corporation, with William Tabler as architect and
Harrison & Abramovitz as consultants. The Sinclair Oil Building (1950–52; Carson & Lundin, architects) and
the Sperry Rand Building (1962–63; Emery Roth & Sons, architects) were built on lots adjacent to the Center,
emulated its architectural language, and were connected to the underground concourse, but they were
developed independently. The Center purchased the Sinclair Oil Building in 1963.
21 Wallace K. Harrison, untitled address to a “New York Times Magazine symposium on New York City as it
will be 50 years from now,” November 22, 1948, folder 1, box 3, series II, Harrison Architectural Drawings
and Papers, 1, 2, 4.
19
20
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The discrepancies between Harrison’s realpolitik and Wright’s escapism would seem to
have erased any conceptual congruence that Rockefeller Center and Broadacre City had
shared during the 1930s. Indeed, most midcentury critics of the projects drove them even
further apart, while also drawing each away from its original premise. In 1935, the Broadacre
City model had shown Lewis Mumford a viable alternative to existing metropolitan patterns,
even if its exclusive focus on single-family homes limited its potential efficacy. By 1953, in a
New Yorker review of Wright’s “Sixty Years of Living Architecture” exhibition, the project
amounted to little more than a “countrywide suburban nightmare,” a prefiguration of the
“encapsulated life” of the automobile-dependent, mass-produced suburban sprawl that
Mumford would indict at length in The City in History (1961).22 At the same time, another and
ultimately more influential way of understanding Wright’s work denied any relationship
between it and Mumford’s suburbia to consider its emanation instead from “the mind of the
artistic genius,” as George R. Collins put it in 1961.23 In both instances, though on different
terms, Broadacre City became dislocated from the metropolitan realities within and against
which it had originally been produced.
Rockefeller Center remained better connected to those realities, but it experienced a
different kind of dislocation. For architect Peter Blake, writing in the June 1965 issue of
Architectural Forum, where he was also editor-in-chief, the “old Rockefeller Center” had
achieved a successful balance of compositional coherence and spatial variety, but “the new
Sixth Avenue is a chaotic agglomeration of piazzas, piazzettas, piazzettinas, arcades and

22 Lewis Mumford, “The Skyline: A Phoenix Too Infrequent—II,” New Yorker, December 12, 1953, 123.
Mumford would reiterate this critique of Broadacre City in “Megalopolis as Anti-City,” Architectural Record 132
(December 1962), reprinted in The Urban Prospect, 128–41. See also Mumford, The City in History: Its Origins, Its
Transformations, and Its Prospects (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961), chap. 16.
23 Collins, “Broadacre City,” in Four Great Makers of Modern Architecture, 74.
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‘courts’” surrounded by “a giant sample-case for a curtain-wall salesman.”24 Douglas Haskell
reiterated Blake’s assessment in the same journal six months later. The “scraggly
aggregation” west of Sixth Avenue, he asserted more succinctly, “should not even be
discussed as a part of ‘Rockefeller Center.’”25 The near-unanimous derision that greeted
Harrison & Abramovitz’s work helped to transform the original complex from a catalytic
fragment that might induce wide-spread metropolitan change to a self-contained urban
enclave isolated from its surroundings—in critics’ conceptualizations if not in physical fact.

There is, however, another way to understand the two projects’ relationships to the postWorld War II era and to one another. It requires renewed attention to the three terms around
which this dissertation has been structured—architecture, capitalism, and the American
metropolitan landscape. Rather than focus on the errant, project-specific postwar histories
of Broadacre City and Rockefeller Center, it uses the underlying logic that originally
organized those two projects and traces it through the midcentury reconfigurations of the
American economy and the country’s metropolitan landscapes.
An entry point into this alternate understanding can be found in architect José Luis Sert’s
contributions to The Heart of the City, the edited volume that resulted from the 1951 meeting
of the Congrès Internationaux d’Architecture Moderne (CIAM) in Hoddesdon, England. Sert, the
nephew of Rockefeller Center muralist José Maria Sert, drew from Siegfried Giedion’s earlier
treatment of Rockefeller Center as a premonition of a new type of modern “civic center” to
conceive of a revitalized metropolitan landscape organized around a “network or constellation of

Peter Blake, “Slaughter on Sixth Avenue,” Architectural Forum 122, no. 3 (June 1965): 17.
Douglas Haskell, “The Super Block as Core: Unity and Harmony at Rockefeller Center,” Architectural
Forum 124, no. 1 (January/February 1966): 46.
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community centres, classified from small to large, one main centre being the expression of the
city or metropolis as a whole, the heart of the city.”26 If the plaza at Rockefeller Center, which
illustrated Sert’s essay, exemplified a “main,” metropolitan community center, then the
pedestrian focus of the well-landscaped and architecturally unified “new shopping centres in
the U.S.A. represent a trend in the right direction” for outlying areas.27 In a more substantial
way than the facile synthesis of skyscrapers and suburbs envisioned in Geddes’s Futurama,
Sert offered an opportunity to locate the networked consumerist festival of Broadacre City
and the corporatist ambitions of Rockefeller Center as part of the same matrix of
metropolitan revitalization.
The fundamental irony and the necessary caveat of such an observation is that the
suburban shopping centers of the late 1950s did constitute a synthesis of the apparently
divergent aims of Broadacre City and Rockefeller Center, just not on terms that would have
been comprehensible to any of their architects or other participants. Take, for example, the
work of Victor Gruen Associates. The interior spectacle of Gruen’s Southdale Shopping
Center (1953–56), the first fully enclosed, air-conditioned shopping center in the country,
located in a Minneapolis suburb, recalled the glass-encased “perpetual fair” of Wright’s
roadside market (figs. 6.6 & 6.7; see figs. 5.15 & 5.16).28 But this and other Gruen projects,
José Luis Sert, “Centres of Community Life,” in The Heart of the City: Towards the Humanisation of Urban
Life, eds. Jacqueline Tyrwhitt et al. (New York: Pellegrini and Cudahy, 1952), 11 (italics in original); cf. Giedion,
Space, Time and Architecture, 569–80. Sert’s interest in the spontaneous “humanized” encounters of such
“community centers” marked a substantial shift away from CIAM’s earlier, more thoroughgoing focus on the
“four functions”—dwelling, work, recreation, and transportation—which Sert had previously detailed as sole
author of Can Our Cities Survive? An ABC of Urban Problems, Their Analysis, Their Solutions, Based on the Proposals
Formulated by the C.I.A.M. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942). See also Eric Mumford, The
CIAM Discourse on Urbanism, 1928–1960 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000), chap. 4; David Smiley,
Pedestrian Modern: Shopping and American Architecture, 1925–1956 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
2013), 232–34.
27 Ibid.
28 Wright visited the Southdale Shopping Center in November 1956. He disparaged its interior as “a
garden court that has all the evils of the village street and none of its charm.” Frank Lloyd Wright quoted in
Hardwick, Mall Maker, 151.
26
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like the Northland Shopping Center (1952–54) outside of Detroit, relied on consolidated,
large-scale development, for which Rockefeller Center served as an acknowledged
precedent.29 Which is to say, a suburban consumer culture, predicated on the automobile and
undergirded by the racial politics of white flight, did come into being during the 1940s and
1950s, but it bore little resemblance to Broadacre City. So too did large-scale corporate
development transform metropolitan America during the same years, but it was not confined
to the metropolitan center as Rockefeller Center’s architects and managers assumed without
question that it would be.
This was due in large part to a critical disjunction between both projects’ abilities to
interpret the socio-spatial changes affecting American cities and suburbs in the 1920s and
accompanying misunderstandings of the economic forces that drove those changes. Service
stations and roadside markets were indeed “agents of decentralization,” but they were not
embryonic forms of a small-scale, individuated “organic capitalism,” as Wright erroneously
anticipated. Corporate investment meanwhile became just as accommodating of dispersed
networks of production, distribution, and consumption as it was of freestanding towers in
the urban core. Both projects established the terms on which new metropolitan geographies
would begin to take shape after World War II, but they failed to anticipate the how mutations
in post-Depression corporate capitalism would map onto those changes.

See “New Thinking on Shopping Centers,” Architectural Forum 98, no. 3 (March 1953): 122–45;
“Northland: A New Yardstick for Shopping Center Planning,” Architectural Forum 100, no. 6 (June 1954): 102–
19. See also M. Jeffrey Hardwick, Mall Maker: Victor Gruen, Architect of an American Dream (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Smiley, Pedestrian Modern. In a fitting bit of circularity, when Rockefeller
Center’s concourse-level shops faltered during the 1970s, in part because of altered patterns of consumption
among middle-class Americans but also because the various additions to the complex over the decades had
turned the lower level into a confusing labyrinth, management took inspiration from the lighting and wayfinding systems of suburban shopping malls to rehabilitate the Center’s underground networks. See Krinsky,
Rockefeller Center, 149.
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FIGURES
Figure 0.1 Rockefeller Center, New York, NY, L.
Andrew Reinhard & Henry Hofmeister, Raymond
M. Hood & J. André Fouilhoux, Harvey Wiley
Corbett & Wallace K. Harrison, architects, 1929–40.
A view taken in mid-1932 from a glassed-in
observation platform on 5th Avenue showing
construction of the RCA Building with the RKO
Building in the background and a preliminary model
of the complex in the foreground. Photograph by
Wendell MacRae. From Samuel Chamberlain, ed.,
Rockefeller Center: A Photographic Narrative (1947).

Figure 0.2 Broadacre City, project, Frank Lloyd Wright, architect, 1929–40. A view of the model under
construction at La Hacienda Hotel in suburban Chandler, Arizona, in early 1935. Photograph by Roy E.
Peterson. The Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation Archives (The Museum of Modern Art | Avery Architectural &
Fine Arts Library, Columbia University, New York); hereafter FLWFA.
271

Figure 1.1 W. H. Winslow Residence, Frank Lloyd Wright, River Forest, IL, 1893–94. Ground floor and site
plan showing the formal terrace leading to the entrance and the gardens beyond the porte cochère. In the
interior, the formality of the front-facing, public portion of the plan begins to break down in the garden-facing
rooms behind. The enormous hearth at the center of the home anchors the pinwheel induced by these
deviations in plan. From Frank Lloyd Wright, Ausgeführte Bauten und Entwürfe von Frank Lloyd Wright (Berlin: E.
Wasmuth, 1910).
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Figure 1.2 Winslow House. View of the street façade, n.d. Photograph by Richard Nickel. Richard Nickel
Archive, 1850–2011 (bulk 1945–1972), Ryerson and Burnham Archives, Ryerson and Burnham Libraries, The
Art Institute of Chicago.

Figure 1.3 Winslow House. View of the garden façade, n.d. The deep overhanging eaves and the tile-clad
upper level, which contains the bedrooms, are continued from the public, street-facing façade. Otherwise, the
protruding semicircular dining room (center), the recessed porch (at left), the living room’s bay window (out of
view behind the tree at left), and the octagonal stair tower (partially visible behind the tree at right) develop a
more picturesque approach to the private familial realm. Photograph by Aaron Siskind. Richard Nickel
Archive, Art Institute of Chicago.
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Figure 1.4 Oak Park, IL, looking west from the rooftop of Oak Park High School at Lake Street and North
East Avenue, 1903. White-painted, developer-built houses populate the foreground, with vegetable gardens in
the rear of each. Rail and streetcar tracks run through the median of North Boulevard (now South Boulevard)
in the middle ground. Emitting smoke at right is the physical plant of the Cicero Water, Gas & Electric Light
Company. Philander Barclay Photograph Collection, The Historical Society of Oak Park and River Forest.

Figure 1.5 Oak Park, looking west on Chicago Avenue from Forest Avenue, 1914. Wright’s house and studio
are out of frame to the left. Horse-drawn carriages, streetcars, and automobiles are all visible on the unpaved
roadway. Barely visible through the trees in the background are commercial storefronts near the intersection of
Chicago and Harlem Avenues. Barclay Collection, Historical Society of Oak Park and River Forest.
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Figure 1.6 Pennsylvania Avenue and Stanley Avenue, Brooklyn, NY, looking north, August 4, 1934.
Photograph by P. L. Sperr. Irma and Paul Milstein Division of United States History, Local History and
Genealogy, The New York Public Library.

Figure 1.7 New Jersey Avenue and Wortman Avenue, Brooklyn, NY, looking south, August 4, 1934. This
photograph was taken less than a quarter mile southeast of figure 1.4. Photograph by P. L. Sperr. Milstein
Division of United States History, New York Public Library.
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Figure 1.8 Detail of the “quadruple block plan” from Frank Lloyd Wright, “A Home in a Prairie Town,”
Ladies’ Home Journal 18, no. 3 (February 1901).

Figure 1.9 Non-competitive entry to the 1913 City Club of Chicago competition, Frank Lloyd Wright, 1912–
13. Site plan of the quarter section. From Alfred B. Yeomans, ed., City Residential Land Development (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1916).
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Figure 1.10 City Club project. Aerial perspective of the quarter section. Cottages and multiunit housing for the
working class define the lower edge of the site, while civic and commercial buildings, the latter with apartments
in the upper level, define the upper boundary. These offer “protection from dust and noise” for the “better
class” single-family homes that populate the site’s interior. A public park cuts through the plan and contains
schools, cultural institutions, and recreational facilities. From Yeomans, City Residential Land Development.

Figure 1.11 Lower Broadway, New York, NY, looking east, ca. 1895. The Standard Oil Building (Ebenezer L.
Robert, 1884–86), with its projecting balconies and taller central bay, occupies the center of the image. To the
right is the Welles Building (W. Pell Anderson, architect, 1881–83). Additional tall buildings can be seen further
up Broadway, but most of the structures are still three- to four-stories tall. Milstein Division of United States
History, New York Public Library.
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Figure 1.12 The Standard Oil Building, addition by
Francis H. Kimball & George K. Thompson,
1896–98, photographed ca. 1915. The steel-frame
structure comprises the leftmost structural bay
(capped by the cubical lantern) and the six floors
that rise above the original cornice line. The grid of
windows in the background at right gives a sense
of the new building’s enormous U-shaped mass.
Aside from Standard Oil’s expansion, the changing
scale of lower Manhattan is evident in the sixteenstory Hudson Building (Clinton & Russell, 1898),
immediately north of Standard Oil, its neighbor the
ornate Empire Trust Building (Henry Ives Cobb,
1902–03), and—visible through the gap between
buildings at left—the Knickerbocker Trust
Building (McKim, Mead & White, 1907–09) and
the pyramid of the Bankers Trust Building
(Trowbridge & Livingston, 1910–12). Photograph
by Irving Underhill. Prints and Photographs
Division, United States Library of Congress.

Figure 1.13 Illustrations showing the four stages of
carving a skyscraper from the zoning envelope.
Hugh Ferriss, delineator. From Harvey Wiley
Corbett, “Zoning and the Envelope of the
Building,” Pencil Points 2, no. 4 (April 1923).
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Figure 1.14 The new Standard
Oil Building, Carrère &
Hastings, with Shreve, Lamb
& Blake, 1920–26. Looking
north from the Bowling
Green. From the exterior, the
earlier Standard Oil Buildings
were seamlessly absorbed into
the new Renaissance-style
visual language. The lighter
colored building directly across
Broadway is Benjamin Wistar
Morris’s Cunard Building (with
Carrère & Hastings, 1917–21).
Photograph by Brown
Brothers. Milstein Division of
United States History, New
York Public Library.

Figure 1.15 Standard Oil Building. Plans of the thirteenth and sixteenth floors. While the existing structure was
absorbed into the uniform visual language of the façade, the floor plans maintain clear traces of the building’s
ad hoc growth. Especially in the thirteenth-floor plan (left), the original building (occupying the three structural
bays left of center), the 1890s addition (far left), and the new building (right) appear to be only barely sutured
together. From American Architect and Architectural Review 122, no. 2403 (September 27, 1922).
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Figure 1.16 Map of Manhattan below 59th Street, showing building heights. Structures taller than 40 stories are
in black, 31–40 stories in red, 21–30 in green, and 11–20 in orange. From Thomas Adams et al., Regional Survey
of New York and Its Environs, vol. 6: Buildings: Their Uses and the Spaces about Them (New York: Regional Plan of
New York and Its Environs, 1931).

Figure 1.17 42nd Street at Vanderbilt Avenue, looking west, 1928. The tower in the distance is the Bush
Terminal Sales Building by Frank J. Helmle & Harvey Wiley Corbett (1915–18). Amidst the crush of
automobiles, streetcars, and pedestrians, note the lone horse-drawn wagon in the immediate foreground.
Photograph by Ewing Galloway. Milstein Division of United States History, New York Public Library.
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Figure 1.18 “Triple-decked streets” proposal, Harvey Wiley Corbett, 1924. From Thomas Adams et al., Regional
Plan of New York and Its Environs, vol. 2: The Building of the City (New York: Regional Plan of New York and Its
Environs, 1931).
Figure 1.19 Perspective
rendering of Corbett’s tripledecked street proposal. While the
sections in fig. 1.18 show only
the transformations above grade,
the perspective includes Corbett’s
proposal to suppress crosstown
traffic below the avenues. From
Adams et al., Regional Plan, vol. 2,
(1931).
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Figure 1.20 “Skyscraper Regulation,” Frank Lloyd Wright, project, ca. 1926. This elevation shows Wright’s
adaptation of setback skyscrapers and elevated pedestrian walkways from contemporary proposals like Harvey
Wiley Corbett’s. Drawing no. 2603.001, FLWFA.

Figure 1.21 Illustrations from a 1927 article in American Builder detailing the organization of an ideal super
service station. The gasoline pumps and attendant’s office occupy a freestanding kiosk near the intersection of
two streets. Additional services are located in a peripheral L-shaped structure. The open court framed by the
buildings facilitates easy vehicular movement through the site. From J. Harold Hawkins, “The Service Station
Backs Up the Name ‘Super-Service,’” American Builder 42, no. 5 (February 1, 1927).
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Figure 1.22 A photograph of the El Dorado Market at Almont Drive and Wilshire Boulevard in Beverly Hills,
Los Angeles, February 25, 1931. The market occupies the L-shaped structure and contains produce stalls, a
butcher, a bakery, a delicatessen, an ice cream shop, and a real estate office. The site planning streamlined
traffic flow and parking, typical of by-then-established drive-in conventions. A filling station occupies the
prominent corner kiosk and is adorned, like the market itself, in Spanish Revival motifs. Photographer
unknown. Security Pacific National Bank Collection, Los Angeles Public Library.

Figure 1.23 Hollywood Boulevard, looking east from Caheunga Boulevard, 1928. The Security Trust & Savings
Bank Building at left, built by John and Donald B. Parkinson, architects (1920–22), inaugurated Hollywood
Boulevard’s so-called “skyscraper mile.” Wright’s Hollyhock House (1919–21) is located two miles away, at the
eastern end of the boulevard’s retail district. Photographer unknown. Security Pacific National Bank Collection,
Los Angeles Public Library.
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Figure 1.24 View of a residential
neighborhood in Hollywood,
looking southwest, ca. 1924.
Wright’s Hollyhock House
surmounts Olive Hill behind the
camera. The site’s eponymous
orchard occupies the foreground.
A filling station sits at the base of
the hill, at the southeast corner of
Sunset and Edgemont. Another
filling station occupied the site’s
opposite corner, at the much
busier, and more commercialized,
intersection of Hollywood
Boulevard, Prospect Avenue, and
North Vermont Avenue.
Photograph by Thompson &
Watson. Security Pacific National
Bank Collection, Los Angeles
Public Library.
Figure 1.25 Cover of a 1929 map of New England
produced by the Standard Oil Company of New York
(Socony). The illustration depicts two automobiles
driving among recognizable landmarks of the region. A
simple pony truss bridge leads into the scene, where a
cottage is nestled into the forested hillside, along with
farmsteads and a whitewashed, wood-frame church. A
Socony service station is situated comfortably in the
middle ground at the foot of the bridge. Neither it nor
the two automobiles seem out of place: the bright red
car in the foreground and the red fuel pumps of the
station are joined chromatically to the red barn and silo
atop the hill. The same red color equates the words
“Soconyland” with “New England.” Ephemera
Collection, Historic New England.
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Figure 1.26 Standardized service station, Frank Lloyd Wright, Buffalo, NY, project, 1927. Plan. Wright
developed different variations of this basic scheme during the fall and winter of 1927–28. The differently
angled wings for concessions at the top of the drawing are the result of adjustments based on lot restrictions
for a site in suburban Buffalo. Drawing no. 3602.009, FLWFA.

Figure 1.27 Standardized service station. Perspective. This view shows the cubic enclosure of the selling and
waiting areas at center. The lower portion is of site-cast concrete; the upper portion, with a waiting room and
restrooms for motorists, is fully glazed. Note the fuel hoses hanging from the underside of the copper canopy
and the Tydol Company name suspended between the two “totems.” Drawing no. 3602.007, FLWFA.
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Figures 1.28a (top) & 1.28b Village Type Roadside Service Station, Frank Lloyd Wright, 1930. These two
views show a revised version of the scheme from figs. 3.17 & 3.18. This variation consists of a larger central
block, a longer cantilever, and a filigree screen joining the two “totems” back to a third mast rising from the
concrete fuel tank housing. The top image shows the station as a freestanding kiosk, while the bottom one has
a courtyard structure hung from the backside of the model, showing one way in which the design could be
adapted into a super service station. The text panel partially visible on the lower edge of the top image says,
“Overhead delivery cantilever construction in concrete, copper and glass – three units standardized + unit one:
restroom – toilets – storage – display – attendant’s quarters + unit two: kitchen – restaurant shop – roadside
service + unit three: garage court and greasing station + first general type + minor variations to suit materials +
design and mechanical patent applied for +” Photo ID 5698, Wisconsin Bureau of Audio Visual Instruction,
Frank Lloyd Wright Projects and Photographs, Wisconsin Historical Society.
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Figures 1.29 Bryant Park and West
40th Street, New York, NY, looking
southeast, May 10, 1930. Unlike most
of the other tall buildings along the
southern edge of Bryant Park,
Raymond M. Hood & John Mead
Howells’ American Radiator Building
(1923–24) is held back from its
property lines to form a freestanding
tower. One of Hood’s other frequent
collaborators, the French-born
engineer J. André Fouilhoux, built a
five-story addition west of the original
tower in the 1930s. Photograph by P.
L. Sperr. Milstein Division of United
States History, New York Public
Library.

Figures 1.30 American
Radiator Building,
ground/mezzanine
level plan (left) and
typical plan of the fifth
to eleventh floors.
From Raymond M.
Hood, “The American
Radiator Company
Building, New York,”
American Architect and
Architectural Review 126,
no. 2459 (November
19, 1924).
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Figures 1.31 Models of Hood & Howells’
Radiator Building, showing progress from
a preliminary study of the allowable
massing as determined by the zoning
envelope (left) to a later, detailed analysis
of the tower’s ornate upper levels. From
Raymond M. Hood, “The American
Radiator Company Building, New York,”
American Architect and Architectural Review
126, no. 2459 (November 19, 1924).

Figure 1.32 A rendering of Hood’s “city
of towers” by Hugh Ferriss. A version of
this drawing was first published in Hood’s
April 1926 Liberty magazine article “New
York’s Skyline Will Climb Much Higher.”
It subsequently appeared in Henry H.
Curran’s December 5, 1926, New York
Times piece “Against the Skyscraper.” An
earlier, less dramatically lighted version
accompanied a December 28, 1924, New
York Times article that first presented
Hood’s proposal. This is from Hugh
Ferriss, The Metropolis of Tomorrow (New
York: Ives Washington, 1929).
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Figure 1.33 A model of Raymond Hood’s “city of towers,” ca. 1927. While the rendering by Ferriss in fig. 1.32
depicts wholesale transformation, Hood shows a process of gradual change. Photograph by Walter H. Kilham,
Jr. Raymond Mathewson Hood Collection, Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania.
Figure 1.34 This is one in a series of four
drawings by Hood, showing a single urban
block converted by from numerous lowrise buildings into three large, freestanding
towers. The caption reads, “Three
progressive owners have finished a block.
Neither the tenants in the block nor the
city should complain, and there is more
rentable floor area than in the blocks
adjoining surrounded by their narrow
congested streets.” Raymond Mathewson
Hood Collection, Architectural Archives,
University of Pennsylvania.
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Figure 1.35 A drawing inspired by Auguste
Perret’s description of his L’Avenue des Maison-tours
(ca. 1920–22). Jacques Lambert, artist. The caption
reads, “An extraordinary project for solving the
housing question in the Paris region. Composed by
Jacques Lambert, after sketches by the architect
Auguste Perret.” From Jean Labadié, “Les
cathedrals de la cité moderne,” L’Illustration 160,
no.4145 (August 12, 1922).

Figure 1.36 Project for a “city under a single roof,”
Raymond Hood, ca. 1929. Like the later versions
of Hood’s “city of towers,” representations of the
“city under a single roof” showed it emerging from
the existing urban fabric, rather than replacing it
wholesale. Unlike the “city of towers,” this project
combined commercial with residential facilities, as
its name suggests. Aside from stairwells and
elevators, the entire structure is raised above the
ground plane, allowing traffic to flow freely
underneath. From Raymond M. Hood, “A City
Under a Single Roof,” Nation’s Business 17, no. 12
(November 1929).
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Figure 2.1 John D. Rockefeller, Jr., driving the “last rivet” at Rockefeller Center, November 1, 1939.
Photography Collection, Museum of the City of New York.

Figure 2.2 Sixth Avenue and 48th Street, New York, NY, looking northeast, ca. 1931. This was the southern
block of the Columbia University leasehold, as seen over the Sixth Avenue El. Photograph by William J. Roege.
Photography Collection, Museum of the City of New York.
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Figure 2.3 Metropolitan Opera House
proposal, Benjamin Wistar Morris. Morris
presented this model at the Metropolitan
Club in May 1928. He planned to design
only the opera house and facing plaza.
Others would build the three revenueproducing towers, although he proposed
that monumental arcades be cut through
their ground floors. Large portions of the
north and south blocks and the entire
Sixth Avenue frontage were left untreated
in Morris’s plan. Winston Weisman
Collection of Architectural Photographs,
Department of Prints, Photographs, and
Architectural Collections, The New-York
Historical Society.

Figure 2.4 Metropolitan Opera House
proposal, L. Andrew Reinhard & Henry
Hofmeister, September 1928. Unlike
Morris’s earlier proposal, Reinhard &
Hofmeister, working for developers
Todd, Robertson & Todd, used this
diagram to propose building out the
entire Columbia leasehold. Office of the
Messrs. Rockefeller Records, Rockefeller
Archive Center.
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Figure 2.5 Metropolitan Opera House “symposium,” Benjamin Wistar Morris, May 1929. Perspective
rendering of scheme B. This version of Morris’s updated proposal included properties uncontrolled by
Columbia on Fifth and Sixth Avenues, which permitted a more rigorously symmetrical composition. The
passage between the two Fifth Avenue towers was for vehicles rather than pedestrians. Winston Weisman
Collection, New-York Historical Society.

Figure 2.6 Metropolitan Opera House “symposium” scheme, Corbett, Harrison & MacMurray, May 1929.
Perspective rendering. From Thomas Adams et al., Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs, vol. 2: The Building
of the City (New York: Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs, 1931).
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Figure 2.7 Metropolitan Opera House proposal, Benjamin Morris, October 1929. Morris’s work following the
1929 “symposium” amounted to a synthesis of his own schemes with Corbett’s proposal. This drawing shows
one such example. The Metropolitan Square board liked the access Corbett’s plaza provided from Fifth Avenue
but were concerned by the loss of retail frontage it would have entailed. Here, in a sketch looking toward Fifth
Avenue from the plaza, Morris showed two buildings framing a pedestrian promenade. Benjamin W. Morris
Architectural Drawings, Department of Drawings & Archives, Avery Architectural & Fine Arts Library,
Columbia University.
Figure 2.8 Rockefeller Center, scheme G-3,
attributed to Reinhard & Hofmeister, January
1930. This scheme was made after the Opera’s
departure but prior to RCA’s involvement. The
plan’s syncopation of mid-rise department stores
and loft buildings and slab-like towers would
ultimately be used to organize the final project,
but not before the architects exhausted every
other possibility and not without substantial
modifications. Winston Weisman Collection,
New-York Historical Society.
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Figure 2.9 An advertisement for the Radio
Corporation of America’s Radiola Regenoflex.
From Scientific American 131, no. 4 (October 1924).

Figure 2.10 The scene outside of the Standard Oil Building on May 1, 1914. The demonstrators were
participating in an Industrial Workers of the World May Day parade, but their presence at 26 Broadway was
due to outrage over the Ludlow Massacre. Photographer unknown. Otto Bettmann Archive, Getty Images.
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Figure 2.11 Plans of the Associated Architects’ office on the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth floors of the
Graybar Building. Drafting room no. 1 (see fig. 2.12a) is on the left, adjacent to the principals’ private offices;
drafting room no. 2 (see fig. 2.12b) occupies most of the plan on the right. A spiral staircase connects the two
levels. From Wallace K. Harrison, “Drafting Room Practice,” Architectural Forum 56, no. 1 (January 1932).

Figures 2.12a & 2.12b Views of the Associated Architects’ drafting rooms no. 1 (a) and no. 2 (b). From
Harrison, “Drafting Room Practice” (1932).
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Figure 2.13 Spread from Raymond M. Hood, “The Design of Rockefeller City,” Architectural Forum 56, no. 1
(January 1932).

Figure 2.14 Spread from Hood, “The Design of Rockefeller City” (1932).
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Figure 2.15 Photograph of the model
debuted by the Associated Architects on
March 5, 1931. From L. Andrew Reinhard,
“What Is the Rockefeller Radio City?”
Architectural Record 69, no. 4 (April 1931).

Figure 2.16 A photograph of excavation and construction work at Rockefeller Center, February 16, 1932.
Photograph by Wurts Brothers. Milstein Division of United States History, New York Public Library.
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Figure 2.17 A view of the plaza, the Channel
Gardens, the British Empire Building (left), and
La Maison Française, looking east from the RCA
Building toward the Saks Fifth Avenue
department store, ca. 1934. Photograph
Collection, Museum of the City of New York.

Figure 2.18 Roof plan of Rockefeller Center,
early 1932. From Merle Crowell, “A Question
Answered,” Architectural Forum 56, no. 5 (May
1932).
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Figure 2.19 Aerial
perspective of Rockefeller
Center’s planned roof
gardens, early 1932. The
caption below this
drawing in the May 1932
issue of Architectural Forum
identified it as “a garden
city aloft.” From Crowell,
“A Question Answered”
(1932).

Figure 2.20 Typical floor plan of the RCA Building. From Hood, “The Design of Rockefeller City” (1932).
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Figure 2.21a & 2.21b The Daily News Building, Raymond M. Hood & John M. Howells, New York, 1928–32.
Views of the exterior looking east along 42nd Street (a) and of the rotunda in the lobby (b). Photograph by
Nyholm & Lincoln. From Arthur Tappan North, Raymond M. Hood (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1931).
Figure 2.22 Rockefeller Center, ca. October
1932, looking southwest from 5th Avenue near
51st Street. The RKO Building is in the
background at right. The blind wall in front of it
is the stage end of Radio City Music Hall. At
center is the nearly completed RCA Building.
The site being cleared in the foreground, still
occupied by several existing structures, is for the
International Building. Photograph by Brown
Brothers. Milstein Division of United States
History, New York Public Library.
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Figure 3.1 A perspective of Le Corbusier’s “City of Towers,” ca. 1923. From Le Corbusier, Towards a New
Architecture (New York: Payson & Clarke, 1924).

Figure 3.2 An installation photograph of Wright’s 1930–31 touring exhibit, shown here in the Layton Art
Gallery, Milwaukee, WI, ca. November 1930. In the immediate foreground is the model of a standardized
service station (cf. figs. 1.28a & 1.28b). Behind it is the St. Mark’s Tower. The drawing on the floor next to the
model is the same one that would accompany Wright’s March 1932 New York Times article.
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Figure 3.3 St. Mark’s-in-theBouwerie Towers, Frank Lloyd
Wright, NY, 1927–1931, project. The
perspective, identified as an
“aeroplane view,” reveals how the
rotated geometries of the tower plans
relate to Stuyvesant Street’s diagonal
intersection with the otherwise
regularly gridded Lowe East Side.
From “The Glass House for America:
St. Mark’s Towers,” Architectural Record
67 (January 1930).

Figure 3.4 St. Mark’s Tower. This
composite drawing shows typical
plans of the primary living level
(bottom right) and the mezzanine
level (bottom left); a section; and a
cutaway perspective that indicates
both the cladding system and the
double-height interior living space.
Drawing 2905.011, FLWFA.
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" BROADACRE CITY": AN ARCHITECT'S VISION: Spread Wide and Integrated, ...
By FRANK LLOYD WRIGHT
New York Times (1923-Current file); Mar 20, 1932;
ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009)
pg. SM8

"BROADACRE CITY": AN ARCHITECT'S VISION
Recently in TM New York Ttme.o

Spread Wide and Integrated, It Will Solve the Traffic
Problem and Make Life Richer, Says Frank Lloyd Wright

Magazine the noted French architect Le Corbi&.mer described the
Green City which he h<ut conceived
'"" the solution of the modern urban
problem-a »ubstitute for the crowdt>d centre. In the article that fol- ery machines; a bal! mt!Uon buses,
l01o8 Frnnk Lloyd Wright, a pi<>- displacing street-car tl"acks and un-

The motor car has just begun on
the city. Why deek or double-deck
neer Am.ericatt architect"' among
modern,.o, present., aft.Dther and di.a- wholesome subways; hundreds of or triple-deck the city streets at a
metrically oppotutd program
the thousands of taxicabs, meantime. cost of billions of dollars, only to
Broadacre City, which he see.o a3 With room enough for each and for fnvite increase aDd meet inevitable
the logical urban de,,elopment of Incidental transients to function at defeat? Why not allow the citizenthe m.achlne age.
all, the mass would fill the busy l!hip to keep the billions that deck·
city channels above the tenth story. fng would cost to buy more motor
B
FRA.NK LLOYD WRIGHT
Allowing for the crlss-cross on the cars aDd get more out of.' Uving In
y
tl
gridiron. It would double and pile a. more natural aDd fruitful llfe, as
ET us approach the traf c : up over the skyscrapers themselves. freedom dawns on the citizen? The
problem not as a tinker or Call this rur:a.ggeration and cut it in utility of the city as a fortn of cenmechanic. nor child- ' two-then cut that in two again, to tralization vanishes by way of the
tshly try to tear the cl:!' ' be rash. Tbere will be enough left machine that built it.
down to get the g:reen . country
at the rate ot Increase "success"
Democracy means just that freeand set the city up In •t again on wiU bring to bury Manhattan out dom for the citizen-if the machine
its old site-feudal towers a little ot sight 'with Its own cars and iB working tor the citizen. Monfurther apart.
Vested interests. tranait'nta.
archy was the ideal of centrali%aonce Invested. cannot be divested
except by agreement. And they will
not agree.
With an architect's vision. let us
...,,. tbe natural law of' organic
r;rowth at work as change: seeking
the sequence to provide for consequences
Enough blind-alley non·
o;ense has been talked about conby skyscraperttea-words
ubscurinj! the simple Issue. or wbat

__

I

L

pra.eUral

ltes'

ust:

is

ex!>"dieot

D

EMOCRACY. as the systematized integration of small Individual units, Is a practical
and rational Ideal of freedom: machine in band. Integration over the
whole surface of the nation Is Ideal
and Is no less practical.
The Broadacre City is not merely
the only democratic city. It Is the
only possible city, looking toward
the future. Exaggerated vertical
lanes of transport Impinging upon
congested, narrow horizontal lanes;
tall channels, ruinous to privacy,
to let light and atr Into offices or
habitations; the shelf and the
pigeon hole-all these are landlord
expedients that It Is high time to
have done with. There Is no. life
In them. There Is
rent.
As for securing privacy by hermetically sealed and blinded build·
lngs, hot air circulating between
two glass surfac:es opaque or trans. parent-that expedient means heat·
lng the Inside and the outside impartially. 50-:10, with no gratitude
from
outside. .And 1,000 people
to the hectarl! (2.47 acres) Is lookIng not so far ahead. It Is 980 too
many.
It has been discovered that severe
standardization iB no bar at all to
even greater freedom in self-expression than was ever known before, Al·
ways providing we mean by selfexpression genuine lndividuality·and
not personal Idiosyncrasy.
These two discoveries are the
Magna Carta of the new liberty
Into which the cltl2:en may now go
by way of machinery, and go In
bls own machine: to join the buildIng of the Broadacre City of the
twentieth century that, all unknown
to him, has already begun to be
built where he belongs.
The present-day city, in the llght
of our new opportunltlea, has become a stricture In distribution and
transport; a handicap. In production; an Imposition upon Jamlly life.

this

Imagery?

Super-

making for rent. to enable

'iUj)<!r-landlords to have and to bold
1he
in super-concent.t'CU.ion to

make super-millions of

'<Upernuo"" millions? For organic
reasons the traffic problem is In·
..aluble for the future on any basts
satisfactor-y to human life within

any busy city
True. the herd-instinct grows with
the swarm In the erstwhile vlllage
lrtreets. But the swarm Is tsklng
to
or to wheels. which iB
much the same because Increased
faciliti..,. of lateral movement are
almost equivalent to
·a fond
human dream about to be realized.

1

I
i

By means of

motor car and
lDVention.- that are here with r
st. the horizon of tht- individual has I

lmmea.surablv widened.
A ride
high Into th-e air in any elevator

I
1

today only shows the man how far j

h .. can go on the ground.

And:

• "iew of t hi£1' horizon gives hltn the ·

desire to go. If he ha.s the means.
ht> goes. and biB horizon widens a.s
This physical releast' iB at
work upon his character
ffi,; selfish interests might easily
multiply and pile him up senselessly.

in tiers of cells. ad tnfinitutrl.

f'ven after he got his release. These
interests may still turn the
trick HP is still dazed by his new
freedom. But. like a bird hom ln
<·!Lptivity. to whom the door of biB
cage has ooen opened. some time,
:<oon. he will learn that he can tly.
And when he leal'ru! that he Is free.
h.. Is gone
Alter all he himself ;., the city.
The city iB going where he goes and
as he goes. When he goes be will
be gone where he may enjoy all
that tbe centralized city ever really
gave him. plus tht' security. freedom and beauty o! the ground that
Is his That means he iB going to
eountry with biB machine by
means of the machine, in larger
seru<e. that is opE'ning the way Cor
h1m.

• • •

of universal or ubiquitous moblllzaUon that the city spreads out tar
away and thin. It is In the nature
of tlytng that the. city disappears.
It is In the nature of universal electrification that the city Is nowhere
or it is everywhere.
Centralization by way of the city
has had a big day and a long day.
It Is not dead yet. But it is no longer a necessity or a luxury. Mobilization of the human animal, volatilization or human thought, voice and!
vision make tbe city as troublesome
an Interference to Ute as "static"
Is troublesome to radio.
Once more humanity has over·
come a physical disability with a
mechanical appliance. The man
may already get more out of biB
new release by way ot Increased
facility for lateral movement than
ever came to him before In the history of biB race. Imagine then,
what Is coming to him In the next
twenty-five years.

tfon-the unit compelled to revolve
around about a common centre.
Democracy is the Ideal of Integration-many units free in themselves
functioning together Jn freedom.
Monarchy has fallen. Our capltallst:lc system, if it perststs as a form
of centralization, stands to fall.
Electrified :mechanical forees that
are bulldfng our modern world now
are, by nature, turning upon centralization to destroy it. That means
that the city Is destroying itself.
Centralization, whether expressed
as the city, the factory, the school
or the farm, now has the enormous
power of the machine-age setting
dead against it. It is in the nature

T

i

I

HE cit)' is yet ouly about one- j
tenth the motor car city It wlll
be If machine-made promises
to the man are kept. Any dutiful
devotion to the machine on ma.a•s
part today should mean a motor
car -eomparative fUght. The citizen
and biB Increase either have a car
or dream of having one, envying
the neighbor the one or two o:r j
t.hr<!e which he already bas.
lr congestion iB crucifixion now·)
what wtn cangestion be within a
few years when It Is multiplied by
"success" as many tim"" "-" Is in<'vitable7
1
Roughly e&J.,.-ulate the mus at !'
maeh1nes that machine-age "success•· must mean to 6,000,000 people. Han. than several million ori- 1
•·ate cars. Perbaps a quarter of a I
willion lrut'ks and as many dellv- l

T

I
Drown by Fnutlc Lloyd Wright.

The Future--A Design for an Apartment Building in the "Braadac:re City."

HE pr.,.,ent form of the automobile Is crude and Imitative
compared to the varied forms
It wUI soon take. The tlylng machine is only in a more or less experimental form, unwieldy In scale
and a hostage to the elements. Tetetransmissions of sight and sound
are not only experimental; they are
In their Infancy, as Is the lntellito which their operation iB
entrusted.
We are proud of the great net·
work of highways-the road ay&tems of the country we are just
beginning to build . .And yet It requires but little Imagination to see
In all the power of these new resources, machines and materials,
new release of human activity with·
In reach of every one-the basis not
only of adventure and romance
with nature·, but of a saler, saner,
1.,. anxious life for a free people: a
longer, happier llfe wherein the man
Is sure of a living for himself and
his own; sure also of some healthful association with beauty. Not
only Is the city Itself a stricture, a
handl.ca.p fn production, but the oon•
tributing ratlroad iB too limited In
movement. too e>!:J)enslvety cltttnsy
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and too slow In operation. The end
of the day of. the back-and-forth
haul, long or short, demanded by
centralization, Is In sight; the end,
too, of mass transport by Iron rail.
No great flight of Imagination Is
needed to see the coming highways
as great architecture, the telephone
and telegraph poles down. Poles
and wires are already useless.
Signboards down, too, as gratuitous
Insults to Intelligence. Fine ·bridges
and noble viaducts may be great
architecture In great landscape,
landscaping healing the cuts and
fills of the construction of the roadbeds.

of

concentration

section be desires dale.

power of a

new

life-we call It the
machine for lack
of a more comprehensive

term.

Suppose the mo·
tor bus Is as comfortable and Inviting to us as the
Pullman never
IGHWAY travel Is growing was and together
more and more Interesting be- with t h e lowcause, becoming as safe as the g r a v I t y trucktrain, and swifter, It is more desir- train It takes to
able because it is more spontaneous. the right of way
Mobile, human transport Is getting of the railroads;
down within reach of every one at the average highlast: no waste time or waste mo- way has four traffic lanes, the main
tion to pay for.
Produce Is fresh every hour be- arteries six or
cause distribution is taking place more.
where producer and consumer hapThese safe,
pen to stand or choose to live. No broad traffic
filght of immature Imagination Is lanes-noble engineeded to see these great highways neering In themwith their tributaries and ramifi- selves are
cations hooked up at Intervals with t h r o n g e d with
safe systems of noiseless, compact life, moving not
air transport; to see the network of humdrum
In
nne roads passing public-service standardized mastations that live up to all the name chines as we
Implies, passing roadside markets, know them, but
integrated with groups of three, In many forms
five and ten acre Intensive fann suited to many
units; diversified manufacturing needs and lndlunits not far away; great automo- v i d u a I s. Swift
bile objectives as amusement re- singles, doubles:
sorts built on and with the natural safe quads and
features
of environment;
fine dignified sextets;
homes In parks and gardens that safety and gayety
are small farms, too, all winding now In the swiftup the beautiful natural features of moving
neet.
our great landscapes Into the spa- G r a d e crossings
cious broadacre cities of the near eliminated.
future: the greatest work of man Charm returning
for the liberation of mankind that to the road.
has ever been reallzed.
Self - contained
Human environment on this soil mechanical units,
of ours dedicated to human free- as varied and well
dom may now be spacious and hu- deSigned, are takBrowning Pl1oto.
mane; life free as to Individuality, Ing off Into the
yet Integrated spontaneously, In- air from plane
The Present-Jammed Streets Overhung by the
stantaneously as a whole with all stations at Interlife; the new cities affording each vals-nolseless, compact and safe. mile radius of the extensive roadman and his family greater facility Beguiling reaorta, famous for hos- side markets, Integrated with them
for culture, the amenities of life on pitality, cuisine, entertainment. oc· -and a ten-mile radius means witha larger seale, human Intercourse cur where the beautiful features of In ten minutes of each other. The
more liberal and healthy. Every the land occur. Extensive, com- factories Dllght be within walking
home Is a centre and a delightfully plete markets, with produce fresh distance of the acre home units of
varied IUlSOciation with nature, the every hour, are Integrated with the the workers; but why, when ten
lntenalve small farm units. Other miles Is ten Dllnutes?
homemaker's birthright.
Not 1,000 to the hectare. No, markets pertain to manufacture or
Interchange of products Is by
nor space sold by the square foot. elaasl.fled foreign products. These continuous movement In beautiful
But space belonging to those who are scattered along the highways, environment each way, spacioususe It, by the acre. There Is space but each serlee Integrated as links ness determined by the man In his
enough for this "distrlbutlon"- In a great chain. Service stations machine and no traffic problem.
that are hostelries and rendezvous because traffic Is the nonn of the
good for nothing else.
Let us say, for the sake of argu- for comfort and entertainment at new spacing or standard of mea.ement, that the objectionable me- strategic points are sightly features urement of the centring of all unltB.
chanical features of travel are re- of the highway Itself.
As the citizen sits In his car, be
moved, as they are rapidly being
The farm units that produce and may preBS a variety of buttons or
removed : that the utUitarlan object the factor!.,.., too, are within a ten- turn an Indicator and obtain any

rich life for the rearing

or

o f the m o d e r n families: work to be done now with
newspaper - the lessons to be learned. Man's relaforests saved and tlon to his animals takes on a bet·
millions of tons of ter character In architecturally
waste paper elim- planned association, In surroundInated. He picks Ings where the nature of the assoup by sound and ciation Is recognized and provided
sight whatever he for Intelligently.
Is Interested In,
Spaciousness, transport, buildings,
learns by listening all of life Intimate with the ground,
where the day's appropriate to each other and to
specialties are to each and every one according to
be found: where his need or the nature of his mead
· events ot interest and love of life. Woods, streams.

In c e n t r a I I zed
cities Is entirely
gone, as It ·Is Indeed, or Is fast
going,
hastened
by the new leverage of the new

are occurring or mountains, ranges of hUls. the
are going to occur, great plalns-all are shrines, beauty

near or tar away.

All over the sur-

H

face of the globe,
In fact.
I! he
pleases, he may
listen ln.
His home is now
a centre to which
all this comes and
he Is Integrated
with all other
homes and forms
of production or
of d I 8 t r 1 b utlon
spontaneously and
Instantaneously.

:::·s :;

t.o be preserved.
Imagination Is our human dlvlnJty.
It alone Is what the human
herd needs to distinguish and save
It from the fate that baa overtaken
all other herds, human or animal.

In the nature of the traffic problem lie" the liberation, and that
soon. of such human enslavement

as the city now stands to exploit.
Or t>lse In Its nature lies the further degradation of humanity.
In tbls collision and Irreconcilable
war of mechanical factors which
we call the traffic problem, an ele-

rect personal con- -held to serve only the will and act

tact with all forms

of more or less gratuitous Corms of

ot production or fortune

that· function mostly as
distribution with- rent, In some guise-the will that
In a radius of l50
the city. The
miles: two hours
by wheeling or a
HE traffic problem will be solved
half-hour by Clyas architecture. But not by verIn g.
He can cross the
tlcallty. Narrow lanes of vertleontlnent, for con- cal transport Impinging on lnade-

T

terence or pleas- quate horizontal alleys, narrow verure, within twen- tical channels destroying privacy to
ty-four hours. The let light and air Into dreary mll<!s
home, you see, upon miles of shelving upon which

takes on a new sig- human beings, by paying tribute.
nificance. A fresh may perch or roost-this arrangeImportance as the ment, however It may be rationalcentre.
Business.

Skyscraper.
Initiative,

In

too .

ized or visualized, affords no measure of life to the man, such as was
promised to hlm by our charter of

takes on a differfreedom, the Declaration of Indeent character. It
pendence.
is a form of freeIn·thls traffic probl<!m our future
dom, not slavery.
Anxiety Is easier as a nation Is at stake. The probto bear. Individual lem will be solved as architecture.
this n<!W freedom, but th" twentieth-century cltl<!s -will

comes alive. Relieved of the inor- be no scrap-pile or brick yard nor
any standardized park with standdinate. merctless pressure of cen-

tralization, architecture bursts Into
bloom. Hugo, the great modern of
his time, sald It might do so In the
twentieth century. There Is no prevailing. style, but style Is everywhere. The common sense of the
age flow'ers Into new fonns born of
new materials.
Better Ideas of life take rational
Imaginative form. The garden as a
park Is normal to the "new" city.
Play spaces for all the sports we

ardized colossi standing In It and
"scraping the sky. It will be solved
by the horizontal line of the machine ag<!, Indefinitely extended us
tbe great architectural hlgh"Way and
by the fiat plane of the machine
age expanded Into the free acreagE!
of the Broadacre City of free

democracy: architecture and acre-

age 15een,as landscape. No power
of man can long preserve any Im-

position reversing these new social
luive now and new ones to come. forces when they are understood

The integrated three, five and ten and put to work by man for man.
acre !ann units are coveted things ]:Jo, not even If lleld by himself
for beauty, and are a basis for a against himself.
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Figure 3.5 Wright’s “‘Broadacre City’: An Architect’s Vision,” New York Times Magazine, March 20, 1932.
Figure 3.6 The second page of Le Corbusier’s
“A Noted Architect Dissects Our Cities,” New
York Times Magazine, January 3, 1932.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Figure 3.7 Title page and frontispiece from Wright, The Disappearing City (1932).

Figure 3.8 Plate following page 18 in Wright, The Disappearing City (1932).

Figure 3.9 Plate following page 66 in Wright, The Disappearing City (1932).
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Figure 3.10 Richfield Oil Company service
station and Beacon Tavern, Edwin Ellison
Merrill and Lewis Eugene Wilson, architects,
Barstow, California, ca. 1930. The aeronautical
tower signaled motorists and pilots with its neon
letters and 16,000,000 candlepower beacon. The
filling station is immediately behind the tower,
with an adjoining hotel, the Beacon Tavern,
behind. Photograph by Mott Studios. California
History Section Picture Catalog, California State
Library.

Figure 3.11 Davidson Little Farms, Frank Lloyd Wright, Long Island, NY, project, ca. 1932. Plan of an
individual farm unit. Drawing no. 3202.024, FLWFA.
306

Figure 3.12 Davidson Farm Unit. Perspective. Drawing no. 3202.008, FLWFA.

Figure 3.13 Davidson Farm Unit. Perspective. Near the right edge of the drawing, the dining nook and kitchen
are made visible by dissolving the wall that would otherwise obscure them. To the left of the hearth, an open
door provides a glimpse into one of the three bedrooms. Drawing no. 3202.006, FLWFA.
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Figure 4.1 A publicity photograph of two Native
Americans observing a model of the RCA
Building in the Rockefeller Center Lounge at the
Century of Progress International Exposition,
July 1934. The original caption identified the two
as Robert Red Wing, a Cherokee chieftain, and
Winona Starr, an Osage princess. It explained,
“Chief Red Wing and Princess Starr agreed that it
had truly been a century of progress from the
times of the teepees of their ancestors.”
Rockefeller Center Archive Center.

Figure 4.2 “Abolition of Bondage,” José María
Sert, 1933. The composition’s centripetal motion
concentrates on the moment of liberation, when
one man breaks the chains of another. Note,
however, the white soldiers entering the scene
from the left, suggesting that emancipation was
not something slaves could achieve of their own
accord. Photograph by Wurts Brothers.
Photography Collection, Museum of the City of
New York.
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Figure 4.3 The painting on the large wall behind the information desk is José María Sert’s “American
Progress.” It was installed in 1937, along with the smaller mural on the return wall, titled “Spirit of Dance.”
The painting on the ceiling, “Time,” was added in 1941 and is also by Sert. Photograph by Joshua McHugh, ca.
2013. From Glenn Palmer-Smith, Murals of New York City (New York: Rizzoli, 2013).
Figure 4.4 A cutaway axonometric
drawing of Rockefeller Center, ca. May
1931, showing a shopping concourse
below street level and parking and
delivery facilities below that. From “The
Question of Radio City,” Architectural
Forum 54, no. 5 (May 1931).
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Figure 4.5 A U.S. Post Office in the concourse of the RCA Building, 1934. Opposite the post office, barely
visible on the left edge of the photograph, is a Western Union telegraph counter. Photograph by Wurts
Brothers. Photograph Collection, Museum of the City of New York.
Figure 4.6 A graph from a January 1935 study
of foot traffic in Rockefeller Center. The data at
the top breaks down the entry points that
pedestrians used to access the RCA Building
concourse, as well as their gender and
destination. The total number of people passing
through the concourse per house for two days,
with each day’s climatic conditions noted, is
charted below. There are twelve other graphs
documenting similar data for other parts of the
site. Rockefeller Archive Center.
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Figure 4.7 Plan of the proposed “Radio City Subway,” L. Alfred Jenny & Co., engineers, February 1933.
Rockefeller Archive Center.

Figure 4.8 Plan, elevations, section, and detail of a subway car for the proposed “Radio City Subway,” L.
Alfred Jenny & Co., engineers, February 1933. Rockefeller Archive Center.
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Figure 4.9 New Jersey rapid transit and
Union Terminal proposal, L. Alfred Jenny &
Co., engineers, August 1936. Rockefeller
Archive Center.

Figure 4.10 A rendering of a self-contained
industrial suburb in New Jersey’s Hackensack
Meadow. The plan was supported by the
Regional Plan Association and would have
entailed, as the text accompanying the plan in
Popular Science Monthly indicated, infilling the
existing wetland with 200 million cubic yards
of dirt and canalizing the Hackensack River.
In addition to residences for at least 730,000
people and various industrial zones, the plan
showed parks, highways, a civic center, and
two airfields. From “A Magic City from a
Swamp,” Popular Science Monthly 113, no. 4
(October 1928).
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Figure 4.11 Concourse level plan of
Rockefeller Center, 1940, showing
connections between the buildings, the
plaza, and the new 6th Avenue subway
(top). Rockefeller Archive Center.

Figure 4.12 A crowd on the platform of the 47th–50th Street subway station below Rockefeller Center, 1946.
Photograph by Stanley Kubrick for Look magazine. Photograph Collection, Museum of the City of New York.
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Figure 4.13 A real-estate brochure for L. J.
Phillips & Co., advertising two buildings’
proximity to Rockefeller Center. The cover
showed an abstracted silhouette of the RCA
Building and the text, “Mr. Rockefeller said,
‘I’ll erect the finest business home in the world
at Radio City.’” Rockefeller Archive Center.

Figure 4.14 Beaux Arts Apartments, Raymond
M. Hood and Kenneth M. Murchison, New
York, NY, 1929–30. Typical plans. From
Kenneth M. Murchison, “Designed, Financed
and Built by Architects,” American Architect 132
(March 1930).
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Figure 4.15 Beaux Arts Apartments, Hood &
Murchison, looking west on 44th Street, April
1930. Photographs Collection, Museum of the
City of New York.

Figure 4.16 Map of proposed land uses for
New York and its environs, from Regional Plan
of New York and Its Environs, vol. 1: The Graphic
Regional Plan (1929). The darkest tone
designates business areas, the next darkest
industrial areas, and then residential areas,
with public parks and reservations the lightest
color.
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Figure 4.17 The top image is a panorama of the east side of Manhattan from the 59th Street bridge, with
Welfare Island (now Roosevelt Island in the foreground. Hood & Murchison’s Beaux Arts Apartments are near
the four smokestacks of the Consolidated Edison power plant near the left edge of the photograph.
Photograph by William Frange. The bottom image shows a City Beautiful-inspired proposal for transforming
the East River waterfront by architect Francis S. Swales. From Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs, vol. 2:
The Building of the City (1931).

Figure 4.18 Photographs of the Villard Estate in Dobbs Ferry, from a Kenneth Ives & Co. real-estate
brochure, ca. 1929. The house in the left image was called “Thorwood.” Jeremiah Burke built the original
structure around 1855. After journalist and financier Henry Villard bought the property, in 1879, he
commissioned McKim, Mead & White to expand the home into a sprawling, two-winged mansion.
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Figure 4.19 A model of an apartment tower,
Raymond Hood and J. André Fouilhoux,
Dobbs Ferry, NY, project, 1931–32. This
model was displayed in the Museum of
Modern Art’s “Modern Architecture:
International Exhibition,” in early 1932. This
photograph and the plan below were
included in the catalogue. Raymond Hood
Photograph Collection, New-York Historical
Society.

Figure 4.20 Apartment tower, Hood &
Foulhouix. Ground floor plan. In the base of
the tower are a squash court, laundry room,
parking spaces, and other support spaces.
Around it are a community garden,
greenhouse, swimming pool, and tennis
court, all set within tree-covered lawns.
Raymond Hood Photograph Collection,
New-York Historical Society.
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Figure 4.21 Aerial view of Rockefeller Center, May 1939. Near the bottom and right of center is the
International Building (1934–35). Immediately behind it is the Associated Press Building (1937–38). The
leftmost building in the complex is the Time & Life Building (1936–37), behind which is the Eastern Airlines
Building (1939–40). The not-yet-completed U.S. Rubber Building (1939–40) is hidden behind the RCA
Building. A cropped version of this photograph appeared in Siegfried Giedion, Space, Time and Architecture
(1941). Photograph by Thomas Airviews. New-York Historical Society.
Figure 4.22 Rockefeller Apartments, Wallace K.
Harrison & J. André Fouilhoux, New York, NY, 1935–
36. Photographed May 1937. The apartments’
generously glazed bay windows drew as much from
trends in contemporary European architecture as they
did the neighboring Italianate townhouses. The
Rockefellers’ 54th Street townhouse borders the left
edge of the photograph. Photograph by GottschoSchleisner, Inc. Photographs Collection, Museum of the
City of New York.
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Figure 4.23 Rockefeller Apartments, Harrison &
Fouilhoux. Floor plans. From “Rockefeller
Apartments,” Architectural Forum 66, no. 1 (January
1937).

Figure 4.24 Municipal Arts Center, Harrison & Fouilhoux, with Morris & O’Connor, New York, NY, ca.
1938. Site plan, showing the proposed Museum of Modern art (right) and two-thirds of Rockefeller Center
(left). Wallace K. Harrison Architectural Drawings and Papers, Department of Drawings and Archives, Avery
Architectural and Fine Arts Library, Columbia University.
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Figure 4.25 A spread from “Building No. 11, Rockefeller Center, New York,” Architectural Forum 72, no. 1
(January 1940), showing plans, a section, and photographs of the Eastern Airlines Building parking structure.
Figure 4.26 Eastern Airlines
Building, Rockefeller Center,
Harrison & Fouilhoux, Reinhard
& Hofmeister, architects, 1939–
40. Rendering by Hugh Ferriss,
ca. 1939. Hugh Ferriss
Architectural Drawings and
Papers, Department of Drawings
and Archives, Avery
Architectural and Fine Arts
Library, Columbia University.
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Figure 5.1 “Frank Lloyd Wright, Industrial Arts Exhibition, Rockefeller Center, New York (N.Y.),” Fay S.
Lincoln Photograph Collection, Historical Collections and Labor Archives, Special Collections Library, Penn
State University Libraries.

Figure 5.2 Spread from a brochure for the 1935 Industrial Arts Exposition, with a description of the Forum as
“the most beautiful space on this continent” and a preliminary visualization of the exposition. From The Annual
Industrial Arts Exposition: April 15–May 15, 1935, Rockefeller Center, New York City (New York: The National
Alliance of Art and Industry, 1935). Thomas J. Watson Library, The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.
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Figure 5.3 Spread from a brochure of the 1935 Industrial Arts Exposition, visualizing the show’s curatorial
themes as concentric circles emanating from “the average man.” From The Annual Industrial Arts Exposition.
Thomas J. Watson Library, The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.

Figure 5.4 Preliminary scheme for the installation of Broadacre City at the 1935 Industrial Arts Exposition,
Frank Lloyd Wright, ca. November 1934. Perspective showing the large-scale model, “collateral” models, and
plywood panel supports, with dimensions and a list of the individual components to be included in the display.
The dimensions Wright drew around the plan add up to just over 2,000 square feet. The Forum had a capacity
of about 22,000 square feet, and the RCA Building’s column grid was, with some exceptions near the end of
the slab, twenty-seven feet six inches on center. Wright seems not to have considered either to be a limiting
factor in his initial layout. Drawing no. 3406.002, FLWFA.
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Figure 5.5 The earliest extant sketch of the
Broadacre City model. Drawing no.
3402.001, FLWFA.

Figure 5.6 Taliesin fellows collaborating on the Broadacre City model, ca. 1935. Image no. 3402.032, FLWFA.
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Figure 5.7 The Forumwith
in the RCA
Building on opening
night ofcopyright
the 1935 Industrial
Arts Exposition,
April 15,reproductio
Reproduced
permission
of the
owner.
Further
1935. Wright’s installation is visible on the lower level, below the flag and between the two automobiles.
Photograph by Times Wide World Photos. From New York Times, April 21, 1935.

Figure 5.8 Detail of the
Broadacre City model,
showing the hillside
apartment towers and
“luxury homes.” The
inscription on the edge
reads, “MODELS MADE
BY THE TALIESIN
FELLOWSHIP / FRANK
LLOYD WRIGHT
ARCHITECT.” Image no.

3402.020, FLWFA.
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Figure 5.9 A detail of the Broadacre City model, showing the county administration building as a large
skyscraper dominating the lake edge at the left of the photograph. Image no. 3402.003, FLWFA.
Figure 5.10 Town plan of Radburn, New
Jersey, Clarence Stein and Henry Wright,
planners, begun 1928. The Depression
interrupted Radburn’s construction. Only
the northwest quarter of the original plan
was realized. A small portion of the planned
commercial and educational facilities, and
none of the industrial section, were built.
From Regional Plan of New York and Its
Environs, vol. 2:
The Building of the City (1931).
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Figure 5.11 A diagram of Clarence
Perry’s “neighborhood unit,” showing
locations for the community center,
shops, and residential blocks, as well
as recommendations for street widths,
ideal overall acreage, and a radius of
one-quarter mile that defined ideal
distance between center and edge.
From Regional Survey of New York and
Its Environs, vol. 7: Neighborhood and
Community Planning (1929).

Figure 5.12 Detail of an advertisement for Kaufmann’s department store from the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, June
18, 1935. A photograph of one of Wright’s models—a “minimum house”—appears above text promoting the
FHA’s sponsorship of the show.
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Figure 5.13 The Broadacre City model installed in the Corcoran Gallery, Washington, D.C., July 1935. Image
no. 3402.056, FLWFA.
C ity was seen the re by many em inent A mer icans . The Pres ident and his
wi fe not present .
Coming back to Tal ies in we set the models up in the new Draughting
Room but soon y ielded to a plea from our home-coun ty , (Iowa County,
N . S. Boardman , cha irma n) to show the city of the future t o the country
people at the county fair. We took it to the fair grounds and set it up
in one of the fair bu ild ings where an interested crowd-and an interesting one-saw it, and each visitor went away with a reprint of Edward
Bellamy's "Parab le of the \!Vater Tank" -exerpt f rom " Equality" Chapter
XXIII.
We then reestablished the work in the Fellowship living room at
interior conditions according to materials, process of making, and their purpose. Working properly together this would produce endless variety . Most of them lie long and low, emphasizing horizontal lines,
but well open to views and garden .
So throughout Broadacre City there would be a true economy harmonious with the life of our century taking honest advantage of modern opportunity . All that Broadacre houses ask of society is that
they be genuinely Democratic, and of all government tha t it be strictly impersonal. This city of the future
does, however , ask for a quality of thought and a kind of thinking on the part of the citi zen that organic
architecture, alone at the present time represents rr seems to understand; although it goes back through
Jesus himself to the Chinese philosopher Laotze, who lived 500 B. C. A new reality in our way of living
and building , an environment in our democracy.
F. Ll . W.

24

Tal iesin late r tak ing it to Marquette under the ausp ices of Mrs . Ab by
Roberts, the City of M arquette, a nd va ri ous clubs of that reg io n.
The whole exh ibit ion , not much the worse for wea r, again reposed
in the new draught ing room of the Fellowsh ip at Hillside, where we
agai n put it into cond it ion for further exhib it ion .
Requests for exhib ition of the models were, for the time be ing ,
refused, as we ou rselves wanted intimate association with our work f or
a time . Eventually we intend to organize a tour for the "City" through out the country and, probably, to Europe for stud ents of Architecture
and allied interests everywhere there-should there be any left a bove
ground.

BROADACRES AT THE WISCO·NSIN STATE
1937
HISTORICAL LIBRARY MADISON
THE TIME LAG IS TOO GREAT. The back-drag is becoming too heavy. Somebody has got to do some
thi nkin g which is neither politics, borrowing or lending . Why not you, my fellow citizens? Ou r govern men t is doing what it can, but politics, though too willing to do so, can't th in k for you Mr . Citi zen .
As our government was planned, polit icians dare not really lead. Amer ican politics is mostly a shrewd
gu ess, with an eye on the politician's future . At their best, politicians can only read the writing on the
w all ! So the greatest good of which they are capable is to execute the will of the people-but seem in giy, the people have no will. " The people" seem only to desire that more money-miracles be worked
for th em so that they, may go on eating and sleeping -in order to work and sit, as usual.
·
W ell, Broadacre City is the - living idea in these desperate circumstances of a builder and citizen,
helped by a faithful band of young enthusiasts. It has and seeks no other cred it than internal ev idence
affor ds to the observer. Broadacres has nothing to sell-but it does ask you to think . And if you think
even a. little you will see how all the forces we call modern (automob ility and electro-communication ) are
inevitably dest.roy.ing .th.e conditions we are now seeking to live by. You will see that just as an industrial
andbetter machine is invented, so our whole reactionary
pl ant goes out of date overnight when a
socia l set-up goes out when machinery comes to be our way of livelihood. I th ink you will see too that the
sudd en liberation from toil, which the machine brought to so many was no unmixed bless ing , an d that
machine-made efficiencies can be just as much a curse as they are a blessing to humanity . Outside of
pl enty to eat and wear and show off with , the rich man is not truly better off now than the poor man . The
q ua lity of his life is often inferior . .I ndeed , it is just this Quality that is lacking in our lives . Quantity is
a poor substitute, as we are learning now.
I believe you will see that if our country is to become better worth living in, the United States of
A merica will have to go to work! The white collarite, himself an enor mous speculative commodity, has
gone t o wreck riding upon speculative commodities. You probably know what these "commodities" are.
I believe you will come to see, as I have, that the ground itself is the true sociological basis, and , when
rightly interpreted, the salt and savor of all good life . And you will see too that the true profit of our
futu re life is bound to come more from a man's sense of his own ground in relation to all of life-if the

Figure 5.14 A typical spread from Wright’s The New Frontier (1940). One of several running editorials fills the
top portion, in red ink. An article on “Broadacre Houses” concludes in the lower two-thirds of the verso,
accompanied by a photograph of a model of Wright’s Jacobs House (1936–37), and another, reprinted article,
originally written to accompany a 1937 installation of the models in Madison, WI, begins on the recto.
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Figure 5.15
Davidson
Wayside Markets,
Frank Lloyd
Wright, architect,
1932. Plan.
Drawing no.
3205.001,
FLWFA.

Figure 5.16
Davidson
Wayside Markets.
Elevation (top)
and Section.
Drawing no.
3205.001,
FLWFA.
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Figure 5.17 A detail image of the Broadacre City model, showing the markets in a different form than the
glass-and-copper ziggurat designed for Walter V. Davidson. Image no. 3402.024, FLWFA.
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Figure 6.1 A view of the Futurama model in the General Motors Pavilion at the 1939–40 World’s Fair, New
York, NY, Normal Bel Geddes, designer. The Norman Bel Geddes Collection, Harry Ransom Humanities
Research Center, University of Texas, Austin.
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Figure 6.2 A map of Frank Lloyd Wright’s proposed “re-federation” of the United States. From Wright,
Taliesin Square-Paper 6 (August 1941).

Figure 6.3 A perspective rendering from Wright, The Living City (1958), showing cropland, a stadium, several
skyscrapers, a swarm of helicopters, and, toward the bottom left corner, what appears to be one of the markets.
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Figure 6.4 A view of “The Nature of the Enemy,” a 1943 propaganda exhibition jointly sponsored by the
Center and the U.S. Office of War Information. The display running through Channel Gardens showed various
Nazi atrocities, including the abolition of religion (partly visible at left) and the militarization of children. The
posters running the full length of the British Empire Building and La Maison Française read, “THIS IS WHAT
THE ENEMY PLANS FOR YOU.” Prints and Photographs Division, United States Library of Congress.

Figure 6.5 A 1959 photomontage of Rockefeller Center with the planned Time & Life Building superimposed.
The Esso Building (1945–47) is visible along the bottom edge. From Real Estate Forum (June 1959).
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Figure 6.6 Southdale Shopping Center,
Edina, Minnesota, Victor Gruen Associates,
architects, 1953–56. Site plan of the shopping
center and surrounding area showing
residential and commercial development that
was planned to accompany it. Gruen
described the benefits of this type of largescale planning in the same terms of
consolidation that the Rockefeller Center
architects had used. From “New Thinking on
Shopping Centers,” Architectural Forum 98, no.
3 (March 1953).

Figure 6.7 Southdale Center, interior, ca. 1956. Photograph by Grey Villet. LIFE Magazine Picture Collection,
Getty Images.
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